

ican determination to bring the war to an end become crystal clear.


Paris from a tourist's point of view is as beautiful as ever. But hotels and restaurants are the most expensive in Europe. If you go to a two- or three-star restaurant, be prepared to pay \$40 to \$50 for two. The small bistros outside the center of Paris are still relatively reasonable, but are only locally known. Artistically, there is nothing really worth seeing or hearing—on the stage, at the opera, or in the concert halls. Paris has become surprisingly uncreative. London and New York are far more interesting, far more alive.

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, NATO has become more active. Member countries have agreed either to postpone projected cuts or to increase some of their contributions. Even the French are more cooperative and more interested in participating in various planning exercises. But at the Brussels headquarters of the European Common Market, there is a crisis of stagnation; with General de Gaulle blocking progress, it is unable to broaden its geographical radius or deepen its political significance. There is a feeling that, with the growing American and Japanese competition in the world markets, the Common Market of Europe will be able to withstand this competition only if it can grow stronger and more united. In such costly and vital fields as communication satellites, for instance, Western Europe is falling behind; the same is happening in the field of peaceful nuclear developments. Prospects for improvement are discouraging. Nationalism, made respectable by General de Gaulle, is growing in Europe; everyone is fending for himself, though the current monetary crisis has shown how interdependent the big industrial states have become—how the fall of one currency can drag down the others.

I am amazed how passionately critical the French are of Jackie Kennedy's marriage to Mr. Onassis. Everybody tells me that the event aroused far more interest than the election of Mr. Nixon. The French sound much less charitable than the Americans. They feel she betrayed a legacy and a legend. I was therefore not surprised that a fascinating interview with Marshal Tito in *Paris Match*—covering world problems of the highest import—ended with the question: "Finally, would comrade Tito have some ideas to convey about the Jacqueline Kennedy-Onassis marriage and its symbolism of capitalist society?" Marshal Tito, who throughout the interview was remarkably frank and outspoken, replied, with the discretion of a gentleman: "Let's say that this is a question of personal taste. . . ."

SR/December 21, 1968

The Power of the Pentagon
by Eugene J. McCarthy



V.O. is the personal choice of more people than any other brand of imported whisky (including scotch).

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The Pursuit of Military Security

1. The Power of the Pentagon

By EUGENE J. McCARTHY

THE military-industrial-academic establishment in America is rapidly becoming a kind of republic within the Republic. Its influence, as President Eisenhower warned eight years ago, "is felt in every city, every state house, every office in the federal government." Since he spoke, the situation has become more serious, more dangerous. The budget of the Defense Department has almost doubled—from just over \$40 billion to about \$80 billion a year. With military missions in many nations of the world, with its own intelligence operations that include eavesdropping ships such as the *U.S.S. Liberty* and the *U.S.S. Pueblo*, with its own business of selling billions of dollars worth of arms—for cash or on credit—all around the world, with its involvement now in "civic action" or "nation-building" in many of the underdeveloped countries, the Defense Department has become perhaps the strongest independent power in world affairs.

Defense Department actions are to a large extent beyond the effective control of the Congress. There is no conspiracy. Rather, the influence of the military in American life today is something that has happened to us almost without critical judgment and without real evaluation of the process.

The Defense Department spends much of its \$80-billion-a-year budget in direct procurement here at home. As the military budget has climbed, the Defense Department has had greater and greater influence upon our foreign policy, upon our domestic policy, and upon the educational institutions of the United

States. If it had a significant influence on only one of these, we would have cause for concern; as it has considerable influence on all three, we need to be triply concerned.

Increasing militarization of our foreign policy has been evident in recent years in our growing readiness to respond in military terms to problems around the world which may or may not be susceptible to military solutions. We sponsored an invasion of Cuba in 1961. We intervened, in violation of treaty commitments, by sending troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965.

MOST serious of all is our involvement in Vietnam. The history of how and why we have come to have, as we do today, more than a half-million American combat troops bogged down in Southeast Asia is long and complex. Yet if there was one crucial decision which set the course more than any other, it was the decision to commit American troops to try to impose a military solution in a country where the problems are chiefly political and social. The Administration has long protested that the real war is "the other war," that the civilian pacification program, or whatever name it may happen to be called at the moment, is one of the greatest importance to the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam. But even the civilian pacification program was turned over last year, presumably in the name of efficiency but without notable result, to the military.

