

Kissinger: 'The Crisis for Us

Following is the transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger's news conference yesterday:

Ladies and gentlemen. I thought the most useful introduction to your questions would be a summary of events between Oct. 6 and today, so that you can evaluate our actions, the situation in which we find ourselves, and our future course.

The crisis, for us, started at 6 a.m. on Oct. 6 when I was awakened with the information that another Arab-Israeli War was probable. I mention this personal detail because it answers the question that the United States intervention prevented Israel from taking preemptive action. The United States made no demarche to either side before Oct. 6 because all the intelligence at our disposal and all the intelligence given to us by foreign countries suggested that there was no possibility of the outbreak of war.

We had no reason to give any advice to any of the participants because we did not believe, nor, may I say, did the Israeli government, that an attack was imminent. In the three hours between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m. we made a major effort to prevent the outbreak of the war. By acting as an intermediary between the parties, of assuring each of them that the other one, or attempting to obtain the assurance of each side that the other one had no aggressive intention.

Before this process could be completed, however, war had broken out. And it started the process in which we are still engaged.

Basic Principles

I do not think any useful purpose is served in reviewing every individual diplomatic move, but I thought it would be useful to indicate some of the basic principles we attempted to follow. Throughout the crisis, the President was convinced that we had two major problems. First, to end hostilities as quickly as possible. But secondly to end hostilities in a manner that would enable us to make a major contribution to removing the conditions that have produced four wars between Arabs and Israelis in the last 25 years. We were aware that there were many interested parties. There were of course the participants in the conflict: Egypt and Syria on the Arab side, aided by many other Arab countries; Israel on the other. There was the Soviet Union, there were the other permanent members of the Security Council, and of course, there was the United States. It was our view that the United States could be most effective in both the tasks outlined by the President. That is, of ending hostilities as well as of making a contribution to a permanent peace in the Middle East. If we conducted ourselves so that we could remain in permanent contact with all of these elements in the equation.

The First Week

Throughout the first week, we attempted to crystallize a consensus in the security council which would bring about a cease-fire on terms that the world community could support. We stated our basic principles on Oct. 8. We did not submit them to a formal vote because we realized that no majority was available, and we did not want sides to be chosen prematurely. On

Oct. 10, the Soviet Union began an airlift which began fairly moderately but which by Oct. 12 had achieved fairly substantial levels. Let me say a word here about our relationship with the Soviet Union throughout this crisis and what we have attempted to achieve. The United States and the Soviet Union are of course ideological and to some extent political adversaries. But the United States and the Soviet Union also have a very special responsibility. We possess, each of us, nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity. We, both of us, have a special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life. Both of us, sooner or later, will have to come to realize that the issues that divide the world today, and foreseeable issues, do not justify the unparalleled catastrophe that a nuclear war would represent, and therefore, in all our dealings with the Soviet Union, we have attempted to keep in mind and we have attempted to move them to a position in which this overriding interest that humanity shares with us is never lost sight of.

Limits to Restraint

In a speech at Pacem in Terris I pointed out that there are limits beyond which we cannot go. I stated that we will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of predominance, either globally or regionally; that we would resist any attempt to exploit a policy of detente to weaken our alliance; and that we would react if a relaxation of tensions were used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots. We have followed these principles in the current situation. It is easy to start confrontations, but in this age we have to know where we will be at the end, and not only what pose to strike at the beginning. Throughout the first week, we attempted to bring about a moderation in the level of outside supplies that was introduced into the area. And we attempted to work with the Soviet Union on a cease-fire resolution, which would bring an end to the conflict. This first attempt failed, on Saturday, Oct. 13, for a variety of reasons, including perhaps a misassessment of the military situation by some of the participants. We were then faced with the inability to produce a Security Council resolution that would command a consensus. And a substantial introduction of arms by an outside power into the area. At this point, on Saturday, Oct. 13, the President decided that the United States would have to start a resupply effort of its own. And the United States, from that time on, has engaged in maintaining the military balance in the Middle East in order to bring about the negotiated settlement that we had sought. Concurrently with this, we informed the Soviet Union that our interest in working out an acceptable solution still remained very strong. And that as

Started at 6 A.M. Oct. 6

part of the solution we were prepared to discuss a mutual limitation of arms supplied into the area.

