

NYTimes MAY 13 1977 Excerpts From Second Segment of Frost's

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Television Interview

WASHINGTON, May 12—Following, as made public by David Frost, are excerpts from the transcript of the televised portions of his interview with former President Richard M. Nixon. This segment, the second, dealing with United States foreign policy, was broadcast tonight.

Q. Whose idea was the initiative to China? Was it yours? Henry Kissinger's? Or whose?

A. I do not know when Dr. Kissinger may have conceived of the possibility of an initiative toward China. I do know that I conceived it before I ever met him and that I pushed it very very hard from the first days of the Administration. I was the one, as he of course agrees, who raised the issue and kept pressing the issue, but he pursued it with enormous enthusiasm.

Q. Chairman Mao very close there to the end of his life. Was he still *compos mentis* at that meeting? Was he still speaking clearly?

A. Well, I should point out that in 1972, ah, Chairman Mao had already suffered, in my view, a partial stroke. He had to be helped to stand up for the hand shake, but he was very proud that way. In this case they were girl aides as you see—these rather pretty Chinese girls that were his—lifted him up and helped him walk over, and—but, once they — once those lights turned on, ah, he got turned away. Another interesting thing I noticed from that picture is that when I went to visit him the first time, I noticed he lived very simply.

Problem Getting Words Out

Q. When the conversation began in '76, did you feel it was still Mao talking or that the interpreter was doing the work?

A. No question about it. Ah, he talked, ah, almost monosyllabically. It was obvious that he was having terrible problems of getting the words out. They were sort of grunts and groans, but the interpreter took things down. But, then, whenever the interpretation was made, he would listen, and then he would nod his head, no, and he would reach over and take a pad from her and then he would write out the answer—right to the last in that conversation, as of course was true in 1972.

Ah, while he had greater problems—great problems in '72 and much greater ones in '76 of communication, Mao was in charge of himself and he was in charge in China. And, all of those around him referred to him as being the one in charge.

Ah, he was a colossus as you can see in this last picture, shriveled, old. But, if you watched his hands, the things that I remembered in both cases, in '72 and '76: His hands never got old. They were very fine, delicate hands. Ah, and yet, we must recognize here had been a tough, ruthless leader, but it didn't show in his hands.

He knew he was going to die. He talked fatalistically. He said, "How long will peace last?" Ah, ah, "One generation?" He held his finger up like that, and I said, "No, I think longer." And then he, without saying, held up another. I said, "No longer than that." And, then he smiled rather ironically, skeptically. "No, I think maybe a hundred years." And, then he—it would be very difficult, and I said, I quoted one of his poems to him, I said, "Well, Mr. Chairman, as you have written, 'Nothing is hard if one dares to scale the heights.'" And I said, "Of course, it is difficult, but the stakes are so great here." And, he reached over and grasped his cup at that point, as you saw on the film and we raised our hands in a toast. And, at the—he seemed to be quite moved by that thought.

With Nixon

Mideast War in 1973

Q. When, for instance in '73, the Russians were supplying Egypt and leading up to the Yom Kippur October War, would you have said that that was contrary to the intent of SALT, which refers to not increasing international tension, and so on? Or, what you would have expected as a Russian tactic towards what was then a client?

A. Well, let us look at what led up to that particular event. Ah, at Summit II, which occurred in Washington at Camp David, and in San Clemente. Ah, there had been a very spirited, and I must say at times, heated discussion of the Mideast. It started in my home, ah, where we'd had dinner for Brezhnev. For three hours, until past midnight, Brezhnev hammered me on the Mideast, Mideast. He said, "You must force the Israelis to withdraw from all of the occupied territories and they must do it soon." And, I told him, "We can't do that." I said, "We cannot impose a settlement," and I

'I felt in the political area my expertise was somewhat more than Dr. Kissinger's, and he understood that.'

said, "You can't impose a settlement." He said: "It is my concern that unless the Israelis do withdraw that the Egyptians and Syrians are going to attack and they're going to attack soon." I said, "If they do attack," I said, "we will not let Israel go down the tube." Or words to that effect.

And, now let me tell you how I got the news of the war, which shows you the brilliance of our intelligence, and in this case the Israeli intelligence. The Israeli intelligence, incidentally, is probably as good as any in the world, next to perhaps the Russian intelligence. But, in any event, I was going to go to Key Biscayne, ah, at the time—the week the Yom Kippur war broke out. I mean, it was a holiday and all the rest. And I got the intelligence report from the C.I.A. that day, and the intelligence report said that an armed attack is possible, but unlikely. The next morning I got a telephone call from Washington that Egypt had attacked.

