

# COUNTER-SPY

The Bulletin of:  
THE COMMITTEE FOR ACTION/RESEARCH  
ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

FALL, '73  
Vol. 1  
No. 3

60¢



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*Covert operation at dawn — CIA-directed special force of Khmer mercenaries crossing into Cambodia from Vietnam two years before Cambodia was officially invaded.*

*In this issue, CARIC presents a brief report describing a private war the American Intelligence Community (AIC) has been waging for more than twenty years against the sovereign people of Cambodia and their Head of State Norodom Sihanouk. The war is still continuing although our intelligence services and their agent Lon Nol are facing certain defeat. Except for Phnom Penh and a few other cities, the Royal Cambodian Government of National Unification (GRUNK) is in administrative control of Cambodia. We expect the GRUNK armed forces (FUNK) will soon gain control of the entire country.*

*Our expectations are based upon a study of current battle-field situations and an assumption of no renewed overt intervention by U.S. military forces. We do not rule out the possibility for a negotiated settlement.*

*Responsible for this issue: Tim Butz—Chief, Internal Security Watch Group  
Bart Osborn—Chief, Intervention Watch Group  
Winslow Peck—Resource Manager*

Cover: PIC, Paris

Above: Jim Page, LIFE

COUNTER-SPY is published quarterly by the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC). Address all correspondence to Box 647, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044. Telephone (202) 785-8330. Subscriptions: \$6/yr. individual, \$10/yr. institutions. Write for overseas and bulk rates. This issue of COUNTER-SPY is a product of CARIC staff members and does not necessarily reflect the views of all sponsoring members or associates. Copyright, © 1973.

# Citizens Sue CIA

*The Intelligence Community has always maintained a shield of secrecy around its internal operations and structure. The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, exists under a charter that is so highly classified that the Senators and Representative charged with approval of the CIA's budget have no idea of what the charter contains, or even how much money they grant to the CIA annually.*

*The illegality of maintaining a secret budget has created Congressional concern in the wake of revelations that the CIA was involved in domestic political affairs. The public and the Congress now know that the CIA provided equipment used by Watergate figures for partisan political intelligence activity, and the revelations have increased the public pressure for more public knowledge of CIA operations and finances.*

During the hearings held on the confirmation of William E. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence, Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss), the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, issued a statement from his hospital bed calling for a review of the CIA Act and the CIA's charter. When the Armed Services Committee does hold its hearings, there is little evidence that they will not follow the pattern of other hearings concerning the CIA and the Intelligence Community. The public will be barred from the sessions, and any transcript made public will be noteworthy only for the number of deletions.

Forcing the CIA to publicly reveal its budget became one force behind a lawsuit filed by civil rights attorney William Higgs and his co-plaintiff, Loren Weinberg, an instructor at the Federal City College in Washington, D.C. Higgs and Weinberg have filed their suit against a cross section of the government bureaucracy, and hope to force the courts to rule on two important constitutional questions and one statutory question.

The defendants in the case are:

*William E. Colby*, who in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, is responsible for the expenditure of CIA money and for CIA operations.

*George P. Schultz*, the Secretary of the Treasury. Schultz is legally charged with the publication of the budgets of all government agencies.

*David Mosso*, the Commissioner of Accounts for the Department of Treasury, legally charged with the preparation of the budgets for publication.

*Roy Ash*, the former President of Litton Industries and now the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.


*Casper Weinberger*, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, one of the government agencies that hides CIA appropriations within their budgets.

The Higgs-Weinberg case is a two pronged attack against the Intelligence Community. In addition to the questions of budget, the suit also seeks injunctive relief to prevent the CIA from engaging in unauthorized clandestine foreign wars, and to stop CIA domestic operations. The questions of the budget and the conduction of acts of war not authorized by Congress are clear Constitutional questions. The use of the CIA for domestic operations is a clear violation of the 1947 National Act, and is the primary statutory question involved in the suit.

The moves to seek injunctive relief from clandestine foreign wars and domestic operations are the major differences between the Higgs-Weinberg case and a suit filed by William Richardson, of Greenburg, Pennsylvania.

The Richardson suit is directed only against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Accounts, and is a taxpayers suit to force a release of a budget figure for the CIA. Richardson's suit does not call for a line by line breakdown of CIA expenditures, nor does it raise any of the concerns of illegal domestic and foreign operations.

The Higgs-Weinberg case is being conducted before U.S. District Court Judge William Bryant, described in a recent Washingtonian magazine article as being "... exceptional, although a bit slow to reaching a decision." Judge Bryant has been very slow in the Higgs-Weinberg case, he has yet to force the government to reply to interrogatories filed by the plaintiffs on October 15, 1972.



The interrogatories filed at that time would have changed the outcome of the 1972 elections if Judge Bryant had forced the government to reply. Among the questions asked by Higgs and Weinberg were questions that would have revealed that E. Howard Hunt used CIA equipment for several of his political intelligence activities, such as moving ITT lobbyist Dita Beard from Washington to Denver, interviewing potential intelligence operatives to gather information on Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass), and providing of CIA identification for Hunt and other Watergate figures.

The knowledge of the Hunt-CIA transactions came to public light in the spring of 1973, when the depth of political intelligence began to surface. The Higgs-Weinberg interrogatories would have made information public before the November 7th election, by asking questions such as:

“Have any funds of the CIA been used in, or for the benefit of, the reelection campaign of the President?”

“Did you or any other employees of the CIA have any knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the Watergate incidents or the espionage or sabotage activities of the Committee to Reelect the President prior to those circumstances becoming public knowledge by the news media? If so, what knowledge?”

In all, Higgs and Weinberg filed ten questions to be answered by the CIA, questions that could have shown the depth of CIA knowledge and involvement in the Watergate months prior to their discovery by the media.

Judge Bryant has done little to move the Higgs-Weinberg case. In addition to his laxness with the interrogatories, Bryant has stayed the proceedings of the case until the Supreme Court rules on the legality of the Richardson case. Richardson’s hearing will be in October, but the differences the two cases make it difficult to project how Bryant will interpret any Supreme Court ruling.

Richardson is suing only one agency, the Treasury Department, as a tax-payer. Higgs and Weinberg have brought a much broader suit against the Treasury Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Health Education and Welfare. Richardson wished only to force the government to reveal the CIA total budget figure; Higgs and Weinberg hope to force the courts to rule on the CIA budget and CIA operations.

President Nixon has expended a great amount of his energy and time in recent attempts to force the Watergate question out of the hands of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and into the courts. Given the recent decision in the Gainesville Conspiracy case, and the potential of civil lawsuits such as the Higgs-Weinberg case, Nixon’s hopes for a strong Executive may not meet well with court decisions.

CARIC has offered its logistical support for the Higgs-Weinberg case, and we ask that everyone concerned with a citizens action program against the CIA do likewise. Bill Higgs and Loren Weinberg can be contacted either through CARIC, or by writing to Loren Weinberg, 2332 19th St., NW, Washington, D.C., 10009.

# TARGET: Sihanouk

*When Prince Norodom Sihanouk succeeded to the throne of Cambodia in April, 1941, very few observers could foresee what history would demand of Sihanouk and Cambodia. There was little in 1941 to indicate that Sihanouk, as Head of State and the symbol of Cambodian independence and neutrality, would become a target of 20 years of covert war waged by the American Intelligence Community (AIC).\**

*The following is a brief report on our government's involvement with Cambodia, emphasizing the contributions of the AIC. We present this report as an example of secret government operations which have produced national shame. The secret war, which eventually escalated to overt war, could not bring about a defeat of Sihanouk's neutral foreign policy, but it did cost many Indochinese and American lives.*

*We urge all citizens to examine this record and then act to restrain present and future leaders in our government from following a similar path.*

In 1954, Cambodia accepted a pledge of neutrality at the Geneva Conference that ended the war between the French and the Vietminh. Later the Cambodians incorporated the following points in their constitution:

1. Cambodia is a neutral country.
2. Cambodia abstains from military or ideological alliances with other countries.
3. Cambodia will not commit aggression against other countries, but if she is the victim of aggression she reserves the right:
  - First, to take up arms in self defense.
  - Secondly, to appeal to the United Nations for help.
  - Thirdly, to appeal for aid from a friendly power capable of crushing the aggressor.

This neutrality Act continues to form the cornerstone of Sihanouk's foreign policy.

Sihanouk's neutralism has often been interpreted by Western observers as "leaning to one side"—the Communist side—in the ideological struggle between East and West. The error in this interpretation, which became dominant in American foreign policy during the Cold War, was in equating a nationalistic anti-imperialism with communism. Two of the leading American exponents of the "Monolithic Communist Menace" theory were John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under Eisenhower, and his brother Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961. John Foster Dulles branded neutralist Cambodia as a "missing link" in the containment perimeter he was forging around the communist world.

Although in 1956 Dulles stated that "the U.S.A. has never made any official observations concerning Cambodian neutrality", his "unofficial" attitude set the tone for future operations of the intelligence community (AIC) and the military services.

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\*The American Intelligence Community is an amorphous grouping of U.S. personnel and agencies having input into secret government operations. The AIC is sometimes referred to as the "Invisible Government" or the "Secret Team". For the purposes of this report, the AIC begins with the efforts of Allen and John Foster Dulles and ends with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The report covers both civilian and military efforts as well as those of foreign governments and mercenary forces involved in deposing Prince Sihanouk.

## THE OSS AND CAMBODIA

Indochina, which was to become of prime interest to the AIC, was only considered fifth in importance on a list of future priority targets projected by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) at the end of World War II. The OSS, the forerunner of the CIA, gauged Indochina's importance in terms of its industrial raw materials and potential markets for American capital—not as a bastion of anti-communism.

Cambodia, as the rest of Indochina, was under Japanese occupation during World War II. Although the OSS did have teams working with various national anti-Japanese resistance movements—including the Vietminh led by Ho Chi Minh—it does not appear that the OSS had contact with any Cambodians. Sihanouk kept his country out of war by ceaseless negotiation with the Japanese High Command.

Cambodia, until December of 1941, had been a protectorate of Vichy France. After Pearl Harbor, France ceded Indochina to the Japanese, who continued to rule through the French bureaucracy headquartered in Saigon. On March 9, 1945, the Japanese assumed full control of Cambodia and the rest of Indochina. The Japanese offered Sihanouk independence for Cambodia if Cambodia joined Japan's side in the war. Sihanouk says that he was "determined to squeeze every scrap of advantage I could get out of our newly acquired status." He explained to the Japanese High Command that he must have documents formally establishing the independence before he could begin mobilizing the country for war. Thus began a long series of negotiations until Japan was defeated by the Allies.

