KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: PART II

Days of disaster,
the final victory and
a surprising admission:
'Ve must give credit
to the Allies'

THE GREAT
In October 1942, when Germans were still pressing on Stalingrad, Khrushchev (center) was at the front in uniform as political adviser to Marshal Yeremenko, who stands at his right.

PATRIOTIC WAR

This installment begins in August 1939, just before the outbreak of World War II. Khrushchev learned in a surprisingly casual manner about the pact signed by the German and Soviet foreign ministers, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov. The pact freed Hitler to attack Poland, thus starting the war.

I first heard about Ribbentrop’s visit the day before he arrived. I was at Stalin’s dacha on a Saturday, and he told me that Ribbentrop was flying in the next day. Stalin smiled and watched me closely to see what sort of impression this would make. I stared back at him, thinking he was joking. Then I said, “Why should Ribbentrop want to see us? Is he defecting to our side, or what?”

“No,” said Stalin, “Hitler has sent us a message saying, ‘I ask you, Herr Stalin, to receive my minister, Ribbentrop, who brings with him concrete proposals. We’ve agreed to meet with him tomorrow.’”

I told Stalin that I’d already planned to go hunting with Bulganin and Malenkov on Voroshilov’s preserve the next day. Nikolai Bulganin had recently been appointed a full member of the Party Central Committee; Georgi Malenkov was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and in general charge of Party work; Klimenti Voroshilov, as Commissioner of Defense, was still supposed to be negotiating with the visiting British and French military missions. Stalin said, “Go right ahead. There’ll be...

CONTINUED
'Stalin hoped that the
In late 1943 the Nazis were on the defensive in Russia, and with the Red Army going westward, Khrushchev emerged with a satisfied look (below) from a recaptured bunker in native Donbas in December 1943.

His military days almost over, Khrushchev addressed new conscripts (left).

English and French might exhaust Hitler’

be nothing for you to do around here tomorrow. Molotov and I will meet with Ribbentrop and hear what he has to say. When you come back, I’ll let you know what Hitler has in mind.”

That night Bulganin, Malenkov and I left for the hunting preserve in Zavidova. We found that Voroshilov was already there, so he couldn’t have been with Stalin for the meeting with Ribbentrop.

It was a wonderful day. The weather was warm, and the hunt was a great success. I was able to bag one duck more than Voroshilov, whom the press had begun to build up as our No. 1 marksman.

I knew Stalin would call us all together, so I brought my ducks to share with the other Politburo members for dinner. Stalin was in a good mood and was joking a lot. While the trophies of our hunt were being prepared for the table, Stalin told us that Ribbentrop had brought with him a draft of a friendship and non-aggression treaty and that we had signed it. Stalin seemed very pleased with himself. He said that when the English and French, who were still in Moscow, found out about the treaty the next day, they would immediately leave for home. [They soon did.]

We knew that they weren’t serious about an alliance with us and that their real goal was to incite Hitler against us.

I heard with my own ears how Stalin said, “It’s all a game to see who can fool whom. I know what Hitler’s up to. He thinks he’s outwitted me, but actually it’s I who have tricked him!”

Of course there were some people who thought that since Hitler wanted to negotiate with us, he must be too frightened of us to attack. But we, the leaders of the government, knew better. We knew that eventually we would be drawn into the war, although I suppose Stalin hoped that the English and French might exhaust Germany and foil Hitler’s plan to crush the West first, then turn east.

I think the vast majority of the Party considered the signing of the treaty tactically wise, even though nobody could say so publicly. We couldn’t even discuss the treaty at Party meetings. It was very hard for us—as Communists, as antifascists—to accept the idea of joining forces with Germany. It would have been impossible to explain it to the man in the street.

We became increasingly concerned about attack from the north. The question of Finland arose.

Leningrad was within artillery range of the Finnish border. Moreover the Finnish Marshal Carl Mannerheim was a former czarist general and a sworn enemy of the Soviet Union. Finland represented a real threat to us because its territory could be used by more powerful governments. We wanted the Finns to give up a certain amount of territory and so move the border farther away from Leningrad. The Finns refused, so we were left with no choice but to decide the question by war.

One day when I came to Moscow, Stalin invited me to his apartment for dinner. He told me Molotov and Kuusinen would be there [Otto Kuusinen was a Finnish Communist leader]. When I arrived at the Kremlin, I had the feeling that Stalin, Molotov and Kuusinen were continuing an earlier conversation. Apparently they had already decided to present Finland with an
"The Germans watched with glee
as we took a drubbing from the Finns' ultimatum. The consensus was that the Finns should be given one last chance. If they didn’t yield to our ultimatum, we would take military action.

