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The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: A Model for Explanation

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sassination of President Kennedy? Khrushchev, with whom Kennedy was working to effectuate the end of the Cold War, was later deposed. I submit that, if the Cold War had been genuinely adversary in nature, there could not have been an intelligence assassination of Kennedy by either the American or the Soviet intelligence agencies. I don't see the Cold War as authentic. Rather I view it as a cooperative effort to foist on both the American and Russian civilian populations an enormous military-intelligence budget.

Senator Richard Russell was correct in being disturbed by Marina Oswald's prospective revelations about possible Soviet intelligence connections with Oswald. And therefore Allen Dulles quieted the matter with a discussion with Isaac Don Levine, a writer on intelligence and a Cold War warrior par excellence. Levine was the author of The Mind of An Assassin, a book that described the killing of Leon Trotsky by Stalin's intelligence. It is interesting that Levine's name, which has been so much associated with the study of political assassinations, was never mentioned by the American press as having been associated with Marina Oswald. It is also interesting that this expert on political assassinations never, to my (nowledge, wrote for publication a single article on the Kennedy assassination. Was his function something other than that of a literary ghost? Was Le-

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Now, let us shift our attention from Allen Dulles, brother of John Foster, to McGeorge Bundy, and his brother, William Bundy. For McGeorge Bundy's roles in the governmental apparatus before and after the assassination are worthy of study, and William Bundy's services in and out of the CIA are also of interest to us.

Kennedy Adviser McGeorge Bundy's Ties to the CIA

With the Kennedy Administration, McGeorge Bundy was in foreign policy a hard-liner who had little use for Adlai Stevenson's idealistic approach to foreign relations. 21 McGeorge Bundy was one of the planners of the Bay of Pigs invasion. 22 Allen Dulles was in Puerto Rico, so Richard Mervin Bissell, Jr., was the CIA's man in charge of the planning. 23 As happenstance would have it, McGeorge Bundy, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, had been a student of Bissell's at Yale. He also had worked for Bissell on the Marshall Plan in 1948. 24 Also in on

that planning, as coincidence would have it, was Gen-

eral Charles P. Cabell, the CIA's deputy director, who is brother of Mayor Earle Cabell, the Mayor of Dallas at the time of the assassination. McGeorge Bundy was — in the Kennedy and early Johnson Administration — the presidential representative and key man on the Special Group which makes the key intelligence decisions for the country. It has operated as the hidden power center of the government.25

As one of the planners for the Bay of Pigs. McGeorge Bundy must take some blame for not serving President Kennedy well and participating in the betrayal of the President in the Bay of Pigs planning operation. Schlesinger discusses that betrayal as follows:

"Moreover, if worst came to worst and the invaders were beaten on the beaches, then." Dulles and Bissell said, "they could easily 'melt away' into the mountains." ... But the CIA exposition was less than candid both in implying that the Brigade had undergone guerrilla training... and in suggesting the existence of an easy escape hatch. ... the Escambray Mountains lay eighty miles from the Bay of Pigs, across a hopeless tangle of swamps and jungles... the CIA agents in Guatemala were saying nothing to the Cubans about this last resort of flight to the hills..." 26

Bundy Also a Vietnam Hawk

But, despite Bundy's complicity with the CIA, which resulted in misleading the President in the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy turned over the direction of Vietnam policy largely to Bundy, along with Rusk, McNamara and Rostow. The best we can say for McGeorge Bundy's handling of Vietnam for President Kennedy was that he botched. Here is what Schlesinger said about Kennedy's feeling concerning the Vietnamese policy:

"He was somber and shaken. I had not seen him so depressed since the Bay of Pigs. No doubt he realized Viet Nam was his great failure in foreign policy, and that he had never really given it his full attention."27

The announced intention of Kennedy as stated on October 2, 1963 by McNamara and Taylor was to withdraw most U.S. forces from South Vietnam by the end of 1965.28 But that was not McGeorge Bundy's policy—and President Kennedy was soon to die—and McGeorge Bundy would be carrying on his hawkish concepts in playing a key role in shaping the aggressive foreign policy of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Bundy Issued the First "No Conspiracy; Lone-Assassin" Statement