The tendency to look at political problems in military terms was largely responsible for getting us into Vietnam. It is also responsible for much of our difficulty in getting out. Until President Johnson's decision to end the bombing of the North and to agree to National Liberation Front participation in the

Paris talks, the United States apparently clung to the hope of military victory. We were not therefore seriously interested in a negotiated settlement.

Several incidents illustrate the confusion of roles between the military and political. On April 28, 1967, the then military commander in Vietnam, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, spoke to a joint session of the House and Senate. At that time, I questioned the appropriateness of having him speak to the Congress on two grounds: first, because it made Congress a captive audience for the presentation of a position on Vietnam which was well known, but which was at the same time highly controversial. Second, I expressed grave reservations about using a field commander on active duty as an instrument to make a case which is not only military but also political.

Later in the year, General Westmoreland again returned to the United States and appeared on TV with our Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, in an attempt to justify and defend the effort in Vietnam. I believe this use of a military commander in what is essentially a public relations capacity was contrary to the tradition of subordination of the military to the civilian authority, and of military judgment to political judgment, on which this nation was founded.

THEN on December 18, 1967, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed that dissent within the United States from the Administration's war policy encouraged Hanoi to hope for a change in that policy, and that this was the "most important factor in prolonging the war." Several months later, it was reported that the Joint Chiefs had been requested to sign a formal assurance that the American outpost at Khesanh, then surrounded by the enemy, "can and should be defended." The first part of that assurance is a military judgment;

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THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE are having a profound impact on American life, affecting the economy, the educational system, and countless individual communities. In addition, the recent decision to develop an anti-missile system may be creating the danger of accidental nuclear explosions in America's urban centers. In this and the following article, two critics of U.S. military policy discuss the issues, the dangers, and the possibilities.

the second may be partially a military judgment, but the context in which it was given appeared primarily political. We ought not to concede a political role to the Joint Chiefs so easily.

In contrast, when General MacArthur publicly urged an escalation of the war in Korea, President Truman did not bring him home to appear before Congress or on *Meet the Press*. He removed him. And Robert Lovett, the civilian Secretary of Defense who favored keeping Korea a limited war, was not sent over to the World Bank. He was kept on the job.

As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I have seen growing evidence of subservience of the State Department and of the Administration


to military determinations and judgments. This is sustained by what has happened in Vietnam and also by the decision to spend at least \$5 billion on an anti-ballistic-missile system which former Secretary McNamara and President Eisenhower as well as many experts have admitted will add nothing to the nation's security.

It is sustained by what has happened on arms sales to developing nations. The Administration has lobbied harder for its arms sales program than for civil rights or for aid to education.

THE Senate Foreign Relations Committee tried to put some limitations upon arms sales and arms distribution around the world in 1966 and 1967. We not only

received no help from the Administration but positive opposition to our efforts. Despite that opposition, we set a limit of \$25,000,000 on arms sales and distribution to Africa last year, and a limitation of \$50,000,000 for Latin America. In opposing these limitations, the Administration claimed that the restrictions would seriously hamper our foreign policy in those countries, which, of course, is what we were trying to do.

Administration officials claimed that if arms distribution were limited, it would seriously interfere with military strength in Greece. That was shortly before the military coup in that country. Evidently the Greek military had enough arms to take over the country, but our State De-



—Wide World.

Defense expenditures and the Vietnam war account for 56 per cent, interest payments and veterans' benefits for 33 per cent, and all other budget items for 11 per cent of the budget dollar—"It is not necessary to accept the old argument that war production stimulates the economy. What is much more significant today is the particular interest developed in certain industries and certain areas of the country with reference to defense contracts and defense expenditures."

partment thought they would be short-handed without the additional military aid we planned for them. It was said that if we limited our arms aid to Turkey, people might lose confidence in our willingness to support NATO. The Administration said that it needed arms for Iran because of the unsettled situation in the Middle East, and added: "If we do not sell planes to Iran, they will probably go to the Russians for military equipment." We did sell the planes to Iran and within two or three weeks, the Iranians went to the Russians for additional military equipment anyway.

Much of our representation overseas is military. Apart from our troops in Europe and the Far East, in 1967, we had 4,681 military agents scattered throughout the world under our military assistance program. Whereas we consider very seriously whether we ought to have diplomatic representation in certain countries, and whereas we examine quite thoroughly the qualifications of ambassadors who are sent abroad when they come before the Senate for confirmation, the military aid groups, which may in some circumstances be more important (this has been true in some Latin American countries), are sent without any kind of formal Congressional examination. These officials often carry on, without publicity and without public awareness in the United States, missions which have strong political overtones.