This was Stalin’s idea. Naturally I didn’t oppose him. Besides, in this case I agreed that it was the right thing to do. All we had to do was raise our voice a little bit, and the Finns would obey. If that didn’t work, we could fire one shot and the Finns would put up their hands and surrender. So we thought.

We sat around for a long time. None of us thought there would be a war.

Suddenly there was a telephone call. We had fired our salvo, and the Finns had replied with artillery fire of their own. The war had begun.

There is, of course, another interpretation of the facts. It’s said that the Finns started shooting first and we were compelled to shoot back. It’s always like that when people start a war. There was once a ritual which you sometimes see in operas: someone throws down a glove to challenge someone else to a duel; if the glove is picked up, it means the challenge is accepted. But in our time it’s not always so clear-cut who starts a war.

There’s some question about whether we had any legal or moral right for our actions against Finland. Of course we didn’t have any legal right. As far as morality is concerned, our desire to protect ourselves justified ourselves in our own eyes.

I was confident that our dispute with the Finns would be solved without many casualties for us. But the Finns turned out to be good warriors. We soon realized we had bitten off more than we could chew. The Finns, who are very athletic, can ski almost before they can walk. Our army encountered mobile ski troops armed with automatic high-velocity rifles.

We tried to put our own troops on skis, too. We started intensively to recruit professional sportsmen. We had to bring them from Moscow and the Ukraine as well as from Leningrad. They left in high spirits. Poor fellows, they were ripped to shreds. I don’t know how many came back alive.

This was a terrible time—terrible because of our losses, and even more terrible in the wider perspective. The Germans were watching with undisguised glee as we took a drubbing from the Finns. Our navy couldn’t do anything right. I remember hearing that one of our submarines had been unable to sink a Swedish merchant vessel which it had mistaken for a Finnish ship. The Germans gave us a teasing pinch by offering their assistance. “Are things that bad? You can’t even sink an unarmed ship? Maybe you need some help from us?”

I recall how Stalin spoke with bitterness about the way the war was going: “The snows are deep. Our troops are on the march. At first they’re full of spirit, saying, ‘Where are those Finns? Let us at them!’ Suddenly there’s a burst of automatic fire, and our men fall to the ground.”

The Finns would climb up into the fir trees and shoot our men at point-blank range. Covered by branches, with white cloaks over their uniforms, the Finns were invisible. The Ukrainian troops called the Finns “cuckoos” because of the way they perched in the trees.

Stalin was furious with the military, and with Voroshilov—
I'd say we lost a million lives

...justifiably, in my opinion. Once Stalin jumped up in a rage and started to berate Voroshilov. Voroshilov was also boiling mad. He leaped up, turned red and buried Stalin's accusations back into his face: "You have yourself to blame for all this! You're the one who had our best generals killed!" Stalin rebuffed him, and Voroshilov picked up a platter with a roast suckling pig on it and smashed it on the table. It was the only time in my life I ever witnessed such an outburst.

Marshal [Semyon] Timoshenko came to me in Kiev and said, "I've been summoned to Moscow. I'll almost certainly be going to the Finnish front." He was put in charge of our troops on the Karelian Isthmus. Our army had learned its lesson. It was decided to hit frontally to crush the Finnish fortifications. The necessary artillery, air power and infantry were concentrated for the strike. The Finnish pillboxes were wiped out. I remember Stalin saying, "Our air force has been called into action. Many bridges have been destroyed. Many trains have been crippled. The Finns have only their skis left. Their supply of skis never runs out."

Finland called for a truce. We agreed on the terms for peace and signed a treaty. The Finns pulled back about 15 kilometers from Leningrad and gave us a base on the Hangs Peninsula. And so the war ended.

I'd say we lost as many as a million lives. Timoshenko told me that faulty intelligence hadn't been to blame; our intelligence services had known about the Finnish defenses all along. The trouble was that no intelligence officers had been consulted when our first strike was planned. I can't imagine how this kind of stupidity was permitted.

It would be wrong to claim that Stalin started the war intending to seize Finland. Why didn't we seize Finland during World War II, when the Finnish army was virtually wiped out? Stalin showed statesmanly wisdom. He knew that the territory of Finland wasn't relevant to the basic needs of the proletarian revolution. When we signed a treaty with the Finns during World War II, just ending the war itself was more profitable for us than an occupation would have been.

Our people never knew [in 1940] that we had suffered a moral defeat, because they were never told the truth. Quite the contrary. When the Finnish war ended our country was told, "Let the trum- pets of victory sound!" But the seeds of doubt had been sown.