Various Approaches

In the days that followed, the Soviet Union and we discussed various approaches to this question, the basic difficulty being how to reconcile the Arab insistence on an immediate commitment to a return to the 1967 borders with the Israeli insistence on secure boundaries and a negotiated outcome.

As you all know, on Oct. 16 Prime Minister Kosygin went to Cairo to work on this problem with the leaders of Egypt. He returned to the Soviet Union on Oct. 19. We began exploring a new formula for ending the war that evening, though it was still unacceptable to us. And while we were still considering that formula, Secretary General Brezhnev sent an urgent request to President Nixon that I be sent to Moscow to conduct the negotiations in order to speed an end to hostilities that might be difficult to contain, were they to continue.

The President agreed to Mr. Brezhnev's request and, as all of you know, I left for Moscow in the early morning of Oct. 20. We spent two days of very intense negotiations, and we developed a formula which we believe was acceptable to all of the parties and which we continue to believe represented a just solution to this tragic conflict.

The Security Council resolution had, as you all know, three parts: It called for an immediate cease-fire in place; it called for the immediate implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted in November 1967 and which states certain general principles on the basis of which peace would be achieved in the Middle East; and thirdly, it called for negotiations between the parties concerned, under appropriate auspices, to bring about a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

International Commitment

This third point was the first international commitment to negotiations between the parties in the Middle East conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union were prepared to offer their auspices, if this proved to be acceptable to the parties, to bring about, and then to speed, the process of negotiations. The United States continues to be ready to carry out this understanding. This then was the situation when I returned from Moscow and Tel Aviv on Monday evening. Since then events have taken the following turn: On the first day, that is Tuesday, of the implementation of the cease-fire, there was a breakdown of the cease-fire which led to certain Israeli territorial gains.

United Nations' Role

The United States supported a resolution which called on the participants to observe the cease-fire, to return to the places from which the fighting started, and to invited United Nations observers to observe the implementation of the cease-fire. In the last—this seemed to us a fair resolution.

In the last two days the discussions in the Security Council, and the communications that have been associated with it, have taken a turn that seemed to us worrisome. We were increasingly confronted with a cascade of charges which were difficult to verify in the absence of United Nations observers, and the demand for actions that it was not within our power to take. There was a proposal, for example, that joint U.S. and Soviet military forces be introduced into the Middle East to bring about an observance of the cease-fire.



By James K. W. Atherton—The Washington Post

Kissinger: "The chances for peace in the Middle East are quite promising..."

I would like to state, on behalf of the President, the United States position on this matter very clearly. The United States does not favor, and will not approve, the sending of a joint Soviet-United States force into the Middle East. The United States believes that what is needed in the Middle East, above all, is a determination of the facts, a determination where the lines are, and a determination of who is doing the shooting so that then the Security Council can take appropriate action.

Great Power Rivalry

It is inconceivable that the forces of the great powers should be introduced in the numbers that would be necessary to overpower both of the participants. It is inconceivable that we should transplant the great power rivalry into the Middle East, or, alternatively, that we should impose a military condominium by the United

States and the Soviet Union. The United States is even more opposed to the unilateral introduction by any great power, especially by any nuclear power, of military forces into the Middle East, in whatever guise those forces should be introduced.

Precautionary Measures

And it is the ambiguity of some of the actions and communications, and certain readiness measures that were observed, that caused the President, at a special meeting of the National Security Council last night at 3 a.m., to order certain precautionary measures to be taken by the United States.

The United States position with respect to peace in the Middle East is as follows: The United States stands for a strict observance of the cease-fire as defined in the United Nations Security Council resolution 338 adopted on Oct. 22. The United States will support and give all assistance, and is willing to

supply some personnel to a United Nations observer force whose responsibility it is to report to the Security Council about the violation of the cease-fire, and which would have the responsibility, in addition, of aiding the parties in taking care of humanitarian and other concerns that are produced by the fact that on the Egyptian-Israeli front, a series of enclaves exist in which demarcation is extremely difficult.

If the Security Council wishes, the United States is prepared to agree to an international force provided it does not include any participants from the permanent members of the Security Council, to be introduced into the area as an additional guarantee of the cease-fire. The United States is prepared to make a major effort to help

seek a political solution which is just to all sides.