The critical point that I wish to make is: I was not surprised to see our intelligence drop the ball. Ah, and, I say this with all due deference to some of the good things they've done. Ah, but they had been—they hadn't for example, had any good information with regard to the Cambodian—the overthrow of Sihanouk. Ah, they hadn't had any good information with regard to many of the things that happened in Vietnam. Ah, I thought basically, that our intelligence community needed a shaking up. Ah, and this

one, of course, didn't increase my respect for their ability. But, what surprised me the most was, I knew they were cooperating totally with Israeli intelligence and the Israeli have fantastically good intelligence and their intelligence told them there was not going to be an attack.

Q. But do you think the Russians knew in advance there was going to be an attack?

A. All that I can say is that we did not know it. As to whether or not the Russians did know it, I would say if they did know it and did not inform us, that would have been, I think, a very great breach of all of the understandings we had. Regardless, of what we'd agreed on paper, even in Summit II.

Q. There were a lot of reports in Israel that you had a key phone conversation with Golda Meir soon after the war began over supplies?

A. Oh, yes, I had several conversations with her. The main point of the matter was this: I can tell the story on the war very briefly. What happened was that because Egyptians and the Syrians struck first, and also because they fought better, not as well as the Israelis, but much better than they had in previous wars—they're learning to fight, and that's one thing the Israelis have got to be worried about as far as the future. They won four wars, but each time they've had more casualties. And they'll win the next one, but, in the end, three million Israelis cannot defeat 100 million Arabs, 'cause Arabs can also learn to fight. That's the problem.

Now, as far as Mrs. Meir—here's the essence of what happened: Ah, her concern was that because of the strike, they were losing a great deal of equipment. She needed equipment. Then came the Russian airlift. It was then that I made a very critical decision in the early time of the war—that if the Russians were sending an airlift in, as they were, to help the Egyptians and to help the Syrians, that we would airlift to help Israel.

I remember the conversation very well when, ah, I'd asked the Defense Department, and they prepared an option paper, what have you, for Kissinger to provide the, ah, method for doing it. At first, we wanted to cover the situation, or they did, and send the—paint some planes differently and make it appear as if they were El Al planes, I mean, Israeli planes or something like that, or have a chartered plane. And, I finally cut through all of the red tape and I said, "Look, I mean, it isn't going to fool anybody."

'Didn't Overrule His Views'

Q. But, what you're saying is that in the end, in terms of the delay in the airlift, you in a sense, had to overrule the views of both Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger on timing, on tactics.

A. Yeah. As far as Dr. Kissinger is concerned, I would have to say I didn't overrule his views. The way that we worked was that he would come in with options, and the option that he presented was that the Defense Department thought we should send three of these big cargo planes and then, of course, he gave his own opinion as to their reasons and reasons which he that politically it would be, ah, perhaps, ah, dangerous for us to send a greater number and that it would, ah, destroy the chances for negotiations in the future if our profile was too high.

And, my view, I felt in the political



NIXON RELAXES: Richard M. Nixon and his aide, Col. Jack Brennan, at golf course in San Clemente, Calif., two days ago. It was Mr. Nixon's first public appearance since the telecast of interview on Watergate. United Press International

area, ah, that, ah, my expertise was somewhat more than Dr. Kissinger's and he understood that, just as I understood that his expertise in certain diplomatic areas was considerably more than mine. And, I said, "Look, Henry, we're gonna get just as much blame for sending three, if we send 30, or a hundred, or whatever we've got, so send everything that flies. The main thing is make it work."

Q. What was the bottom line [on a cease-fire] then really? That you had the leverage?

A. Well, no, we didn't put the Israelis in the spot where we were trying to threaten them, because they won't take it. I mean, they're—they're not—they'll never take it. And, we wouldn't put them in that spot. What we did was to reason with them, but to reason with them in a way, well, we in effect, if I may paraphrase from the "Godfather," "We gave 'em an offer, ah, that they, ah, could not refuse." And, the offer basically was: "Look, the United States will continue to stand by you. We have demonstrated that we will come to you aid with arms if you come under attack, but third, on your side, if we will take such great risks, including, not only the airlift but an alert in order to save you, you must listen to us, at least, in terms of being reasonable in talking to your potential enemies."