I came to Moscow either at the end of 1940 or the beginning of 1941. I received a message that Stalin wanted to see me right away. Stalin was lying on a couch reading. This was possibly the only time he ever talked about military matters when we were alone. Apparently he just needed someone to talk to and didn't care who it was. That's the only way I can explain it because usually he felt no urge to exchange opinions with others. While I was with him he telephoned Timoshenko and started arguing angrily with him. He was obviously very worried about the state of our defense. [Timoshenko was now Defense Minister, having replaced Voroshilov.]

I reacted very humanly to these outward manifestations of Stalin's deep alarm. Hitler had been stunningly successful in his conquest of Europe. Hitler occupied Norway almost without a shot, moving right beside our northern frontier near Murmansk. We were all together in the Kremlin when we heard over the radio that the French army had capitulated and that the Germans were in Paris. Stalin's nerves cracked when he learned about the fall of France. He cursed the governments of England and France. " Couldn't they put up any resistance at all?" he asked despairingly.

I don't know what had weakened our army more—our shortage...
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When Stalin set for this portrait by Lucia Margaret Bourke-White in August 1941, the Red Army was in bad shape and Moscow was besieged and burned. But within four months the army was holding, and Stalin eventually regained his old nerve.
KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

CONTINUED

Zhukov were exceptions. Once Timoshenko pulled me by the sleeve into a session of the Defense Council. He wanted me to see how these people were tearing at each other's throats. I was appalled that someone like Mekhlis could enjoy Stalin's unbounded confidence. I considered him a nitwit. [L. Z. Mekhlis was a particularly treacherous and incompetent secret police general.]

It's a credit to our people and our army that we survived and, in the end, prevailed. But at what a price!

All of the Soviets' worst fears were confirmed when German guns began to roar at 3:30 a.m. June 22, 1941. Overnight Khrushchev was transformed from the supreme civilian ruler of the Ukraine into the Politburo's military representative in that region. These early days were dreadful for the Red Army—and for him.

I was in Moscow just before the war broke out. Stalin kept telling me, "Look, what's the rush on getting back to the Ukraine? You don't need to leave yet." I didn't see any sense in sticking around Moscow. There was just one long dinner after another.

I'd already begun to despise these dinners. They gave me a chance to watch Stalin closely, and I didn't like what I saw. He'd obviously lost all confidence in the ability of our army to put up a fight. It was as though he'd thrown up his hands in despair and given up after Hitler crushed the French. Finally I asked him, "Comrade Stalin, war could break out any hour now, and it would be very bad if I were caught here in Moscow or in transit. I'd better return to Kiev."

"Yes, yes, that's true. You'd better leave." He knew my proper place was in Kiev. He had kept me around simply because he needed people with him. He couldn't stand being alone.

The next morning I returned to Kiev. That night I got a warning from Moscow that we should be ready for war within the next few days or even hours. Then we got a call from our command post at Tarnopol, informing us that a soldier had just defected to our side; he claimed that Germany was going to attack the next morning at three o'clock. He and the other troops had been issued three-day rations. We tended to believe him.

Sure enough, as dawn began to break, we got word that the German artillery had opened fire. But we received orders from Moscow not to shoot back. Our leaders issued this strange command because they thought that possibly the artillery was a provocation...
I'd seen Stalin paralyzed by fear