The United States recognizes that the conditions that produced the war on Oct. 6 cannot be permitted to continue. And the United States, both bilaterally and unilaterally, is prepared to lend its diplomatic weight to a serious effort in the negotiating process foreseen by paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 338. We are therefore at a rather crucial point. From many points of view, the chances for peace in the Middle East are quite promising. Israel has experienced once more the trauma of war, and has been given an opportunity for the negotiations it has sought for all of its existence. And it must be ready for the just and durable peace that the Security Council resolution asks for.

Concern of Arabs

The Arab nations have demonstrated their concern, and have received international assurances that other countries will take an interest in these negotiations. The Soviet Union is not threatened in any of its legitimate positions in the Middle East. The principles I mentioned earlier, of the special responsibilities of the great nuclear powers to strike a balance between their local interests and their global interests, and their humane obligations, remain. And seen in this perspective, none of the issues that are involved in the observance of the cease-fire would warrant unilateral action.

As for the United States, the President has stated repeatedly that this administration has no higher goal than to leave to its successors a world that is safer and more secure than the one we found. It is an obligation that any President, of whatever party, will have to discharge. And it is a responsibility which must be solved, if mankind is to survive, by the great nuclear countries at some point before it is too late. But we have always stated that it must be a peace with justice.

The terms that have been agreed to in the United Nations provide an opportunity for the peoples of the Middle East to determine their own fate in consultation and negotiations for the first time in 25 years. This is an opportunity we are prepared to foster. It is an opportunity which is essential for this ravaged area and which is equally essential for the peace of the world. And it is an opportunity that the great powers have no right to permit to miss. Now I'll be glad to answer questions.

Press Questions

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you go into a little more detail on the Soviet threat that caused the alerting of U.S. military elements last night. And also, could you tell us if Ambassador Dobrynin delivered you a notice described by Sen. Jackson as to the Middle East situation?

A. Sen. Jackson is a good friend of mine, but he does not participate in our deliberations. I will not discuss details of individual communications. We became aware of the alerting of certain Soviet units and we are puzzled by behavior of some Soviet representatives in the discussions that took place.

We do not consider ourselves in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We do not believe it is necessary at this moment to have a confrontation. In fact, we are prepared to work cooperatively toward the realization of the

objectives which we have set ourselves.

But cooperative action precludes unilateral action and the President decided that it was essential that we make clear our attitude toward unilateral steps.

Q. When you were, early on, talking about special responsibility of the two nuclear superpowers to avoid anything that would eliminate or incinerate humanity, you went on to say there were limits beyond which we can't go. And among those, you said, we would resist any attempt to exploit the detente in a manner to weaken others, or weaken our allies—I didn't get that exactly—but, you will recall what you said, and what I want to ask you is whether you believe that the action of the Russians so far, particularly in departing from what you thought was an agreement, has gone to the point where it threatens exploitation of the detente to an adverse extent.

A. We are not yet prepared to make this judgment. We have to realize of course, as I pointed out in my remarks, the Soviet Union and we are in a very unique relationship. We are at one and the same time adversaries and partners in the preservation of peace. As adversaries, we often find ourselves drawn into potential confrontation. And each of us has friends that in themselves—that themselves pursue objectives that may not be sought fully by either of us. When we took the precautionary steps of which you are all aware, we did so because we thought there might be a possibility that matters might go beyond the limits which I have described. But we are not yet prepared to say if we have gone beyond these limits, and we believe that the possibility of moving in the direction that the Security Council had established earlier this week is still very real. And if the Security Council today were to pass a resolution that permitted the introduction of United Nations forces, except those of the permanent members, the United States would feel that we are back on the road that had been charted earlier this week.

Q. Could you tell us whether the United States received a specific warning from the Soviet Union that it would send its forces unilaterally into the Middle East? Do you have intelligence that the Russians are preparing for such an action? The reason I raise these questions — as you know, there has been some line of speculation this morning that the American alert might have been prompted as much by American domestic requirements as by the real requirements of diplomacy in the Middle East. I wonder if you could provide some additional information on that?

A. Marvin, we are attempting to conduct the foreign policy of the United States with regard for what we owe, not just to the electorate, but to future generations. And it is a symptom of what is happening to our country that it could even be suggested that the United States would even alert its forces for domestic reasons.

We do not think it is wise at this moment to go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges that prompted this decision.