Q. There was another regional war during your Presidency that could well have embroiled the big powers and that was the war between India and Pak-

istan over Bangladesh, what had been East Pakistan. How closely was the United States involved in that particular conflict?

A. In the first phase of the Pakistan-Indian clash, Pakistan clearly, ah, was the party that was—has to take the major responsibility and blame, ah, because of the cruelty with which they put down the Bangladesh, East Pakistan rebellion. As a result of that, ah, this brought India into the conflict, and India, despite warnings from us, and we think even from the Soviet Union, ah, declared war on Pakistan—or they didn't declare war on Pakistan, they entered, ah, Bangladesh ah, fighting the Pakistan army in Bangladesh without a declaration of war.

In the meantime, messages are going back and forth between the United States and Moscow. We ask—tell the Russians how important it is for them to restrain the Indians. Ah, they tell us how important it is for Pakistanis to give up East Pakistan, and, ah, there

were a number of issues. But, in any event, we both got across to each other, ah, our points of view. And, our point of view was very strongly stated that we thought that if the Russians allowed their client, India, using Soviet arms, ah, to destroy Pakistan, ah, both East and West, that this would imperil our future relationship. And, we put it down just as hard as that. Now, what happened was that after the Bangladesh phase of it, ah, began to be

Brezhnev is 'a much safer man to have sitting there with his finger on the button than Khrushchev.'

worked out, even though India as you recall, ah, would not adhere to a U.N. cease-fire resolution there. Then, from a source that we consider to be totally reliable, we learned that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, in a meeting of her Cabinet, had directed that a military operation be put in place to attack West Pakistan, and we had, as I said, information that we knew was completely reliable.

It was then that we made the move that we did make. It was then that I ordered the carrier task force into the Indian Ocean. We sent a very sharp note, of course, to the Russians, ah, and, ah, the Indians, ah, ah, according to the Russians, ah, this was Brezhnev's, I thought very weak response, he says: "Well, they're very difficult to deal with. We find that our influence on them at this point, once they have tasted the victory in East Pakistan, is very little." But I knew that we had to help try to save West Pakistan.

Now, unless we had brought pressure to bear on the Russians, unless we had basically conditioned our continued progress toward the summit, détente, etc., on their restraining their clients, and we of course by the same token, would restrain, to the extent we could, the Pakistanis, who didn't need to be restrained; they were defeated. Unless that had happened, I believe, ah, I believe, that, ah, she would have taken West Pakistan. She would have gobbled it up and that would have had dramatic consequences; an effect on the Chinese, on American-Soviet relations, for reasons that I've mentioned, as well as of course, the point is: It would have been wrong and totally wrong. And, so basically, we saved West Pakistan because it was right. We also saved it, it's true, because it had something to do with our China

initiative. The Chinese were putting a lot of pressure on us to do something. They couldn't do anything. They didn't want to get involved in a war with India at that point, although they had utter contempt for the Indians.

What we did in saving West Pakistan built up a lot of credibility with the Chinese.

Khrushchev and Brezhnev

Q. We've talked a lot about your dealings with Brezhnev and we've talked about the various material confrontations and so on with him, but we haven't really talked about what your impressions and memories of Brezhnev as a man were. What sort of a man was Brezhnev as a man were. What sort of a man was Brezhnev to deal with?

A. Well, let me compare him with Khrushchev, because I think people have a more vivid picture of Khrushchev, even today, people of our generation at least, than they do of Brezhnev. Khrushchev was, ah, boorish, crude, brilliant, ah, ruthless, potentially rash, terrible inferiority complex.

I'll never forget one time at Camp David when we were up there with Eisenhower, that, ah, we were trying to make pleasant conversation at lunch and Eisenhower asked Khrushchev where he went for his vacations. He says, he went to the Crimea, and Khrushchev—ah, and, ah, Eisenhower said, well he didn't like the seashore so well, he liked to go to the desert. And, ah, Eisenhower said: "The only trouble with vacations is that you

have, ah, you can't get away from the telephone. You've always got the telephone." The translation was made and Khrushchev blew up, angry. He says: "We've got telephones in the Soviet Union, too! We've got more telephones than you have!" Well, in any event, that's typical of what we ran into.

