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# Text of Secretary of State

Associated Press

Here are the text of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's statement in Salzburg, Austria, yesterday, and excerpts from the question-and-answer period that followed:

Ladies and gentlemen, I have requested this meeting as a result of the series of articles that have appeared growing out of my press conference last Thursday.

I am speaking to you extemporaneously on the basis of my best recollection of events.

Last Thursday, a number of you commented on the fact that I seemed irritated, angered, flustered, discomfited. All these words are correct.

After five weeks in the Middle East I was not thinking about the various investigations going on in the United States. I did not prepare myself for the press conference by reading the records of investigations that I believed had been completed.

I have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in public session, in executive session, and then at a closed meeting with Sen. Sparkman and Sen. Case, where at my request we went over each FBI report on the wiretaps that existed.

The meeting with Sens. Sparkman and Case was also attended by Attorney General Richardson and Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus, who supplied what information they could from their records or their recollection.

Since that press conference there have been many articles and several editorials. I was prevented by the short time interval between the press conference and the President's departure from holding a press conference in the United States before we left.

However, I got in touch with Sen. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on Sunday, and I sent him the following letter yesterday morning, which I will now read to you.

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

"You have no doubt seen the news reports and editorial comments relating to my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time of my confirmation hearing. They involve fundamental issues concerning the truthfulness and completeness of my testimony, hence they raise issues of public confidence and directly affect the conduct of our foreign policy.

"You will remember that my testimony concerning national security wiretaps ordered by the President and carried out by the FBI under the authority of the attorney general was in three parts: public testimony, an extensive executive session, and a session with Sens. Sparkman and Case in which we went over received FBI files.

"The meeting with Sens. Sparkman and Case was conducted in the presence of then-Attorney General Richardson and the then-Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus. I emphasize this because no new material has appeared since my testimony except a brief excerpt from presidential tape, a large part of which is described as unintelligible.

"The documents now being leaked were, to the best of my knowledge, available to me before my testimony. They were given to Sens. Sparkman and Case prior to my meeting with them. In a few cases my recollection differed in emphasis from the documents. In those cases I pointed out apparent discrepancies and explained them at the time.

"The innuendos which now imply that new evidence contradicting my testimony has come to light are without foundation. All the available evidence is to the best of my knowledge contained in the public and closed hearings which preceded my confirmation.

"You are familiar with the details of my testimony, so I shall not repeat them here. Nor do I have any reason to change the testimony presented to your committee in any particular.

"Nevertheless, at this sensitive period, I feel it important that the committee which first examined the evidence and which has a special concern with the conduct of foreign affairs should have an opportunity to review it once again.

"I should add that if the committee decides on a review, I would not object should it wish to examine relevant security files and reports on wiretaps sent to my office.

"I, of course, stand ready to appear at any time."

Since sending this letter, there have been more articles, and more are undoubtedly in the process of preparation. In these circumstances, it is not appropriate for me, as secretary of state, to go with the President to the Middle East without having a full discussion of the facts as I know them, keeping in mind only that I do not have all my records here with me.

I shall now discuss these facts with you. I shall afterwards stay on as long as there are any questions. There will be no ending of the question period as long as there are any questions left to be asked.

First, what is it we are talking about?

The impression has been created that I was involved in some illegal or shady activity that I am trying to obscure with misleading testimony.

The fact of the matter is that the wiretaps in question were legal, they followed established procedures. When they were established, the then-director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation assured me that they were reinstating procedures that were carried out in previous administrations.

Before public reputations are attacked or destroyed, elementary fairness requires that this particular statement be looked into, and that it be made clear whether the national security wiretaps were in fact carried out in previous administrations.

The history of these wiretaps derived from a series of leaks that occurred in the spring of 1969. As assistant to the President for national security affairs, I had the duty to call the attention of the President to what seemed to me violations of national security.