The OSS, during the last years of the war, was competing with British Intelligence (the Special Service Executive-SOE), the Kuomintang (KMT) intelligence service, and the French secret services over operations in Indochina. Finally, at the Potsdam Conference, the Big Three decided to divide French Indochina into two zones of occupation: areas above the 16th Parallel were to be liberated by Kuomintang troops (Northern Laos and Tonkin), areas below the 16th Parallel were to become British responsibility (Cambodia and Cochin China, with its capital in Saigon).

The British, primarily interested in regaining their Asiatic colonies, decided to help the Gaullist French regain control over their colonies in Indochina. The Vietminh demonstrated their strength in Tonkin by later proclaiming the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), thus preventing any "liberation" by

the Kuomintang. The rest of Indochina, however, was still available as colonies or protectorates for the Allies.

The OSS, already in conflict with the SOE over operations in the former British colony of Siam (now Thailand) began vying for control of clandestine operations in Cambodia and other parts of Indochina. In Cambodia and Cochin (South Vietnam), the British paved the way for the French to re-enter their former colonies. An anti-French resistance movement developed in Cambodia at this time called the Khmer Issarak, which grew from several small anti-Japanese groups. The Khmer Issarak cooperated with the Vietminh and the Free Lao forces in attacking French installations over the next few years.

The OSS was disbanded by President Harry Truman on September 20, 1945, but many of the "old Indochina hands" remained to protect American interests. Many of these hands were supportive of the nationalistic aims of the Indochinese, but government leaders in Washington were becoming increasingly alarmed at the success of the Vietminh in Indochina. The U.S. then began to underwrite 15% of the French military budget for Indochina. This figure was to rise steadily to approximately 80% in 1953-54.

The problem for the Cambodians was not the presence of American OSS agents, but rather the French effort to regain control over the former protectorate.

## THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE

With the Khmer Issarak and later elements of the Royal Cambodia Armed Forces (FARK) attacking French installations, Sihanouk pursued the path of negotiation he had perfected with the Japanese. The first step towards full independence was the Franco-Cambodian Treaty of 1949, which provided for qualified independence for Cambodia as an associate state within the French Union. This quasi-independence was not enough for Sihanouk and his subjects, who demanded full independence.

The anti-communist element of the American power-elite began to make its voice felt, vis-a-vis Cambodia, when Senator William F. Knowland and the U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, Donald Heath, went to Phnom Penh in late 1953. Knowland, who had close ties with the Kuomintang, and Heath insisted that Cambodia remain in French hands to fulfill the main task of destroying communism in Indochina. Sihanouk would have none of this business and assured the Vietminh that Cambodia would not be used for a base for operations

against other Indochinese. At the same time, Sihanouk declared that Cambodia was not Communist. The French, losing to the Vietminh on the battlefield, were unable to maintain their presence in Cambodia. On November 9, 1953, Cambodia became an independent nation.

American interests in Indochina in the period between 1945-53 are contradictory. It is certain that some officials—liberals from the old OSS—supported an independent Cambodia, but the dominant political thread in Washington was anti-communism. John Foster Dulles, in April, 1953, told Sihanouk to “defeat Communism in your area! Then we will put pressure on France to do what is necessary.”

#### CAMBODIAN DEMOCRACY AND SEATO

American anti-communist leaders, frustrated by their attempts to destroy communism in Korea, were determined to “contain” the growing influence of communist ideology at the 1953 growth level. But the growing weakness in France presented a problem for American leadership. Increasing numbers of officials—old Indochina hands, members of Congress, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—became convinced that the United States should no longer help the French.

One of the first missions to Indochina of the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency was the Special Technical and Economic Mission in Indochina in 1953. This mission was directed by Robert Blum, a former senior member of the OSS counter-intelligence team in Europe during World War II. Blum openly opposed French colonialism in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and shortly before his death in 1965 stated that it was inevitable that American intervention should replace French colonialism in Indochina.

In the last days of the French occupation, the French were openly accusing American intelligence of sabotaging French objectives. The credit for the French defeat, of course, does not lie with American intelligence but rather with the Indochinese quest for self-determination.

For Cambodia, the next step towards realizing this goal was Sihanouk's abdication of the throne in March, 1955. As Sihanouk stated “The role of a monarch, while suited for the royal crusade for independence, would not be suitable for the tasks ahead.” Various political factions in Cambodia were then competing for control; Sihanouk, as a voice of unity, decided to “step straight into the political arena.”

Sihanouk created an original form of democracy in Cambodia. A national Assembly was created with Deputies elected from 15

provincial assemblies. The Deputies in the provincial assemblies were elected from local communes (an administrative grouping of several villages) on the basis of their local records. Candidates stood for office as individuals and not as members of a political party, although political parties continued to function. The cabinet was appointed by the King—later by the Head of State—from among the elected Deputies. Sihanouk made his appointments so as to insure representation of most political factions. A month after abdication, Sihanouk, as the Head of State, introduced an even more novel form of democracy with the formation of the Sangkum Reaster Kium (the Popular Socialist Community) as an instrument of national unity. Sihanouk wanted the Sangkum to be composed of all parties and to give birth to a “truly democratic, egalitarian, and socialist Cambodia, to restore the past greatness of our motherland.”

The first parties to rally to Sihanouk's call for national unity were the right-wing groups, the Khmer Restoration Party, the Populist Party, and the National Democratic Party. The other parties—the Democratic Party, the Pracheachon (communist) Party, and the Liberal Party—at first opposed the Sangkum, but joined after the September 1955 elections to promote national unity. Two weeks after the 1955 elections, the first Sangkum National Congress was held.

The Sangkum Reaster Kium functioned from October, 1955, until December, 1969. The Congress, held twice yearly, presented the government officials with fact to face criticism from the Cambodia people—an act of democracy rare since the early days of Greece. But Cambodian Democracy and Sihanouk's neutralism had now become the targets of the American Intelligence Community.

John Foster Dulles was forging ahead with his plans to create anti-communist bastions in South Asia. In September, 1954, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed when the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. The Philippines, Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia were incorporated into the treaty area, although the governments of these countries were not signatories to the treaty.

Sihanouk then came under pressure from the Democratic Party and the right wing to join the umbrella of SEATO. Sihanouk wished to avoid involving Cambodia in a new war with their Indochinese neighbors, and after consultation with Nehru of India, Sihanouk continued to stress the policy of a neutral Cambodia. Sihanouk realized that Cambodia needed a

strong defense force if neutrality was to be viable, and agreed to accept U.S. military assistance. As a U.S. diplomatic mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group were established in Phnom Penh, the CIA was also establishing a Phnom Penh office.

The first post-Geneva conference Ambassador to Cambodia was Robert McClintock. In 1954 McClintock came from Saigon where, as Embassy Charge, he had helped Col. Edward G. Lansdale, Chief of the Saigon Military Mission, establish contact with South Vietnamese political leaders.<sup>1</sup>

With American presence in Phnom Penh established, John Foster Dulles dispatched his brother Allen, head of the CIA, to Phnom Penh in 1955. Allen Dulles presented elaborate "proofs" of impending communist aggression. The "proofs", however, did not coincide with Sihanouk's information and Dulles was told that Cambodia wanted no part of SEATO.

Ambassador McClintock then began to apply pressure on the royal family to force Sihanouk to join Cambodia with SEATO. McClintock failed in his mission, and only managed to strain relations between Cambodia and the United States by his condescending and obnoxious behavior towards the Cambodians.

McClintock's chief aid was Martin F. Herz, a former major in Army Intelligence during World War II. Herz went to work for the State Department after the war, working closely with the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency. Herz, like McClintock, exerted a great deal of pressure on various parties in Cambodia in attempt to bring Cambodia into SEATO. Herz later wrote *A Short History of Cambodia from the Days of Angkor to the Present* (New York, Praeger, 1958) which served as a major propaganda tool for the AIC's efforts to include Cambodia in Dulles' plans to fight communism in Indochina.

A last effort was made to include Cambodia in SEATO when Sihanouk was invited to the Philippines in March, 1956, by President Magsaysay. During the visit, Philippine leaders attempted to maneuver Sihanouk into making pro-SEATO announcements. They failed in their attempts.

Shortly after this, Sihanouk visited Peking and was received with warm affection. The June, 1956, Peking trip was a sharp contrast to the crude manipulative attempts to McClintock and the AIC-Supported Phillipinos. Sihanouk accepted a \$22.4 million grant from China, the first such grant made by the People's Republic of China to a non-communist country.

As Sihanouk held out against a Cambodia-SEATO alliance, the AIC began a series of both clandestine and overt economic reprisals coupled with military and intelligence operations designed to eventually link Cambodia with its neighbors Thailand and South Vietnam. The game plan, in the final analysis, became a private vendetta by the AIC against Sihanouk.

## EARLY INTERVENTION AND THE DAP CHHOUN PLOT

In early 1957, the South Vietnamese troops of Ngo Dinh Diem launched several minor incursions into Cambodia territory. In 1958, these troops invaded northern Cambodia, occupied a village, and moved the border markers to Cambodia's disadvantage. Sihanouk protested to both the U.S. and the International Control Commission, and was informed that he could not use American military aid against invaders who were a part of SEATO. During the same period, Cambodia was also invaded by right-wing members of the Krom tribe, called the Khmer Serei and led by Son Ngoc Thanh.

The Khmer Serei operated from bases in South Vietnam and Thailand; they were financed, trained, and armed by the CIA. Son Ngoc Thanh's second-in-command was Sam Sary.<sup>2</sup> The Khmer Serei operated with the assistance of the Thai and South Vietnamese governments.

In September, 1958, a month after Sihanouk returned from Peking, the SEATO Council met in Bangkok. Among the items covered by the conference was the question of how to deal with Sihanouk for having established diplomatic relations with Peking. It was decided to leave the details to the Thai government and the U.S. CIA. The next month, Field Marshall Sarit Thanarit seized power in Thailand with support from the CIA.

