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Js, HR Nixon/Peace HW 12/27/72

Attached is a copy of today's Zorza column I regard as important in what it says and in the obvious it falls short of saying. Some of the marks I made on it in reading may be visible when I make the copies.

HR does not know of some of the exchanges between JDW and me on some thinks, like Nixon the Unoriginal, the copier. There are many things he could be copying right now, but one illustration should be fairly easy to recall, the way the military set about boxing everyone in in Southeast Asia. At the time it happened, I may have included it in note to both of you, but the government painted itself into a corner, gratuitously, with Thieu in a dominating position, as the first order of business. There was no need to give him effective veto, but Nixon did, if not the very first thing, close to it. Any sensible person had to read this as the intent to make agreement impossible. Thieu cannot survive any agreement short of capitulation by the others, which is most unlikely. The other side had no choice but to enter negotiations and to assume that possible his inability to accomplish any ends by war might persuade Nixon to negotiate in the hope of reaching what the wational world would conclude he needs, a real settlement. My longtime view is unchanged, anything like peace means economic collapse or something close to it for the US and for Nixon. His concern is not the unemployment the end of military needs for excess manpower means. He may have a slight concern for the unemployment that would result from even reduced war production. He can t stand the idle factories, and the hearts of cities can't be rebuilt in GM and GE factories. No more is there a market, less a need, for civilain-market manufactures. There is already an abundance and foolishnesses have been contrived to create more wasteful, unnecessary products that people do buy. His support come from the segment of the economy that is most benefitted by the warlike conditions. And he believes.

Just as little as war with ^China and the USSR is now unthinkable, so also is any kind of major disagreement. And, as he looks for markets, where else can he find them? Thus the too-late detente that he and his likes alone prevented for all these years. I think we, today, can less tolerate any backing out of the deals made and in the offing than the relative have-nots, the USSR and ^China. And he now can t call either the enemy, as he had to take what seems like initiatives and probably isn[°]t with both of them.

If he can get the kind of settlement he wants he can have a continuation of a similar condition in SEAsia, where the basis was created long, long ago and expanded by him. That will always be true, popular revolation being the only think that can undo it and that would be for him no more than a new VietNam. So, while he can justify more with VN staying as it is, that is not indispensible. But he runs into new problems he can probably take care of and thinks he can with the front shifting elsewhere (I also think he can). And there are many things he can't for the immediate future waste as he can in VN, like B52 and all those bombs and all the mony compinents, from raw materials to anchibework and ascembly and transportation. It is a big part of the primer of the pump.

JDW noted the obvious embarrassment in Kissinger's "peace it within reach" pronounceent. It wasn't, he knew it wasn't, and little else can explain the embarrassment I also noted in a number of ways, the unctrolability of his little throat-clearing/cought being one of the easiest to see. Extint Of that speech what immediately struck me has bee emphasized recently by radion and TV news commentators, his pinning everything on Nixon, something that has not deviated. If K were a real team player, the obsvious device was the traditional "we", which included the entire team, specifically Nixon and K. He didn't. His permeating really dominating reference was to the President only. Translated by time and events, there is one thing only NAXAX H was saying: the President ruined it. Next, I had it all done but the President ruined it.

I have not fully explored K's options. In my thinking, that is. I watched his eyes as ¹ listened to his cought. I think he still smarts from the belaboring of his former academic colleagues. Let me illustrate with Garrison. There came a point where Judge Crustenberry ruled against Garrison, and the double-banner headline in the States*Item gaid that the federals again made what he sought impossible. THAT was the place to stop. e didn't, and it has been a disaster. Even the relative lightweights(he had no heavies) on his staff saw, understood, and failed to persaude him. Kissinger is now in a similar position. He has negotiated a ""settlement" that is "peaceful", the other saide has gunounced it for him, Nixon has blocked it, and Enery has the further graceful out, Nixon's own announced need of new blood. For the least sanguine of the academics, Kissinger now has a successful career of doing the impossible and making it seem right and that he was right. Unless he is a completely insensitive man or one who can't live out of the limelight, he will out, immediately or announce it soon and do it when expedient. I has to know the chances are slim that a) the others will negotiate under the unequalled heavy bombing or any such serious pressure, and b) tha Nixon can't and won't do anothing that appears to be a backing down.

2

What Zawza fails to say is that the situation he describes was created by Nixon, not without knowing its potential. He has created the present situation and all the jeoparty it holds because he wanted it. I don't think K did or does. Or, Histoxx Nixon has copied the past of others and his own to paint himself into a corner.

As he sees things, it is an advantageous condition. He wants more authoritarianism and this also holds means of hastening that. If there is any rupture with the USSR and/ or ^Cbina, he can point to his initiatives in normalizing relations with both and getting away with saying they made the change.

If he forces their hawks into the ascendancy, more military production here, and that also he wants.

If you want a guy to take a swing at you, one of the ways of bringing it to pass is to kick them hard. He has kicked, hard. As he sees it, nobody saw him kick. The papers that saw it haven't reported it so they won't later say we saw him kick first and did not report it.

Why Zorza didn't say the obvious I don't know. But he did spell it out enough for those who think and look. More can be read into his piece, but I haven't time for it now.

HW 12/27/72