

Book Forum

Letters from Readers

action as President, implicitly rejecting the democratic process, so qualify him, then how can Huey Long, the autocratic Kingfish of Louisiana, be excluded? On what basis is the Liberty League, the nonfascist organ of economic royalists fulminating against FDR and the New Deal, included? McCarthyism is shrewdly dissected as a marginal case, but precisely why it is ultimately assigned to the ranks of extremism remains obscure.

The social basis of support of various right-wing groups is also explored by the authors through analysis of many survey and election materials. In general, such movements are found to be disproportionately attractive to the less educated, lower-occupation and lower-income groups, to the working class and marginal middle class. (One exception is the Birch Society, half of whose members are from groups higher than working-class.) Conservative economic élites pursuing mass appeal must deal with the fact that low-status groups are statist in their support of liberal economic measures. An economic program tailored to the needs of the privileged few (in the manner of the Liberty League) or that seems to threaten the economic gains of lower-status groups (in the manner of the Goldwater platform) provides a recipe for limited appeal and electoral defeat. A marriage of the different preservative thrusts of upper- and lower-status groups within a common right-wing movement typically emphasizes status rather than economic concerns. Such alliances mirror more than manipulation by élites. A sense of status deterioration is genuinely shared by the classes and finds natural expression in despair over a disappearing way of life, over the rapid erosion of a sense of place and belonging in society.

Perhaps the most successful base for the interclass marriage is the satisfaction of the separate instrumental (economic) needs of each class and their shared symbolic (status) needs as well. Lipset and Raab report surveys indicating that most Southerners perceived Wallace as a conservative on the statist question, doubtless because of his opposition to government action on behalf of blacks, while a majority of non-Southerners saw him as an economic liberal on the statist axis, one who would protect existing favorable government programs. In the 1968 election Goldwater and the *National Review* berated Wallace as a liberal populist, but many right-wing groups, including extremists, endorsed and worked for his candidacy.

As these facets of the Wallace campaign suggest, the followers of an ex-

DeGolyer and Hayes

EVERETTE LEE DEGOLYER was one of the world's foremost petroleum geologists, and I was glad to see Reynolds Girdler's review of the DeGolyer biography by Lon Tinkle [SR, Dec. 12]. An error in fact and an unfortunate implication seem worth mentioning. I don't know if these items stem from the book or were introduced by the review. C. Willard Hayes was Chief Geologist, not Director, of the U.S. Geological Survey when DeGolyer worked summers for the Survey. The review implies that Hayes went to Mexico, taking DeGolyer with him while Hayes still was an officer of the Survey. Hayes resigned from the Survey when he became Chief Geologist of the Mexican Eagle Oil Co. in October 1911.

This was a period when many research and academic geologists were being sought out by oil companies because it was being realized that the unique skills of the geologist enabled him to recognize with a large degree of success those places where oil was likely to be found by drilling. Hayes was one of the first Survey geologists, and perhaps the highest ranking, to enter the lucrative field of petroleum geology. He was specially qualified for successful work in Mexican petroleum geology because he had been geologist for the Nicaragua Canal Commission, with a report published in 1899, and he had also been part of a postwar geological survey of Cuba, with a report published in 1901.

Although most of Hayes's Survey career involved work in the Southern Appalachian Mountains, he had also worked in Alaska. After 1900 he concerned himself as well with the occurrence of oil and gas in the Louisiana and Texas Gulf Coastal Plain, a region geologically similar in many ways to the Tampico region.

It takes nothing away from DeGolyer to recognize that Hayes brought much specialized experience and knowledge to the Mexican Eagle Co. It was his good fortune to take DeGolyer with him.

HARRY A. TOURTELOT,
Denver, Colo.

Poets, Patriots, and the Bard

GORDON C. CYR [BOOK FORUM, Dec. 12] claims that Shakespeare was "A man whose biographical traces are to be found only in nonliterary surroundings." This happens not to be the case, though, unfortunately, it is a view dating perhaps from the time of Dryden.

England's Parnassus will serve to illustrate (this volume was a very popular anthology—three editions were issued in 1600). From this anthology I choose only a few of the ninety-five excerpts from Shakespeare. Significantly, Shakespeare

ton, and Daniel: ". . . Sparing Justice, feeds iniquitie."