In November, 1958, Thanarit met in Bangkok with Son Ngoc Thanh and Ngo Trong Hieu. Hieu was Saigon's Consul-General in Phnom Penh and a relative of Ngo Dinh Diem. Several members of U.S. Ambassador to Thailand John Puerifoy staff were also in attendance at the meeting.<sup>3</sup>

At the meeting it was decided to finance an opposition party in Cambodia to undermine Sihanouk's regime. At the same time, an atmosphere of insecurity was to be created by kidnapping, armed hold-ups, and false rumors of a communist take-over. It was further decided to form armed groups inside Cambodia to prepare for an invasion from Thailand and South Vietnam.



The plan called for Son Ngoc Thanh to concentrate his three battalions of Khmer Serei on the Thai-Cambodian border at Battambang province. Thanh's deputy, Sam Sary, with help from Saigon's Ngo Trong Hieu, massed a similar number of right-wing Khmer Krom called KKK in South Vietnam commandoes on the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border. The expectation was that the Khmer Serei and KKK forces would link up after moving in from Thailand and South Vietnam. At the same time, there would be a coup in Phnom Penh led by Cambodian General Dap Chhuon.

Dap Chhuon was the commander of the armed forces in Siem Riep and Kompong Thom provinces, which included the world famous ruins at Angkor. Dap Chhuon concentrated his forces in strategic points in these provinces and placed men inside the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh. Sam Sary, in the mean time, had entered Cambodia with an appeal to Sihanouk to form a new party—decidedly pro-U.S.

In January, 1959, Sihanouk was warned of the plot by both Chinese and French intelligence. Sihanouk ordered the arrest of Sam Sary, who escaped with the help of Ngo Trong Hieu and the CIA's control for the operations, Victor Masao Matsui.<sup>4</sup>

One of Matsui's friends was Slat Peou, the brother of Dap Chhuon. Slat Peou was the Sam Riep province delegate to the National Assembly and had been a member of Sihanouk's delegation to India in 1955. It is possible that Slat Peou was first recruited by the CIA during the New Delhi trip; he has definitely admitted that he received instructions for the coup from

Allen Dulles while visiting New York City. Slat Peou was the contact between Matsui, Hieu, and Dap Chhoun.

After Sam Sary's escape, several meetings were held in the Angkor Wat, the famous temple in Sam Riep province. First Hieu payed a visit to Dap Chhoun in Angkor, then he left for Saigon. On February 7, 1959, two South Vietnamese, under the cover of Chinese employees of the "Kam Wah Film Company," arrived from Hong Kong with huge cases of radio equipment to be installed in Dap Chhoun's villa. Later that day, Admiral Harry Felt, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific CINCPAC, visited Dap Chhoun. Ten days later, General Lawton J. Collins arrived in Angkor. The next visit was from Col. Edward G. Lansdale, the chief U.S. advisor to the Diem regime. Finally, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Hopwood, visited Dap Chhoun at his villa.<sup>5</sup>

On February 21, Sihanouk sent troops to arrest Dap Chhoun. The troops commanded by General Lon Nol, then Chief-of-Staff of FARK, were guided into Siem Riep by Dap Chhoun's own forces. Dap Chhoun was captured and then shot. After Sam Sary's escape, Dap Chhoun and his CIA controllers had hoped to implement their minimal game-plan. The plan called for separating the northern provinces of Cambodia and merging them with the southern provinces of Laos, controlled by right-wing Prince Boun Oum of Champassac, but even this plan was foiled by Sihanouk's swift action.

The two South Vietnamese agents were arrested and evidence was collected that disclosed the framework of the plot and the

#### SON NGOC THANH

Born: South Vietnam—1908

Thanh is an ethnic Cambodian who was Secretary of the Buddhist Institute in Phnom Penh in 1937. After the Japanese seized Indochina, Thanh was set up as the Prime Minister of Cambodia. Arrested for treason by the French when they reoccupied Cambodia in 1945, he was sentenced to death. He was saved by Sihanouk's personal intervention and eventually permitted to return to Cambodia, where he launched a rightist armed movement ostensibly against the French, but in fact against Sihanouk. After failure he fled to Thailand, and then to Japan. In Japan he renewed his contacts with Japanese intelligence now being advised by American intelligence. He reappeared years later as head of the Khmer Serei, a CIA run organization based in Thailand and South Vietnam. The Khmer Serei and Thanh participated in many attempts to overthrow Sihanouk and his neutralist government. He returned to Cambodia as "special adviser" to Lon Nol, and was appointed Prime Minister in March 1972. He did not hold this post for long, but is a member of the ruling GRK High Political Council.

CIA's involvement. The radio equipment was seized along with the logbooks of communications between Dap Chhoun and Saigon and Bangkok. Seized also were 270 kilograms of gold in small ingots for paying agents and commando groups. The evidence was shown to a group of twenty diplomats including McClintock's replacement, Ambassador Carl Strom.<sup>6</sup>

Matsui and Hieu were expelled. Slat Peou was shot as a traitor. The Saigon radio operators were shot as spies. With the failure of this attempt to defeat Sihanouk's neutralism and install a pro-Western foreign policy on Cambodia, the AIC—led by the CIA and the military services—escalated their tactics.

Just six months later, on August 31, 1959 a postal bomb was mailed from a U.S. military post office in Saigon. The bomb was concealed in a lacquer box and set to explode when the wrappings were removed. The box was sent as a "gift" to Sihanouk's mother. The package was opened by Prince Vakrivan, the Chief of Protocol, who was killed immediately. A hole was blown through a thick concrete floor, killing the personal valet of Sihanouk's father, the King, and wounding two more servants. When a check was made of all present at the palace at the time, several of Sam Sary's relatives were found who admitted that Sam Sary had asked them to be at the palace that morning to report any unusual events. Sam Sary was with Song Ngoc Thanh in Saigon at the time.

In January, 1960, an Indian newspaper published a photostat of a letter written by Sam Sary to Edmund Kellog, political counsel attached to the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh. Dated September 3, 1959, the letter expressed "regret" for the failure of August 31 and said that "only the most effective measures can help us attain our common goals". According to the photostat, Sam Sary expressed "complete agreement with the opinion of your Ambassador, His Excellency, Mr. William Trimble, . . . and I can count upon his help and cooperation". Trimble had replaced Carl Strom as U.S. Ambassador to Phnom Penh.<sup>7</sup>

Another attempt to assassinate Sihanouk occurred toward the end of 1959. A young right-wing fanatic named Rath Vat was indoctrinated in assassination by Son Ngoc Thanh. He was infiltrated into the country with the help of CIA personnel and instructed to mingle with the crown during one of Sihanouk's visits to the rural provinces. He was spotted by the police and detained. A hand grenade and pistol were confiscated from Rath Vat, who admitted his contacts with the CIA and Son Ngoc Thanh.

As the war in South Vietnam grew in intensity, air raids and intrusions into Cambodian territory were begun. As early as 1956, the South Vietnamese newspaper *Tu Do Van Nghe* had declared: "The Chinese Communists are preparing to invade us via Cambodia. . . . It is to avoid breaks in our flanks that Vietnam and naturally Thailand must take defensive measures."

By 1958, the Saigon regime was warning Sihanouk that Cambodia territory must not be used "as a base for Communist infiltration and subversion against Vietnam, or as a refuge for Vietnamese outlaws. This then was the new pronouncement of the Dulles policy on neutralism: neutrality was "dangerous and immoral" because it provided a base "sanctuary" for communist activity. Yet even as late as 1964, there was no evidence of the existence of Vietnamese communist bases in Cambodia despite the Saigon government's various charges. In spite of all the raids, no evidence has been produced that a single DRV or NLF member was killed or a single "base" destroyed, yet the scope of civilian casualties and property destruction is documented. Having failed in the attempts at assassination, the AIC program for Cambodia now called for stepped up pressure by Thailand and South Vietnam.

In June 1958, Saigon troops invaded Strung Treng province. Sihanouk rallied his ill-equipped armed forces and through diplomatic pressure the Saigon troops were removed. The Strung Treng affair only increased the tensions between Phnom Penh and Saigon.

Equally upsetting to the Cambodians was the Thai occupation of Preah Vihear. This issue was settled in the International Court at the Hague in Cambodia's favor and the Thai troops withdrew in 1962. In the mean time Sihanouk had broken diplomatic relations with Thailand after Sarit Thanarit insultingly described Sihanouk as "a pig trying to stand up to a lion."

The Khmer Serei also increased their raids into Cambodia during this period, although President Kennedy, in a letter dated August 31, 1962, assured Sihanouk of his respect for neutrality. He assured Sihanouk that the United States had no role in the activities of the Khmer Serei. However the CIA was continuing support of the Khmer Serei. The Khmer Serei set up transmitters in South Vietnam and Thailand and broadcast anti-Sihanouk propaganda aimed at the Cambodian population.

In April of 1960, a crisis arose in Cambodia when Sihanouk's father King Norodom Surarait died. Sihanouk blames shock over the palace




**NOL, LON**

Born: November 13, 1913—Kompong Leau in Prey Veng Province.

His father commanded the guard post at Komchaimea, then was the head of the district of Puok under the French Administration. Lon Nol was educated at Chasseloup-Laubet high school in Saigon and started a career in law, then entering into government service in 1937. He climbed through the ranks of provincial administrator working primarily on rural development and became governor of the province of Kratie in 1945. He was head of the Cambodian delegation to the negotiations that returned Battambang province to Cambodia and became governor of the province of Kratie in 1945. He was head of the Cambodian delegation to the negotiations that returned Battambang province to Cambodia and became its governor in 1947. He took command of the FARK 2nd Battalion in 1952 and held the rank of lieutenant-colonel. He organized a right-wing militant group known as the Life Forces in 1953 which fought against the Viet Minh. In 1955, he entered the Military Academy and then was nominated head of the General Staff, and, after that, Minister of National Defense.

Lon Nol attained the rank of Colonel on December 3, 1953; brigadier-general on March 27, 1957; major-general on April 11, 1958; and lieutenant-general in November, 1961. He has been commander-in-chief of the Khmer Armed Forces since June, 1960 and was Minister of National Defense in most of the Sangkum governments. Lon Nol was named Prime Minister of the post-coup Salvation Government and was promoted to the rank of full general on October 9, 1971. He is currently Marshall of the Khmer National Armed Forces (FANK) and Prime Minister of the Khmer Republic (GKR).

Lon Nol is believed to have been a co-conspirator in the Dap Chuon Affair. Later Lon Nol and his brother Lon Non organized anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Svay Rieng (Parrot's Beak) province. Lon Nol is highly superstitious and is advised by Huot Tath, a monk of the Mohanikay Order, Huot Tath is reported to be in the pay of the CIA/CAS in Phnom Penh. Lon Nol is under a sentence of death pronounced by the GRUNK.