These violations cannot be assessed only by analyzing the intrinsic merit of individual documents, but they must

be also analyzed in terms of the confidence other governments can have in a government that seems totally incapable of protecting its secrets. After a series of egregious violations, the President ordered, on the advice of the attorney general and the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the institution of a system of national security wiretaps:

I repeat, I was informed when I was told about this system that it was reinstated, a system that had existed in previous administrations, even though it may have been administered from different offices. I was asked to have my office supply names in three categories:

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Individuals who had adverse information in their security files, individuals who had had access to information that had leaked and individuals whose names had appeared as a result of the investigation that submission of the previous two lists might entail.

My office, for which I bear full responsibility, submitted those names in carrying out this program. I would be prepared to let any appropriate investigative body examine the list to make certain that no name was submitted through my office that did not fit into one of these categories.

In submitting these names, we knew that an investigation was certain and that a wiretap was probable, and I so testified in the executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, no matter how sentences are now taken out of context.

I testified both to Sen. Case and to Sen. Muskie that in submitting the names we knew, of course, that a wiretap was a probable outcome. The basic issue is whether through my office or with my knowledge any names were submitted for any purposes other than the protection of national security and whether the information was used for any purpose other than the protection of national security.

When a wiretap was installed, the FBI would send a report to my office only when, in the judgment of the FBI, the conversation involved violations of national security. It is totally incorrect and outrageous to say that these taps that were submitted to my office involved a description of extra-marital affairs or pornographic descriptions.

I do not know what the original logs show. The system that was followed in the operation of the national security wiretaps was, first of all, that no verbatim transcript was ever sent to my office. What was sent to my office was a page-and-a-half summary of conversations that seemed to the BI to involve issues of national security. These memoranda were then screened in my office and if, in the judgment of those who screened the memoranda, they were of sufficient importance, they were shown to me.

One of the leaks that I have read recently speaks of 54 logs that were allegedly sent to my office. The word "logs," of course, is a lie. What was sent to my office was a page-and-a-half summary.

But if you consider that during that period that eight or 10 people were being subjected to investigation, that the period covered in which my office received these reports was one year, you have to see that this meant that on the average 4½ reports a month were sent to my office, of which I was — I cannot be sure what percentage — maybe one or two.

The implication that my office was spending its time reading salacious reports by subordinates is a symptom of the poisonous atmosphere that is now characteristic of our public discussion.

I repeat, if we can find an appropriate forum which will do no damage to the individuals involved, I would not object letting anybody see the reports that were received in my office.

After May 1970, it was decided that my office was not equipped to deal with internal security matters. And after May 1970, no reports from the FBI were sent to my office for the remainder of the period that the national security wiretaps remained in force.

During this period, Gen. Haig maintained, at my direction, contact with Director Sullivan of the FBI. The reports from that time on were sent to Mr. Haldeman's office. If a report of sufficient gravity had been sent to Mr. Haldeman's office, Mr. Sullivan might inform Gen. Haig and if in the judgment of Gen. Haig the report was sufficiently serious, I would be informed of the content, but I would not see that report.

To all of this I have testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I would have no hesitation if the Senate Foreign Relations Committee decided to declassify the report. I would only ask that the individuals whose names are mentioned be given an opportunity to have the material deleted that refers to the reasons why particular cases in my recollection arose.

When I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I was aware that my recollection of particular events differed in a few cases from the memoranda. I nevertheless submitted the memoranda, pointing out, and I quote, "You have to remember, Sen. Case, I was one of those who strongly recommended that the report be given to the committee and that when there was a difference between my recollection and this report. I nevertheless decided to stick to my recollection."

There were three cases, all of which have now been leaked, of such differences, each of which I explained in detail to the committee, to the best of my recollection, after which the committee confirmed me by a vote of 15-1; and I believe that the one negative vote was unrelated to this particular issue.

Now then, this raises a number of questions. The first is, was the program legal? I have already answered that.

The second is, was the program administered ethically and properly?

I have seen innuendos according to which allegedly the criteria which I testified to were violated and according to which the first four people that were submitted, according to these criteria, did not really meet these criteria but were united, according to this report, by having worked for the Johnson administration.

Let me point out that I, too, worked for the Johnson administration and

that I knew President Johnson before I knew President Nixon and that I have never been ashamed of having worked for President Johnson.