Under "Kings" he appears with Drayton and Daniel; selections come from *The Rape of Lucrece*:

The baser is he coming from a king,
To shame his hopes with deeds
degenerate: . . .

Under "Love" he appears with Drayton and Spenser:

O learne to loue, the lesson is but
plaine,
And once made perfect, neuer lost
again.

In stating that Shakespeare does not appear in Camden's *Annals*, Mr. Cyr overlooks that Camden elsewhere approved of Shakespeare's application for a coat of arms; Camden names some of the "most pregnant witts of these our times, whom succeeding ages may justly admire"—Spenser, Jonson, Drayton, and Shakespeare (*The Shakespeare Allusion Book*, London, 1932, I, 127).

Unfortunately, *England's Parnassus* is rare. Since the first three editions in 1600, it has been reprinted only once, in 1913, and this edition is hard to come by. An understanding of Shakespeare would be greatly helped if this important collection could be made available.

E. P. KUHLE,
Iowa City, Iowa

IN THE FACSIMILE EDITION of the Stationers Register of London I found the entry (as I remember it): "The Passionate Pilgrim, 1599. William Shakespeare (Pseud.)." I would be interested to know why, in the many years I have read and heard the competing claims for various authors of Shakespeare's plays (other than Shakespeare), I have never encountered any reference to the "(Pseud.)" in the above-quoted entry.

AUBREY BURNS,
San Rafael, Calif.

Malign Tendency of the Pretentious

JERRY RUBIN might conceivably be written in by Shakespeare as a tertiary character—let's say aide de camp to Caliban—but that would seem to me to be thin excuse for Henry S. Resnik to denigrate both Shakespeare and Carroll by insinuating their names into his unctuous polemic, ominously headed "The Shadows Cast by Chicago" [SR, Dec. 12].

One of the evils that lurk in the hearts of men, as The Shadow knows, is the malign tendency of the pretentious to associate their egregious nonsense with symbols of style, quality, and knowledge-ability.



—Wide World

Paul Meadlo (l.) and his attorney, John Kesler, leaving military court in Fort Hood, Texas—"The issues of Nuremberg . . . have come back to haunt us in Vietnam."

NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: An American Tragedy, by Telford Taylor (*Quadrangle*, 224 pp., \$5.95; paperback, \$1.95); **WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE**, edited by Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden (*Holt, Rinehart & Winston*, 208 pp., \$5.95; paperback, \$2.95); **BETWEEN TWO FIRES: The Unheard Voices of Vietnam**, edited by Ly Qui Chung (*Praeger*, 119 pp., \$5.95; paperback, \$1.95); **CONVERSATIONS WITH AMERICANS**, by Mark Lane (*Simon & Schuster*, 247 pp., \$6.95)

Reviewed by James Reston, Jr.

■ Nineteen-seventy was the year of Mylai. That event dominated the military news, and it has radically changed our view of the GI in Vietnam. Reporters went after a different kind of story: Instead of poignant portraits of the sacrifices and tensions of battle, the most vivid images projected by the media were the ditch at Mylai, the shotgun gushing marijuana smoke, the black-power salute, the refusal to go out on search-and-destroy missions.

One hopes, as we go into a new year, that our attention as a people will now concentrate on what all this says about our involvement in Vietnam: that we shall analyze it, put the sensational details in context, and see what we can do about it. To help us begin the task we have two important books, Telford Taylor's *Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy*, and *War Crimes and the American Conscience*, edited by Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden; a collection of stories by Vietnamese, entitled *Between Two Fires: The Unheard Voices of Vietnam*, and a hodgepodge of hearsay by Mark Lane, called *Conversations with Americans*.

stomach-turning incident after another of rape, torture, maiming, and wanton slaughter perpetrated by Americans in Vietnam. All of the reports are unverified, some are irrelevant, others complain about training methods that have been standard since the days of Julius Caesar. Lane makes no pretense of distinguishing between fact and a soldier's talent for embellishment. For the salacious mind that wants to get the guts out of this book quickly, it is necessary only to read the last page of each interview. If you have never heard that Marine drill sergeants are mean, or that recruits have to yell "Kill!" at boot camp, or that officers say loose things in the combat zone, you will find it here. If this is not enough, you can savor the story of the female VC sympathizer who was brought in for interrogation, stripped, and then raped by every man in the battalion. (Lane does not explain that in Vietnam an American battalion runs anywhere from 1,000 to 1,200 men.) Or you can learn, from a radioman based in Asmara, Ethiopia, how the military distorted its press reports on American casualties in Vietnam.

