

Angleton/CIA-Warren Commission/opposition to Nosenko's defection/ Mangold's 7/3/91  
"Cold Warrior" note; Agent Oswald?

In previous notes of the past few days I've referred to disclosed records I have that an honest Mangold could have found use for in an honest book, without indicating what they are or their possible significance(s).

The CIA from the first ignored all my Nosenko FOIA requests beginning in 1975. This is established in my CIA FOIA file. The FBI did the same. In each case despite/appeals, also ignored, in the case of the FBI when my appeal had the support of the appeals officer, quin Shea. (Ultimately eased out by the FBI.) But then came an abrupt change in the FBI. It stated sending me some of its records of CIA origin, meaning with the CIA's required approval. At first I wondered why after the lapse of more than a decade the FBI was suddenly making limited disclosure to me of some Nosenko records. Then it made a simple mistake: it addressed me as "Mr. Mooney" or as "Michael Mooney." I'm not checking to see which but I do recall that I had known a reactionary Michael Mooney who had been an editor of the old Saturday Evening Post. I therefore came to believe that the CIA was approving FBI disclosure of CIA information to him and thus had to give me duplicates. The nature of the information disclosed is subject to the interpretation it served his pre-conceived planned uses of it or was designed to influence how he would use it: in support of the Angleton/CIA position on Nosenko.

Of what I remember of these records they reflect and I think are reasonably interpreted as meaning that there were those within the CIA, particularly if not almost exclusively in Geneva, who opposed Nosenko's defection when what Nosenko would say was not disclosed to them. They did know his position within the KGB, however, an executive position within the KGB's component whose responsibilities included knowing about English-speaking suspected agents and the recruitment of English-speaking agents for the USSR, if I recall the latter correctly. If I am correct in what I am suggesting, it means that there was the assumption that Nosenko would say or would be in a position to say what some in the CIA did not want known. I believe that this was before Golitsyn could impose his paranoid view that Nosenko was dispatched to undermine him or to disinform on the JFK assassination.

While this, if correct, can be interpreted to include that those opposing Nosenko's defection could or did anticipate that it would include more or less what he said about what the KGB believed and knew about Oswald, this is not by any means certain. However, if it is possible, then there is the clear inference that it did not want what the KGB knew or suspected about Oswald to be known to any part of the US government and that in turn does suggest that Oswald could have had some kind of relationship with it, this CIA component. It is beyond any question at all that CIA Switzerland contrived a series of untenable, unreasonable "reasons" for denying him permission to defect to the US. For a man in his position, with what he knew, this in and of itself is highly suspect. He could be and he was an extraordinarily important source so that had to be what those opposing his defection regarded as a great danger to themselves in his defection.

If I am wrong in this there remains the reasonable certainty that the CIA Switzerland opposition to this defection was of Angleton's inspiration and that he was opposing it without disclosing his reason or Switzerland did not know his reason.

How could he have any basis for opposing Nosenko's defection? Either he by then was so addicted to Golitsyn's position that all additional defectors were dispatched to undermine him or he had consulted Golitsyn and Golitsyn had this or another reason or Angleton had an undisclosed reason. It could have been his own or that of another or others in the CIAHQ.

In what thinking I've done about this, far from really deep, all that occurs to me is that he and/or others did not want to have known what they knew Nosenko would be in a position to disclose about Oswald.

In turn this had to be of extraordinary importance to them because without question any man in Nosenko's position inside the KGB possessed intelligence information of quite exceptional importance to the CIA and to have knowledge of the KGB and how it worked that the CIA could hardly have gotten from anyone else. When in the end he was cleared and employed and used by the CIA in its training it found the latter very valuable and important.

What I intend to be taken from this is that the CIA's behavior as reflected in the disclosed FBI records I refer to above is reasonably interpreted as possible indicating he and Oswald had some kind of connection. Far from established but not an unreasonable suspicion.

However, the CIA's very strong and ultimately successful effort to talk the Warren Commission out of taking Nosenko's testimony is not positive confirmation of this. If the CIA had had no connection with Oswald at all it still would have been seriously embarrassed if the KGB's suspicion that Oswald was an in-lace or sleeper US agent were publicly known.