Upon the conclusion of the present diplomatic effort, one way or the other, we will make the record available and we will be able to go into greater detail. And I am absolutely confident that the . . . that it will be seen that the President had no other

choice, as a responsible national leader.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you say, sir, why the United States feels that the permanent members of the Security Council should not send forces, although there is a chapter in the U.N. charter, I believe, that calls upon all members of the U.N. to provide forces when called upon to do so?

A. We believe that the particular provision of the charter which you mentioned should be seen in the light of the particular circumstances. When you have a situation in which several of the permanent members may have conflicting interests, and when the presence of the forces of permanent members may themselves contribute to the tension in the area, it seems to us the only possible course to exclude the members — the forces — of all permanent members. It would be a disaster if the Middle East, already so torn by local rivalries, would now become, as a result of a U.N. decision, a legitimized theater for the competition of the military forces of the great nuclear powers. And therefore, it seemed to us that the political purpose would be best served if any international force emerging were composed of countries that had no possibility of themselves being drawn into rivalry as a result of this action.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, it may seem obvious, but I'd just like to ask you: Is the purpose of the work that is now going on to tell the Soviet Union that if they send forces into the Middle East, we would do the same?

A. I don't want to speculate about what the President may decide to do, in circumstances which we fervently hope will not arise. It would seem to us that to threaten all that has been achieved in the search for peace by unilateral action would be a step of irresponsibility that we do not believe is likely.

And therefore, I do not want to speculate what the United States would do if it should appear that instead of getting an era of cooperation, we were thrown back to the confrontation which sooner or later will have to be surmounted, because humanity cannot stand the eternal conflict of those who have the capacity to destroy it.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, Cairo Radio says that such an offer of Soviet troops for enforcing a cease-fire has been received from Moscow. Has such an offer been made, and if so, have the Soviet troops indeed been alerted, and are they on the move?

A. We are not, of course, aware of the diplomatic exchanges that may go on between the government of Egypt and the government of the Soviet Union. We are also not aware of any Soviet forces that may have been introduced into Egypt, and we believe that we will bend every effort in that direction—that any actions that are taken by any countries in the Middle East will be within the framework of the Security Council and of United Nations decisions. I want to repeat again, we do not now consider ourselves in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We continue to be prepared and we believe it is entirely possible to maintain the direction that has brought us to this point and on which the peace of the world depends.

Q. Why do you believe that the Soviet Union has threatened unilateral action and took the circumstances to the brink of confrontation? Does it seem possible that they saw the events of last weekend as having so weakened the President, by threatening him with impeachment, that they saw a target of opportunity and decided to move?

A. Speculation about motives is always dangerous. But one cannot have crises of authority in a society for a period of months, without paying a price, somewhere along the line.

Q. Mr. Secretary, from a public standpoint, until this morning, the public would have had the belief and the view that this crisis was in hand, that the cease-fire was taking hold.

You have declined to discuss specific communications, but was there prior to this latest sudden development, any indication that this situation might go in such a direction?

A. No, there was not. Until yesterday afternoon, we had every reason to believe that the basic direction that had been established and to which all parties had agreed would, in fact, be implemented. I repeat, that we still believe that it is possible to continue in this direction. Nobody can gain from introducing great power rivalry, or from compounding—by compounding—great power rivalry.

The overriding goal in the Middle East must be a just and durable peace between the Arab nations and Israel, that the United States is prepared and indeed determined to promote.

And that is the issue, to which we should address ourselves.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Sen. Jackson among others has said that this government has been operating under what he called an illusion of detente from the very beginning. Can you be a little more precise now, under these circumstances, about the status of this detente with the Soviet Union?

A. Mr. Lisagor, we have from the beginning of this administration recognized that there is—that we are dealing with an ideological and political adversary. We have also believed that we had an historic obligation precisely in these conditions of being in our position to attempt to remove the dangers of war. We have always maintained and we have always practiced, that we would resist any foreign policy adventures. Through the many tragedies in the early part of this administration, where we have differed with some of our critics, it was our conviction that it was dangerous to attempt to interfere in addition with the domestic affairs of a country with such a different domestic structure and such a different ideological orientation. We have maintained the integrity of our allies and the security of the United States while reducing the danger of war. As I said in my remarks, this is a historic task that somebody will have to solve and that it is in the interest of all Americans and of all of mankind that it be solved as quickly as possible. As for the status of the detente, I think we can make a better judgment when we know whether peace has taken hold. If the Soviet

Union and we can work cooperatively first, towards establishing the peace bonds, and then towards promoting a durable settlement in the Middle East, then the detente will have proved itself. If this does not happen, then we have made an effort for which we have paid no price—that had to be made—and then one has to wait for another moment when the task of procuring, or bringing peace, to mankind can be attempted.