CONTINUED

on the part of some German field commander acting independent-
ly of Hitler. Stalin was so afraid of war that he convinced himself
that Hitler would keep his word and wouldn't really attack us.
We got word that German planes were approaching Kiev. Soon
they were bombing the airfield. Fires broke out in the hangars,
but fortunately there were no planes in the hangars at the time.
The situation turned very bad, mostly because there was so lit-
tle help forthcoming from Moscow. I phoned Moscow to arrange
for a shipment of weapons with which to arm citizens who wanted
to join the front. The only person I could get through to was Ma-
lenkov. "Tell me," I said, "where can we get rifles?"
"You'd better give up any thought of getting rifles from us. The
rifles in the civil defense organization here have all been sent to
Leningrad."
"Then what are we supposed to fight with?"
"I don't know—pikes, swords, homemade weapons—anything
you can make in your own factories."
"You mean we should fight tanks with spears?"
"You'll have to do the best you can. Light up bottles of gas-
oline or kerosene and throw them at the tanks."
The Germans moved swiftly. Their occupation of the Ukraine de-
prived us of our mining and agricultural heartland. A large por-
tion of our automotive production was lost when the Germans
moved into our industrial base around Moscow.
I had to argue with Stalin many times. Even though he could
have blasted me with fire and water, I doggedly tried to persuade
him to my point of view. Sometimes I succeeded. However, it was al-
ways very difficult to argue with him—and very dangerous.
After the successful conclusion of our operation outside Mos-
cow [the Germans got within sight of the Kremlin before being
thrown back in December 1941], I was called to Moscow to con-
sult with Stalin. I found myself confronted with a new man. He
had pulled himself together and was acting like a real soldier. He
had also begun to think of himself as a great military strategist,
which made him harsher than ever to argue with him. But I knew
what sort of hero he was. I'd seen him when he had been par-
alyzed by his fear of Hitler, like a rabbit in front of a boa con-
sstrictor. And my opinion of him hadn't changed.
During the first part of the war, when things were going badly,
I'd noticed that Stalin's signature didn't appear on a single doc-
ument or order. This practice didn't change even after we repulsed
the Germans outside Moscow and Stalin began to regain his con-
fidence. And this was no accident.
There is another example of Stalin's refusal to accept direct re-
ponsibility for what was happening at the front. Many of our gen-
erals who were taken prisoner were declared traitors on Stalin's
order, and their families were sent to Siberia. The treatment of the
rank-and-file troops and junior officers was no better. When a com-
mander reported to Stalin about someone's incompetence or mis-
take, Stalin used to ask, "Did you punch him in the snout? If he
does something like that again, punch him right in the snout!"
Another thing that distressed me was Stalin's dependence on
the Cheka (the secret police) for military intelligence. Early in the
war the commander and I had no choice but to move our head-
quaters from Kiev. Suddenly I got a telegram from Stalin un-
justly accusing me of cowardice. He accused me of intending to
surrender Kiev. This was a filthy lie. Kiev fell not because it was
abandoned by our troops, but because of the pincer maneuver
which the Germans executed from the north and south.
I saw Zhukov a number of times early in the war. I was always
glad when he flew in to take over the command. People who came
to the front weren't always so helpful. Budyonny [Marshal Sem-
ya] was sent when the Germans were closing in around Kiev. I
sat in on a session while the chief of our operational section,
Colonel Bagramyan, reported on the situation. Budyonny told Bagramyan in a high-pitched voice, "It looks to me as though you aren't even in control of your own troops. I think we'd better have you shot."

"Semyon Mikhailovich," replied Bagramyan, "why should I be shot? If I'm not fit to be chief of the operational section, then give me a division to command. What purpose would it serve to have me shot?"

Budyonny would hear nothing of a simple transfer or demotion and tried stubbornly to get Bagramyan to agree that he should be shot. Naturally Bagramyan wasn't ready to agree to any such thing. It should be kept in mind that this "friendly" conversation took place after a hearty dinner and a lot of brandy. Despite these extenuating circumstances, I was still shocked. Fortunately nothing ever came of Budyonny's threat. Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan is still alive and well—may he live another thousand years!

Khrushchev's stock plummeted to an all-time low after the Soviets' Kharkov offensive in May 1942, which was an unmitigated disaster. How much of the blame should fall on Khrushchev is unclear, even from his own account. But Khrushchev was heavily involved, and the failure of the enterprise was, for him, a traumatic experience. Indeed he was lucky to escape with his life.

Stalin's dissatisfaction with me reached its peak when he thought that we were going to lose the Ukraine. He was supreme commander, but he didn't want to take responsibility for the defeat. He started looking for a scapegoat. I was the obvious candidate since I was First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee and a member of the Military Council.

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Perhaps my most perilous hour was during the disastrous counteroffensive toward Kharkov. I forget who had taken the initiative for organizing the operation. Later Stalin was to accuse me of having ordered the offensive. I won't deny that I may have had a part in it but, as I asked Stalin, "What about the commander, Timoshenko?"

"No," said Stalin, "it was your idea and Timoshenko simply gave in to you."

The operation had begun promisingly enough. We had broken through the enemy's first line easily—too easily. This meant we had stumbled into a trap. Now it remained for us to get permission to call off the offensive altogether and pull back. We ordered a halt and took steps to build up our defenses. I returned to my quarters. It was three o'clock in the morning and I was taking off my clothes to lie down when Comrade Bagramyan...
Lou Hinton got an extra holiday bonus this year.

First came a generous year-end bonus check from his law firm. And then Lou received a 6 lb., 8 oz. tax deduction from his wife, a genuine bonus baby boy. With all that good fortune, Lou just had to break out the holiday bottle of Harper's a little early and celebrate. The first bonus would easily cover the second.

I W. Harper
Sometimes the bourbon has to be this good.

KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

'I want to speak with Comrade Stalin personally'

Continued

burst in on me. He was very upset: "I thought you should know that Moscow has countermanded our order halting the offensive. If we go ahead, our troops in the salient will be doomed. I implore you: speak to Stalin personally."

