Khrushchev Dies After Heart Attack

Russians Not Told Of Death

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Sept. 11 — Nikita S. Khrushchev, the former premier of the Soviet Union, died in a Moscow hospital this morning after a massive heart attack. He was 77.

Khrushchev was the leader of the Soviet Union and the guiding hand of the world Communist movement for six years, after succeeding Nikolai A. Bulganin as premier in 1958.

Khrushchev was an erratic and, at times, jarringly outspoken leader whose tenure was marked by uneven economic progress in the Soviet Union, agricultural problems and dramatic de-Stalinization.

The Khrushchev years were the years of Berlin crises, the Spirit of Camp David, the U-2 incident and its aftermath, and the Cuban missile crisis.

The new Soviet leaders, who deposed the flamboyant and unpredictable Khrushchev in 1964, withheld the news of his death from the Soviet public tonight. This official silence was in keeping with the status of "unperson" they chose for Khrushchev after depriving him of the leadership of the Soviet government and Communist Party.

But government officials privately confirmed the news of Khrushchev's death, which was first revealed in a dispatch by Victor Louis, Moscow correspondent of The London Evening News, Louis, a Soviet citizen, is widely thought to be an employee of
A friend of the Khrushchev family said tonight that the former first secretary and premier would be buried Monday in Moscow's Novodevichy ("new maidens") Cemetery, not far from the Kremlin.

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Symbolically, however, such a burial would be far indeed from the most honored graves in the Kremlin wall.

Novodevichy Cemetery is part of an ancient monastery which "adjoins the Kremlin, and it has long been the final resting place of illustrious Russians. Gogol, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Prokofiev and Joseph Stalin's first wife are all buried there.

This company may be distinguished, but the rotund and excitable man from the Ukraine would undoubtedly have liked better treatment. He was immensely proud of his Long Communist career.

Khrushchev became a Bolshevik in 1918 and his first important party job seven years after joining. By 1939 he was appointed first secretary of the Moscow Communist Party, and in 1939 he was admitted to Stalin's Politburo. He played an active role in the war and participated in the battle of Stalingrad.

After serving as post-war boss of the Ukraine, Khrushchev came to Moscow in 1949 and soon became Stalin's agricultural chief. When the dictator died, Khrushchev was ranked fourth in the hierarchy. But by 1956, when he ousted and succeeded Bulganin, Khrushchev was clearly number one. He stayed at the top until 1964.

Khrushchev had been suffering from heart disease for some time, and was hospitalized last year. Unofficial informants said today that he fell ill again several days ago and was taken to a hospital for Kremlin officials. These informants said his wife of 48 years, Nina Petrovna, was by his side when he died.

Khrushchev was last seen in public last June 13, when he voted in Moscow in elections for the Supreme Soviet. He said then he felt fine.

Such scant appearances were virtually the sum total of Khruschev's public life since his fall from power. Had it not been for the dramatic publication of memoirs attributed to him last fall, Khrushchev might well have died in the obscurity of his successors apparently prescribed for him.

Those memoirs, published under the title "Khrushchev Remembers," put Khrushchev back in the public limelight in which he had once loved to bask. Khrushchev issued a formal denial that the memoirs were genuine, and his wife also denied their authenticity. The Soviet government attacked the book as a fraud and a concoction of the CIA.

Many Western experts believe that the memoirs are at least partially genuine, though academic debate about them continues. Unofficial sources in Moscow who claimed to know the facts of the matter said the memoirs were based largely on tape recordings of Khrushchev's dictated reminiscences.

Foreign observers in Moscow are waiting with great interest to see how the current leadership copes with Khrushchev's death. The place in which he is to be buried, the people who attend the funeral, the size and content of the articles (if there are any) in the Soviet press—all will undergo the utmost scrutiny.

Khrushchev's name was barely mentioned in recent years. Indeed, many histories and commentaries have been awkwardly altered merely to avoid the use of his name. One clearly anti-Khrushchev novel was published in the conservative journal "October" this year, but without using his name. Conversely, the memoirs of Marshal Ivan K. Bagramyan, an old Khrushchev army colleague, were published last January with considerable praise for the former leader.

A revealing statement of the current leadership's view of Khrushchev came, allegedly, from Anastas A. Mikoyan, the elder statesman of the Politburo. In a small underground publication called "Political Diary," whose existence was revealed in the West only last month, Mikoyan is quoted as saying in 1964 that Khrushchev deserved credit for many achievements, but he also had to be replaced.

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old, impatient and too talkative, the Political Diary quoted Mikoyan as saying. He made hasty and wrong decisions, and then blamed others when they went wrong. Finally, a meeting of the Central Committee was called and "people spoke (against Khrushchev) in a businesslike way, without abuse," and then he was deposed, Mikoyan allegedly said.

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Strong Impression

Nevertheless, Khrushchev was allowed to retain some of the comforts and trappings of prominence in Soviet society, including a dacha 25 miles west of Moscow.