Q. The reports that the joint, the Soviet plan for a joint Soviet-U.S. force were rather widespread before you went to Moscow, especially in Eastern Europe. Did Mr. Brezhnev discuss this idea with you in any way and if not

why do you think he kept quiet about it then only to appear to activate it a few days later?

A. I don't know what plans were widespread in Eastern Europe. I can only deal with plans that reach us in a joint official manner. The plan for a joint U.S.-Soviet military force in the Middle East was never broached to us either publicly or privately until yesterday, and we immediately made clear that we would not participate in such a force and also that we would oppose any unilateral move.

Q. You have said U.S.-Soviet auspices might be useful in moving this along diplomatically. Are you prepared personally to play a role in getting these talks started, and secondly, have all the parties accepted the necessity for direct Arab-Israeli talks?

A. We have not been in equally close contact with all of the parties, but we have reason to believe that a sufficient number of the parties have accepted these talks, for them to start and indeed, as late as yesterday afternoon, preliminary talks took place between ambassador Dobrynin and me, about the site, participation and procedure for these talks.

Q. Earlier you referred to legitimate Soviet interest in the Middle East, and indicated that we felt they were not threatened there. Have the Soviets indicated they agreed with your assessment?

A. On the basis of the conversations that I had with General Secretary Brezhnev as late as last Sunday, and the communications that were exchanged afterwards between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev, there was every reason to expect that while of course, our interests were not congruent, and while of course, there were differences in approach that a certain parallelism could develop in the direction of producing a permanent peace. And therefore I would have to say, that we had reason to believe—and we have no reason yet to alter our estimate that the joint auspices of which the Security Council resolution speaks can yet be implemented.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, these two cease-fire resolutions in the United Nations . . . in that period the Israeli forces have made substantial military gains on the ground. Is the United States prepared to urge Israel to comply with the resolutions, or for all parties to withdraw to their borders at the time of the first cease-fire?

A. The United States supported both resolutions and is today supporting another resolution containing similar provisions as well as a provision for an international force drawn from all member states of the United Nations for which all member states of the United Nations would be eligible except the permanent members of the Security Council.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I noticed that you said the President decided on the military alert and you said the President had no other choice. Did you recommend this, or did the President initiate the military alert matter, and do you feel that it is a totally rational decision?

A. Mr. Mollenhoff, I have a general rule not to provide a checklist of what advice I give to the President, but due to the particular implication of your remark, I may say that all of the President's senior advisers, all the members of the National Security Council, were unanimous in their recommendation as the result of a deliberation in which the President did not himself participate, and in which he joined only after they had formed their judgment, that the measures taken, that he in fact ordered, were in the essential national interest.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, would you say what in your judgment changed from

the period yesterday when you and Ambassador Dobrynin were talking about participation and sites, and so on, for talks, and the period last night which led the Soviets to take the action that they took? What in your estimation changed?

A. I would like to make clear that as of now, the Soviet Union has not yet taken any irrevocable action. It is our hope that such an action will not be attempted. I repeat again what I have said on many occasions in this press conference: We are not seeking an opportunity to confront the Soviet Union. We are not asking the Soviet Union to go back from anything that it has done. The opportunity for pursuing the joint course in the Security Council and in the diplomacy afterwards is open. The measures we took and which the President ordered, were precautionary in nature. They were not directed at any action that had already been taken. And therefore, there is no reason for any country to back off anything that it has not done.

As to the motives, I think we should assess that after the current situation is over.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in the reasons that prompted the President to make the decision, did any of those reasons include a threat aimed against this country, as opposed to a threat in the Middle East?

A. I really do not think it is appropriate for me to go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges. We are not talking of threats that have been made against one another. We are not talking of a missile crisis type of situation. We are talking of a situation where 72 hours ago, we still introduced joint resolutions where the necessity for a joint movement toward peace is as real now as it was then. Where the participants in the Middle East had everything to gain from a period of quiet and from at least watching or attempt-

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ing to see what an American diplomatic effort can produce. And therefore, we are talking about a precautionary situation, and not an actual one.