**MATAK, SISOWATH SIRIK**

Born: January 22, 1914 in Phnom Penh

As a Sisowath, Sirik Matak is a historical rival of Sihanouk who is of the Norodom branch of Cambodia royalty. Matak graduated from Chasseloup Laubat High School in Saigon and entered the Cambodian School of Administration in Cambodia (class of 1938). From 1938 to 1949, he worked his way up to the position of provincial governor. In 1949, he was chief of battalion and a major of the Cambodian armed forces in the autonomous sector of the country. In 1952, he was Secretary of State for National Defense, in 1953, Minister for Foreign Affairs, National Defense and National Education. In 1955 he was forced to give up the title Prince when Sihanouk downgraded the monarchy. In 1958, he became chief-inspector of Kingdom affairs and in 1962 a government delegate to UNESCO in Paris. He became ambassador to China and Mongolia in 1961 and in 1964 he was Minister of State for National Education. From 1966 to 1969 he was ambassador to Japan and the Philippines. While ambassador he came in contact with the Japanese, Philippine and American intelligence services.

He participated in many early attempts to depose Sihanouk and in 1969 was picked as vice-premier of the Government of National Salvation (GRK). In May 1971, he became Premier-Delegate of the GRK and in May 1973, now Lieutenant-General Matak became a member of the High Political Council of the GRK. Matak is reported to be the ranking member of the Cambodian power elite.

bombing for his father's early death. To avoid civil war caused by a scramble for power within the Cambodian royal family, Sihanouk began to phase out the monarchy. By June, all powers were vested in the Head of State and the National Assembly; the monarchy remained only as a symbol of national unity.

Except for the increasing raids into Cambodian territory from Thailand and South Vietnam, the years 1961-62 were relatively calm for Sihanouk. In 1963, however, Sihanouk and the AIC began a new series of battles. In July 1962, the Geneva Conference on Laos produced an agreement for a three party neutralist government in Vientien. But by April of 1963, after neutralist Laotian Prime Minister Quinim Pholsena was assassinated by a team recruited by the Laotian Military Police Chief—reported to have been paid by the CIA—the Geneva agreements were broken as the CIA backed government of Souvanna Phouma attacked the Pathet Lao (Neo Lao Haksat).

On the First of November, 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were overthrown and assassinated in Saigon. 22 days later, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Thus the stage was set for the next episodes of the AIC's war in Indochina.

Inside Cambodia, events were moving rapidly. The shock waves of the assassinations increased the concern of leftist Cambodians in Phnom Penh. Then, one month after the assassination in Laos, a plan was uncovered to assassinate Sihanouk and the President of the PRC, Liu Shao Chi, while the latter was on a state visit to Cambodia.

Two agents of the Kuomintang, including a high-ranking army officer from Taiwan, infiltrated Phnom Penh and rented a house alongside the airport road. The two began digging a tunnel towards the center of the road. A bomb was then to be placed in the tunnel and exploded as a car with Sihanouk and the Chinese emissary passed over. But Sihanouk's security forces had been warned by Peking when the two agents departed from Taiwan for Phnom Penh. They were captured and confessed that they had been recruited by both the Kuomintang and the CIA. They were tried and sentenced to death but were not executed. General Lon Nol pleaded with Sihanouk for their pardon.

Later that year a customs inspector noticed a damaged crate, one of several addressed to the U.S. Embassy. The crate was examined and found to be full of arms. Sihanouk claims that the arms were for a Khmer Serei fifth column being developed in Cambodia to aid the Thai and South Vietnamese plan for a "preventive war."

Then one of Son Ngoc Thanh's lieutenants, Preap In, marched into Takeo province from Thailand and announced to the governor, In Tam, that he was prepared to negotiate the surrender of Sihanouk. Preap In was arrested and after appearing before a special session of the National Congress—where he heard the expressions of loyalty to Sihanouk from the delegates—Preap In admitted that the Khmer Serei units were being organized across the Thai and South Vietnamese borders by the CIA. He further confessed that the CIA agents had convinced him that defeating Sihanouk would be easy; all he had to do was march in with his men and Sihanouk would surrender. Preap In was condemned by the National Congress and executed.

In South Vietnam, the war was escalating. Pacification attempts to force the rural population into "strategic hamlets" brought thousands of refugees into Cambodia. Many of the forced relocation operations violated Cambodian territory. Eventually, Sihanouk broke diplomatic relations with Saigon as he had with Bangkok.

#### SUPPRESSION OF THE LEFT/ECONOMIC INFILTRATION

In 1962, Marshall Lon Nol began a series of witch-hunts against the left in Cambodia. In 1963, Lon Nol produced several dossiers with "proof" that the left was plotting Sihanouk's overthrow. Hundreds of students, teachers, university professors and journalists began to disappear; many are presumed to have been killed by Lon Nol's police. Some, however, escaped due to assistance within the police. The purging of the left caused great political turmoil within the Sangum but these activities were overshadowed by other events. In November, 1963, forces of the NLF in South Vietnam captured a Khmer Serei headquarters in Can Tho province, SVN. Captured, along with Son Ngoc Thanh's troops, were several American Special Forces advisors. Training manuals and operational plans were found covering every method of assassination and sabotage and for establishing a base inside Cambodia. After this base was destroyed, the Khmer Serei main headquarters was switched to Thailand.

Then Sihanouk decided to end U.S. military aid to his country. From 1955 until 1963, Cambodia received a total of \$94 million in direct military aid. Aid to Cambodia from the communist countries during this period amounted to \$66.85 million, but unlike the U.S. aid the communist governments did not make provisions as to its use.

The aid program of the U.S., as Sihanouk observed, amounted to economic penetration of Cambodia. Aid programs took two forms. First direct aid took the form of American commodities flowing into the Cambodia market and the support funds of Americans living in Cambodia. Indirect aid took the form of a "counterpart fund" used to finance importation of consumer goods and the military. This fund became a device for U.S. control of dollars flowing into the hands of Cambodian importers and officials. This dollar flow, via the "counterpart fund," created a comprador class of what Sihanouk calls "dollar addicts." Corruption became widespread through most sectors of the Cambodian economy.

After Sihanouk stopped accepting military aid from the U.S., the National Congress, In November, 1963, established two mixed state-private companies: SONEXIM to handle exports and imports, and SONAPRIM for distributing imported goods through state shops and to control wholesale and retail trade. A good part of the profits which had formerly gone into the private bank accounts of the comprador class were now being diverted into national development programs. Of course, the leaders of the comprador class, most notably Sirik Matak, were upset at the loss of their profits gained from U.S. aid and the exorbitant rents they were charging U.S. military advisors, the Embassy, and businessmen who had left after Sihanouk's decision. Over the next few years the Cambodian comprador class would make many attempts to sabotage Sihanouk's policies and regain U.S. support.

A good example of economic penetration and its relationships to the AIC's war with Sihanouk is the Son Sakd affair. Son Sakd was a Thai born Chinese who came to Phnom Penh to invest in various businesses. He built several motels and founded the Bank of Phnom Penh with money Sihanouk claims came from the CIA. Sihanouk was approached by the governor of the National Bank who did not think Son Sakd was a banker. The National Bank governor, Son Sann, had noticed that several top government officials were depositing their accounts in the Bank of Phnom Penh and not the state banks. He investigated and discovered that Son Sakd was actually buying the services of high-ranking members of the government by paying higher interest rates—bribes—than the state banks. When government comptrollers arrived at the Bank of Phnom Penh they discovered that Son Sakd, possibly tipped off by Sirik Matak, had fled the country to Saigon with all the bank's funds. Son Sakd later joined Son Ngoc Thanh in Bangkok and became number three in the Khmer Serei triumverate, along with Son Sary.

When the bank's ledgers were examined it was discovered that the entire rightist coalition in the National Assembly, including Sirik Matak, were involved in the plan to siphon off capital from Cambodia. But due to the great number of deputies involved in the affair, Sihanouk was unable to do any more than confiscate Son Sakd's property, gaining back part of the stolen funds. But the comprador class created by the flow of U.S. dollars continued to be a resource for AIC operations in Cambodia and became a major force subverting Sihanouk's neutralist position.

## THE END OF NEUTRALITY

In 1964, the AIC escalated their attacks against Cambodian neutrality. Saigon's Air Marshal, Nguyen Cao Ky, put pressure on the Johnson Administration for operations into the DRV, Laos and Cambodia. The Johnson Administration then authorized implementation of OPLAN 34A. OPLAN 34A called for clandestine operations by U.S. and Allied personnel, including air raids against the DRV and Laos, and ground operations into the DRV, Laos, Cambodia, and the People's Republic of China, if necessary. On March 16, 1964, Robert McNamera made a substantial report to President Johnson, "On Steps to Change the Trend of the War." The final paragraph of the report made this proposal:

"12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian 'Border Control' actions . . . and the 'retaliatory Actions' against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days notice to initiate the program of 'Graduated Overt Military Pressure' against North Vietnam."

McNamera's view was that the plan would "present a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations against North Vietnam from which "I believe we should aim to select those that provide the maximum pressure with the minimum risk." Border control stations were defined by McNamera as meaning that U.S. and South Vietnamese forces could, in hot pursuit, move across the Cambodian border. They could also destroy NLF bases on the border.

Actually, OPLAN 34A became an authorization for various clandestine operations, including high altitude U-2 flights, low altitude reconnaissance flights, tactical and strategic bombing, and clandestine ground cross-border operations. Most of these operations were coordinated attacks on selected target areas.

The OPLAN 34A ground operations included sea raids on coastal installations sabotage campaigns, kidnapping for intelligence purposes,

psychological warfare, and support for counter-guerrilla forces including the Khmer Serei. Although the plan was approved on Feb. 1, 1964, the ground and air operations had begun much earlier.

Chosen to organize these cross-border operations were elements of the Army's Special Forces, the Navy's "SEAL" teams (Sea Air Land) and the Air Forces's Air Commandoes/Special Operations Forces. Most of the raids into Cambodia from South Vietnam were organized by elements of the Army's 5th Special Forces Group.