It is difficult for an outsider to judge Khrushchev's standing in the minds of Soviet citizens, but there is no doubt that he made a strong impression on his people. Younger Russians seem quicker to condemn him as a bumbler who made too many mistakes. Their elders, who knew Stalinism and knew how Khrushchev did away with its most terrifying aspects, seem to have more mixed feelings. Some intellectuals and artists remember him approvingly as a leader who allowed them some freedom.

Many Russians seem to feel that Khrushchev was too unpredictable and self-centered. A group of engineers in Siberia discussing Khrushchev and President John F. Kennedy last month had little to say for their own former leader.
Harriman, 
Cyrus Eaton 
Pay Tribute

Two prominent Americans who knew the late Nikita S. Khrushchev when he was premier of the Soviet Union described him today as a pragmatic leader with whom the United States could deal.

Industrialist Cyrus Eaton, who first met Khrushchev in the Kremlin in 1958, said, "I found he was not a fanatic on political and ideological matters, but took a practical approach. "He was trying for understanding with the United States and was content that we should pursue our own economic and political systems while his country followed its own ideas."

W. Averell Harriman, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, said the late Soviet leader was "willing to compete with the U.S. in world domination but ready to back down to avoid a nuclear war."

Referring to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, in which President John F. Kennedy forced Moscow to remove its missile installation from the island, Harriman said: "Khrushchev saw the determination in Kennedy so he backed down. We probably will never get a complete détente with Russia, but with Khrushchev you could get agreement on certain things."

Harriman recalled that Khrushchev had a sense of humor "that made you like him. He was easier to get along with than Josef Stalin."

At a party at his home in 1963, Harriman said, Khrushchev asked him if he had a great-grandson, as Khrushchev did. When Harriman replied that he hadn't, Khrushchev said, "That proves that the Communist society is more productive than the capitalist society because you're older than I am."

Both Harriman and Eaton sent their condolences to Khrushchev's widow, but both said they would not attend the funeral.
By Chalmers M. Roberts

On the evening of Sept. 19, 1959, I went up to the head table to ask Nikita Khrushchev for his autograph. It was the Los Angeles World Affairs Council dinner for the Soviet premier, and his ambassador, "Smiling Mike" Menshikov, did the interpreting. Nikita Sergeovich turned over the dinner ticket I had proffered for his signature. "It's not a blank check," I said, "you don't have to worry." Quick as ever he replied: "I'm not worrying; I have nothing; I'm a poor man." He scrawled his signature on the back of the late ticket.

A few minutes later Khrushchev's mercurial nature produced a quite different result. Los Angeles mayor Norris Poulson stood up to publicly chide Khrushchev for his earlier statement that "we will bury you." Enraged Reaction

Khrushchev reacted with rage. He already had explained that remark, he said, and it referred to economic competition, not to a military strike. "I am deeply concerned over these conscious distortions of my thoughts," he shouted at the stunned audience. "I've never mentioned any rockets."

"Let's not try to bury one another," Khrushchev declared. We are the two most powerful nations and "the consequences of a play on words can be too sad for our peoples. Our rockets are on the assembly line" but "I have come with serious intentions and you try to reduce the matter to simply a joke." And: "if you want to compete in a cold war, go ahead but think what it means with modern weapons."

Khrushchev worked himself into a fury. It had taken him 12 hours to fly to America, he said, but it would take "even less" to return. He turned on Poulson, shouting again: "I trust that even the mayor reads the press. In my country the chairman of the City Council reads the press or he isn't elected the next time he runs. If you want to insist on this cold war line, then there can be no thought of disarmament."

The dinner ended in a shambles. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, back from Moscow for Khrushchev's American tour, thought he might very well head for home the next day. Khrushchev already was out of sorts over the refusal of the Americans to let him visit Disneyland.

Back to Old Self

Next morning Khrushchev was glowering as we boarded the special train for San Francisco. But the friendly crowd at Santa Barbara warmed him up. During an incredible roving press conference he held as he walked through the jammed press cars, Khrushchev was back to his old self.

"The people are wonderful," he told us. "The people want peace. There must be peace in the whole world." After the crowd at the San Louis Obispo stop he was on top again but still needling about Disneyland: "I'm especially glad that the house ar-
rest I was placed under has been lifted and they allowed me to approach the people and to look them in the eye."

"I'm a political leader," he said. "My strength is my tie with the people. To lose the tie is to lose all influence."

A most extraordinary political leader, he was, indeed, one of the most amazing and unusual of this turbulent century. He had been invited to America by President Eisenhower as a way out of an impasse over Berlin and he was all eyes and ears to see and known about this epitome of capitalism and imperialism. Nikita Khrushchev was a Communist by faith, as ardent as any religionist has ever been.

Nuclear Changes

But it was Khrushchev who was the first Soviet leader to sense that nuclear weapons had changed the ways of international politics and to act upon it. He found a similar sense in Eisenhower and together, despite the almost immeasurable gulf that separated them, they began to take the first steps until Francis Gary Power's U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union.

In 1960 at Paris, after the U-2, he raged and he did so again that fall with his shoe-pounding at the United Nations. It was a rage induced no doubt by the fact that the U-2 incident had gravely impaired his power and as he subsequently was to tell an American visitor.