If this book had any redeeming social significance, it would be to show that a pattern of atrocities exists in Vietnam, proving that while Mylai was larger it was not unique. This needs to be demonstrated, since the Pentagon continues to insist that Mylai was an isolated case. But the effort will have to be left to more responsible parties, like the National Veterans Inquiry Into U.S. War Crimes, which in a three-day meeting in Washington in early December heard testimony from more than fifty ex-GIs on things they had seen or done in Vietnam. (It is significant that this group disassoci-

Through veterans' statements at that hearing, the disparity between the rules found in Army manuals and customary behavior on the battlefield becomes clear. Acts that are technically forbidden are often overlooked under the pressure of combat. In particular, the use of torture in interrogation appears to be freely condoned, with the caveat "But don't get caught." Yet most such cases seem to result from frustration. I was taught at Army Intelligence School that torture was not only illegal, it was counterproductive: the victim was likely to tell you anything he thought you wanted to hear. During the three-day conference in Washington only one story was related that indicated such methods could produce valuable information. It involved the technique of taking two VC suspects, an important and an unimportant one, up in a helicopter, questioning the unimportant one first, and, when he did not talk, throwing him out. The GI, who witnessed two such episodes, said that they resulted in "a successful interrogation" on both occasions.

The Pentagon, however, operates from the written law, and it provides a perfect cover. Any specific charge of torture against a specific individual will be investigated, they say, and if the evidence warrants, a court-martial will take place—though they cannot remember any such charge ever having been brought. Thus, the burden of triggering an investigation is left to the individual GI. The Pentagon's reaction to the Lane book is to discredit the sources. Chuck Onan, the first interviewee in *Conversations*, testified about the techniques of torture taught to him as an elite scuba expert in the Marine counterpart of the Special Forces; the Pentagon replies that Onan's service record shows he never was at scuba school, but was an aviation mechanic and storeroom clerk.

The most destructive aspect of the Lane book is not that its specific details can be so easily dismissed by the Pentagon, but that it allows Americans to dismiss their collective responsibility for the war as a whole. No American will feel responsible for a GI who runs a hot bayonet up the vagina of a Vietnamese woman; he can only be a lunatic, not "one of our boys in uniform." This emphasis on atrocities misdirects the sense of shame that the American people should feel about the concept of the war of attrition, recommended and executed by General Westmoreland, applauded at the Pentagon, approved by two Presidents and, by political implication the majority of

name to "gooks" and "slopes," a small collection of Vietnamese stories, *Between Two Fires*, humanizes them again in noble and poignant ways. It should be required reading for every American soldier, and also for American civilians who may harbor the same condescending attitude towards Oriental people, though they manifest it not with bullets but with ballots or silence. Out of these simply written stories by schoolteachers and soldiers from the villages of Vietnam emerges a portrait of a sensitive, tragic people, caught between an AR-15 and an AK-47. The Vietnamese, writes the editor, Ly Qui Chung, "no longer want to take sides in this war that is gradually . . . destroying us. We have no desire to be called 'an outpost of the Free World' or to be praised for being 'the vanguard . . . in the world socialist revolution.'" From a people who have suffered casualties of 900,000 dead and three million wounded—out of a population of fourteen million—since the American military build-up in 1965, the message comes through loud and clear.

Responsibility is the most important question this country must face in the early Seventies. It is no good to say simply that Vietnam has been an American tragedy and leave it at that. The fundamental question is whether the U.S. can rise from the humiliation into some new maturity about its role in the world.

Toward meeting this challenge Telford Taylor's legal primer on Nuremberg and Vietnam is both useful and disappointing. It is useful because it focuses on the issues of Nuremberg that have come back to haunt us in Vietnam: the problem of aggressive war, the definition of war crimes and the task of assigning guilt for them, the defense of "superior orders," and justification because of military necessity. The book is a well-argued brief on a precedent in international law, and it is supported with much important and interesting historical background.