Organizing of OPLAN 34A was left to the office of General Victor H. Krulak, the Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities (SASCA). SASCA had been created in 1962 and was a staff element of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; its role was to coordinate clandestine operations for the entire AIC, including the CIA, Pentagon, and White House, SASCA enjoyed operational control over the counter-insurgency forces of the military services.<sup>8</sup>

Shortly after creating the Special Forces in 1960, President Kennedy created a special group within the National Security Council called the Special Group Counter-Insurgency (SGCI). The SGCI was the descendant of a similar committee under the Eisenhower Administration known as Special Group 5412. Later, Johnson changed its name to the 303 Committee and then to SIGS. The committee is now referred to as the 40 Committee. This is the committee which had the overall responsibility for organizing the clandestine activities in Cambodia.

In South Vietnam, a group was formed within the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) to supervise cross-border operations. The Studies and Observations Group (SOG) was headquartered in Saigon and reported directly to SASCA.

Supportive elements, such as medics and helicopter pilots came from other elements of MACV, but most of the U.S. personnel came from the 5th Special Forces. These "Green Berets" in SOG devised their own emblem based on the skull and crossbones, which they placed in the base bar and on their beer mugs. At their bases they continued to wear the emblems of the Special Forces, but once assigned to SOG they were no longer controlled by the 5th Special Forces headquarters in Hga Trang.

The bulk of SOG forces were native mercenaries formed into Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) by the Special Forces. The Khmer Serei and the KKK forces were called Mike Forces of the CIDG. Besides cross-border operations, the Mike Forces operated several broadcast radio stations with

equipment and advisors provided by the Australian forces in South Vietnam and Thailand.

A former SOG officer told Barry Lando for his article in the *Washington Post* that the CIDG and Mike Forces "liked to work for us. They weren't just mercenaries. They knew that if anything happened to them in action we'd bust our ass to take care of them. They were good soldiers—Mountagnards, Cholon cowboys, lots of Cambodians. Many of them became fine soldiers. The good ones were as good as any soldier anywhere. We trained them for weeks at the base camps and those patrol units became as tight as brothers."

SOG maintained three field offices known as Command and Control units C&C. C&C North organized operations into the DRV and Laos. C&C Central had responsibility for operations into the DRV and Laos. C&C Central had responsibility for operations into Southern Laos and parts of Cambodia. C&C South operated in the southern areas of Cambodia. The primary bases for the Command and Control units were:

C&C North – Quang Tri, Hue/Phu Bai, and  
Marble Mountain near DaNang  
C&C Central – Kontum, Dac To  
C&C South – Banmethout, Long Binh

Each of these main base camps had approximately 150 American personnel (SF & CIA) and from 300 to 600 mercenaries. From the early 1960's until 1971, the American personnel assigned to C&C were administratively a part of the 5th Special Forces. When the 5th SFG was officially withdrawn from Vietnam in January, 1971, C&C personnel stayed on under the cover of the Task Force On e Advisory Element.

Infiltration into Cambodia was a secret combination of helicopter missions and ground patrols. The utmost secrecy was maintained on these missions; even the helicopter pilots were forced to sign a loyalty declaration for each mission they flew. Exfiltration was not often easy, and there are indications that a common belief amongst C&C American personnel was that if a mission failed, they would be abandoned and listed officially as missing in action.

Only four or five patrols would be operating from any one base at a single time because of the extensive support force needed for infiltration. The patrols would carry all the equipment they would need for operations lasting up to several weeks. American and Khmer Serei personnel would wear "sterile" uniforms (no insignia) or full North Vietnamese uniforms. It is

possible that cross-border teams would occasionally try to pass themselves off as members of FARK.

After the teams were inserted into Cambodia, helicopters would hover over the area for a few minutes, ready to protect the ground team in case of an ambush. "When the (helicopter gunships) were gone," a former SOG officer said, "you lived with constant mental strain. The fear never left you. It was worse than for anyone else in the war because of the isolation. Six or seven men and yourself and no one else within 100 miles except the enemy."

There were two distinct types of patrols; unilateral and bilateral. Unilateral patrols involved American personnel only, and no foreign governments or groups were advised of these operations.

Bilateral operations would involve foreign personnel—either the mercenary troops or elements of Saigon's Armed Forces (RVNAF). The Military Security Service (MSS) and the LLDB (Special Forces) were Saigon's units involved with cross-border actions into Cambodia. In 1965, SOG operations into Cambodia were known as Project Omega. On May 22, 1967, the program was officially begun with the code-name DANIEL BOONE and later the name was changed to SALEM HOUSE.

According to the Pentagon the following restraints were placed on DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE:

- a. Only reconnaissance teams were to be committed and could not exceed an overall strength of 12 men to include not more than three U.S. advisors.
- b. Tactical air strikes (TACAIR) and/or the commitment of additional forces were not authorized across the border into Cambodia. Teams were not to engage in combat except to avoid capture.
- c. No contact with civilians was permitted.
- d. No more than three reconnaissance teams could be committed on operations into Cambodia at any time.
- e. The total number of missions could not exceed ten in any 30-day period."

These restraints were designed to prevent any accusations of American ground fighting in Cambodia. The Pentagon has not indicated what restrictions were placed on the Mike Forces and RVNAF participating in SALEM HOUSE.

The Pentagon (DOD) states that the missions were "basically intelligence collection and verification." The DOD has not indicated what intelligence collection and verification methods were used.

The DOD has also revealed the "authorized" penetration restrictions. By October, 1967, SALEM HOUSE operations along the entire

Cambodian-South Vietnamese border were authorized to a depth of 20 Kilometers. The use of helicopters for infiltration was authorized at the rate of five per month to a depth of 10 kilometers into Cambodia. In December, 1967, with State Department concurrence, the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, authorized the use of Forward Air Control (FAC) aircraft over the SALEM HOUSE area to control helicopters and to conduct reconnaissance of the landing areas. Only two such flights were authorized.

After the Tet offensive of 1968, SALEM HOUSE cross-border ground reconnaissance operations into Cambodia were modified. The emplacement of land mines with self destruct features was authorized in October, 1968. By December, the depth of these operations was increased to 30 kilometers in the northern part of Cambodia. In the central and southern operating area—where specific JCS approval was required for any ground reconnaissance operation—penetrations were limited to 20 kilometers. While the restriction on numbers of participating U.S. personnel was removed, total team size remained at 12 members, and various additional restrictions reemphasized the intelligence collection and verification nature of SALEM HOUSE."

Some of these routine reconnaissance and intelligence collection and verification programs included intelligence observation, interdiction of communications and supplies, sabotage, kidnapping, and assassinations. Some operations were known as Search, Locate, and Anihilate Missions (SLAM). Another activity was leaving behind the dummy ammunition for the insurgent forces to find. The ammo was packed in boxes with exactly the same markings found on regular insurgent ammunition. But the ammunition left by the SALEM HOUSE teams was packed with a high explosive instead of gunpowder. The ammunition was dropped along well travelled paths in the jungle in the hope that insurgent forces would find it and attempt to use it. The booby-trapped ammunition was for small arms, mortars and machine guns.

These cross-border missions were at first supported by South Vietnamese air units bombing in Cambodia. Later in 1969, the U.S. officially began covert bombing of Cambodia. American and South Vietnamese assaults by land and air against Cambodia continued from the first implementation of OPLAN 34A. In 1965, the Western press began an attack on Sihanouk and his family. Most of the false information in these reports was supplied by the CIA. Then on April 28, American planes bombed the Cambodian villages of Cheap Tatep and Veal Moream Tiek in Kompong Cham

**CLANDESTINE U.S. OPERATIONS AGAINST  
CAMBODIA 1967-August 15, 1973\***

**DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE/THOT NOT  
(Ground Cross-border Operations)**

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971-April 1972
<b>Missions<sup>1</sup></b>					
Reconnaissance Team	99	287	454	558	437
Platoon	0	0	0	16	22
Multi-Platoon	0	0	0	3	9
<b>Support Missions</b>					
Helicopter Gunship Sorties <sup>2</sup>	67	359	398	1548	568
TACAIR Sorties <sup>3</sup>	34	48	0	1239	659



**AIR OPERATIONS**

**MENU (B-52 ARC LIGHT Strikes)**  
March 18, 1969 to May 26, 1970

Sorties **3,875**  
Tons **108,823<sup>4</sup>**

**PATIO (TACAIR Missions April-May 1970)**

Sorties **156**  
Tons **unknown**


**FREEDOM DEAL (TACAIR Operations)**

**June 30, 1970 to February 17, 1971**

Sorties **Over 8000**

**February, 1971 to August 15, 1973<sup>5</sup>**

Sorties **unknown**  
Tons **unknown**



\*This information is compiled from DOD White Paper *Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and Laos*, September 10, 1973 and from the April, 1973 Staff report on Cambodia prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1. All statistics appear to be for bi-lateral operations only. Reconnaissance Teams usually included three U.S. personnel. Platoon's would include 5-6 Americans and 20-22 were authorized for a multi-platoon force. It is believed that virtually all of the 1,119 RT's, Platoon, and 1 multi-platoon operations conducted between May 22, 1967 and June 30, 1970 involved U.S. participation. The Pentagon has no records of total U.S. participation.

2. These statistics do not include fixed-wing gunship sorties in Cambodia in support of SALEM HOUSE or the 1970 invasion.  
3. None of these sorties admitted to be in Cambodia until April 20, 1970. Earlier sorties officially in SVN or LAOS. These statistics are supposed to reflect the sorties in support of SALEM HOUSE and not PATIO or FREEDOM DEAL.

4. These ARC LIGHT's occurred in six base areas in Cambodia code-named: DESSERT, SNACK, DINNER, BREAKFAST, LUNCH, SUPPER.

5. TACAIR operations were continued after February, 1971 at the request of the GKR until the bombing halt in August, 1973.



province. On May 3, 1965, Sihanouk expelled several private U.S. interests, including the Asia Foundation, for subversive activities.<sup>9</sup>

By this time, many members of the AIC, the military services and the governments of Thailand and South Vietnam were convinced that Cambodian neutralism must be stopped even if it meant invasion by U.S. troops. But President Johnson and McNamara were against a full invasion. Instead OPLAN 34A was allowed to continue but plans for invasion were probably prepared by the DOD.

Events in Cambodia would move fast over the next few years as Lon Nol, head of the rightist coalition, emerged the winner of the September 11, 1956 general elections. Lon Nol was appointed Prime Minister by Sihanouk and three prominent left-wing deputies, elected in the September election left Phnom Penh to organize guerrilla forces (the Khmer Rouge) in the frontier areas in early 1967. In April, Lon Nol attempted to expropriate the farms of peasants in Battambang province near Thailand. The peasants rose up in arms to resist the expropriation and Lon Nol used this as one of several "proofs" that China was going to invade. Sihanouk remained unconvinced. In April, 1967, Lon Nol temporarily resigned after an automobile accident but he would come back to power in 1969.