Secondly, three of the four people on that original list were appointed to the National Security Council staff by me over the strong objection of all of my associates. Two of them were appointed to the national security staff by me over the strong objection of security officers and I personally gave them a clearance.

Can anybody, in all fairness, believe that three months after appointing these individuals to my staff I would initiate a wiretap program designed to assume that criteria were established that were being met?

Stories have been leaked to the effect that I harassed the director of the FBI with such phrases as "I will destroy the leakers," and that he was somewhat reluctant about this program. I repeat, the program was instituted on the recommendation of the attorney general and the director of the FBI by the President.

The memorandum that was leaked in which I allegedly said "I will destroy them" is a memorandum that was also available to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was a memorandum written by the director of the FBI, nine-tenths of which deals with a telephone call that he initiated to me informing me of the security risks that he saw dealing with my material or with the NSC material.

At the end of this conversation, devoted entirely to a recitation by the director of the FBI of various security violations, I said to him, according to his memorandum—I have no recollection of this event today, but according to this memorandum I said—"Keep up the investigation and if you find somebody, we will destroy them."

I think the connotation of this remark is entirely different from that which has appeared in the public press.

All of these facts have been put before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I know there have been semantic disputes about the word "request," "Recommend," "initiate." I have spent some time with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explaining what the significance of the word "request" might be in the context and what the significance of the phrase "initiate" might be.

Of course, in the sense that we submitted the names of individuals who belonged in the categories which we were ordered to produce, we initiated submitting names.

The point I am making is my office did not initiate any requests for wiretaps that were not triggered either by a security violation or by fulfilling the criteria of adverse information in the security files, and that last criterion was met only once, at the beginning of the program.

These are the facts of the national security wiretap program as I remember. I do not apologize for it. It is not a shady affair, as has been alleged. It followed legal procedures. I fully testified to it and I stand ready to testify again before any appropriate committee.

Now let me turn to another matter that is also constantly being invoked: the issue of the "plumbers" and David Young.

I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I said in a press conference that I did not know about the existence of the "plumbers" by that or by any other name. I did not know that David Young was working for the "plumbers."

I said this under oath and I repeat it today. I hope none of you are ever in a position that you have to prove the negative of a knowledge.

Now, since then, various stories have come to the fore.

There is the argument that I was responsible for the creation of the "plumbers" because of my concern about the theft of the Pentagon Papers, a concern which was transmitted to the President.

There is the argument that I misled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee because I did not tell the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that I had heard a tape in which David Young interviewed an admiral who had information with respect to security.

There is the argument that I was on a helicopter ride with Mr. Ehrlichman in which the "plumbers" were discussed.

Let me deal with these issues in order.

It is perfectly true that I was profoundly disturbed by the publication of the Pentagon papers. Any assistant to the President for national security affairs who was not concerned when 10,000 classified documents appeared in the public print would not be doing his duty. Nor can my concern be explained away by calling to the intrinsic insignificance of the individual documents or maybe the whole body of documents.

My concern was at that time we were preparing the secret trip to China. I was engaged in secret negotiations with North Vietnam that ultimately led to the end of the American participation in Vietnam. We were also engaged in secret discussions on strategic arms limitation.

I was profoundly concerned, and so expressed my views to the President, that these initiatives might be aborted if other governments had the idea that the United States government was not in a position to protect its secrets and that anybody could publish any docu-

ment and then the proof of its intrinsic significance was left to the government.

I recognize that national security has been abused in recent years, but because there have been abuses does not mean that there was not justified concern by honorable people. It did not occur to me in expressing my concern that this might lead to the burglary of a doctor's office. It did occur to me that measures might be taken to protect the government against a recurrence of these leaks.

I was in China when David Young was assigned to Mr. Ehrlichman's office. I returned from China the morning of July 13 to learn that Mr. Ehrlichman had recruited one of my staff members. To this I expressed a strong objection. My impression was, as I

have testified publicly and as I here repeat, that Mr. Young was assigned to a declassification project that was to last three months and then was publicly announced. I had no reason in the world to deny knowledge of the existence of a group designed to prevent as such with attempting to prevent leaks.