One may ask what is the purpose in haggling over the fine points of "laws of war" and the definition of war crimes when war itself is a crime. Is this not like "pouring perfume on dead bodies"? Taylor offers two important reasons for his study. First, the laws work: "Violated or ignored as they often are, enough of the rules are observed enough of the time so that mankind is very much better off with them than without them." Second, they prescribe the kind of killing that is allowable: "War is not a license at all, but an obligation to kill for reasons of state; it does not countenance the infliction of suffering for its own sake or for revenge."

the problem of how we can apply the Nuremberg precedent today. Telford Taylor, as a preeminent international lawyer and the chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, may be the person in America best able to instruct us. His conclusion is that the courts as now constituted can do very little. The courts, he says, are not the appropriate forum for a discussion of the propriety of our involvement in Vietnam; this debate is more properly carried on in the political arena. So we are left with a tract on the limitations of the juridical application of the Nuremberg precedent, and no discussion of its broader importance. We must be content with the weak conclusion that "Somehow we failed ourselves to learn the lessons we undertook to teach at Nuremberg, and that failure is today's American tragedy." No. We can still learn those lessons. Nuremberg is not dead. It lives today, and Taylor's book shows clearly—if only by implication—where international lawyers must now focus their attention so that the gaps can be filled.

The major gap in the Nuremberg code is its failure to deal with technological warfare. Taylor writes, "It is difficult to contest the judgment that Dresden and Nagasaki were war crimes, tolerable in retrospect only because their malignancy pales in comparison to Dachau, Auschwitz, and Treblinka." Dresden and Nagasaki were not justified by military necessity, according to Taylor. Must we then examine each B-52 raid in Vietnam to see if it was justified by military necessity? What of the totality of the bombing effect? This

properly falls under the "Crimes Against Humanity" section of Nuremberg, which Taylor fails altogether to discuss. It is odd that defense lawyers have stressed the "Crimes Against Peace" section of Nuremberg in draft-resistance cases rather than the "Crimes Against Humanity" section. Pleading crimes against peace, the defense is left with the burden of proving that America is the aggressor in Vietnam. Pleading crimes against humanity, the defense could concentrate on the devastation that the American military has wrought in Vietnam.

Taylor is right, of course, that it is the political arm of our government that must end our involvement in Vietnam. *War Crimes and the American Conscience*, edited by Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, is based on that premise, and it is the most important book on Vietnam in print today. It is the product of a Congressional Conference on War and National Responsibility, organized by a handful of liberal Congressmen who brought the best minds in the country on the Vietnam issue to Capitol Hill for two days in February 1970. This edited transcript of those proceedings is a lucid ordering of the endless details of the war with which the American people have been bombarded. The volume puts the war in perspective as no other work has yet done.

War Crimes and the American Conscience contains specific recommendations that must not be lost sight of. Representative Henry S. Reuss proposes a commission of American jurists to

Your Literary I. Q.

Conducted by David M. Glixon

K I D S T U F F

Young folks get the first crack at this quiz by Jean Graney of Hollis, N. H. The task is to indicate which character in Column Two appears in the same story as which character in Column One, and which author is responsible. The nursery bookshelf is on page 29.

- | | | |
|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Ali Baba () | A. Bagheera | a. anonymous |
| 2. Arthur () | B. Benjamin | b. J. M. Barrie |
| 3. Irene () | C. Blitzen | c. L. Frank Baum |
| 4. Margalo () | D. Carpenter | d. Lewis Carroll |
| 5. Mole () | E. Celeste | e. Jean De Brunhoff |
| 6. Mowgli () | F. Curdie | f. Eugene Field |
| 7. Owl () | G. Dorothy | g. Kenneth Grahame |
| 8. Peter () | H. Little John | h. Rudyard Kipling |
| 9. Pooh () | I. Morgiana | i. Edward Lear |
| 10. Prancer () | J. Nod | j. George MacDonald |
| 11. Robin Hood () | K. Piglet | k. A. A. Milne |
| 12. Tinker Bell () | L. Pussy Cat | l. Clement C. Moore |
| 13. Toto () | M. Stuart Little | m. Beatrix Potter |
| 14. Walrus () | N. Tiger Lily | n. F. B. White |

fill the gaps of Nuremberg. This is a vital idea, but it should be internationalized, bringing together the great legal minds of the world. Richard Falk, an international lawyer from Princeton, calls for a world conference of governments to update the rules of war, which have had no substantial revision, he says, since 1899.