I'd never seen Comrade Bagramyan in such a state. I put through a call to general headquarters. I got Vasilevsky, chief of the general staff, on the line: "Aleksandr Mikhailovich, please take a map along and explain to Comrade Stalin what will happen if we continue this operation."

"No, Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Stalin has already made up his mind. He has already issued his orders."

I decided to call him back and try again. He still refused: "Nikita Sergeyevich, Comrade Stalin has made up his mind and that's all there is to it."

I had no choice but to try to call Stalin myself. He had already issued his orders. I called the dacha and Malenkov answered. He knew the layout of the dacha very well. He knew exactly where everyone would be sitting and how many steps it would take Stalin to reach the telephone. I could hear Malenkov saying that I was on the phone. I couldn't hear what Stalin answered, but Malenkov came back and told me, "Comrade Stalin says you should tell me what you want, and I'll pass on your message." This was a sure sign of trouble.

"I want to speak with Comrade Stalin personally."

Malenkov passed this on and then came back on the line: "Comrade Stalin repeats that you should tell me what you want."

So I had to tell Malenkov that we had overextended and weakened our front and were exposing our flank to the Germans. There was another pause. When Malenkov came back, he said: "Comrade Stalin knows you didn't get the front commander's approval on your decision to halt the offensive; he knows that calling off the operation was your idea alone, and he's against it. There's no point in discussing it further. Stalin says the offensive must continue."

"All right," I said. "Orders are orders. Continuing the offensive is all too easy since we have no enemy troops in front of us. That's exactly what worries us." Malenkov hung up.

Bagramyan's nerves cracked, and he burst into tears. He foresaw what was going to happen. He was weeping for our army. Catastrophe struck a few days later, exactly as we had expected. The staff of the 57th Army was wiped out completely. When our men were encircled, they didn't even have enough fuel to escape. Many were killed, but most were taken prisoner. A few days after the disaster, I received a call from Moscow. They weren't summoning Timoshenko, the front commander, but me. I hardly need describe what I was feeling. We had lost many, many thousands of men. Suffering defeat was bad enough. To make matters worse, it looked as though I was going to have to take the blame for it personally. As I flew toward Moscow I put myself in the hands of fate. I was ready for anything, including arrest. At first Stalin didn't give any sign whether he was furious with me or sympathetic toward me. He was a good actor. Then he said, "The Germans have announced that they captured more than 200,000 of our soldiers. Are they lying?"

"No, Comrade Stalin, they're not lying. We had approximately that number of troops, perhaps a few more. We must suppose that some were killed and the rest taken prisoner."

Continued
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**KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS**

*I doubted that Stalin would forgive*

Continued...

Stalin didn't say anything more, but now I could see he was seething. I didn't know when this boiling kettle would explode and who would get scalded when it did.

I stayed in Moscow for a number of days. The longer I stayed the more wearisome and painful became the process of waiting to see what would happen to me. I doubted very much that Stalin would forgive the defeat. I knew exactly how Stalin would formulate his revenge. He was a master at this sort of thing.

We were sitting at Stalin's table having dinner. Stalin started a conversation in a noncommittal tone. "You know," he said, looking at me closely, "in World War I, after our army fell into a German encirclement in East Prussia, the general commanding the troops was court-martialed by the czar. He was condemned and hanged."

"Comrade Stalin, I remember this event well. The czar did the only right thing. Myasnikov was a traitor. He was a German agent."

Stalin didn't say anything. He'd already said enough to give me some idea of where I stood. Stalin was preparing me psychologically for understanding why he might have to punish severely all those responsible for the Kharkov disaster.

The only thing that made it difficult for Stalin to blame me was that I had tried stubbornly to persuade him to call off the offensive—and I had done so in the presence of witnesses. I had transmitted my opinion to him through Malenkov, and I'm sure Beria, Mikoyan, Molotov and possibly even Voroshilov were at the dinner with Stalin when I called from the front. These men could have been very disagreeable witnesses for me if the offensive had turned out differently, but as it was they were disagreeable witnesses for Stalin himself.

Finally Stalin said I could return to the front. I was relieved, but I realized I wasn't safe yet. I knew of many cases when Stalin would reassure people by letting them leave his office with good news, and then have them picked up. But nothing happened to me during the night after I left his office. The next morning I flew back to the front.

After these many years, I often look back on the Kharkov episode as an agonizing moment for our Homeland and a milestone in my own life.

