

Excerpts From the Kissinger News

Following are excerpts from Secretary of State Kissinger's news conference in Washington yesterday, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of A.B.C. News:

OPENING STATEMENT

First, with respect to the situation in the Middle East: As I have pointed out before, our objective was to solidify the cease-fire so that we could move forward together with the other interested parties towards peace negotiations.

Now in the complex situation that exists on the Egyptian-Israeli front sufficient progress has been made on the cease-fire negotiations so that we can look forward with some confidence to the beginning of peace negotiations.

Our effort will be to create the appropriate auspices called for in Security Council Resolution 338, and under the auspices of the United Nations to begin a negotiating process, hopefully during the month of December, that we believe will—and that we expect and hope will lead toward the just and lasting peace that all parties have attempted to negotiate.

The United States has committed itself in Security Council Resolution 338 to support the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts. We will make a major effort to narrow the differences between the parties, to help the parties move toward the peace that all the peoples in the area need and that the peace of the world requires.

Now this will be our policy in the Middle East. We stated this policy to the Arab Foreign Ministers at the United Nations prior to the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war.

Interests, Not Pressures

I lay stress on this because the United States policy is determined not by the pressures that this or that nation may attempt to generate, but by the American conception of the national interest and of the interest of general peace.

Now the United States has full understanding for actions that may have been taken when the war was going on by which the parties and their friends attempted to demonstrate how seriously they took the situation.

But as the United States has committed itself to a peaceful process, and as the United States has pledged that it would make major efforts to bring about the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, those countries who are engaging in economic pressures against the United States should consider whether it is appropriate to engage in such steps while peace negotiations are being prepared and, even more, while negotiations are being conducted.

I would like to state for the United States Government that our course will not be influenced by such pres-

ures, that we have stated our policy and that we have expressed our commitment and that we will adhere to those and will not be pushed beyond this point by any pressure.

Now this is all I will say on the Middle East, but of course I'll be delighted to answer your questions.

There's one matter that I wanted to raise with you ladies and gentlemen, growing out of my last press conference, in which I promised within a week to supply the material on which—out of the evidence on which our decision to have—or go on alert was based. It was a statement that quite frankly I regretted having made in terms of the short deadline immediately afterwards.

The reason is that as we are now moving toward peace negotiations which we expect to conduct with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, I do not believe any useful purpose would be served if the United States recited confidential communications that had taken place and tried to recreate an episode of confrontation that hopefully has been transcended.

As time goes on and as the spirit of cooperation which we are attempting to foster in the Middle East takes hold and things can be seen in fuller perspective, we still expect to fulfill what I have stated.

I'm also glad to note that whatever the formal cooperation of the government's reportorial enterprise and the reluctance of associates to admit anything less than full knowledge of participation in events have both combined to produce journalistic efforts that have given a fuller picture of events than those that were available on the morning of my last press conference.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. In your explanation on the Middle East you said the United States will not be influenced by the pressure—I assume you mean economic or otherwise. And I wanted to ask you whether the opposite side of that coin has any validity. What I want to know is, Are you going strike back at them in some way?

A. The principal objective in the Middle East now is to try to move the contestants towards a spirit of greater conciliation and towards a

greater understanding that the requirements of world peace simply do not permit the constant warfare that has been characteristic of the past 20 years.

We still hope that some of the steps that were taken when certain assumptions were made about the principal American objective in that area will be changed when it becomes apparent that we are attempting to bring about a just peace.

Conference

However, it is clear that if pressures continue unreasonably and indefinitely, that then the United States will have to consider what countermeasures it may have to take. We would do this with enormous reluctance and we are still hopeful that matters will not reach this point.

Nuclear Arms in Mideast

Q. There have been some reports that the Soviet Union has introduced tactical nuclear weapons into Egypt. Is that so and if so how do you feel about it?

A. We have no confirmed evidence that the Soviet Union has introduced nuclear weapons into Egypt and there are public Soviet statements rejecting this allegation. If the Soviet Union were to introduce nuclear weapons into local conflict this would be a very grave matter and would be a fundamental shift in traditional practices and one hard to reconcile with an effort to bring about a responsible solution. But I repeat, we have no confirmed evidence that this has been the case.

Q. In your answer about the alert, on the contents of a confidential communication from the Soviet Union, I have great difficulty with that answer when you said that you saw no useful purpose in clarifying it. This is a democratic country of 200 million people who have been on alert before, and this is the first time they've never been told why. Don't the Russians certainly know what was in their note? And I would like to hear some more about why the American people can't.

A. I have given an account of these events to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. And there are in the national politics situations in which—as I pointed out in my last press conference—there has to be a modicum of confidence between the public and the responsible officials.

At this point, to go through the whole sequence of events would only bring about a recitation of a situation of confrontation and a scorecard of the won or lost which we do not believe would contribute to the atmosphere of confidence that is necessary.

We have given an account to elected representatives of the American people; we have given some account to the press. I recognize the seriousness of your question. It is not any lack of confidence in our judgment as to the alert, but a plea for some understanding that there are greater imperatives at this moment when we are trying to calm the situation, when we, in a very delicate situation,

are trying to bring about a cooperative attitude on the part of all the parties, not to recite in this time frame the elements of a situation of confrontation.