Representative Reuss further advocates a commission of legislators and private citizens to examine "violations of international legal and moral standards today." More Congressional conferences with private citizens are needed to guide legislators and the public alike through the withdrawal and the post-Vietnam periods, but I hope the next one will include more conservative politicians. The question of war crimes is not a liberal issue. It is an American problem, and all Americans must face it.

Former Congressman Frank Kowalski suggests that the Secretary of Defense appoint a commission of military and civilian jurists to examine the military code of justice in light of the atrocity stories and in the light of Nuremberg. There is little chance that this will happen without pressure. The Defense Department's significant moves on the matter in the fall of 1970 consisted of 1) a cavalier one-paragraph denial of command responsibility for General Westmoreland in the Mylai case, and 2) a three-volume report by a military review board charging President Johnson with exercising "extraordinary controls" over "military needs," creating an "unstabilizing effect on long-range programs."

The proposals in *War Crimes and the American Conscience* are all helpful, and one can think of several other possibilities. For example, it would be interesting to know whether Dow Chemical Company speaks for the business community as a whole in a statement such as the following:

Our position on the manufacture of napalm is that we are a supplier of goods to the Defense Department and not a policymaker. We do not and should not try to decide military strategy or policy. Simple good citizenship requires that we supply our Government and our military with those goods which they feel they need whenever we have the technology and capability and have been chosen by the Government as a supplier.

Simple good humanity may lead some businessmen to question that blanket endorsement, especially when the government asks for weapons that induce a slow, gruesome death, as napalm does.

There is also a need for the semanticists to cut through the language the

AMERICA AND RUSSIA IN A CHANGING WORLD:

A Half Century of Personal Observation

by W. Averell Harriman

Doubleday, 218 pp., \$5.95

Reviewed by Harrison E. Salisbury

■ President Thieu of South Vietnam deliberately sabotaged the Paris peace talks in the autumn of 1968 in an effort to defeat Hubert Humphrey and elect Richard Nixon.

This is the grave allegation made by W. Averell Harriman, chief negotiator for President Johnson during that critical phase of the Paris talks. Coming from some lesser source, it might be dismissed as partisan propaganda or personal pique. Coming from the man who has emerged as America's senior statesman, the charges cannot be so lightly brushed aside.

Mr. Harriman feels deeply and profoundly that the war in Vietnam would be well on its way to peaceful conclusion had it not been for Thieu's gambit, which he believes probably insured Mr. Nixon's election. Mr. Harriman does not implicate the President in the maneuver. "I don't in any way suggest that President Nixon knew anything about this," he states. But he also believes there is "little doubt that through one channel or another Thieu was counseled to wait until after the American election. He was evidently told Nixon would be much harder-line than Humphrey, and he was warned that if negotiations began, Humphrey might be elected."

This is one of dozens of revelations, salty judgments, and caveats advanced by Mr. Harriman in this wide-ranging, informal substitute for a memoir (possibly best characterized as a mini-memoir). The volume is constructed around the framework of a series of lectures delivered last year at Lehigh University. Russia is the central theme, but neither geographic boundaries nor time limits impede Mr. Harriman's exercise. His most recent years have been heavily devoted to Vietnam and Southeast Asia, beginning with the Laos con-

ference of 1962, and the war continues to hold top priority among his concerns.


Mr. Harriman has no doubt that the war should and must be ended at the earliest moment. Nor does he doubt that it can be ended if only we announce and carry out a scheduled program for withdrawal of our troops from South Vietnam. Thieu and his government must be denied a veto over U.S. policy. We must abandon what Mr. Harriman considers the calculated goal of Mr. Nixon's policy—"to support pro-Western military governments regardless of local opposition." He sees the administration's Vietnamization effort as a fraud. "[It] is not in my opinion a program for peace but is a program for the perpetuation of the war. . . . Furthermore, the Vietnamization of the war is dependent on an unpopular and repressive military government."

Second only to Vietnam as a critical international issue in Mr. Harriman's opinion is SALT, "the most vital negotiations being held today." Here, too, he gives the Nixon administration indifferent marks. He thinks we should have declared a moratorium on deployment of ABM and MIRV and proceeded only if the Soviet side proved obdurate.