Khrushchev got off lightly, but Timoshenko was demoted and Zhukov took over as deputy supreme commander under Stalin. Khrushchev redeemed himself in the winter of 1942-43 at Stalingrad, where he was political adviser to the front commander, Marshal A. I. Yeremenko. That battle was Khrushchev's greatest hour. It ended in the destruction of the German Sixth Army, although it was less decisive, in a broader sense, than the battle of Kursk in July 1943, which never caught the Western imagination the way Stalingrad did. Khrushchev was concerned with Kursk also, as political adviser to Lieutenant General N. F. Yaroslav, a gifted commander.

When the battle of Stalingrad started our forces were still suffering from a shortage of heavy artillery, machine guns, antiaircraft and antitank weapons. But now our troops had begun to put up stubborn resistance.

Our setbacks were still very painful. I remember a tragic sight...
that I saw when I went out to the battle south of the city. Some of our fighter-bombers flew over, heading toward the front. Suddenly German Messerschmitts appeared. Our bombers were hit and caught fire. The pilots bailed out. Our infantry thought the stricken fighter-bombers were German, so they opened fire on our pilots as they parachuted to the ground. I remember how one pilot screamed: "I'm one of you! I'm one of you!" Then there was a burst of machine-gun fire, and it was all over.

The Germans reached the Volga and half encircled us, closing off our railroad contact with the North and stopping all navigation on the river. I got a call from Stalin. He asked me menacingly, "What's this about you starting to evacuate the city?"

"Comrade Stalin, who said anything about evacuating the city? Who reported this to you? It's absolutely untrue."

Stalin never mentioned the evacuation again. Later I learned that the rumor about an evacuation was Stalin's own doing. It was what he would have called a preventative device, just to let us know how he felt about it in case the idea were ever to come up. This was typical of Stalin's conduct of the war.

The enemy subjected Stalingrad to the cruellest air raids. Stalingrad was in flames. We found ourselves cut off from the left bank of the Volga. The commander [Yeremenko] and I decided that our continued presence in Stalingrad was inadvisable. We sent off the appropriate dispatch. A day passed, and there was no reply. We repeated the request. Again there was no word from Moscow. We couldn't move the command post without permission.

Then Stalin called about something else entirely. I said, "Comrade Stalin, we've already had to repeat our request for permission to transfer our command post to the left bank. Time is of the essence, so I ask you to give us the go-ahead now."

"No, that's impossible. If your troops find out that their commander has moved his headquarters out of Stalingrad, the city will fall."

I tried to explain to Stalin as best I could that his fears were unfounded: "Comrade Stalin, I don't look at it that way. The 62nd Army under the command of Chuikov has undertaken the defense of Stalingrad." [Marshal Vasili I. Chuikov, later involved in the race to Berlin, was the supreme military hero of Stalingrad.]

"Well, all right. If you're certain that the front will hold, I'll give you permission to move to the left bank. Just make sure you leave a representative of the front headquarters in Stalingrad who can report to you on the way things are going."

Yeremenko and I decided to leave General [F. I.] Golikov in Stalingrad to keep us advised. We called Golikov in and Yeremenko told him. A look of terror transformed Golikov's face. As soon as Yeremenko had left the room, Golikov pleaded with me not to leave him alone in the city. I never saw anyone, soldier or civilian, in such a state during the whole war. He kept saying: "Stalingrad is doomed! Don't leave me behind! Let me go with you!"

As Kursk, where the Russians decisively beat the Germans in history's greatest tank battle, Khrushchev was adviser to General Vatutin (left).
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KHUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

'The devil held a string to Stalin's nerve'

CONTINUED

"What are you talking about? Can't you see that things have changed? Our army is making a stand here. You've been ordered to stay in the city, and you will obey."

A few days later we received a message from an officer in Stalingrad informing us that Golikov had lost his head and was behaving like a maniac. We relieved Golikov and had him recalled.

Later he complained to Stalin. Stalin reproached me angrily for having the wrong attitude toward our generals. I asked him, "Exactly what general do you have in mind?"

"Well, take Golikov, for example." Then he launched into a tirade against Yeremenko. Before this I had often heard Stalin praising Yeremenko in the most glowing terms.

I told Stalin the story of how Golikov had behaved. From the way Stalin's expression changed I could tell that he had known nothing about the incident. "Therefore," I concluded, "I really don't see why you're lashing out at Yeremenko and myself. Golikov got exactly what he deserved."

Then Stalin told me that the decision had been made to relieve Yeremenko of the Stalingrad command. I told him I thought this would be a serious mistake. At first Stalin resisted stubbornly, but he began to soften. Finally he said I could fly back to the front. He shook my hand and said: "I'm glad we called you back for consultations. If we hadn't, we would have sacked Yeremenko. Yeremenko can stand on at his post."

"You won't be sorry, Comrade Stalin. You're doing the right thing."