What was McGeorge Bundy doing on the day President Kennedy was dispatched? Theodore H. White in his book, The Making of the President, 1964, tells us that the Presidential party on its flight back to Washington on the afternoon of that fateful day "learned that there was no conspiracy, learned of the identity of Oswald and his arrest..."29 This was the very first announcement of Oswald as the lone assassin. In Dallas, Oswald was not even charged with assassinating the President until 1:30 A. M. the

next morning. The plane landed at 5:59 P. M. on the 22nd. At that time the District Attorney of Dallas, Henry Wade, was stating that "preliminary reports indicated more than one person was involved in the shooting...the electric chair is too good for the killers." 30 Can there be any doubt that for any gov-

ernment taken by surprise by the assassination—
and legitimately seeking the truth concerning it—
less than six hours after the time of the assassination was too soon to know there was no conspiracy?
This announcement was the first which designated Oswald as the lone assassin. Who was responsible for
that announcement?

That announcement came from the White House Situation Room. Under whose direct control was the White House Situation Room? The Situation Room was under the personal and direct control of McGeorge Bundy.

I do readily concede that Mr. McGeorge Bundy is a most intelligent man. Joseph Kraft, a well known American political writer, said of Mr. Bundy in 1965 in Harper's:

"His capacity to read the riddle of multiple confusions, to consider a wide variety of possibilities, to develop lines of action, to articulate and execute public purposes, to impart quickened energies to men of the highest ability seems almost alone among contemporaries..."31

John F. Kennedy shared this view of Bundy's intelligence for in speaking of him he said, "You just can't beat brains." 32 McGeorge Bundy himself is not

known for his modesty on the question of his intelligence. He was reported to have been "mildly miffed" when a Kennedy aide quoted the President as remarking that Bundy was the smartest man he knew next to Ormsley Gore, a British diplomat.33

So, then, Mr. Bundy — this man of brains — this coordinator of intelligence for President Kennedy — had reason to know that his Situation Room's announcement of Oswald as the lone assassin on the afternoon of November 22, 1963, before there was any evidence against Oswald, was premature. Make no mistake about it. Bundy, who had been in the Pentagon³⁴ when the announcement of the assassination was issued, spent that fateful afternoon in the Situation Room. Jim Bishop tells how President Johnson was — while on Air Force One flying back to Washington — "...phoning McGeorge Bundy in the White House Situation Room every few minutes."35

Was Bundy's Statement a Warning from the 'New Rulers'?

I propose the thesis that McGeorge Bundy, when that announcement was issued from his Situation Room, had reason to know that the true meaning of such a message when conveyed to the Presidential party on Air Force One was not the ostensible message which was being communicated. Rather, I submit that Bundy, with "his capacity to read the riddle of multiple confusions, to consider a wide variety of possibilities" was really conveying to the Presidential party the thought that Oswald was being designated the lone assassin before any evidence against him was ascertainable. As a central coordinator of intelligence services, Bundy in transmitting such a message through the Situation Room was really telling the Presidential party that an unholy marriage had taken place

between the U.S. Governmental intelligence services and the lone-assassin doctrine. Was he not telling the Presidential party peremptorily, "Now, hear this! Oswald is the assassin, the sole assassin. Evidence is not available yet. Evidence will be obtained, or in lieu thereof evidence will be created. This is a crucial matter of state that cannot await evidence. The new rulers have spoken. You, there, Mr. New President, and therefore dispatchable stuff, and you

the underlings of a deposed President, heed the message well." Was not Bundy's Situation Room serving an Orwellian double-think function?

And, so, it came to pass that Bundy's Situation Room knew well whereof it spoke. For the federal government remained wedded to the lone-assassin myth in spite of the absence of evidence to support the proposition, and in the face of irrefutable proof which would demolish it as a rational idea.

The Presidential Party Got the Message

The Presidential party, which also numbered among it men of brains, apparently got the message. None, to my knowledge, of that Party has undertaken to express a single public doubt as to the veracity of the lone-assassin theory. Yet seeds of doubt have grown to mountainous dimensions among the less intimidated elements of the population who did not seek to hold or retain trappings of power. The lack of expressed skepticism among the Presidential party is not to be interpreted as evidence of their stupidity. On the contrary, their silence speaks more of their strong instincts of self-preservation and their penchant for governmental careers, rather than lack of intelligence.

