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'Should Have Trained Here'

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Former CIA Chief Views Bay of Pigs

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WASHINGTON — The man who was inspector general of the CIA during the Bay of Pigs fiasco now believes it would have been wiser to have trained the invasion force at a military base inside the United States to preserve the security of the anti-Castro operation.

Prof. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., now on the faculty of Brown University, disclosed this view in a lecture delivered at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. The speech has been published in the current college review.

Kirkpatrick also said: "If the President makes the policy to get rid of Castro, that is about the last he should hear of it. If something goes wrong

he can fire and disavow, which is what a president should do, not acknowledge and accept blame. Of course, I am being critical of the President (Kennedy) but I think this is essential."

The former CIA official said control of "covert" operations such as the Bay of Pigs exercise in 1961 should be at a much lower level of government than the president's office. Having covert operations run out of the White House or even out of the office of the secretaries of state or defense "makes absolutely no sense whatever in any society."

Although he said he was speaking only his personal views, Kirkpatrick said the blame for failure of the Cuban exile invasion belongs to the CIA, not on the military

where President Kennedy tried to place it.

"It can be concluded," said Kirkpatrick, "that the President never really fully understood that this proposal entailed a military operation in the true sense of the word. Instead of an assault landing consisting of some 1,500 men, Kennedy seemed to think this was going to be some sort of mass infiltration that would perhaps, through some mystique, become quickly invisible."

Kirkpatrick said the recruiting and training of the exile force was done under goldfish bowl conditions in Miami and Central America while the bulk of the CIA, Pentagon and State Department was excluded from it. He said that even Richard Helms, who was chief of the CIA operations, was not involved.

To his knowledge, Kirkpatrick said, only two documents were written in the federal government opposing the operation: one by then-Under-Secretary of State Chester Bowles, who had inadvertently heard of the invasion and the other by Roger Hilsman, then assistant secretary for research and intelligence, who asked to be briefed on it and was turned down.

Yet the raising of the invasion brigade and its training were well-known in Miami, Central America and to Fidel Castro's intelligence. News stories had appeared beforehand that told almost every-

thing but the date of the landing.

Kirkpatrick said it would have been more feasible to use a U.S. base instead of those in Guatemala and Nicaragua for the invasion of Cuba because the United States could have isolated the brigade and trained the pilots without disclosure.

"The Bay of Pigs experience," he said, "does not mean that we should forget covert operations as a tool for implementing national policy. In fact, that's the last thing it means. The capability to mount a covert operation is an exceedingly important capability for our government to have."

Reflecting on the Bay of Pigs operation, Kirkpatrick said the most vital lesson learned was from the failure to secure accurate intelligence. He said inaccurate intelligence was the basis for the disaster adding, "there is no other place to put the blame for that than on the agency mounting the operation."