On Soviet obduracy Mr. Harriman rates as an all-time expert. His dealings with the Russians go back to the early 1920s, when he dickered as a private businessman. No one had more difficult talks with Stalin than he—nor drew more realistic and hard-headed lessons from the experience. (Vice President Agnew's allegation a few months back that Mr. Harriman was soft and acquiescent in negotiating with Moscow was based on either total ignorance or total irresponsibility.)

Mr. Harriman is not, however, prepared to abandon all hope of change in Russia nor to embark on a policy of "non-benign neglect." He notes the changes that have come over Soviet policy in the long passage of years, and Moscow's common stake in preventing world disaster. Contrary to frequent assertions, he reports, Russia has been helpful on Vietnam, particularly in getting the stage set for the 1968 talks that Thieu so successfully sabotaged. He is moderately encouraged by the bravery of the young intellectuals and dissenters in Russia who have raised the banner of challenge at great personal risk.

"There will continue to be a changing scene in Russia," he says. "At times greater difficulties will undoubtedly arise, but if we meet them with common sense and sophistication, I believe things will, on balance, improve. Gradually the pressures for individual freedoms within Russia will increase, and



would have remained as nourishing as old straw. From about 1915 when, aged twenty-three, he published *Rashomon*, until his death at thirty-six, he poured feeling and intellect into vision and craft, until the distillation reached its final purity and power in this last work.

A Fool's Life is both novel and autobiography, and neither. It runs to fifty-one chapters. The shortest contains two lines, the longest twenty-three. This is Chapter 15, complete:

They

They lived in peace. In the expansive shade of a great *basho* tree's leaves.—Even by train, over an hour away from Tokyo, in a house in a town on the seacoast. That's why.

Akutagawa chose to die. Nowhere in *A Fool's Life* is there any hint of the "why—because" game so dear to West-



ern intellect. Instead, he unfolds the experience of "how" the thrust of energy in a living man may be turned upon itself to kill that man. It is better, I think, to let him reveal himself. Chapter 17:

Butterfly

In wind reeking of duck-weed, a butterfly flashed. Only for an instant, on his dry lips he felt the touch of the butterfly wings. But years afterward, on his lips, the wings' imprinted dust still glittered.

And the last chapter:

Defeat

The hand taking up the pen had started to tremble. He drooled. His head, only after a 0.8 dose of Veronal did it have any clarity. But even then, only for half an hour or an hour. In this semidarkness day to day he lived. The blade nicked, a slim sword for a stick.

That is the method to Akutagawa's magic: placing/joining the details, letting be. The finger points. The eye follows.

Thomas Fitzsimmons, who teaches English at Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, studied Asian philosophy and literature in Japan.

Vietnam

Continued from page 28

Defense Department has invented to sanitize the devastation we are bringing to Vietnam: circumlocutions like "protective reaction strike," "food denial programs," "neutralizing the Vietnam infrastructure," "interdiction of enemy supply lines," "forced draft urbanization."

If all the professions that have participated in Vietnam are honest with themselves, and are prepared to examine the notions upon which their involvement was predicated, it can provide an opportunity for this country to attain a wiser sense of direction, and to evolve a higher system of accountability in humanitarian terms for decisions that in the past have been justified solely by vague national security principles.

Albert Speer, sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment by the Nuremberg Tribunal, addressed himself to the old excuses of not knowing about Nazi atrocities or not participating directly in them. In his remarkable memoirs, *Inside the Third Reich*, he wrote:


I no longer give any of these answers. For they are efforts at legal exculpation. . . . In the final analysis I myself determined the degree of my isolation, the extremity of my evasions, and the extent of my ignorance. . . . Whether I knew or did not know, or how much or how little I knew is totally unimportant when I consider what horrors I might have known about and what conclusions would have been the natural ones to draw from the little I did know. Those who ask me are fundamentally expecting me to offer justifications. I have none. No apologies are possible.

Americans now know enough about Vietnam to draw some natural conclusions. The question is: Will they do it?

James Reston, Jr., has just completed a first novel, "To Defend, To Destroy," whose theme is the conscience of a GI and the question of responsibility.



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