Some among that Presidential party had no need to see the Zapruder film. They had on that fateful day witnessed first hand the bloody horror of the multiassassin ambush. Doubts as to the veracity of the single-assassin story were more likely to give way to certainty of conspiracy in their minds. The message from Bundy's Situation Room was necessary to dispel other doubts. Perhaps some of the Presidential party leaned toward misreading the situation and were laboring under the belief that some sharpshooting nuts had gotten lucky in Dealey Plaza and that punishment was in order. Bundy's Situation

Room was putting them straight. Through that announcement it became clear to all in that Presidential party who could think, that the assassins, if madmen they were, were highly placed in the pinnacle of power of the intelligence community of the United States government and that punishment of them was out of the question.

Important Foreign Policy Changes Immediately Followed the Assassination

McGeorge Bundy was quite busy on November 22, 1963. After having spent a good deal of time on the telephone with President Johnson as Johnson was flying to Washington, he managed to be at the new President's side when Air Force One landed. 36 He was seen with Lyndon B. Johnson when the President emerged from the South Lawn of the White House. 37 History records that Bundy remained with President Johnson to be designated by him as one of the leading hawkish advisers of the Johnson Administration. 38

What was the future to hold for the United States

following the assassination of President Kennedy? What changed? The most important and immediate change following the assassination of President Kennedy occurred precisely in the area of foreign policy. The Cold War warriors of the Bundy brothers' stripe gained a stranglehold on the foreign policy of the nation, much in the same fashion that Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles had in Eisenhower's administration. Of course, to note such a change is not to prove it was a deliberate consequence of the assassination. Yet, a careful examination of foreign policy following the killing of Kennedy is required to see whether the change might have been related to the killing of the President.

U.S. Promised Help to New Saigon Government

The book The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam has the following to say about the change:

"Three weeks after the assassination, on December 19 and 20, 1963, McNamara and CIA Chief John A. McCone visited Saigon to evaluate the war efforts of the new Saigon government. McNamara told the junta leaders that the United States was prepared to help...as long as aid was needed." 39

"...the United States had made the crucial decision to reverse the policy, announced during the last day of President Kennedy's administration, of gradually withdrawing U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Was it all a coincidence that a change in leadership in Washington was followed by a change in policy, and a change in policy by a corresponding change in Saigon's government?"40

That there should have been a change in Vietnamese policy so immediately after the murder of Kennedy when the external situation in Vietnam did not evoke it, raises serious questions about what caused it in our internal situation. What is at stake here is the issue not of how the assassination was accomplished, but the fundamental question concerning why it was done and which elements were and are behind it. At issue are questions of war and peace that involve the whole of humanity. For the movement for peace in Vietnam not to raise these questions is and has been irresponsible.

Militarization of the U.S.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the definite and deliberate policy of militarization of this country was quickly put into action immediately after the death of President Kennedy. There was no evidence of governmental traumatization, but rather a most efficient and abrupt movement to military policies.

Bundys Continued to Shape Hawkish Policies

McGeorge Bundy and his brother, William, continued to help shape the foreign policy of the Johnson Administration. McGeorge Bundy became part of Johnson's Tuesday lunch arrangement which was in fact the National Security Council, Johnson style.41 Bundy did most of the foreign policy coordinating for Johnson in the early part of his administration.42 It was McGeorge Bundy who by happenstance was in South Vietnam when Pleiku was shelled. After an inspection of the Pleiku base, he recommended to President Johnson instant retaliation. He urged upon the President a steady program of bombing the North, which recommendation was followed with horrendous consequences to peace.43

In the Gulf of Tonkin farce, Bundy was full of admiration for Johnson's decisiveness. Bundy said to friends that he had "...never seen a man who knew so clearly what he wanted to do or so exactly how to go about it."44

Ultimately, the Bundy brothers gave up their titular positions in government. McGeorge Bundy became President of the Ford Foundation. William Bundy joined the Center for International Studies at MIT.