#### SIHANOUK GAMBLES AND LOSES

From the end of 1967 through 1968, the right wing was ascendant in Cambodia and they made preparations for taking power on a program "entirely devoted to American politics." By June 11, tensions with the U.S. had lessened and diplomatic relations began, again. The new American Ambassador to Cambodia was Lloyd Rives.<sup>10</sup> With Rives arrived American intelligence . . . Agents from Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, South Vietnam and Japan were also soon operating in Phnom Penh.

American aggression continued despite the reopening of diplomatic relations, though below the peak years of 1967 and 1968. When the Nixon Administration took power in January, 1969, it appeared that aggression towards Cambodia might decrease. Cambodia casualties from attacks in 1969 were down to 33 dead and 114 wounded, compared with 85 dead and 184 wounded the previous year. But then under the President's own authority the attacks increased. Bombing, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare flights increased over Cambodia in February 1969.

On March 17, 1969, the U.S. began B-52 operations (ARC LIGHT) into Cambodia using the code name MENU. MENU operations used a

complicated dual-reporting system for security reasons. These operations were coordinated by the Strategic Air Command Advanced Ecelon (SACADVON) attached to MACV. SACADVON was a liaison unit from SAC to MACV and coordinated the bombing missions via several MSA—all weather, bombing control, ground radar—sites named COMBAT SKYSPOT.

Besides these SAC MSQ units facilitating MENU operations, elements of the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) community aided MENU and SALEM HOUSE operations. Various types of orbiting and ground communications monitoring platforms (stations) operated in South East Asia. Many were targeted with Cambodia. The ARDF (Airborne Radio Direction Finding) Coordination Center (ACC) in Saigon, maintained by the 509th RRG (ASA) and the 6994th SS (AFSS), coordinated several airborne platforms flying over Cambodia from February, 1969. These missions were charged with locating insurgent units in Cambodia and the information they collected was used for planning of both MENU and SALEM HOUSE operations.

Between April 18 and May 14, 1969, U.S. spray planes defoliated nearly 40,000 acres of rubber—about a third of the total rubber in Cambodia. American bombardment continued throughout the year and on the ground SOG continued organizing cross-border deployments.

But events turned for the worse for the Special Forces and the AIC in 1969. Several members of C&C unit B-57 and the Commander of the 5th Special Forces were charged with murder and conspiracy to cover-up murder, by General Creighton Abrams, the Commander of MACV. This act was prompted by a long standing conflict between the Special Forces and the regular Army. The conflict was a result of the elite Special Forces being controlled more by the CIA—via SACS—than by the Army. The case was dropped because the CIA wouldn't allow its agents to testify at the court martial. The shock of this event helped restrain SALEM HOUSE operations for a time.

Sihanouk was gambling for neutrality. As diplomatic relations with the U.S. resumed, Sihanouk began negotiations to resume official contact with Thailand. In January members of the Khmer Serei began to cross the border from Thailand coming from their main bases of Bos Ampeou, Thkav, and Tatum. About 2,000 Khmer Serei were stationed at these bases receiving aid and advice from the CIA and the SRKPP—Thai Clandestine service. But as they came across they "rallied" to the Royal government in Phnom Penh. In truth they were just preparing themselves for the day when Son Ngoc Thanh would lead an invasion into Cambodia. Sihanouk's gamble was that they had

truly rallied for national unity. In September 1969, Sihanouk went to Hanoi to attend the funeral ceremonies of DRV President Ho Chi Minh. This occasion was used by the Cambodian right to step up its attacks on Sihanouk; accusing him of communist sympathies.

#### MARCH 18 COUP

In recent weeks evidence has come to light indicating that the CIA, the Khmer Serei and KKK, and Lon Nol conspired to overthrow Sihanouk in the 1970 coup. While Son Ngoc Thanh was organizing his invasion via infiltration of Khmer Serei "ralliers" to the Royal Army (FARK), Lon Nol, head of FARK, and Sirik Matak were making plans for a coup.

Lon Nol made contact with Son Ngoc Thanh in September of 1969, shortly after the Special Forces in Vietnam were shaken by the murder scandal. Then Thanh's invasion plan was terminated in favor of the coup. Lon Nol left for Paris in October, 1969, and while at a hospital recovering from an injured shoulder, he met with CIA personnel and solicited U.S. support for a coup. It appears that Sirik Matak was a chief promoter, among the comprador class, for Sihanouk's overthrow. Sirik Matak then attempted to destroy the nationalist economic measures instituted years earlier by Sihanouk. He attempted to denationalize the banks, dismantle SONEXIM and SONAPRIM and take other measures designed to facilitate U.S. economic penetration of the economy.

Early in January Sihanouk left for a medical cure in France as more Khmer Serei and KKK troops were entering Cambodia. Lon Nol in the mean time, had been sent a shipment of arms aboard the *Columbia Eagle*, which used the entry cover of being "hijacked" by two anti-war sailors.

The AIC at this time had two options for disposing of Sihanouk. Firstly, they could support an invasion by Son Ngoc Thanh. The risk value in this would be great considering the extent of the MACV/Special Forces conflict and the failure of other CIA backed invasions. The other option was to back a coup by the rightest comprador class. This option then became the game-plan for ending Cambodian neutralism.

Just before the coup, Mike Forces (KKK) troops were sent to CIA training camps in Greece. They then were sent to Phnom Penh as "ralliers" and were armed with the weapons brought in by the *Columbia Eagle*.<sup>11</sup> In early March anti-Vietnamese demonstrations broke out in Svay Rieng province (the Parrot's Beak) led by Lon Nol's brother Lon Non. A few days later demonstrators, led by Lon Non, attacked the Embassies of the PRG and the DRV.


Sihanouk had left Paris for Moscow and, as he was preparing to leave Moscow for the next stop in his diplomatic trip (Peking) he received word that the National Assembly, headed by Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, had disposed him as Head of State while Lon Nol's troops—including the KKK—occupied Phnom Penh.

After Sihanouk was deposed, Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh and others in the National Assembly declared Cambodia to be a republic (GKR). The GKR's armed forces, including the Khmer Serei ralliers, became known as the FANK—previously the FARK. Lon Nol imposed the usual post-coup internal security measures—mass arrests of minority leaders and political dissidents and imposition of martial law. The criminal justice process was abandoned in favor of swift execution. And as usual a post-coup resistance movement began as thousands of Cambodians rallied to Sihanouk's call for resistance from his new headquarters in Peking. Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge established a government in exile called the Royal Government for the National Unification of Cambodia (GRUNC) with its armed forces the FUNK.

Within weeks the FUNK forces had spread throughout Cambodia. As they deployed their forces they abandoned many of the base camps they had previously occupied near the Vietnamese borders. Many of these camps were undoubtedly *ban trams*—supply depots, hospital areas, bivouac and rear-echelon bases of NLF activity in SVN. The existence of these so called "sanctuaries" had for some time been the excuse for SALEM HOUSE and MENU operations and in April of 1970 would be the cover for the overt military invasion of Cambodia in support of a failing Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime.

Another Special Group within the National Security Council, WSAG—Washington Special Action Group formed after an EC-121 electronic warfare plane was shot down near North Korea in April, 1969—developed the plans for OPERATION PROMETHEUS—the so called FISH-HOOK incursions.<sup>12</sup> Since the invasion in 1970 most operations by the AIC have been overt—increased U.S., Vietnamese and Thai bombing, continued cross-border activity and direct military and economic support of the Lon Nol regime.

On April 24, 1970, the first authorized use of U.S. TACAIR units, in addition to the B-52 sorties, began in support of the Allied invasion. Code-named PATIO, 156 sorties are admitted to have been flown over Cambodia. But the Pentagon admits that due to the special security precautions—dual reporting—and inadvertant mistakes, that its records are not accurate. The total tonnage of munitions dropped by TACAIR



Sir. R.G.K. Thompson visits Lon Nol during recent mission to Phnom Penh on behalf of President Nixon

ROBERT G. K. THOMPSON  
Born: Surrey, England—1916

Thompson has been a career civil servant since 1938. At age 22, fluent in Cantonese, he joined the British Malayan Civil Service. Caught in Hong Kong in 1941, at the outbreak of combat with Japan, he travelled into China, joined an RAF unit supporting the Wingate Chindits (an Indian-British combined infiltration and sabotage force operating behind Japanese lines in 1943 and 1944). He was active during World War II with OSS and British SOE operations in China and Burma, and after the war returned as Chinese Affairs Officer in Ipoh, Malaya. Starting in 1948, with the activation of the Malayan popular front, Min Yuen, Thompson acted as the planner and advocate of early counter-insurgency programs. These included "national registration" (government ID's for all citizens over 12, with thumb print and photograph), a system of wanted notices and bounties issued for the key leaders of the insurgent forces, and neutralization (assassination) teams such as the Ferret Force 136, attempting to project as much colonial government influence as possible beyond the capital. Together with media censorship of the Straits Times and local press, controlled areas—such as the "sleep with the planters" program of protecting plantations and their owners—and control of intelligence operations under the Malaya High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney, Thompson developed a program for control of the civilian population. These programs emphasized police rather than military operations, as would his later recommendations for programs in SE Asia including South Vietnam.

With his experience as a counter-insurgency planner, Thompson worked with Colonel Edward Geary Lansdale of the CIA and others in South Vietnamese paramilitary operations. In competition with US proposals for counter-insurgency under

Lansdale of the US mission Advisory Group, Thompson advised President Ngo Dinh Diem as head of the British Advisory Mission. With the acceptance of his proposal for counter-insurgency programs in October, 1961, the Saigon government escalated its police actions and political repression. It was Thompson's contribution to suggest that an effective long-range effort by Saigon "should lead by stages to a reorganization of the government machinery for directing and coordinating all action against the communists and to the production of an overall strategic operational plan for the country as a whole, defining responsibilities, tasks and priorities. At the same time it will lead to the establishment of a static security framework which can be developed eventually into a National Police force into which can be incorporated a single security intelligence organization for the direction and coordination of all intelligence activities against the Communists. "I agree with your Excellency", Thompson added in his report to Diem, "that it would be too disruptive at the present moment to try to achieve these (ends) immediately and that they should be developed gradually. Using a medical analogy, the remedy (to civilian control) should be clinical rather than surgical."