With Brezhnev, you had a man, not as quick as Khrushchev, intellectually, ah, a man far better mannered, ah, than Khrushchev, a man who did not have the inferiority complex, even though he knew they were inferior in certain ways, he knew as Khrushchev did not know, that the Soviet Union by that time, when Brezhnev was in power, had — was, frankly, dealing equally across the table, whereas Khrushchev knew he was behind, and therefore, had to put on this big bravado act or the big macho act to prove, ah, that he was ahead of every-

body and everything.

Sloppy Hat and Cufflinks

Another difference is—and this appears not to be too important, but it's interesting, ah, Khrushchev tried to put on the air of being just a common peasantlike person. He would dress with the sloppy hat and, and, ah, collar wouldn't be too clean and this and that, or clean. Ah, whereas Brezhnev was somewhat of a fashion-plate. He liked beautiful cars. He liked beautiful women. Ah, a small thing. Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin all wore cufflinks. None of the Soviet party in 1959 wore cufflinks. Ah, things had changed. Ah, the new class in the Soviet Union is doin' pretty good.

Ah, now let's get to the kind of a man he is: Ah, intellectually, not as quick as Khrushchev, but smart. Ah, as far as his temperament is concerned; not as rash as Khrushchev, more cautious, one who consults with people before acting rather than moving off impulsively on his own; not as volatile as Khrushchev, and in that way, a much safer man to have sitting there with his finger on the button than Khrushchev.

He is basically very much a, ah, physical kind of person. Ah, he has a lot of animal magnetism, as distinguished from Podgorny, or particularly from Kosygin, who's rather cold, more aristocratic in bearing. Ah, he's a man who's very earthy in his humor. I won't go into how earthy he is—let's just leave it there. Ah, but, also not as crude, not as boorish as Khrushchev in some of the expletives that he would use; better mannered.

When I said that he was cautious, I would not like to leave the impression that he was timid. Ah, I think that he had read and practices the doctrine of Lenin, which is; as you may recall, "Probe with bayonets; if you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw." And, that's the way Brezhnev will be. That's the way the Communist leaders will be all over the world. Because as Communists, they have to go forward spreading the gospel. That's what they believe. They want just not a Communist Russia or what have you; they want a Communist world.

I'm not sure that's the Chinese view at the present time, but it may come that way in the future, and they may want to accomplish it in different ways. But I remember one incident that perhaps tells Brezhnev's deeper sense better than anything else. I'll never forget the day that we were riding on his yacht. His yacht makes that old Sequoia, that President Carter's, now put in moth balls, look like a row boat next to a 100-foot yacht. But anyway, here's this marvelous Russian Navy yacht, and we had a beautiful luncheon on the yacht with the other members of the party, with caviar and champagne and everything else. And, as we were—went up the tour, up by the Black Sea, he pointed out Yalta; he pointed to where Roosevelt had stayed and where Stalin had stayed and where Churchill had stayed. And as he pointed this out to me, all of a sudden, impulsively, he reached over and grabbed me. He was kind of like Johnson that way—he likes to grab people. He and Johnson would have had a lot of fun. They're much alike. And, he put his arm around me and he said, "You know, my friend, President Nixon." He said, "I only hope the day will come when every Russian and every American can sit together as we are sitting now, and we can be friends."

Kissinger

Q. When you first selected Henry Kissinger for the N.S.C., did you expect him to become as much of an international star as he did or did you intend it originally to be a back-room role?

A. No, I don't think I expected, and I don't think he expected it either. Ah, however, I knew that we were going to deal with great events. I didn't know at the time I met him, ah, I didn't know enough about his background; I didn't know him enough personally to know what a dramatic impact his personality would have as he executed his role quite brilliantly.

Q. You must have had disagree-

ments, I suppose. What were the most important ones?

A. Ah, I'm a fatalist, basically. Ah, Kissinger is more, despite his enormous intellectual capabilities, ah, one who, ah, ah, is, ah, perhaps, ah, somewhat less fatalistic, and, ah—or determinist in his views. More emotional, interestingly enough. Ah, although, I, too, have emotions. I tend to hide them perhaps more than he does, or submerge them, or suppress them, ah, but, ah, be that as it may we won't try to psychoanalyze each other at the moment.