World Energy Crisis

Q. You have met with representatives of American oil companies. Were you at all encouraged that these oil companies would take the efforts—the American efforts—to produce a peace settlement in the Middle East into consideration, particularly with emphasis on Japan, and the supply of oil to American troops stationed on Okinawa and Japan? And will they provide some of the scarce reserves they have to help the Japanese?

A. The problem of the worldwide energy crisis has been a very profound challenge to all the oil consuming countries. At a minimum we have an obligation to study seriously what we can do to alleviate difficulties that have been caused either by policies which we consider responsible during the war—which would be the case with the Netherlands—or which are produced by the stationing of American troops, which would be the case in Japan.

We are now looking at the problem very seriously and hope to formulate some position by the early part or the middle part of next week. The meeting with the oil executives was not primarily concerned with these more or less technical issues.

It was rather concerned with the fact that here are representatives of American companies that are operating in many of these countries and that need to understand what the basic direction of our policy is so that in their own economic activities they are at least aware of how we conceive the national interest.

Nixon-Brezhnev Link

Q. Exactly what role [did] President Nixon's personal relationship with Mr. Brezhnev [play] in the recent alert.

A. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States is an inherently ambiguous one. We have never said that détente

indicates that we have parallel objectives, or that it indicates that we have compatible domestic structures. Our view has been that the détente is made necessary because, as the two great nuclear superpowers, we have a special responsibility to spare mankind the dangers of a nuclear holocaust.

And if one looks at history and sees how often it has happened that wars have been produced by the rivalries of client states without a full consideration of the worldwide issues, how easily misunderstandings could produce confrontations that could have catastrophic consequences, the overriding need of finding a solution to the problem of worldwide general nuclear war becomes overwhelming. As I pointed out in my last press conference, this is the central problem of our period, and it is a problem that will have to be solved either by this group of officials or by their successors. But it cannot be avoided.

Now in this situation, in this relationship, one will always have an element both of confidence and of competition coexisting in a somewhat ambivalent manner. The relationship that has developed between the Soviet Union and the United States since 1971 has been one of considerable restraint, and there have been very frequent and very confidential exchanges between General Secretary Brezhnev and the President.

At the same time it is perfectly conceivable and, indeed, it has happened during the Middle East crisis, that long-standing commitments—ideological pressures—produce actions that bring these two sides into confrontation.

At that point it is important that enough confidence exist so that the confrontation is mitigated. And therefore one has to judge not only the fact that a confrontation occurred really in the aftermath of a settlement and as a result of actions which could not be fully con-

trolled by either of the two sides because it happened the immediate cause was the violation of the cease-fire.

But one also has to consider how rapidly the confrontation was ended and how quickly the two sides have attempted to move back and are now moving back to a policy of cooperation in settling the Middle East conflict.

I would therefore say that the relationship that had developed between the two Governments and between the two leaders played a role in settling the crisis even though it had not yet been firm enough to prevent the crisis.

Impact on NATO Assayed

Q. NATO proved to be a rather fragile vessel, and some harsh words were exchanged openly and privately. Would you give us your estimate of the damage which was done to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and what can be done to shore it up.

A. Let me say first of all that the relationships in the Atlantic area remain the absolutely core element of American foreign policy. We remain convinced, as we have been convinced on a bipartisan basis of the North Atlantic cannot regulate their relationship with each other, it is hard to see how they can cope with these problems on a global basis that they confront.

On the other hand it is necessary to realize that serious difficulties arose in recent weeks. These difficulties were not accidental, but have reflected strains that have been apparent for a good part of this year.

I have read a great deal of speculation which ascribes this inadequate consultations by the United States. And, of course, senior officials have a tendency toward a conviction in their infallibility and they rarely admit that mistakes might have been made.

But I don't even want to argue that point. Any process of consultation can be im-

proved. The key question one has to ask oneself, however, is — and that one has to answer as well—it is a rude fact of the situation that the countries that were most consulted proved among the most difficult in their cooperation.

And those countries that were most cooperative were least consulted. So that there is at least no automatic relationship between consultation and agreement.

Secondly, if we deal with the question in its deepest aspects, are the objections that were raised due to inadequate information or to a different perception of their role? And one cannot avoid the perhaps melancholy conclusion that some of our European allies saw their interests so different from those of the United States that they were prepared to break ranks with the United States on a matter of very grave international consequence.

And that we happen to believe was of very profound consequence to them as well. Now I don't want to debate the merits of this issue, and in answering your question—what damage has been done to the Atlantic alliance—I would say the recent weeks made evident the need which the United States tried to underline by its initiative for these declarations of defining just what it is that the nations of the North Atlantic can do together and what they should do separately; of defining what forms of consultation are appropriate, how these nations of the North Atlantic can cooperate.

This is what we put before the Europeans in April. This is what we hope to achieve. And this is what the need for it should have been made evident to both sides of the Atlantic in recent weeks. And if that is the conclusion that is drawn on both sides of the Atlantic—as it is on this side of the Atlantic—then I think it will have been a good thing and it can lead to a new period of progress.