What was wrong was some of the activities that were being conducted by the office. And Mr. Krogh, who headed the office, has publicly stated that I had no knowledge of its activities. So the only thing at issue is whether I deliberately lied about knowing about the existence of an organization, the substance of which by common agreement I had nothing to do with.

Mr. Ehrlichman describes three meetings, on the 13th, 15th and a subsequent date in July. He places me at only one of these meetings, on a helicopter ride from Los Angeles to San Clemente.

My recollection of that day is that it was the day on which the President announced his China initiative and which I had just returned from China. After the China initiative was announced, the President, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, I think Mr. Scali and I went to a restaurant in Los Angeles to celebrate the events. We then spent a half-hour to 40-minute helicopter ride from Los Angeles to San Clemente.

My only recollection of this helicopter ride is that Mr. Ehrlichman was needling me about not being able to use my staff properly and therefore having asked for the assignment of Mr. Young to his staff. I repeat, I have no recollection that the "plumbers," by that or any other name, were discussed on that helicopter ride, although I leave open the possibility that given the noise of a helicopter ride there may have been some misunderstanding.

But I do not use this as an alibi. I have no recollection of such a conversation and no one has ever placed me at any meeting of the "plumbers" or any meeting where the "plumbers" were discussed subsequently.

Now, let me turn to the question of whether the fact that I listened to a tape in which Mr. Young interviewed Adm. Welander indicated that I had been less than candid in testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The question which I answered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was as follows: "Did you, when he, namely David Young, left your employment and was transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent time that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities, burglary, conspiracy to burglary or whatever they might be?"

This, ladies and gentlemen, is the question I was answering before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, not the question whether I ever heard

anything of David Young.

But I do not want to engage here in legal quibble. What did I know about the interview of David Young?

In the fall of 1971 there were a series of massive leaks of National Security Council documents which appeared in the columns of Mr. Anderson. Some of them included verbatim summaries of meetings of subordinate bodies of the National Security Council.

I was told at that time by Mr. Ehrlichman that he was conducting the investigation and that I was to have nothing to do with any part of that investigation. As a result, a member of my staff, Adm. Welander, reported to Gen. Haig that he concluded from the internal evidence of some of the documents that had leaked that they must have come from his office. Gen. Haig asked me what to do with this and I told Gen. Haig to send Adm. Welander to Mr. Ehrlichman.

Some weeks later, Mr. Ehrlichman called me to his office and played for me the tape that included the questioning of Adm. Welander by David Young. I knew, of course, that David Young was working for Mr. Ehrlichman. But to conclude from this fact that a one-time interview of an individual that my office had discovered and my office had sent to Mr. Ehrlichman) to conclude from this fact either that Mr. Young was conducting a security investigation, or even more, that Mr. Young was conducting security investigations as his regular activity, is inconceivable.

If Mr. Ehrlichman had sent somebody to my office for an interview, I would certainly have assigned a staff member to that task and it would have been impossible to draw from that the implication that this was my staff member's full-time duty.

At the time of the press conference in which David Young's name was raised, I did not know that he wrote a report on his investigation. Of course, I had never seen that report.

Since then I have seen the report in the form of a diary which was submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and it makes clear that at no time during this investigation did David Young have any contact with me whatsoever, did David Young talk to me or communicate with me.

Now, it is true that the conduct of a government is complex and that the responsibilities of the assistant for national security are complicated. Moreover, I was engaged in many activities in which the protection of documents was the smallest part.

I do not doubt that now when this transcript is analyzed it is possible to find this or that nuance, and to engage once again in the process of defaming public officials, but I know for a fact that the testimony I have given was truthful to the best of my recollection.

I joined this administration five years ago when this country was deeply divided. I felt that with my particular background I had a special obligation to understand the dangers of national division and to do my best to overcome them.

None of you in this room have ever heard me attack the motives or the purposes of those who disagreed with us. All of you in this room know from your profession that the truth very often has intangible aspects.