No one who was there will ever forget the grim looks that faces Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy as they came out of their last meeting in Vienna in 1961. Khrushchev had judged Kennedy a patsy for his debacle at the Bay of Pigs, a judgement that I am sure had much to do with his emplacement of missiles in Cuba in 1962. Yet the two leaders managed to step back from the brink of disaster in time to save us all.

Khrushchev was, as we all wrote, beady-eyed. He was a master of theatrics, turning rage or laughter or charm on or off at will and always to a purpose. He was a Russian peasant, a Communist apparatchik, a totalitarian. He never forgot his past or Russia's past.

Skouras Debate

In Los Angeles that day before the dinner he indulged in an amazing verbal match with another poor-boy-made-good, film magnate Spyros Skouras. They kept interrupting each other, shouting out fragments of their life histories to prove that a man could make it better under one system than the other.

Skouras, an immigrant from Greece, told how he had gone to work at 12. Khrushchev shouted back that "until the age of 12 I worked as a shepherd for a capitalist."

Then he "worked at a factory for a German. " "In a French-owned mine" and "at a Belgian-owned chemical factory."

Then he stopped Skouras for good: "And I am the Prime Minister for the Great Soviet State!"

The American visit of Nikita Khrushchev was one of the most profoundly important trips ever taken by a leading statesman. Khrushchev would never admit it but the sight of America altered his view of this country and its power and potential.

Still, he could never believe that Americans also had will and so he took us to the brink over Cuba, not to mention his Berlin ultimatum, to test it.

The sad fact today is that Khrushchev's successor in power, Leonid Brezhnev, has never been to the United States nor have many of his compatriots at the top of power with the major exception of Premier Alexei Kosygin.

Arms Race Danger

Khrushchev once said that "the continuing unprecedented arms race" presents "serious danger that even a small blunder on the part of the statesmen of this or that country might trigger off a new war." So great a truth; so hard for statesmen to act upon.

Perhaps the gray men who followed him to power in the Kremlin have done better in acting upon the truth. Part of Khrushchev's row with Mao Tse-tung was over the meaning of that truth.

Somehow, looking back, one must give this peasant from the Ukraine an immense amount of credit, both for his own success despite the bodies he crawled over on the way to the top and for bringing the Soviet Union to a realization that in the nuclear age weapons of total destruction are ideologically blind.
At right, with Bulganin, Zhdanov, Stalin and Voroshilov in 1938.

Soviet leaders line up in 1936 on the 19th anniversary of the Russian Revolution from left: Mezhlauk, Khrushchev, Chubar, Andreyev, Rudzutak, Molotov, Stalin, Kaganovich and Kalinin. Stalin then ruled the Soviet Union.

Soviet leaders line up during a May Day celebration in 1957: from left, Zhukov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov and Mikoyan. Khrushchev, still second from left 21 years later, was approaching the top power.
At right, with Ukrainian Bolsheviks during demonstration in 1941.

With Gen. Vatutin shortly after victory at Stalingrad in 1943.

With Malenkov in 1954, a principal rival after Stalin's death.
With Balgamin, his partner on the famed "B and K" traveling team of the 1950s.

With cosmonauts Andrian Nikolayev, Pavel Belyayev and Yuri Gagarin in 1961.
Khrushchev at the peak of his power speaks out on Berlin. In 1959 (left), awaits British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1960 (center).
and puts his shoe on his desk at the UN in 1960.
Khrushchev's Life:

By Stephen S. Rosenfeld
Washington Post Foreign Service

Born the son of a poor peasant in a backward land, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev became the leader of one of the two greatest nations in the world. But he died in official dishonor and personal obscurity, the victim of a coup in October, 1964.

In his decade of Kremlin stewardship, he nursed the Soviet Union toward effective nuclear equality with the United States and set out to fit Soviet policy to the new Soviet power. Through a series of numbing crises in Berlin and Cuba, his moves and the American responses produced an uneasy but real conviction that no dispute between Russia and America could justify war.

An even more historic achievement to his own people, perhaps, was that he took terror out of their daily lives. Through his assault on Stalin and the deadliest features of Stalinism, he transformed the basis of Communist rule and the quality of life in the Soviet union.

His formal power, often belied by his gnomish appearance and peasant earthiness, lay in being chief executive officer of both the ruling Communist Party and the government machine—First Secretary and Premier. His real power lay in his ambition, daring and immense personal resourcefulness, in his gourmet's taste for the Byzantine convolutions of Soviet politics, and in his determination not only to possess power but to use it actively—even acrobatically—to serve Soviet or Communist goals.

A loyal and able functionary in Stalin's political apparatus, he reached the heights of the party Politburo in 1938. Stalin's death in 1953 found him among the "collective leadership" that succeeded to power. Courage, skill and fortune made him "first among equals" he soon shed the "equals."

Thereafter nibbling incursions into his primacy were made but he shifted and fended them off—until October, 1964. A group of subordinates, each with his separate grievances and seemingly united by a view of Khrushchev's personality as abrasive and erratic, ousted him.

He had sought to bring the Soviet government into a detente with the Soviet people, and the Soviet state into a detente with its erstwhile satellites in Eastern Europe and with the West—even at the risk of "lossing" Communist China from the socialist commonwealth. He was immersed in these policy streams when his public life closed.