Ah, but Kissinger, I will remember, after we went into Cambodia. He was going in, ah, but here I made a decision on the spot which we had not discussed before. He wondered about it at the time, but he totally supported it once it was made. We went to the Pentagon, and the day after the first movement into two sanctuaries and I asked the people at the Pentagon how many there were, and they said there were six. And, I said, "Let's move into all of them." I remember Westmoreland raised the point that he didn't know whether or not we could even handle two.

However, the other chiefs and the rest felt maybe we could handle all of them, particularly with the way the, ah, South Vietnamese, in the early days were fighting. So, right then, the decision was made to go into six, and it was one of the best decisions we made. Then came Kent State, which was a terrible emotional shock to me, ah, and a very great shock to Kissinger. And, of course, a torrent of abuse because the implication was that because we did Cambodia, three students were killed in Kent State—that one followed the other, although the student body president of Kent State pointed out when he came to see me at the White House that while the Kent State tragedy partly was due to the disagreement about the war, that long before the war there were other issues that were stirring people up.

But, I remember right after that Henry came in one day and he said, "You know, I'm not sure that we should have gone into this Cambodian thing, and perhaps now has come the time that we should shorten the time and get out a little sooner." Ah, he wasn't seriously considering it, but he says, "I think," and he used to always preface it by saying, "I must warn you, Mr. President, that the situation that I hear from my colleagues from the colleges and universities is very, very serious, and, ah, Cambodia is—it could have been a mistake." And, I said, "Henry," I said, "We've done it." I said: "Remember Lot's wife. Never look back." I don't know whether Henry had read the Old Testament or not, but I had, and he got the point.

Henry and I often had a little joke between us after that. Whenever he would come in and say, "Well, I'm not sure we should have done this, or that, or the other thing." I would say, "Henry, remember Lot's wife." And, that would end the conversation.

Occasional Hints About Resigning

Q. How many times did he say he might resign?

A. Oh, to me he would hint it on occasion. How many times, ah, ah, not many, not often. He would come in and say, "Well, I—I just wonder if my usefulness isn't finished. I wonder if I shouldn't resign." He had a tendency, too, to get highly elated by some piece of good news and very depressed by something that he considered to be bad news. Ah, that doesn't mean that he was emotionally unstable: it simply meant, that having the kind of wide-ranging mind that he was—he had the imagination that any genius, and he was a genius in this area, or intellectual has—and, ah, one of the, one of the characteristics of an individual with an exceptional mind is that he can see the heights and also see the depths, and he feels them both. And, Henry, was that way.

Well, I of course, don't contend that I'm a genius, ah, and so forth. I usually could see the heights, and could be—



China Pictorial

Mao Tse-tung during his meeting with President Nixon in 1972. "Mao was in charge of himself and he was in charge in China."

feel somewhat elated, although I tried to restrain elation, because I always know that the, ah, as Churchill once said, that the brightest moments are those that flash away the fastest. And, so that when you're up today, you may be down tomorrow. Ah, but, ah, many times I think that the way that the instant historians write about the Kissinger-Nixon relationship that they misread it to an extent because they, they take for example, an emotional statement; ah, ah, which, ah, he may not really mean. He would never come in and threaten to resign. He would come in and suggest that maybe he should because he was no longer useful. I, of course, then would say, "Now, look here, just stop all that talk, I'm not gonna want to hear any more of it, let's talk about the real thing."

Q. How many times did he come in and say that maybe, maybe he should resign?

Maybe a half a dozen. But, to others, more often. He would talk to Haig and to, ah, Haldeman about this. And, this would be when he would be in fights with the bureaucracy. He couldn't stand the bureaucratic infighting. He had differences, as you know, with Secretary Rogers. And, incidentally, this was a very painful thing for me

because Rogers had been my friend. He was a personal friend. Henry, of course, was not a personal friend. We were, we were associates, but not personal friends; not enemies, but not personal friends. Rogers was a personal friend. But, ah, Henry was fighting—first, they were—they were two very proud men. They were two very intelligent men.

There could be only one person to handle some of these major issues, and where secrecy was involved, I mean, secret negotiations, it had to be Henry, ah, in the areas like Vietnam, China, Russia and the Mideast. Now in the case of Rogers, on the other hand, being a very proud man, ah, he did not resent Henry handling such things, but he objected to the fact that Henry got too much credit, and he felt was taking too much credit, and also he objected, and here I think he had a good case; and I think Henry would have to agree, that he, Rogers, who had to make public statements all the time and testify and answer questions before the Congress, wasn't informed about things. He wanted to be informed.