I believed also that because of my previous association, I had a special obligation toward those who were not

frequently members of this administration, and I intended to discharge this through all the turmoil of the national debates, but it seems to me that our national debate has now reached a point where it is possible for documents that have already been submitted to one committee to be selectively leaked by another committee without the benefit of any explanation, where public officials are required to submit their most secret documents to public scrutiny, but unnamed sources can attack the credibility and the honor of senior officials of the government without even being asked to identify themselves.

I have been generally identified, or it has been alleged that I am supposed to be interested primarily in the balance of power. I would rather like to think that when the record is written, one may remember that perhaps some lives were saved and that perhaps some mothers can rest more at ease, but I leave that to history.

What I will not leave to history is a discussion of my public honor. I have to heal division in this country. I believed that I should do what I could to maintain the dignity of American values and to give Americans some pride in the conduct of their affairs.

I can do this only if my honor is not at issue and if the public deserves to have confidence. If that cannot be maintained, I cannot perform the duties that I have exercised, and in that case, I shall turn them over immediately to individuals less subject to public attack.

So, I have put before you the facts as I know them. They are consistent with my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I do so not to maintain a position in the government which I will not maintain for one day beyond the public confidence; I do so because simple fairness requires that either there be an exoneration or that there be a public accounting of those who engage in this defamation of character.

I repeat, I am willing to repeat, under oath before congressional committees, what I have said here.

I say it here only because I wanted to spare the United States the indignity and humiliation of having its secretary of state, while engaged on a trip to the Middle East, constantly exposed to these public charges and this is all I want to say, but I will be delighted to answer any questions and I will stay as long as there are questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in the nature of this meeting it seems terribly important for you to identify those whom you regard as engaged in defaming your character. Can you do that?

A: I do not know the name of the unnamed sources who allege that my testimony before the Senate committee was untrustful, who claim to know that the facts contradict what I said, and I do not know their names.

Q: Then may I follow, please? How can there be a public accounting of those as you suggested at the end of your remarks?

A: I believe that if public officials must give an accounting of their activities, those who print the accusations should state where these accusations come from so that a judgment can be made about the motive of the individuals making them.

I have submitted all the documents that I have voluntarily, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year, and I explained every document of which I had personal knowledge to the Senate, first in the session with Sen. Sparkman and Sen. Case and then in the meeting of the full committee. I could do no more than that.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, you said today that you felt there were more leaks coming. Is that one of the reasons why you decided to speak to us today?

A: No. I am speaking of the leaks with which I am familiar and since I know that not all of the documents have yet leaked, there could be more leaks.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you seem to imply here that if this campaign is not stopped, you are going to resign. Is that a fair assumption from what you said?

A: I am not concerned with the campaign. I am concerned with the truth. I do not believe that it is possible to conduct the foreign policy of the United States under these circumstances when the character and credibility of the secretary of state is at issue. And if it is not cleared up, I will resign.

Q: What has the President said to you in relation to what you told us, and I am sure you have in various versions given him your same thoughts. What was his reaction?

A: This is a question of my honor and I told the President that I should give you a public accounting and he agreed and we had no further discussion on it whatsoever.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, are you suggesting that it is the responsibility of reporters who have written stories of these leaks and/or editors who have printed those stories (to) come forward and identify their sources?

A: I am suggesting that when the credibility of senior officials is put in question on the basis of unnamed sources for the selective leaking of documents, and when this attack affects not only the individual concerned — which may be a personal injustice — but affects the standing of the United States in the world, then I believe an obligation exists in one way or another to do this, yes.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, you are under attack and you think you are being defamed. I also understand that you may have opposed the President's current trip because of his problems in the same area. Did you oppose the trip, and what do you think? Should it go on under your criteria?

A: I did not oppose the President's trip. The President's position is quite different from mine: He is an elected official; he was invited by the heads of government in a period of great transformation of international affairs; and he has a duty as a President, as long he conducts the presidency, to conduct it in the name of the national interest and not be deflected by what may go on domestically.

Q: Could I beg a question, sir? You say you are concerned about affecting the standing of the U.S. in the world and yet, at a very critical time, you have raised the prospect of your own resignation, which would indeed affect

the standing of the U.S. in the world. On that basis, is it not required that you more specifically define the circumstances under which you will shelve your statement about the threat to resign?