The man who undertook these world-wrenching tasks was born on April 17, 1894, in Kalinovka, a south Ukrainian village which received prideful favor from Khrushchev when he became ruler of his land.

His family was in that uprooted condition midway between traditional life on the soil and Czarist Russia's new industry, that made many Russians re-
sensitive to the certainties promised by Marxist ideology.

Thus young Nikita tended animals in the summer and, at age 15, joined his father in the Donets coal basin where he worked in a mine and as a factory fitter. These jobs gave him the proletarian experience he required for Communist belief, credentials as a strike organizer and a lifelong supply of anecdotes.

He did nothing of note in the Russian Revolution of 1917. But, apparently swept up by the tide, he joined the Communist Party the next year.

His debater’s skills were quickly recognized; he was sent to conduct propaganda among the Reds who fought against anti-Bolshevik Russians and foreign interventionists (including Americans) in Russia’s Civil War of 1918-20.

Then he became assistant manager of a mine in the Donbas region of the Ukraine. Here he was tapped by the Party for training at the Donets Industrial Institute, apparently his first formal education.

His growing but still local reputation in the combined political-economic work of a Party apparatchik—member of the apparatus—led him to the Party’s Industrial Academy in Moscow in 1929. He now was 35.

He became the protege of Lazar M. Kaganovich, the Moscow Party chief whom he was later to displace. For helping Kaganovich build the Moscow subway, he won an Order of Lenin, the first of four.

He reached the Central Committee in 1934. Stalin’s favor, and the places opened up by Stalin’s purges, brought him the leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1938, alternate membership of the top national policymaking Politburo in 1938 and full Politburo membership in 1939.

The Ukraine in that period put up tremendous resistance to Stalin’s policies. Millions died. Khrushchev’s hands were bloody. His ruthless administration and his identification with Stalin became his chief political embarrassment after Stalin’s death.

During World War II he was a political general, a commissar. He was at the decisive battle of Stalingrad. After the war he stayed at the helm of the Ukraine’s Communist Party until 1949, when he became a secretary of the Party’s Moscow regional organization.

For Stalin’s 70th birthday in 1949, Khrushchev expressed “the most profound feelings of love and devotion.” Outside Russia, he was virtually unknown.

At Stalin’s death, he later said, he wept “real tears.” Then he plunged into the succession struggle. At each juncture he surefootedly combined with the majority against the exposed minority, switching policy positions and loyalties with unerring instinct and calculation.

Within six months, Khrushchev as First Secretary had charge of the Party machine; he made it his own. By 1953 he had maneuvered Premier Georgi Malenkov out of the premiership and installed Nikolai A. Bulganin.

The climactic challenge of the “anti-Party group” came in 1957. A Presidium majority “outvoted” Khrushchev. With Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov’s help, he collected the larger and heretofore unused Central Committee, packed with his own men. He won, thereby disgracing his erstwhile patron Kaganovich, former Premier Malenkov and former Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

A few months later he took advantage of Zhukov’s absence from the country to remove him from the posts with which he had rewarded him for his earlier help. In 1958, he took over Bulganin’s job as Premier.

Khrushchev was now alone at the summit of Soviet power, all the more in political control through his combined forfeit and loss of Stalin’s pervasive weapon of terror. Khrushchev had, in fact, altered the basis of Soviet rule, restoring the Communist Party to the command-post spot pre-empted by Stalin’s police and setting up a dynamic balance of different interest groups (industry, military, consumers, etc.) as the gyroscope of the Soviet system.

Even before he had maneuvered to power and emerged to international press attention, he set about the reform of Russia. His great insight was that the land of Stalin had been squeezed and terrorized virtually to the point of exhaustion.

In 1954 he moved to break the Soviet agricultural bottleneck and to conciliate the alienated peasantry by various financial and administrative concessions and by daring to sow to grain the vast “virgin land” areas in Soviet central Asia where drought and wind were known threats.

But his great stroke of domestic reconciliation was de-Stalinization. Khrushchev undertook to smash the legend of Stalin and thereby to purge Soviet life of Stalin’s ominous legacy of terror and fear.

The decisive blow was the “secret speech” of 1956. The American Central Intelligence Agency acquired all but its foreign-policy section and soon the whole world saw Khrushchev’s picture of Stalin as a bloodthirsty, vain tyrant who had distorted and abused the Communist Party in his charge.

Stalin’s heirs had already dismantled much of the secret-police machine, and hundreds of thousands of wrongly sentenced Soviets had already been quietly released from Siberian forced-labor camps.

This development, in fact, had been responsible for “the thaw,” a relaxation of controls which took its name from a book by weathervane writer Ilya Ehrenburg.

But the “secret speech” still hit like
a triple soupolxius punse. It destroyed the old god but put up no new one; it released old hates and habits of obedience but drew no fresh limits of authority. The result was that its intended beneficiaries overreacted, and the doubters and conservatives in the Soviet leadership pressed Khrushchev to reverse it.

