

Recognition Of Peking Suggested

By Murray Marder
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The United States should consider formally recognizing the People's Republic of China as China's "sole government" before the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, a senior analyst of the Central Intelligence Agency has publicly advocated.

Failure to act before the ailing, 82-year-old Mao dies could undermine the pro-U.S. faction in Peking and strengthen pro-Soviet forces, said Roger Glenn Brown, writing in the quarterly magazine, Foreign Policy.

Publication of these views of a CIA official on one of the most sensitive subjects in Washington brought reactions of surprise inside and outside the Ford administration. State Department officials said they were not aware of the publication in advance. They ridiculed speculation that it might be an official "trial balloon."

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger maintains tight control over all governmental comment concerning China. The Brown article "was not sent to us for clearance," a State Department official emphasized.

Foreign Policy described the commentary as the work of "a senior analyst" at the CIA who is presenting his own views and not the official position of his organization. One source, however, described the article as representative of "a minority view" in a major, continuing debate on China policy inside the Ford administration.

The official U.S. position is that the normalization of relations with China, since

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Comment by Leslie H. Gelb on Brown's article, NYT
4 Jun 76 - China file.

Full Ties With China Suggested

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the Nixon administration in 1972 ended a generation of hostility with China, is a continuing process with "no established timetable."

The United States and China operate "liaison offices" in Peking and Washington while this country maintains diplomatic ties, and a defense treaty, with the nationalist Chinese regime on Taiwan.

The Brown article contains many departures from official American assessments of how the triangular U.S.-Chinese-Soviet relationship developed.

The most provocative is Brown's assessment that in the celebrated 1969 Ussuri River clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops, Mao and the late Premier Chou En-lai engineered the initial Chinese attack on Soviet forces. Part of this objective, Brown concludes, was to isolate the late Defense Minister Lin Biao and his military supporters who sought improved relations with Moscow.

In 1971, by Brown's interpretation, after Lin's death in an abortive coup against Mao, "Mao and Chou systematically exaggerated the threat of war with the Soviet Union to create a crisis atmosphere conducive to party unity during the purge they conducted of pro-Lin military figures..."

Now, Brown warns: "... Prolonged stagnation in Sino-U.S. relations could well contribute to undermining the political power of those individuals and groups within China which are favorably disposed toward Washington, and lead to an increase in the relative power of either pro-Soviet elements in the military, the radicals, or some coalition of both groups.

"If this happens, China might well revert to a self-imposed isolationism similar to that of the Cultural Revolution or seek a general accommodation with Russia."

The CIA, through a spokesman, yesterday dis-

claimed any responsibility for the article, describing it as "a totally personal point of view... from totally open sources available to all China scholars."

"The agency does not get into policy," the spokesman said. CIA Director George Bush, who headed the U.S. liaison mission in Peking before he was installed as CIA chief on Jan. 30, was not involved in the preparation or publication of the article, the spokesman said.

The Brown article originally was "prepared last year," the spokesman said.

At that time, William E. Colby was CIA director. According to Foreign Policy, the magazine began discussing the article with Brown in February or March of this year. It includes references to the death of Chou last January, and the sudden overthrow of Chou's successor, Teng Hsiao-ping, and his replacement by Hua Kuo-feng as acting premier in February.

The CIA spokesman declined to put through a call to Brown but said that *Brown is 35, a "middle-level" official who has worked for the CIA for nine years, four of them as a China specialist until the end of 1975. Brown is now working "in another area," the spokesman said.

One State Department source said "it is almost unbelievable that a guy on active duty writes on a subject that he knows is of extraordinary sensitivity."

To specialists, what is significant is that although the article may be based on "open sources," what gives the analysis extraordinary impact is that the author had reinforcing access to secret data.

Brown wrote: "I believe that Washington should consider recognizing Peking before the aged Chairman leaves the scene in the hope that this might influence the present configuration of political power within China and thereby the succession struggle certain to intensify following Mao's death."

To deal with China's insistence that the United States must break relations with Taiwan, Brown said:

"With respect to the difficult issue of Taiwan, the United States could follow the 'Japanese model,' formally recognizing Peking while maintaining a close economic relationship with Taiwan."

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