

Excerpts From Kissinger's Testimony to

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WASHINGTON, Sept. 7—Following are excerpts from Henry A. Kissinger's testimony today at hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his confirmation as Secretary of State:

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT: Dr. Kissinger, your statement prompts me to put a few questions when you say, "We will seek to maintain a climate of mutual trust so that arguments can center on methods and not motives." One of the disturbing recent developments in the press has been the revelations in the press that several of your staff associates and members of the press, some 17, altogether, I believe, were subjected to electronic surveillance without their knowledge. This concerns, it seems to me, a very serious matter of procedure and mutual trust within our Government, and a procedure which I do not believe is in accord with our traditions, so I believe it would be useful to you and to the committee to clarify just exactly what was the truth about these allegations.

Could I ask you, did you or anyone else acting in your name, or on your authority first propose any of these wire taps?

Explains Circumstances

MR. KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, I think it would be helpful if I explained the circumstances of this particular event, and I think that will contain the answer to your question.

When this Administration came into office, for a period of many months it was confronted with leaks to the press of documents that were considered of the greatest importance to the national security. These included discussions of National Security Council deliberations, of procedures in case of emergency contingency planning, and of specific military operations.

The last conversation, in fact, that I had with President Eisenhower was when he called me from Walter Reed Hospital to protest that information that had been given to him by the President only two days before as extremely confidential had found its way into a newspaper on the day that he called.

In early May, 1969, the President consulted the then Director of the F.B.I., the Attorney General about best methods to deal with this problem. He was told that the most effective method was to apply procedures that had been followed also in previous administrations, that is to say, to tap individuals according to specific procedures, and he was assured by the Attorney General, the then Attorney General, that this procedure met the legal requirements.

At that time I had been in the Government for four months, and I must say that it did not occur to me to question the judgment of these two individuals.

Asked to Submit Names

My office was required to submit the names of these officials that had had access to the information that had leaked, because my office was a natural place for this information to exist.

After wiretaps were placed on certain individuals, I was not informed of the fact necessarily that a wiretap had been placed. The F.B.I. would send to my office a report if the telephone conversation included information that in the judgment of the F.B.I. contained N.S.C. information. In other words, we did not receive reports on conversations in general.

After some months of this procedure, in the summer of 1970, it was decided that the internal security aspects of national security should be separated from the foreign policy aspects. In other

words, that my office should no longer have anything to do with the internal security, and from then on all these reports went to Mr. Haldeman's office and not to mine. Also, from that time on my office did not participate in any of the other internal security operations that have recently come to public attention.

Informally as it was maintained, however, in the one area that had predated this decision between General Haig and Mr. Sullivan of the F.B.I., as a result of the wiretaps that continued, developed information of sufficient gravity—Inspector Sullivan would call up General Haig and either inform him of that fact or call his attention to the fact that a report containing that information had been sent to Mr. Haldeman.

Secrecy Questioned

SENATOR STUART SYMMINGTON: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee has revealed that the bombing of Cambodia, which began in March of 1969, was deliberately held secret not only from the American public but from the relevant committees of Congress.

Did you approve this withholding of information regarding the extension of the Indochina war?

MR. KISSINGER: Senator, let me answer your question first and then let me perhaps add a sentence or two to it.

First, as presidential assistant and executive secretary of the National Security Council, it was not my role to approve it or disapprove it at that time and therefore, the technical answer to your question is that this was not my function in the early steps of the Administration.

Nevertheless, I do not want to mislead the committee. I was in agreement with the policy that was then being pursued, and I believed

then and I must say in all honesty, I believe now, that the action itself was correct. I do not accept the proposition that it was an extension of the war into Cambodia as such.

The circumstances were confronted with a massive North Vietnamese offensive in which our casualties were 1,300 a month in March in violation of the agreement to the bombing halt, and when the agreement to halt the bombing was made in November, 1968, all the senior officials of the then Administration pointed out that if there were any violation they would resume the bombing of North Vietnam.

We waited for four weeks before we took any major action. There were several Presidential warnings in press conferences, and I repeat our casualties were 1,300 a month.

There were some 50,000 North Vietnamese troops that were shuttling back and forth across the Cambodian frontier engaging in combat operation with our troops and inflicting heavy casualties. But the problem that we faced in March, 1969, was to do something that was significant without resuming the bombing of the North which we were not prepared to do at that time.

Q. Who in the White House set this in motion, this policy, of the bombing of Cambodia, starting in March of 1969, this policy of deception?

A. Senator, there were two, in the hearings before our committee, there were two issues of deception raised, or so-called deception raised. One was the double book-keeping that was engaged in in the Air Force, and the other one was the cover stories that were used with respect to the bombing. Now one thing that I do not think has been brought out in the hearings sufficiently was that when the bombing first

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started, it was intended as a series of individual acts. For example, there was only one attack in March, two attacks in April, and two attacks in May.

The first time, the double bookkeeping we never had any knowledge of, though in retrospect I must say that given the requirements of security that were imposed perhaps one should have asked oneself the question how these raids were going to be accounted for, but we had no knowledge of the double bookkeeping.

Double Bookkeeping

On the cover story, after the first operation, at that National Security Council meeting that approved the first operation, which was the only one that was approved then, it was agreed that if—the formal press guidance would be that there were attacks taking place northeast of Tay Ninh without specifying their exact location. We would neither agree or deny there were any accusations they were in Cambodia, but we would say they would be investigated, if the Cambodian Government protested that we would apologize, and would admit that it had taken place.

This was the press guidance that was agreed to at this National Security Council meeting, and it is to my knowledge the only press conference that was ever discussed at the White House level.

Q. Well, who directed the secrecy with respect to the bombing and the bombing itself?

A. General Wheeler has testified before your committee that the secrecy had been ordered by the President, but there was unanimity within the National Security Council that it should be kept secret for the reasons that have been given.