The “thaw” froze and domestic improvements were checked. In its foreign counterpart, Khrushchev’s effort to relax the ties that bound other Communist countries to Moscow, there was a similar reaction. To relieve the strain on Soviet resources and to get around the Western roadblock to Soviet advance, Khrushchev had extended a policy of relaxation towards the outside world. He had tried to put a smile on Russia’s grim visage. Hence his and Bulganin’s showboat trips to Britain, to the Indian subcontinent and Communist China.

This went so far as the Geneva summit conference of 1955, attended by President Eisenhower on the basis of the hope that Khrushchev was sincere in cutting back aggressive thrusts and tending to affairs at home. The same Soviet policy took Khrushchev to Yugoslavia in 1956 to apologize publicly to the maverick Communist Marshal Tito for Stalin’s abuse of him. But the fallout of the “secret speech” was extreme: A peaceful revolt against Soviet dictatorship in Communist Poland and a military revolt in Communist Hungary.

A political solution was worked out in Poland whereby the country’s own national path to socialism was recognized by Khrushchev personally, in return for Poland’s continued loyalty to Soviet international goals. But in Hungary Khrushchev finally ordered Soviet troops to crush the revolt which his earlier apparent permissiveness had partially caused.

Typically, Khrushchev’s recovery from his “Butcher of Budapest!” label was quick. Early in 1957, his press announced the first successful test of an intercontinental missile claimed by any country. An even more vivid propaganda victory was scored with Russia’s launching of the first man-made earth satellite in October of that year. Meanwhile, after the Suez crisis of 1956, Khrushchev leapfrogged Soviet influence into the underdeveloped world.

It seemed that Khrushchev’s insistence on ultimate Soviet superiority—“we will bury you,” he had boasted—had strong scientific and political foundation.

Khrushchev was sure it had an economic basis, too. In a characteristic burst of exhilaration, he took aim on the American standard of living and vowed that the Soviet Union would “overtake and surpass” the United States soon in meat, milk and dairy products and shortly thereafter in general consumer affluence. These pledges were later to become a measure of his economy’s shortfall. They defined his goal of “goulash” communism.

It was in this comeback year of 1957 that Khrushchev vanquished his internal political opposition and it was soon after that he made his cockiest foreign-policy challenge. Late in 1956, a record grain harvest under his belt, he gave the West a 6-month ultimatum to get out of Berlin.

The United States got out of the crisis, temporarily, by inviting Khrushchev for a visit. Having failed to win the “hard” way in Berlin, Khrushchev wanted the trip in order to test a softer policy tack.

Khrushchev alternately exuded charm and bristled with toughness in his United States tour of late summer, 1959. His meetings with President Eisenhower created the “Spirit of Camp David,” in which the prospects of international relaxation seemed rosy.

But six months later an American spy plane fell into the Soviet heartland. In the aftermath, down the drain went a Paris summit conference, the planned Eisenhower visit to the Soviet Union and the hopes of detente. Obviously, Khrushchev felt that he had been let down by the Americans; his rage came out in his press conference in Paris.


While Britain’s Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was addressing the General Assembly on key world issues, Khrushchev interrupted him four times with heckling shouts and table-thumping. For the delegates, it was the most astonishing performance in the U.N.’s history. Many were left aghast.

He demonstrated similarly when U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold addressed the Assembly in opposition to Khrushchev’s plan for converting the Secretariat into a “troika” of East, West and neutral representatives, each with veto power.

At one point, the leader of world communism, oblivious to parliamentary decorum, took off his shoe, brandished it at a speaker, and then
Despite the campaign promises of John Kennedy to make the United States a more formidable foe of Russia, Khrushchev gave him a breathing spell.

Meeting the President for the first time in Vienna in June, 1961, Khrushchev apparently decided he could roll over him to an advantage in Berlin. His self-confidence was vindicated by the American acceptance of the Berlin wall, erected in August, but when Khrushchev again gave the United States a Berlin ultimatum, he found that he had misjudged.

President Kennedy responded with a major military buildup in Europe. With American and Soviet tanks pointing down each other's muzzles, Khrushchev lifted his Berlin ultimatum.

He broke off the slight consumer favor and military demobilization that he had begun and increased the Soviet military budget heavily. He broke too, his two-year-old promise to refrain from unilateral nuclear tests.

Again Khrushchev had boldly tried to wring a concession from the West. Again he had been overconfident. Again his plan to benefit Soviet consumers had been dashed.

Mr. Khrushchev, in the 22d congress of the Soviet Communist Party in the fall of 1961, shifted his focus. He launched the Soviet Union on a 20-year program, designed to carry it into the nirvana of Marxism for which so many had dreamed (and for which so many millions had died)—actual "communism" in fact as well as in name, in which the state, in theory, would "wither away" and each would work according to his ability and receive according to his needs.

This was the first over-all program since Lenin's broad outline of Soviet socialism in 1919. It was designed as the capstone of Mr. Khrushchev's career. To attempt to achieve it, however, required peace, not in the full Western sense, but in pushing back the front of thermonuclear war. Khrushchev had long proclaimed his belief in "peaceful coexistence," a state of nonmilitary competition in which he believed the Soviet Union would assert its superiority over the U.S. and capitalism, and its appeal to the less developed countries.