The enemy pressed on, but our army made the Germans pay for every inch they gained. Whenever the situation looked gravest, Malenkov flew in with Vasilevsky, Voronov [Marshal N. N. Voronov, one of the better Soviet generals], or some other representative from the general staff. I was never very pleased to see them.

I sensed that Stalin had sent Malenkov to keep an eye on me. I noticed Vasilevsky and Malenkov whispering together. Malenkov would have to report to Stalin about why the battle was going so badly, and naturally he wanted to escape any personal responsibility for what was happening.

In the end Vasilevsky and Malenkov would tell me they had received orders to return to Moscow. After they left, an eerie silence seemed to fall over the area, as often happens in a forest after a storm.

Given the difficulties which had developed, it made sense to divide the Stalingrad front, but it was sad for Yeremenko and me to part with the armies of the new Don front. Stalin called Yeremenko. I don't know how their conversation went, but afterwards I found Yeremenko literally in tears: "Comrade Khrushchev, you don't understand. You're a civilian. You forget how we thought we were doomed, how Stalin used to ask us if we could hold out for three more days. We all thought that the Germans would capture Stalingrad, and we would be made scapegoats. Maybe you don't foresee what will happen, but I do: the new Don front will get all the glory for the Stalingrad victory, and our armies of the new Southern front will be forgotten."

I couldn't do anything to console him. I really did feel very sorry for him.

We encircled Paulus's army in the fall and finished it off in the
winter [a reference to the majestic operation which destroyed the army of Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus]. I saw a horrible scene when we moved into the city in the early spring [1943]. Our troops were busy gathering up the corpses of German soldiers. We knew that unless we did something quickly they would begin to decompose and an epidemic might break out. It wasn't easy. The earth was still frozen. We gathered thousands of corpses and stacked them in layers alternating with layers of railway ties. Then we set these huge piles on fire. I once went out to watch, but I didn't go back a second time. Napoleon or someone said that burning enemy corpses smelled good. I don't agree. It was a very unpleasant smell, and altogether a very unpleasant scene.

As we pushed forward after the battle, I saw large piles of German soldiers who had been shot. I asked about this: "Were these men executed?"

"No, they were all killed in battle."

Well, the enemy always sustains huge losses when an army is advancing, but I didn't rule out the possibility that some of our men had violated strict instructions. In addition to the moral consideration, we didn't want to give enemy propaganda an excuse to claim that the advancing Soviet forces were shooting their captives. However it was understandable that some of our men might have given in to their hatred and tried to kill any fascist soldier they could get their hands on in revenge for the atrocities committed by the Germans.

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Kursk—July 1943—was by far the greatest tank battle in history. Some 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns maneuvered on open steppe. This, not Stalingrad, was the battle which finally tore the heart out of the German army in the East—and put Stalin in a commanding position to deal with the Western Allies.

Our detractors used to say that the only reason we were able to defeat Paulus's colossal army at Stalingrad was that we had winter on our side. Ever since Russia turned back Napoleon's invasion, people claimed that winter was our main ally. The Germans couldn't use this excuse to explain their defeat at Kursk. They chose the time, place and form of the battle. All the cards were in the hands of Hitler and his cutthroats. It was high summer. You could say that the countryside was in full bloom, dripping with fragrant juices.

Our armies under [Konstantin] Rokossovsky were supposed to start an offensive on July 20. Suddenly we got a call. A German soldier had defected and he had some important information: "He says the Germans are going to attack tomorrow morning at three o'clock." [The attack date was actually July 4. I interrogated him. This defector was a young fellow from one of the fairly well-known SS divisions. I asked if he was a Nazi.

"No, I'm against the Nazis."

"But you're with the SS, and they're all Nazis."

"Not anymore. My parents are from Alsace, and I was raised on French culture. I don't want to risk my neck for Hitler." Stalin listened calmly as I explained the situation [by telephone]. He wasn't rude or impatient the way he had sometimes been in the past. I have no idea why he was so calm and controlled on this occasion, while on other occasions he would completely lose his temper. It was as though the devil himself held a string attached to Stalin's main nerve, and no one knew when the devil would give the string a jerk, sending Stalin into one of his fits of rage. Stalin asked me, "What do you think we should do?"

"We're very optimistic. We're just as glad that the Germans are opening an offensive tomorrow. Our defensive positions are solid, and we'll make the enemy pay in blood. It takes fewer forces to defend than it does to attack."

The enemy, too, was confident. Later I saw an order which we captured from a demolished German armored unit. It contained a message addressed to the German troops: "You are now waging continued..."
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IEHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

‘The Americans could have taken Berlin’

CONTINUED

Their new tanks were menacing indeed, but our troops learned how to deal with them. In my opinion the battle of Kursk was the turning point of the Great Patriotic War. I’m not without certain human weaknesses, including pride, and I’m certainly pleased to have been involved in the huge battles which the Red Army waged at Stalingrad and Kursk.

