Irony of Detente

By Murrey Marder Washington Post Staff Writer

YALTA, U.S.S.R., June 30— A coincidence of history has brought President Nixon to the one spot in the world, paradoxically, which he helped to inscribe in Republican political consciousness as the arch symbol of misguided American statecraft.


The President had a choice, Soviet sources insist, as to where he and Soviet Commu-nist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev would enjoy the climate and beauty of a weekend at a Black Sea resort to c continue their summit

The sources said there were alternatives to Yalta, the site of the 1945 Big Three conference which greatly influenced the post-war division of Europe and has been sharply criticized for years by Republicans, especially Richard

The summit, according to the summit, according to the sources, could have been at Sochi on the east coast of the Black Sea, or Pitsunda, east of Sochi, where the late French President Georges Pompidou was the guest of Brezhnev last March.

The last thing American of-ficials want to do now is to discuss the matter in a way that will put the name Yalta into public print. They indicate, however, that the site options left little real practical choice because spacious accommodations commodations were needed for the several hundred White House staff and backup per-

Nixon compound at San Clemente, Calif.



Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhie, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko walk t Brezhnev's Black Sea dacha after their flight from M500w.

In deference to Nixon ad-the visiting Americal press ministration sensitivities, the proud Russian name of Yalta with the Nixon almistrapparently even has been oblition's effort to have listory terated temporarily from the record the summit a Orenda, Russian, if not the American, not Yalta. But the usup-Russian, if not the American, press. Soviet newsmen have been instructed not to use the word Yalta in their stories, and one Russian reporter was fired just before the summit conference began, according to his colleagues, for violating the ban.

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The White House's ge sonnel and 170 visiting newsmen. Most of all, Brezhnev
clearly preferred the Yalta reHe was anxious to show off
his companion-site to the
Nivor compound at Son Clear

With the ban. and one Russian reporter was fired just before the summit conference began, according

A plan to have the mayor of Yalta give a press briefing to graphic dilemma undoubted

Takes Nixon to Yalta

is being compounded, not miti-prolonged war against Japan, It escalated with publication gated, by the futility of its defensive public relations. A viet power, were assailed by accords by the Eisenhower adsympathetic Soviet newsman observed wryly: "It probably would not matter to American critics of detente where the leaders were this weekend—they would label it 'Yalta,' in any case. lem." We see the prob-

President Nixon's pursuit of detente is ill-served by rea-wakening memories of the first Yalta conference, subordinates ruefully agree, even though there is no comparison with the circumstances surrounding the meetings at Yalta 29 years apart.

In the 1952 presidential campaign, Mr. Nixon as the Republican candidate for vice president on the Eisenhower ticket, was one of the most vociferous denouncers of the February 1945, Yalta confer-ence where Soviet Marshal Jo-seph Stalin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made critical deci-Winston sions on the shape of the post-World War II world.

"Yalta," at the onset of the Cold War became a Republi-can synonym for Soviet duplicity—even though many historians dispute that. Yalta was equated with the Communist control of Poland, the "loss of China," and many other ills.
In the tumultuous events

that followed Yalta with often incomprehensible swiftness at the time, nuclear weapons were used for the first time at Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the war with Japan more quickly than any diplomat anticipated.

The territorial concessions that the United States made to Stalin at Yalta to gain Soviet entry into an expected some, in retrospect as a very lopsided bargain. Others argued that it was impossible to know that at the time.

Yalta, in retrospect, also supplied an additional, special, personal target for Richard Nixon for years afterward: the U.S. delegation at Yalta included a man named Alger Hiss.

He was to become the central subject of the Nixon pursuit of communism in government and his imprisonment for perjury on a charge unrelated to the Yalta conference was to catapult the Nixon name into national prominence. The term "Yalta" now had another politically super-charged link in American life, regardless of Hiss' minor role at Yalta.

Speaking in New York on Oct. 6, 1952, candidate Nixon said the hope for the "eventual freedom" of Communist-controlled Poland "can be rekindled by our repudia-tion of Yalta commitments that abet the Communist slavery of nations.

The "Yalta" outcry, a major issue in the Republican 1952 campaign, did not dimmish with the landslide victory of the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket. ministration.

Vice President Nixon, speaking in Chicago on March 17, 1955, said the errors committed by the United States at Yalta were "not of the heart but of the head." Yalta, he Yalta, he said, was "no deliberate at-tempt to sell out" by "loss" of China and "of course it naturally followed that we had a war in Korea and one in Indo-china." The reason, Mr Nixon said, was that in 1945 the Western world "did not know enough about the true nature of communism.

Once more at Yalta there is another kind of U.S.-Soviet test in a completely different atmosphere. Now it is the pace of detente that is under negotiation, and history now has cast Mr. Nixon as the American champion of the search cooperation accelerated with the Soviet Union,