To emphasize his sincerity and his symbolic separation from the past, he heaped new obloquy on his old political enemies and removed Stalin's body from the Red Square mausoleum it had shared with Lenin's.

He was still to be plagued by his own and the Soviet people's memory of his part in Stalin's crimes. This tension between his past and his promise never ceased to muddle his efforts to bring the Soviet Union through a political decompression chamber and restore it to a living state.

Nowhere was his path more crooked than dealing with the arts. Here Khrushchev's untutored tastes and his Party's stalwart compulsion for control conflicted with his desire to unleash the arts for de-Stalinization and other ends. His propane outburst against "donkey tail" art in late 1962 ushered in a notable cultural freeze but, typically, he later relented and allowed another thaw.

Mr. Khrushchev's version of "peaceful coexistence" with the West brought him into more nearly direct collision than ever before with his chief rival in the Communist world.

Well back in the 1950s, an accumulation of national, ideological and personal factors had made Sino-Soviet differences a potential threat. Basically, Khrushchev did not wish to risk the Soviet Union's strictly national interests of security and status for the benefit of the Chinese. He did not want to risk nuclear war and destruction for China, for revolutions elsewhere or for the puritans of Marxist ideology.

Peking converted its feelings of betrayal and neglect into an intense personal challenge to Khrushchev on the basis of his alleged distaste for the poor, for non-whites, for Asians and for Marxism.

Khrushchev had been able to muffle the Chinese at world Communist meetings in 1957 and 1959. Thereafter Peking stiffened and so, reluctantly did Khrushchev. The rift erupted into full view at the 1961 Party Congress, with Khrushchev sweepingly asserting Moscow's claim to the leadership of world communism, and it deepened further in the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962.

Khrushchev had secretly begun to install missiles in Cuba in order to overcome Soviet strategic inferiority and thereby give him the leverage he needed to "solve" his central problem in Berlin and Germany.

On Oct. 16, aerial photos revealed to President Kennedy that they were not the short-range defensive missiles previously suspected but medium-range missiles capable of reaching many American cities. On Oct. 22, Kennedy publicly revealed Moscow's "secret swift and extraordinary buildup" and announced a "strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba." Khrushchev had
Khrushchev is welcomed by President Eisenhower in 1959, meets with President Kennedy in 1961, and tests corn with former Roswell Grant in Iowa.

Khrushchev addresses the American press during his 1959 visit to Washington and debates Nixon the same year in the kitchen of a U.S. exhibit in Moscow.
Khrushchev enjoyed meeting heads of state abroad or at home. He presents de Gaulle a model of a Russian earth satellite in Paris, embraces Kadar in Budapest, plays host to Macmillan in Moscow, and visits Tito in Yugoslavia.
forced the most serious postwar nuclear confrontation.

On Oct. 24, the Soviet Premier recalled several Cuba-bound ships about to be challenged by the American Navy, and on Oct. 27 he sent Kennedy two compromise letters. One proposed that, in return for pulling Soviet missiles out of Cuba, the U.S. should remove its missiles from Turkey; Kennedy refused to respond to this offer.

To the second Khrushchev letter, evidently containing signs of great personal stress, Mr. Kennedy replied that the proposals were "generally acceptable as I understand them." Namely, that Moscow would take its missiles out of Cuba under U.N. observation and the U.S. would agree not to invade Cuba. Khrushchev was then claiming he had put the missiles in only to forestall such an invasion. Though U.N. observation never was implemented, the U.S. did determine by its own intelligence that the missiles were removed.

Khrushchev claimed a victory, saying he had preserved both peace and the Cuban Communist regime. Washington saw victory in Khrushchev's retreat and in Berlin's continued safety.

But the Chinese claimed that Khrushchev had been "adventurist in installing the missiles and "capitulations" in pulling them out. Sino-Soviet relations slid with evermore bitterness down a slope whose bottom was not yet in sight.

As the nuclear nuclear peril disappeared, both Khrushchev and his American counterpart came increasingly to believe that a true watershaf in human history had been crossed.

Cuba proved, it was thought, that national disagreements could no longer be solved by war, and that henceforth it was vital to find at least limited areas of agreement to reduce tensions and make the world a safer place.

The main diplomatic upshot of this consensus was the partial nuclear test-ban treaty signed in Moscow in August, 1963. Symbolizing Khrushchev's commitment to nuclear sanity, it considerably mellowed his reputation in the outside world.

To accomplish his various domestic tasks, he needed international ease. This was particularly the case through 1963 as the Chinese intensified their challenge and as a bad harvest forced Khrushchev to buy American grain and to embark on a long and costly farm improvement program.

By 1964, Khrushchev, 70 years old, seemed tired. Work bored him. Increasingly he fled the capital for travel and rest.

More importantly, things weren't clicking; the thickening dispute with Peking promising nothing more than the previous year a sense of Soviet-American momentum was proving difficult to freshen; the growth rate of the Soviet economy had sagged to a post-World War II low; the approach of the next five-year plan was forcing particularly difficult choices on where and how to proceed.