After Kursk, Khrushchev followed the victorious Soviet troops into Kiev and stayed with them all the way to the new Polish border. He was a lieutenant general now, but his military days were almost over.

I wish I’d had more chance to visit the front headquarters after our troops crossed over into Poland. I would have loved to see something of our pursuit of the Germans into Eastern Europe, but I had my hands full in Kiev, supervising the reconstruction of the Ukraine.

I remember one day in Kiev getting a call from Zhukov. He was jubilant. “Soon I’ll have that slimy beast Hitler locked up in a cage,” he said, “and when I get to Moscow I’ll ship him by way of Kiev so you can have a look at him.” Then, after Germany capitulated, Zhukov called me again and said, “I won’t be able to keep my promise. That snake Hitler is dead. He shot himself, and they burned his corpse. We found his charred carcass.” Thus ended the great epic of our people’s war against the Hitlerite invaders.

I should have known better, but I decided to call Stalin to congratulate him. And what was his response? He cut me off rudely and said I was wasting his time. I was simply dumbfounded. I should have expected exactly what happened. Stalin was pretending that now that the war was over and done with, he was already thinking about other matters. He wanted me to think that he had known all along how the war would turn out.

I knew better. I had watched him during moments of crisis. I knew that the war Staff had been even more worried and afraid than the people around him.

What follows includes the first public acknowledgment by any Soviet politician of the immense part played by American and British aid to the Soviet armed forces.

After the war I frequently heard Stalin speak about Eisenhower’s noble characteristics. Stalin always stressed Eisenhower’s decency, generosity and chivalry. Stalin said that if it hadn’t been for Eisenhower, we wouldn’t have succeeded in capturing Berlin. The Americans could have been there first. Eisenhower told his troops back and halted their offensive, thus allowing our troops to take Berlin. If he hadn’t done this, the question of Germany might have been decided differently and our own position might have turned out quite a bit worse.

However, at this time Truman was President, and Stalin had no regard at all for Truman. He considered Truman worthless. Rightly so. Truman didn’t deserve respect.

At the very end of the war, when the Germans were hard-pressed by our troops, they moved west to surrender to the Americans. Stalin addressed himself to Eisenhower, saying that Soviet troops had
shed their blood to crush the Germans and now the Germans were surrendering to the Americans. Eisenhower ordered the commander of the German army to surrender to the Russians.

Whenever I had dealings with Eisenhower in later years, I remembered these actions during the war. I kept in mind Stalin’s words about Eisenhower. Stalin invited Eisenhower to our Victory Parade and expressed his recognition by presenting him with our highest medal, the Order of Victory. This was the first time I met Eisenhower. The same medal was given to Montgomery, but in that case it was merely reciprocity. Stalin had formed good relations with Eisenhower and even better ones with Roosevelt. He had bad relations with Churchill and even worse ones with Montgomery.

It’s difficult to judge what the intentions of the Allies were toward the end of the war. I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that their desire to postpone an assault on Hitler’s Western front was dictated by their desire to put a still greater burden on the shoulders of the Soviet Union and to bleed us even more. Or perhaps it’s as they explained: they weren’t sufficiently prepared. They needed more time, and so on. Both explanations were probably true, but I think they were mostly dictated by their desire to bleed us.

The Western Allies were certainly not interested in strengthening us. England and America, from their class positions, knew they had to help us to an extent, but they still wanted the Soviet Union to be considerably weaker after the war so that they could dictate their will to us.

The Potsdam decision [1945] was a compromise based on the distribution of power among the Allies at the end of the war. The one-sidedness of the agreement was particularly reflected in the clauses concerning Berlin and Vienna. These cities were located in the zone occupied by Soviet troops, and it would have seemed that they should have been part of our zone. However the Allies didn’t give them to us. Berlin and Vienna were each divided into four sectors.

Nevertheless we must still give credit to the Allies for their contribution to the common cause. In order to avoid excessive haughtiness, the people and the Party of the Soviet Union must be properly informed. Unfortunately our historical works about World War II have perpetuated an illusion. They have been written out of a false sense of pride and out of a fear to tell the truth about our allies’ contribution—all because Stalin himself held an incorrect, unrealistic position. He knew the truth, but he admitted it only to himself in the toilet.

Telling the truth needn’t have been a humiliation. Recognizing

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NEXT WEEK: PART III 'THE DEATH OF STALIN' Khrushchev describes the death scene, then tells how he put together the Kremlin combination that toppled Beria