Well, Henry would come to me and we had several arguments about it. He would say, "I will not inform Rogers because he'll leak." I said, "Henry," and I must have told him this a dozen times, I says: "Henry, the State Department bureaucracy will leak. It always

has. It always will," I said, "but, Bill Rogers will never leak, if we—if I tell him it's in confidence." "Well, I'm not so sure." See, he didn't know Rogers as well as I did. I knew that Rogers was a man of honor and I knew he wouldn't leak. And that was why on the China initiative, for example, we had a very good—we had quite an argument about that. Henry didn't want to tell anybody, of course, except those on a need-to-know basis. And I said,

'He [Henry Kissinger] would say, "I will not inform Rogers, because he'll leak.'"

"Rogers has gotta know." And he said, "Well, he'll leak, or he'll object to it." I said: "You cannot have the Secretary of State not be informed, because he has got to take off the day that announcement was made."

Q. Did Henry say that he'd resign if John Connally was appointed Secretary of State?

A. Not to me. I, ah, I have read reports to that effect, and I do know, ah, he, ah, ah, that his views with regard to Connally were mixed. Ah, he had—he respected him as a political leader. However, I think Henry saw in Connally—let's face it, a potential rival. Ah, Connally basically—everything that Connally touches, ah, in the political area, Connally controls. And so Connally would be a very formidable person to have around. Ah, I could sense that he would have preferred somebody else—let's put it that way.

Q. Were you actually considering John Connally as Secretary of State?

A. Yes. I thought he would have made a very good Secretary of State. However, in this case, while Henry did not have a veto power—ah, nobody can have a veto power where the President is concerned, ah, any President—but, while he didn't have a veto power, it was indispensable that whoever was Secretary of State be able to work with Henry and Henry be able to work with him because he had his fingers in so many pies, ah, which were in various stages of development, ah, and consequently, we couldn't possibly have a situation where he'd be at odds.

In other words, I'd gone through, ah, the Rogers-Kissinger feud for four years, and I didn't want to buy another feud with another Secretary of State for the—for the rest of the four years, and that's why I finally made Henry—gave Henry both hats, which I, ah, in retrospect, probably would not have done, had, ah, we—could we have

found some individual who would be Henry's equal. That didn't mean that from time as we did at the time of the May 8th bombing, when, ah, we got advice from Connally and took his rather than Henry's ah, with regard to go ahead with the bombing and don't cancel the summit, rather than the other way around which is the way Henry first recommended it, and the way I first approved it.

Family Angered by Kissinger

Q. Didn't you sometimes feel, "Why is he saying all those terrible things about me?"

A. Well, to answer the question quite candidly, it drives my family up the wall. And it's only because that it bothers them that it would bother me at all. Ah, after such accounts appear, I know that, ah, I always get a call from Henry on the phone, ah, ah, explaining that, ah, that there's been either a misquotation, or misinterpretation or what have you. And I have always said to him, ah, "Forget it." I said, I said, ah, ah: "What your opinion of me is, is, ah, not, ah, however you express it, isn't going to affect our relationship unless you express it to me personally. I mean, what you say about me to other people isn't going to bother me." That's what I said. But in all candor I would have to admit my family didn't share that, and I think what we have to understand, too, is that Henry likes to say outrageous things.

Ah, most, ah, people with great intellectual ability couldn't care less about the so-called Hollywood celebrity set or celebrities of any kind. I mean, basically, they're only interested in a person's brains, and not particularly whether or not they have a lot of money or a lot of a—of good news clippings, or what have you. But, Henry, on the other hand, was fascinated first by the celebrity set, and second, he liked being one himself. Not at first, but people would start coming up for his autograph and he was invited more and more to the Hollywood parties and the rest. I used to like them, but Henry will learn to despise them, too, after he's been through a few more. But, be that as it may, so he goes to a party, and I can see exactly what happened in Canada. He runs into a lady who, ah, has a very low opinion of me, and ah, ah, so Henry feels that really he's defending me and that the way to defend is to concede that, "Well, he's sort of an odd person, he's an artificial person," and so forth and so on, and ah, the only problem was that he didn't think to turn the microphone off, but on the other hand, I didn't turn it off either in the Oval office on occasions, so I never held him for that.