

**Negotiation Instead of Confrontation
 Still Working Despite No Small Odds**

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WASHINGTON, Oct. 25—The Nixon-Kissinger policy of negotiation instead of confrontation seemed to be still working today — against considerable odds.

That news came in after lunch in Washington. The Soviet Union had agreed not to send troops unilaterally to the Middle East, and would vote instead for a United Nations peace-keeping force minus great-power participation, as proposed by the United States. Before lunch the situation seemed as grave as the face Secretary of State Kissinger wore when he appeared at a news conference at noon.

News Analysis

Two critical questions were presented to him by the assembled reporters: How did we get into this, and how do we get out?

Secretary Kissinger would not, in detail, answer the first question. He could not at once answer the second.

The second question was answered for him by the events of the afternoon. The Soviet Union decided against immediate confrontation with the United States, a confrontation Mr. Kissinger repeatedly insisted that the United States did not want. The timing — it all happened within a couple of hours — suggested that the Soviet decision had already been made before Mr. Kissinger spoke.

On the first question, the record was less clear. Near the end of his news conference, Mr. Kissinger was asked why the American people, "already badly shaken by the events of the last week," should be asked to accept "a very dramatic military alert involving nuclear forces on the basis of a kind of handful of snow."

A Unanimous Recommendation

All that Mr. Kissinger had said was the United States had observed "the ambiguity of some of the actions and communications" by the Soviet Union, "and certain readiness measures."

Mr. Kissinger did not say it, but others indicated that the Soviet Union had deliberately let the United States know that some Soviet airborne troops had been alerted. It was presumably a signal—diplomatic as much as military

These worrisome actions, coupled with "the behavior of some Soviet representatives," produced a unanimous recommendation from President Nixon's advisers and the National Security Council that he "order certain precautionary measures." Those measures were taken by the President at 3 A.M.

Compared with the measures taken in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, they were vague

and ill-defined and much less alarming. In 1962, when Soviet nuclear missiles were implanted in Cuba, American ships were sent to sea and planes were sent aloft. The country was scared.

Secretary Kissinger did not indulge in scare talk today. He said that "the chances for peace in the Middle East are quite promising." But he was grave, somber and unsmiling, perhaps deliberately so, sending the Russians a message.

The message was, in effect, "we want to work this out, but we are not going to be pushed around."

It was a moment of crisis, not only for the country, but also for Henry Kissinger and the President.

They had gone to Moscow together and together had achieved what they claimed to be a triumph of diplomacy—a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union. Since the new Arab-Israeli war started on Oct. 6, they had been counting on joint action with the Soviet Union to stop the fighting and initiate peace negotiations.

As recently as Sunday, Secretary Kissinger was in Moscow negotiating on that basis with Leonid I. Brezhnev, chief of the Soviet Communist party. They reached an agreement.

Kissinger Clearly Dismayed

As late as yesterday afternoon, Mr. Kissinger said, he and the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, were talking about the site, the participants and the procedures for the peace talks that were supposed to follow the cease-fire called for by the Soviet-American resolution approved by the Security Council.

At that time, in Washington, the détente seemed to be working. Mr. Kissinger was clearly dismayed that, suddenly, it seemed to be in jeopardy. Today at his news conference he described in details how the détente was supposed to work.

"The United States and the Soviet Union," he said "are, of course, ideological and to some extent political adversaries. But the United States and the Soviet Union also have a very special responsibility.

"We possess, each of us, nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity. We both of us have a special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life."

As far as the status of the détente was concerned, the Secretary of State said a better judgement could be made "when we know whether peace has taken hold." If that does not happen, he added, "then we have made an effort for which we have paid no price," and must try again to insure peace for mankind.