It was in this atmosphere of personal and national fatigue that Khrushchev, perhaps at the ulterior suggestion of his colleagues, went off on another Black Sea vacation. Most of his personal aides were out of Moscow, too, including his son-in-law, Alesei Adzhubei, editor of the chief government paper Izvestia.

On Monday, Oct. 12, apparently free of suspicion, Khrushchev stood with Soviet President Anastas Mikoyan and engaged in typically Khrushchevian banter with the three Soviet cosmonauts sweeping overhead in Sunrise I.

That day, perhaps the next, the Party's elite Presidium met secretly in Moscow, without Khrushchev, and decided by a vote of 7 to 2 to unseat him. It is said.

On Tuesday an aroused Khrushchev abruptly ended an appointment with a visiting Frenchman and flew back to the capital. He demanded—as he had demanded when a Presidium majority confronted him in 1957—that the 350-man Central Committee be convened. But this time his challengers were ready for that tactic.

Through the night into Wednesday, Oct. 14, the Central Committee conducted its fantastic session. By report, Mikhail Suslov took up Khrushchev's handling of the conflict with Peking and his personal style of leadership.

Another Presidium member, Dmitri Polyansky, supposedly discussed Khrushchev's policies in agriculture.

Khrushchev's frequent reorganizations of the various Party and economic bureaucracies had caused concern, it was later leaked, and his spur-of-the-moment bestowal of Soviet medals and monies to Egyptian President Nasser, and his tendency to rely on son-in-law Adzhubei for various out-of-channel missions, and his willingness to countenance personal publicity, and his intention to visit West Germany, and . . .

It wasn't that Khrushchev had done anything so horrible, it seemed—his successors' emphasis on policy continuity made that fairly clear—but that he had become too unsettling: his manner made his subordinates wonder what he'd be up to next, he bothered people, he wasn't orderly. The new leaders had a word for it, which kept popping up in the veiled critiques which appeared for a while in the press: "hare-brained."

The old man himself is said to have conducted a vigorous defense. Some reports say that he got 30 per cent of the vote.

He retained some peripheral titles, but Leonid Brezhnev succeeded him as First Secretary and Alexei Kosygin as Premier. They opened another era of "collective leadership" whose public style was in appropriate contrast to the eminent Khrushchev.
An Appraisal: Marked by a

By Edward Crankshaw

If Khrushchev had died when he was 60, in 1954, he would have passed into deserved and unlaunched oblivion. He would have been no more than one of Stalin's bully boys whose total obedience and lack of scruples made possible the destruction of the old Leninist party and the subjection of a cowed and broken people to a tyranny of the bloodiest kind.

During the active years of his life, from his joining of the Bolshevik Party in 1918 at the age of 24, through his rapid ascent of the party ladder until the final scramble that brought him into Stalin's immediate entourage over the dead bodies of his comrades, right up to his master's death, he had held his own through the exercise of that unpleasant combination of sycophancy and violence that he shared with all his colleagues: the only visible distinguishing mark was a streak of recklessness that drove him to expose himself in difficult assignments and to win through by boldness of attack while his rivals were counting on his fall.

Two or three times under Stalin he nearly came to grief. He was lucky again to survive in high office when his chief rival, Malenkov, backed at first by Beria and others, took over when Stalin died. But within four years, with the exercise of consummate political skill, based in peasant cunning, he had more or less painlessly destroyed the entrenched and formidable opposition.

He emerged, for all practical purposes, as master of a refurbished Soviet Union—having, in the course of the struggle, risked shattering the whole fabric of the Communist world by his exposure of some of Stalin's crimes.

From then on, for the next seven years, he grew and expanded at a dizzy rate to establish himself as an international statesman able to lead the Soviet Union out of the Stalinist wilderness and into some sort of communion with the world outside.

If he could have brought to bear on internal Soviet problems the relative freshness and openness of mind with which he faced the complex challenge of a global society of which he had known next to nothing for the first 60 years of his life, he would have been a very great statesman.

If he could have combined his dynamism and courage with steadiness and a methodical approach he would have kept his power until he died.

This was too much to ask. The very qualities that enabled him to break out of the Stalinist paralyse called for a recklessness, a refusal or inability to think a problem through that did not go with steadiness. He was alive to approach the outer world with a fresh eye precisely because, when he first encountered it (at Belgrade in 1954), he quickly knew nothing about it and had everything to learn.

He was unable to bring an equivalent curiosity to his contemplation of the Soviet Union because he had inhabited that closed system all his life and thought he had nothing to learn.

His achievement, great as it was, was also, of course, severely limited by the evil nature of his climb to power. Born the poorest of the poor, and having escaped from his peasant home to better himself as a mechanic in the mines of the Donbas, he had next to no formal education. After the Revolution the simple certitudes of elementary Leninism or anticapitalism were enough for him. Here was a gospel. This was the way the world went.

And it was a gospel that was to suffice him until the end of his life. He was never to seek to expand it or deepen it, much less question it. His later development, when he amended the Leninist canon to exclude war as a necessary stage in the progress towards world revolution and to allow the possibility that revolutions might be achieved elsewhere by peaceful means, was a pragmatic response to certain new facts of life—above all the atom bomb.