Thompson is one of the last of the World War II generation of flamboyant old guard, to whom social change is a threat. Since the de-escalation of US ground warfare and the resultant emphasis on police control of the population (public safety programs), he has returned to Indochina as Special Advisor to President Nixon on counter-insurgency affairs.

units is unknown.

Following the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Cambodia in June of 1970, TACAIR operations were continued under the code-name FREEDOM DEAL. FREEDOM DEAL sorties numbered over 8000, many of them flown in areas of Cambodia not occupied by U.S. forces. Again the total tonnage is unknown.

SALEM HOUSE cross-border operations continued after the invasion until June 30, 1970, the date of withdrawal of U.S. forces. The operation was then Vietnamized and called THOT NOT. Although no U.S. forces were authorized on the ground in Cambodia after this time there are indications that the operations are continuing. In any event U.S. support for THOT NOT officially ended on April 30, 1972. Although the Pentagon states that only 27 U.S. personnel were killed on SALEM HOUSE missions in Cambodia there are indications that this figure is much higher. The DOD does not know the total number of U.S. personnel who were operating in Cambodia from 1967-70.

After the coup, invasion, and subsequent world protest, Congress passed legislation limiting the ceiling on U.S. personnel in Cambodia to 200. Many of these men are direct hire personnel of the CIA. Others belong to AID and the military services. Still others are contract personnel for CIA supported airlines—Air America, 999—or advisors from various American Companies—Bell Tech, Federal Elec-

tric Corporation, etc. Almost all U.S. personnel currently stationed in Phnom Penh are in some manner continuing the private war on Sihanouk declared by the Dulles brothers twenty years ago.

U.S. military and economic aid from FY 1946-1971 only totalled \$588.5 million. Total appropriations for FY 1972-73 however have risen to \$573 million for this two year period. Among other items, the military portion of this aid met the payrolls of FANK. FANK at times received pay for as many as 300,000 soldiers although surveys indicated that the FANK forces may never have been greater than 180,000 active personnel. Presumably the funds paid to the "phantom soldiers" have found their way into the pockets of corrupt GRK personnel.

Estimates of the FUNK forces are contradictory. The official DIA, CIA, and State Department estimate is that no more than 50,000 troops are deployed against the Lon Nol forces. More realistic estimates are that Sihanouk's army numbers closer to 250,000.

Currently the battle between American intelligence and Sihanouk is at a stalemate. Lon Nol's government is not stable but Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge have not occupied Phnom Penh. In Phnom Penh infiltration is increasing and the cities are facing constant food shortages.

Cambodia, once a major rice exporter, now imports rice from Texas to feed its own people.

The Lon Nol government controls only a few provincial capitals and the city of Phnom Penh. GRUNC controls almost 90% of the countryside and over half of the population are under its administration. Many officials now believe that there are no Vietnamese fighting with the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk has stated that he is only waiting till enough munitions arrive from China before an offensive will begin against the Lon Nol regime. Without renewed American air support it is doubtful that the Lon Nol government can survive this offensive.

Because of this possibility, some members of the Government are proposing negotiations with Sihanouk before the Khmer Rouge take power in Phnom Penh. But this concept is being resisted by other members of the AIC who refuse to deal with Sihanouk. Sihanouk has rebuffed Dr. Henry Kissinger's attempt to negotiate.

Whether the war between American intelli-

gence and Sihanouk ends by negotiation or one last battle the outcome is obvious. After twenty years of deception, sabotage, attempted assassination, and war, all that the American Intelligence Community has succeeded in doing is what Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) feared they would in 1962. In a report that year to President Kennedy, Senator Mansfield noted that "it seems to me essential that we go very far in attempting to find practicable solutions which will meet the Cambodian desire for reassurance that it will not be overwhelmed from either Vietnam on the east or Thailand on the west. Cambodian fears exist. They are probably excessive fears at least in present circumstances. Nevertheless, there are powerful and deeply felt fears based in part on history and it would be most unwise to underestimate their potential influence on Cambodian policy. It would be most unfortunate if they pushed Cambodia further in the direction of China."

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#### FOOTNOTES

1. For more information see Lansdale, E.G. *In the Midst of Wars* (Harper & Row, New York) 1972, and "Pacification: The 100 year Flight of the Phoenix," CARIC's *COUNTER-SPY* Vol. 1, No. 2, (May) 1973.
2. Sam Sary was the principal Cambodian negotiator at the 1954 Geneva Conference. While Ambassador to London, he beat up one of his female servants, who he had been using as a concubine. She ran into the streets and was rescued by the London police. After Sary explained that beating servants was a Cambodian custom, he was recalled. Shortly after this, he fled to South Vietnam and joined the Khmer Serei. It is now believed that he was killed by Son Ngoc Thanh.
3. For more information on the coup in Guatemala see Wise, David and Ross, Thomas B. *The Invisible Government* (Random House, New York) 1964. 165-183. Puerifoy participated in the coup.
4. Matsui was a Japanese-American who was later expelled, in 1966, from Karachi, Pakistan for subversive activities. Matsui is currently under cover as a political officer in the US Embassy in Abijan, Ivory Coast.
5. Harry Donald Felt is currently on the Executive committee of Telecheck International, Inc., the advisory board of Crocker Bank and President of the Hawaii Foundation for American Freedoms. He resides in Honolulu, Hawaii. We do not know the whereabouts of Hopwood. Collins is a director of American Securities and Trust Co.
6. McClintock is currently Ambassador AEP to Argentina. We do not know Strom's whereabouts.
7. Trimble is still listed as a counselor with the State Department, although primarily retired, and lives in Brooklandville, Md.
8. SACSA is now known as the Defense Office for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (DOCSA) and is commanded by General William R. Wolfe.
9. The Asia Foundation, at the time, was directed by Robert Blum (see text).
10. Rives was succeeded by Amory C. Swank. Swank, well known for his connections with American intelligence, has since left Phnom Penh.

11. During the invasion in 1970, the commander of one KKK unit admitted to western journalists that he and his men liked to eat the livers of Vietnamese people. Several photographs of this Khmer Serei cannibalism appeared in the media.

12. The membership of WSAG, at the time, was Dr. Henry Kissinger, chairman; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard; General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, and Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Admiral Thomas J. Moorer often replaced General Wheeler in these meetings. Also, Lt. General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., Deputy Director of the CIA had input into WSAG plans for the invasion.

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## Gainesville

On August 31st, a Gainesville, Florida, jury acquitted eight members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization of charges that they had conspired to violently disrupt the 1972 Republican National Convention. The trial of the Gainesville Eight closely parallels that of other anti-war activists, but the government's motivation for the trial went beyond another attempt to stifle anti-war activism.

From the beginning of the 14 month lag between indictment and acquittal that Gainesville Eight charged that they were selected for prosecution as a part of the Watergate cover-up. The connections between Watergate and Gainesville have taken months to establish, and there are still more connections to unearth.

CARIC has compiled this analysis from documents presented during the trial of the Watergate burglars, from testimony presented to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, and from interviews with the Gainesville Eight, their attorneys, and our own sources.

On July 7, 1972, only 20 days after the Watergate 7 were caught inside the Democratic National Committee offices, a Federal Grand Jury was convened in Tallahassee, Florida. The Grand Jury was enpaneled by the head of the Justice Department's Special Litigation Section (SLS), Guy Goodwin. Goodwin had previously headed the government's prosecution attempts against the Chicago Seven, the Camden 28, the Seattle 8, the Harrisburg 8, and others.

On July 10, the opening day of the Democratic National Convention, Goodwin began questioning the 24 members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War he had subpoenaed. On July 13th, the Grand Jury handed down indictments against VAW members Scott Camil, Alton Foss, John Kniffen, Peter Mahoney, William Patterson, and Donald Perdue. On

October 18th, two additional indictments were handed down against Stanley Michelson and John Briggs, the only non-Vietnam veteran indicted.

Immediately after the original indictments were handed down, Nixon campaign groups in the South and West began circulating a brochure titled "52 Reasons Why McGovern Must Be Defeated"; Reason 32 cited McGovern's support of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. While the brochure was an appeal to ignorance rather than reason, it was the first indication that the Gainesville Conspiracy was more than another incident of government harassment of the left.

After the anti-McGovern brochure appeared, members of the Gainesville Eight began speculating that their trial was tied to the Watergate cover-up. It was not until the trial of the Watergate burglars that evidence of a motive for their prosecution became evident. On January 17, 1973, Gerald Alch filed a memorandum on behalf of his client, James McCord, outlining McCord's defense along the relatively untested theory of the Law of Duress.

The Law of Duress, as defined by Alch, was a valid defense "If one is under a reasonable apprehension—regardless of whether that apprehension is in fact correct—he is justified in breaking a law to avoid the greater harm. . . . The greater harm, according to McCord, was coming from the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, the only organization specifically named by McCord as a source of anticipated violence during the Republican Convention.

The White House quickly signalled approval of McCord's defense by having the Executive Director of the Inaugural Committee, Jeb Stuart Magruder, appear on the January 18th CBS Morning News to make a public statement asking Senator McGovern to control possible violence at Counter-Inaugural demonstrations. Magruder used the opportunity to tie McGovern to several anti-war groups, and repeated the violence-baiting charges against the VVAW.

Federal Judge John Sirica, however, denied Alch's move to base his defense on the Law of Duress. Whether McCord actually believed that the VVAW was planning violence, or he simply adopted the theory after the fact, McCord took the Law of Duress theory from Judge Sirica's courtroom to the Senate Select Committee hearings.

It was in the period between McCord's conviction on charges of conspiracy, burglary, and illegal interception of communications that White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman signed a memorandum to John Dean, the President's official lawyer, citing the political

need to tie together anti-war activity and the Democratic Party. The memo, dated Feb. 10, 1973, stated:

"We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or communist money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in 1972. We should tie in all 1972 demonstrations to McGovern and thus to the Democrats as part of the peace movement.

The possibility of communist influence and finances within the Democratic Party pre-dated the Haldeman memorandum however. E. Howard Hunt told Frank Sturgis, Eugenio Martinez, Bernard Barker, and Virgilio Gonzalez that they had to break into the Watergate because "... their old enemy Fidel Castro was sending money indirectly to the Democratic Party. . . ." The indirect route, of course, was the anti-war movement.

Suspensions of communist money and the threat of violence during the campaign motivated McCord to do more than participate in the Watergate break-in though.