Interconnections of the CIA and Foundation-Dominated Scholarship

Let us not imagine that these two architects of the Vietnamese War by taking on these new positions abandoned their penchant for power. Nor were the Bundy brothers retreating far from government in assuming these positions. David Horowitz said the following about the interlocking aspects of the CIA and the private foundations:

"It should be noted in passing that the congeniality of foundation-dominated scholarship to the CIA reflects the harmony of interest between the upper-class captains of the CIA and the upper-class trustees of the great foundations. The interconnections are too extensive to be recounted here, but the Bundy brothers (William, CIA; McGeorge, Ford) and Chadbourne Gilpatric, OSS and CIA from 1943 to 1949. Rockefeller Foundation from 1949 on, can be taken as illustrative. Richard Bissell, the genius of the Bay of Pigs (and brother-in-law of Philip Mosely of Columbia's Russian Institute), reversed the usual sequence, going from Ford to the CIA."45

As for William Bundy's respite from the CIA and his State Department career, David Horowitz feels that the MIT Center is not in the least removed from the grip of the CIA:

"MIT's Advisory Board on Soviet Bloc Studies, for example, was composed of these four academic luminaries: Charles Bohlen of the State Department, Allen Dulles of the CIA, Philip E. Mosely of Columbia's Russian Institute and Leslie G. Stevens, a retired vice admiral of the U.S. Navy.

"If the MIT Center seemed to carry to their logical conclusion the on-campus extension programs of the State Department and the CIA, that was perhaps because it was set up directly with CIA funds under the guiding hand of Professor W. W. Rostow, former OSS officer and later director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff under Kennedy and Johnson. The Center's first director, Max Millikan, was appointed in 1952 after a stint as

assistant director of the CIA. Carnegie and Rockefeller joined in the funding, which by now, as in so many other cases, has passed on to Ford."46

How We've Paid For Our New Rulers' Ineptness

So, we have examined how the CIA and the military had committed American power to ruinous military adventures through staged international incidents — reminiscent of the Oswald charade — but on an international level. These adventures, following

close upon the assassination, have spilled the blood and sapped the moral fiber of our youth. Our cities have been turned into tense and neglected seas of metastasizing blight. Our economy, buffeted by pushand-pull war-induced inflation, has become unbalanced. Our international trade position has deteriorated, so that now we find ourselves with not only an unfavorable balance of payments, but also an unfavorable balance of trade. Our urban public schools are relegated to bare custodial functions. The standard of living of our workers and the middle class has dipped along with the quality of their

lives. All of us have paid for the ineptness of our new rulers who, by the killing of John F. Kennedy, had effectively overthrown the Republic.

The CIA's Follow-up Tactics

If our model of explanation, our hypothesis, of the assassination of John F. Kennedy accurately interprets the data of the assassination, then it should also be useful in ferreting out current operations in which the Central Intelligence Agency would have had to involve itself domestically as a natural and necessary followup to the Dallas assassination. For, as the CIA's clumsy cousin, the American military, persisted in its Vietnamese adventure, the costs became prohibitive.

Of course, secret elitist police organizations such as the CIA do not thrive on peace, democracy, and a contented and informed people. The power of intelligence agencies increases in direct proportion to the degree of sickness of a nation. A healthy and united people can localize the cancer of a powerusurping intelligence agency and eventually extirpate its malignant cells from the nation's political life. Therefore, the intelligence apparatus which killed Kennedy has a need to keep our society in turmoil. It has - in order to maintain its power - to generate a high degree of chaos. Chaos is required to make a people willing to accept such strong medicine as is administered by the secret police in order to restore order and to stabilize a disintegrating society. It takes an acutely sick society to be able to accept as palatable the terrible cure totalitarianism.

The Assassination Model As a Key to Domestic Events

One must look to our model of the assassination for an explanation of what has happened to our domestic society since the killing of President Kennedy. Now that the Vietnamese War has been rejected by our people, we must keep our eyes and ears open for an inevitable split between the CIA and military. For, although the military still looks to winning on foreign fronts the war against Communism, the super-slick non-ideological CIA sees the need to bring the war home. We must be alert to CIA agents

who would promote the polarization of our society. We must examine the evidence which indicates that fake revolutionaries, who are inciting insurrection in our cities, have had their pockets and minds stuffed by the CIA.

The movement for peace in Vietnam has been silent too long on the critical issue of the assassination of President Kennedy. We cannot rest with the official federal government version of his assassination.

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