It is very much to be doubted if he ever realized the radical importance of these amendments, or that he fully appreciated the inevitably explosive consequences of his denunciation of Stalin. He was concerned above all not with any theory, but with clearing away certain physical obstacles to the physical and political development of the Soviet Union—with himself very firmly at the helm.

It is hard to see how such a man could have been otherwise. Impatient of intellectuals, including revolutionary intellectuals, he was a born man of action, priding himself on his grasp of the practical, a sort of human bulldozer with a delicate eye for the main chance. He did not begin to find himself until the civil war was over, sent back to the Donbas to help get the mines working again; he emerged as a man with a will and great driving force. He was precisely the sort of unquestioning man with an iron fist that Stalin and those close to him were looking for in their drive to capture the party from the emigre intellectuals.

It was to Kaganovich, whom he was much later to vilify and ruin, that Khrushchev owed his swift promotion from the lowest level of the party apparatus—first to Kiev, then to Moscow in 1929, and very soon to the summit of the Moscow party apparatus.

Now it was his task not only to put a
Streak of Reckless Courage
decrepit capital into some sort of shape (including the rushed building of the Moscow Subway) but also to make the whole Moscow region safe for Stalin during the great purges of the 1930s. It was now that he came to work closely with Bulganin, at the head of the Moscow Soviet, with Malenkov and with the villainous Yezhov, who was to become head of the secret police when the purges began to run wild.

In a word, Khrushchev was in the thick of things throughout this terrible epoch. He survived and had his reward. His reward turned out to be the making of him, perhaps also his salvation. In 1938, he was made a candidate member of the Politburo and was sent off to be Stalin's viceroy in the Ukraine. Such an exalted position would never have come his way at that time but for the fact that virtually the whole of the Ukrainian party apparatus, led by men very senior to Khrushchev, had been shot. He grasped his opportunity with both hands.

Now he was on his own, away from the demoralizing atmosphere that surrounded his Moscow colleagues strutting about in Stalin's shadow. His essentially self-reliant spirit had a chance to develop. He became a boss in his own right—boss of 40 million souls.

Further, because the Ukraine bore the brunt of the German assault in 1941, he was caught up with the Army machine as none of his Moscow colleagues were. He was at the terrible encirclement at Kharkov, at Stalingrad, at the great battle of the Kursk Salient that tore the heart out of the German armies. He got on well with the marshals and took their part against interference from Moscow, and this was to stand him later in good stead. He saw with his own eyes the sufferings of ordinary people and learned more about their lives than any of his Moscow colleagues ever knew.

By the time he was called back to Moscow in the winter of 1949 he had been on his own for 11 years; he had a more independent view and a greater confidence in his own powers than any of the men who had stayed close to Stalin and been overshadowed by him. He started throwing his weight about and speaking off the cuff as nobody under Stalin had ever spoken. Sooner or later he would have gone too far and ruined himself; but Stalin had only three more years to live and died in time.

This was the background, essentially parochial though on a vast scale, of the man who was to emerge in late middle life in all his ignorance onto the world stage and use every weapon of calumny, threat, deception, flattery, reason and blackmail to advance the cause of the Soviet Union; to talk to Eisenhower as an equal, patronize MacMillan, enchant Nehru, anathematize Mao Tse-tung. This was the man, also, who more than any other achieved some sort of constructive working relationship between two hostile worlds.

He never, of course, broke away from his past. He never saw that in condemning Stalin for his crimes against the party he was really condemning the party for its crimes against the people. Even while he was genuinely seeking coexistence he thought until it was too late (until after the Cuban fiasco, that is) that he could have things both ways: that he could achieve a military detente while pursuing bitter ideological warfare.

He still lapsed into bullying when crossed. Nevertheless, this little man, who had no feel for personal dignity, achieved dignity on occasion by his very passion to uphold the dignity of his country—and once, over Cuba, by his readiness to suffer humiliation in the cause of peace.

He pushed the quarrel with China (inevitable as it was to some degree) too hard and too fast, with ruinous consequences to the Communist cause. He brought new ideas to Soviet domestic problems, seeing the need to break the Soviet Union out of Stalin's repressive bonds and release initiative. But he was incapable of working out a considered, articulated plan—thus rushing from one badly-thought-out panacea to another and unsettling the economy, in some aspects quite disastrously.

Yet, when all is said, with all his plunging he did no more harm to the economy than his successors have done with all their caution—and he did much more good for the spirit of his people. He opened windows (or broke them) to let in more light than in fact he knew how to bear.

He was, that is to say, an anti-Stalinist who nevertheless accepted the premises on which the Stalinist regime had been based. He was part of that regime. He wanted Stalinism without tears. Russia needed the sort of explosion he alone dared invite.

It was easy enough to see why, in the end, his inferior colleagues ganged up against him. One hoped that after a pause for breath they would set to work to bring order into a house with open windows. Instead they started closing windows, and instead of order they contrived stagnation. Khrushchev's achievement may be measured in part by the failure of his successors to bring forward new ideas. Another measure is that coexistence, no longer a favorite word, is still a firm reality.