McCord, in his role as Security Director for the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP), hired former FBI agent Alfred Baldwin for a variety of jobs including the infiltration of VVAW. Baldwin began as a gun-toting bodyguard for Martha Mitchell, and later was assigned to surveil anti-war demonstrations at the Capitol building. In June, Baldwin began to monitor the bugs planted in the Democratic National Committee offices, and was informed that his next assignment would be to infiltrate the VVAW for the purposes of "embarrassing the Democrats."

One of the demonstrations that Baldwin observed occurred on May 4, 1972, when Bernard Barker led a group of right-wing Cubans in an attempt to disrupt a demonstration and beat the main speaker, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg. Barker used CREEP money provided by Charles Colson to bring the Cubans from Miami to Washington, and among them was 28 year old Pablo Fernandez.

Aside from his friendship with Barker, Fernandez was contacted by another Watergate figure prior to the break-in. Eugenio Martinez offered Fernandez a job as a CREEP informant at \$700 per week. Fernandez had to turn down Martinez, he claims, because he was already infiltrating the Miami VVAW for both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the City of Miami police.

Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis was also involved in the recruitment of CREEP informants. Former CIA operative Vincent Hannard claims that he was contacted by Sturgis, and

offered a \$1,000 per week job to infiltrate VVAW. When he turned the offer down, he was contacted again by a man he identified as "possibly" being Bernard Barker, who increased the offer to \$1,500 per week. Hannard refused the offer, and has told Florida State Attorneys that it was obvious that his job was to include provoking disruptions at VVAW demonstrations during the Republican convention.

There are very likely other attempts to infiltrate VVAW: the CREEP intelligence network has yet to be fully uncovered. It is known that CREEP hired college students and street people for their intelligence networks, and the Gainesville defendants admit that infiltrating VVAW was an easy task. It should be remembered, however, that CREEP was not totally dependent on its own intelligence network for political information. At least two types of government intelligence reports were made available to CREEP; weekly Justice Department intelligence reports were routinely delivered to James McCord, and Operation Inlet reports were routed directly to John Mitchell.

The weekly reports given to McCord were prepared by the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department under the direction of Robert Mardian and Guy Goodwin. A reliable source has informed CARIC that these summaries, from the time the government alleges the conspiracy began until the week the Grand Jury was convened, *did not reflect any concern of violence from the VVAW*. Goodwin, who had total access to these reports, was the man who convened the Grand Jury that indicted the vets; Mardian has become a central Watergate figure.

Another source of information available to CREEP came through the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Operation Inlet. Operation Inlet was a program designed to identify political intelligence "of interest to the President", and route that intelligence directly to both the White House and John Mitchell.

Operation Inlet data was not routed through the normal FBI channels, and the program was functioning while John Mitchell was simultaneously the Attorney General and the behind-the-scenes boss of CREEP.

Inlet was kept a secret by the FBI and the White House, so FBI informants never knew of the operation. One VVAW informant operating during Operation Inlet was William Lemmer, the government's star witness against the Gainesville Eight.

Lemmer was a member of the U.S. Army Rangers, and had spent over 13 months in Vietnam. He had once been offered a psychiatric discharge, and appears to have suffered from severe re-adjustment problems after his return



from Vietnam. It is believed that Lemmer first became an FBI informant while in the Army, where he was active in the G.I. Movement.

In 1971, Lemmer became the coordinator of the Arkansas-Oklahoma region of VVAW and was a member of the National Steering Committee. He travelled to VVAW meetings in Denver, Houston, and Gainesville, where plans for convention demonstrations were discussed. According to participants at the Memorial Day weekend, 1972, Gainesville meeting, Lemmer attempted several times to initiate talks on violence at the Republican convention.

During the course of the Gainesville 8 trial, Lemmer charged that defendant Scott Camil had planned to train VVAW members for "Operation Phoenix II"—a grandiose scheme for assassinating GOP political figures. Lemmer also stated that the assassination teams were to be trained on a Gainesville farm owned by Scott Camil's best friend, Emerson Poe.

Emerson Poe was a surprise prosecution witness, he also was a FBI informant during the Operation Inlet period. Poe's testimony failed to support Lemmer's claims, but it did raise an important legal question that should have an effect on later political trials. Poe worked for the FBI from an undisclosed time in the fall of 1971, until the day he testified at the trial. He made constant reports on the activities of Scott Camil, and pretended to be one of Camil's friends. While Camil was preparing his defense, he often used Poe's farm for a quiet hide-away.

Poe was trusted because Guy Goodwin had sworn during a pre-trial hearing that none of the names contained in a list prepared by the defense were government informants or potential witnesses. Poe used Goodwin's Bill of Health to infiltrate the defense camp, and the revelation of his true role has raised the question of the violation of attorney-client privileged communication. Poe had been called before the Grand Jury that indicted the Gainesville 8, and was represented by Doris Peterson, an associate of the Center for Constitutional Rights when he was called before the Grand Jury. Ms. Peterson was also one of the defense attorneys for the Gainesville trial, and her articulate and energetic objections to Poe's testimony was over-ruled by Federal Judge Winston Arnow.

Another FBI informant who testified against the Gainesville 8 was Carl Becker. Becker was also the "best friend" of one of the defendants, Peter Mahoney; and like the other informants, Becker gave information to the FBI during the Operation Inlet program. Becker's role in fomenting a conspiracy was so blatant that the Federal Grand Jury cited Becker as an unindicted co-conspirator.

During the course of the trial of the Gainesville Eight, seven infiltrators testified against the defendants. With the exception of one undercover agent from the Dade County Public Safety Department, all the informants collected information on VVAW during the period when VVAW was on the White House "enemies list", and Operation Inlet was gathering information on individuals and organizations "of interest to the President."

The government prosecution team represented the government's desire to obtain a criminal conviction. The team was controlled behind the scenes by Guy Goodwin, operating from Room 176 of the Interstate 75 Holiday Inn, just outside Gainesville. Goodwin slipped in and out of the courthouse to confer with prosecutors Jack Carouth and Robert Schnieder. Carouth is an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Florida, the best "local boy" available to the government in that area. Advising Carouth and acting as the political monitor inside the courtroom was Robert Schnieder, brought to Gainesville fresh from obtaining a conviction of four Missouri youths on charges of attempted bombing. Completing the team was Special Agent Claude Meadows of the FBI's Jacksonville field office. According to Jack Anderson, Meadows has had a vendetta against Camil since 1970.

The government took thirty days to present its case, the jury took only four hours to acquit the eight. The prosecution's witnesses were so contradictory and inconsistent, that the defense put only one witness on the stand, a chemistry professor who repudiated the government's claims that chemicals listed in the indictment could make an "illegal" incendiary device.

The Gainesville acquittal is more than a simple setback for the government or another failure for Guy Goodwin. Gainesville represents a failure of an experimental strategy for dealing with domestic radicals, a repudiation of the government's tactic of informant infiltration, and a repudiation of the "red-scare" justification for the Watergate burglary.

The acquittal has produced a public record of the concrete ways in which the Nixon Administration will handle "White House enemies" who operate outside of the electoral process.

The strategy that the government had experimented with in Gainesville was based on the hope of destroying the VVAW through the courts, for the first time since the Smith Act prosecutions of the early 1950's, the courts were saddled with the sole responsibility for crushing a mass based political opposition group through "legal" means.

The government had attempted to use the courts previously to jail anti-war activists such as the Berrigans, the Camden 28, the Chicago 8, Seattle 8, et cetera, but those conspiracies involved either collective pockets of resistance or cross sections of New Left leadership. In Gainesville, the government tried members of one mass-based group, and selected defendants that represented every level of membership involvement from rank and file member to the national coordinator level. Gainesville was meant to be a warning.

- The government had tried to break the Panthers through the courts, but the courtroom was not the only government battleground against the Panthers. The midnight raids and police-Panther shootouts did more to weaken the Panthers than the courtroom battles. The government could not use police attacks against VVAW with the same results as they had with the Panthers because the VVAW had gone to great ends to build a public image and public support that would make police attacks impossible. A conviction in Gainesville would have possibly changed this, but until the government had destroyed the VVAW's image and replaced it with the "anarchist bomb thrower" stereotype, they could not resort to violence against the vets.

The typically Mid-American jury that acquitted the Gainesville Eight also repudiated the government's use of informants who were actually involved in formulating the conspiracy in question. Everyone of the informants was shown to have actively participated in the "bull sessions" that the government claimed were serious conspiracy planning sessions. According to defendant John Kniffen, the jury was alienated by informants in general, and particularly disturbed by the use of "best friend"/informant Emerson Poe, who was referred to as a "sleazy son of a bitch" by one juror after the trial.

Poe's testimony was not damaging for its content as much as the possible precedent it presented. Had the jury accepted Poe as a witness, it would have opened the door for future incidents of government penetration of defense teams through the use of "best friend"-informants.

The least noticed, but most important effect of the Gainesville acquittals is the fact that twelve average Americans denied Richard Nixon scapegoats for his Watergate strategy. No longer can James McCord, Jeb Stuart Magruder, or any other Watergate figure cite the danger from radical elements as necessitating the Watergate break-in. With CIA memorandums released

during the Watergate hearings showing that no communist money was involved in any anti-war demonstrations (memorandums prepared prior to the Watergate break-in) the "redscare" over violence from VVAW during the campaign is now another major contradiction in the rationale for the break-in at the Democratic National Committee offices.

Since Richard Nixon's television address of August 15th, supporters of the President have been repeating his feeling that "The time has come to turn Watergate over to the courts. . . ." Gainesville was the first courtroom test for Watergate politics, and the acquittal of the Gainesville Eight means that Richard Nixon must find new scapegoats to justify the break-in at the Democratic headquarters.


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Central Intelligence Agency  
official map

**LAND USE AND  
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY**

- |                      |                        |
|----------------------|------------------------|
| Brewery              | Sawmill                |
| Cement               | Sugar refinery         |
| Distillery           | Textiles               |
| Glassware            | Livestock              |
| Paper                | Precious stones        |
| Petroleum refinery   | Tobacco products       |
| Phosphate fertilizer | Tourism                |
| Plywood              | Hydroelectric facility |
- 
- |                                     |
|-------------------------------------|
| Forest (dense to moderately open)   |
| Cultivated land, predominantly rice |
| Tree crops, chiefly rubber          |
| Grassland                           |
| Principal inland fishing area       |



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
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