In addition to its influence in the international arena, there is growing and dangerous involvement of the military establishment in the domestic affairs of

the United States. It is not necessary to accept the old argument that war production stimulates the economy. What is much more significant today is the particular interest developed in certain industries and certain areas of the country with reference to defense contracts and defense expenditures.

THE \$80-billion defense budget estimate for fiscal 1969 does not, for example, represent the full cost of defense activities for the year. Other defense-related expenditures include \$4.4 billion for international programs, \$4.5 billion for space research and technology. Another \$14.4 billion is required for Government payment of interest—much of which is interest on debts arising from past wars—and \$7.1 billion goes for veterans' benefits.

What are the effects on our economy of this enormous economic power? Sudden surges within the defense sector have certainly contributed to inflation. Defense spending can also be blamed, in large measure, for our balance of payments difficulties of the past several years. Not only has defense drawn away large numbers of workers from civilian activities, but it has also taken a proportionately large number of highly qualified personnel.

In fiscal 1965, the armed forces numbered 2,750,000, and they were supported by approximately 1,000,000 civilian workers attached to the Defense Department. Another 2,000,000 civilians were employed in private industry working directly or indirectly on supplying

the military establishment. This was a total of 5,750,000, or eighty-six out of every 1,000 employed workers in the United States. By the end of fiscal 1967, this total was almost 7,500,000, or 103 out of every 1,000 employed workers.

Military technology has become very sophisticated, and the workers involved are, on the average, better paid than workers engaged in non-defense production. Last year, professional workers accounted for nearly 16 per cent and skilled blue-collar workers for 21 per cent of the civilians employed in defense work, in contrast with about 13 per cent for each of these groups in the rest of the working population. One out of every five of the nation's electrical and mechanical engineers in civilian jobs was employed on defense goods during the past year. The comparative ratio for airplane mechanics is two out of five and for physicists outside of teaching two out of five. These figures do not include the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which are also defense-related.

MUCH of the defense sector of the economy consists of research and development. The federal budget for this year allotted some \$7.8 billion to research and development for defense and another \$4.5 billion to space. Since 1960, defense and space programs have amounted to about 54 per cent of the expenditures on research and development carried out in the entire country.

Defense-related industries, notably aerospace, electronics, and communications, have become a major factor in the economy. While the technical competence acquired in these fields is beneficial to the economy, concentration on the defense sector has retarded growth in some other areas. Civilian-oriented laboratories or businesses have often been unable to match the salaries and the equipment that subsidized defense firms offer to scientists and engineers, and this has handicapped research and development for the civilian economy.

The third area which needs our attention is the growing influence of the military on education, with tremendous amounts going to colleges and universities in the form of defense-oriented research grants. Through these grants, the military can exercise great influence on science and technology in the United States. They can determine what research shall be carried out. More subtle, but perhaps more important, is the danger that the academic institutions may begin to tailor their whole direction and approach to court these research grants.

By establishing the criteria by which certain categories of students are drafted and certain others deferred, the military

(Continued on page 44)



Gen. William C. Westmoreland addressing joint session of Congress, April 1967; (background) Vice President Humphrey and House Speaker John McCormack—"I hope that the people will bring some judgment to bear . . . on the influence of the military upon our domestic life."

—Wide World.

Pentagon Power

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even influences the subjects our young people are studying in college today. In this manner, they are influencing quite directly the whole culture of America and the direction and tone of our national life.

In any society, there should be some institution—and hopefully there will be more than one—that stands in a position of judgment upon every other kind of institution. This was the role fulfilled by the medieval university in its dedication to the uncompromised pursuit of knowledge and truth. It is the role the university must continue to fulfill today. This is especially important when the problems which lend themselves to scholarly and academic review are as important to the future welfare of the nation as are the problems of today.

I hope that the people will bring some judgment to bear on the direction of the military complex, on the militarization



of our foreign policy, and on the influence of the military upon our domestic life.

This is particularly important now, because America is on the verge of becoming a great world leader. The question that we must decide—at least in part—is whether we will direct that leadership toward continuing a kind of militaristic policy, or whether we will attempt to blunt that thrust and to inject into American politics and into American government the acceptance and understanding of our true role: that this nation is not to make its record in the history of the world as a military power, but by demonstrating that all of those things that we claim for ourselves—the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and a basic belief in freedom and in the dignity and worth of the individual—are the real strengths of America and that these are the best gifts that we have to offer to the rest of the world.

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