A: I cannot conduct my office if I have to devote my energies to disproving allegations of perjury, nor do I believe that the United States can conduct an effective foreign policy with a secretary of state who is under such attack, and therefore I am simply stating a reality.

I have attempted, however inadequately, to set some standards in my public life. If I cannot set these standards, I do not wish to be in public life.

Q: Would you be satisfied if the leaks ceased, as of now?

A: No. I think this issue now has to be resolved.

Q: If the Senate Foreign Relations Committee resumed its hearings and went through the whole matter again and gave you a clean bill of health, would you then withdraw your threat to resign?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you think these leaks are designed to force you to resign, sir?

A: I don't believe that, and I do not believe that I am surrounded by a conspiracy. I have not had unfortunate experiences with the press.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, I am still not quite clear in my own mind what you feel your role was in initiating the wiretapping program. Now, you said the decision, if I understand you correctly, was actually made at a meeting between the President, the attorney general, then Mr. Mitchell, and the head of the FBI, then Mr. Hoover. Now, do you feel that you played a major role in getting that program started or do you feel you were kind of an innocent bystander who, in effect, played a minor role? What is your own concept of your role?

A: My concept of my role, to which I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and which Elliot Richardson also supported, I may say, from the record—not on the basis of conversations with me as has been alleged in a newspaper article—my concept of my role was that on a number of occasions I called to the attention of the President, it would seem to me, very significant security leaks.

This, then, led the President, I believe on the recommendation of the attorney general and the director of the FBI, to institute a program of wiretapping. I did not, myself, propose this program. I was new in the government, and therefore I also was unaware of the fact that such a program, according to the director of the FBI, had also been carried out in every previous administration since Franklin Roosevelt.

So, in retrospect, I would have to say I undoubtedly contributed, by my description of the security problem and being new in government, it is possible that in one or two cases I may have taken an exaggerated view of them. I did not recommend the program as such, though this does not mean that I disagreed with it. I find wiretapping distasteful. I find leaks distasteful, and therefore, a choice had to be made. So, in retrospect, this seems to me what my role had been.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you go over again once more under what conditions you would withdraw your threat to resign?

A: I believe that the committee which looked over the records initially, which still has all the records available, and which has a primary interest in the Senate in the conduct of foreign policy, might appropriately do it. There may be other mechanisms for doing it. I want to make absolutely clear, I am not making this as a threat in order to gain support. I am stating an objective fact.

It is impossible and incompatible with the dignity of the United States to have its senior official and to have its secretary of state under this sort of attack in the face of the dangers we confront and the risks that may have to be run and the opportunities that may have to be seized. This is a fact. This is not a threat.

Q: But, Mr. Secretary, does not that same objective of fact apply to the President of the United States even though he is an elected official?

A: The President is the only nationally elected official. For a President to resign under attack would raise the most profound issues of national policy, and in my judgment a President can leave office only according to the constitutional processes that have been foreseen for it, a position which I believe has also been maintained by the leaders of the Democratic Party.

I strongly support that position. An appointed official has no such responsibility to the elective process. An appointed official has a responsibility only to the immediate conduct of his affairs.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, did you at the time when these decisions were made have any doubt about the ethicality—save the legal aspects—did you at that time have a question in your own mind whether it was ethical or not, and now, with the benefit of hindsight, do you have any doubt at all in your mind that it was ethical?

A: At the time I found it an extremely painful process. It involved in some cases individuals with whom I had been closely associated. It involved threats to individuals who, if they had been found to be security leaks, would have reflected badly on my own judgment.

So I did not find it a task that was particularly pleasant. But I could not quarrel with the judgment, and I did not quarrel with the judgment, of those who found it necessary . . .

Q: You said a few minutes ago that you told the President you were going to come out here and raise these issues. Two questions: Have you discussed with him specifically the possibility of your resignation?

A: I did not discuss the content of what I would say with the President.

Q: Have you discussed the possibility of your resignation and if so, what has been his reaction?

A: I have not discussed the content of this press conference with the President before giving it. I felt this was a matter in which I had to state my view.