Q. It seems to me that you're asking the American people—you and the President—who had already been shaken by the events of the last week, to accept a very dramatic military alert involving nuclear forces on the basis of the kind of handful of smoke without telling them or us exactly why. As I understood you earlier, you said that we had discovered the alert of some Soviet forces and we were disturbed by the behavior apparently of some people that American officials were dealing with, and that that's all we really have to justify this alert. Now, this country's pretty badly shaken, and I wonder if you can give us any more information that will help convince people that there is some solid basis for the actions that have been taken?

A. We are attempting to produce a

peace in very difficult circumstances. It is up to you ladies and gentlemen to determine whether this is the moment to try to create a crisis of confidence in the field of foreign policy as well. We have tried to give as much information as we decently and safely and properly can, under these conditions. As soon as there is a clear outcome we will give you the full information and after that, you will be able to judge whether the decisions were taken hastily or improperly. The alert that has been ordered is of a precautionary nature and is not of any major and irrevocable—it is not in any sense irrevocable. It is what seems to be indicated by the situation. We would be prepared however, I am certain within a week, to put the facts before you. But there has to be a minimum of confidence that the senior officials of the American government are not playing with the lives of American people.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the immediate problem in the Middle East at the moment appears to be the concern by Egyptians for the safety of its Third Army on the east bank of the canal. Are there any steps being taken to pos-

sibly ameliorate their situation and secondly, could you give us some more details about the topics of conversation as to forthcoming talks, about 12 hours ago, everybody was waiting for talks to begin. Could you tell us in which direction you anticipate that to go?

A. We believe that the particular problems that are raised by a cease-fire in which the forces are deployed in such a curious fashion—one unit... each army having units behind the lines of the other—that these conditions first of all, produce, especially the initial phases many difficulties. We also are absolutely convinced that the presence of observers with good will on all sides and with the active participation of the United States and the Soviet Union that the difficulties can be substantially eased, and eventually removed.

It is my understanding, for example, that some humanitarian supplies reached the Third Army today, and we must certainly be prepared to lend our good offices to an effort in which the... in which neither side gains a decisive advantage as a result of the deployment of their forces I therefore am

convinced that the particular conditions of the cease-fire, difficult as they are, can be dealt with and can be ameliorated with statesmanship on all sides.

Q. You have surely told Dobrynin and the others what you have told us and perhaps even more, can you give us any indication of what effect this had on these people?

A. We are at this moment in the Security Council debating the resolution that we are supporting. If that resolution is accepted and carried, out, we believe it will lead to an immediate easing of the situation and to a restoration of the conditions as we observed them at noon yesterday. May I say also that this press conference was scheduled at a time before this latest event was known or suspected. And I went through with it in order to be able to put into perspective the evolution that brought us here and as much of the reasoning as I could given the delicacy of the situation.

Q. Dr. Kissinger...

A. We believe that negotiations can and should begin in a matter of a very few weeks.

Q. How?

A. How?

Q. Yes, you knew something of participation forum. I was wondering if you could give us more details.

A. I think we should wait until the parties are prepared to announce it.

Q. Has there been any indication of how the Soviet Union will vote on the resolution?

A. I think the debate is still in process and once we know the result of that vote...

Q. Any indication how they might vote?

A. We are hopeful that the Soviet Union will vote for the resolution.

Q. If that resolution is passed, Dr. Kissinger, do you expect the alert would be taken off?

A. The alert will not last one minute longer than we believe is necessary.

Q. Dr. Kissinger...

A. And it will be taken off as soon as any danger of unilateral action is removed.

Q. Concerning the role that the United States may play in obtaining an enduring peace, several months ago you were reported saying that you

were supportive of an American policy that supports Israel but not Israeli conquests. What is your view on that now?

A. I think I was quoted to that effect 4½ years ago, before I understood the special nomenclature that is attached to the various ground rules. Our position is that as I have stated publicly, that the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations and that any process of negotiations — it is — it will be necessary for all sides to make substantial concessions. The United States' problem will be to relate the Arab concern over... for the sovereignty of its territories to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries. We believe that the process of negotiations between the parties is an essential component of this; and as the President has stated to the four Arab foreign ministers, and as we have stated repeatedly, we will make a major effort to bring about a solution that is considered just by all parties. But I think no purpose would be served by my trying to delineate the exact nature of all of these provisions.