


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ISOLATIONISM NEW ISSUES WATERGATE

By Bob Burchette—The Washington Post

Old Wars and

By Lou Cannon

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DAVID DEAN RUSK is gone from government now, gone far from the arena where he was praised and reviled in the name of war and peace.

His few strands of remaining hair have yielded gracefully to advancing baldness. The spring has faded slightly from his step. He is 64 years old. But Rusk remains in private life the self-effacing, thoughtful and essentially public-spirited person who rose from hard-scrabble Georgia beginnings to become a Rhodes scholar and secretary of state for two of America's most important Presidents.

He is proud of his service to these Presidents, and proud, too, of a tenure which he believes has helped to prolong the hope that mankind can somehow avoid the ruin of nuclear war. He is reflective about what happened to his country in the Vietnam war under these Presidents — and reflective, also, about what happened to Vietnam.

New Realities

An Interview with Dean Rusk

compassion for the President is balanced by his repugnance that the political process he reveres could be so tragically misused.

No Paternosters

RUSK DISCUSSED the Vietnam past and the Watergate present in that luncheon meeting, then again in a tape-recorded interview.

Such taped interviews are a rarity for Rusk, who insists that he will write no memoirs of his long service to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He quotes George Marshall, who once observed that if he wrote memoirs he would want to tell the full truth and that if he told the full truth he would injure a good many people, himself included.

Those unwritten memoirs no doubt would contain many pungent comments about both of his presidential bosses, with whom Rusk says he enjoyed "24-hour-a-day access, any day, and I didn't have to go through any Haldemans, Ehrlichmans, Kissingers or people like that."

Despite his aversion to tapings, Rusk is not naive enough to believe that he escaped being electronically recorded in his dealings with some foreign countries. With a twinkle, Rusk quotes the English judge who said that "a man and a woman don't go into a bedroom to say a paternoster."

"When I was meeting with officials talking official business, I wasn't saying a paternoster, either," Rusk adds. It is his way of noting that he didn't say anything he didn't expect to be held accountable for.

Rusk recalls that once, in Washington, he suspected he was being wiretapped on his private line from the State Department to his home. He had the line checked and found that squirrels gnawing on the insulation were producing a sound similar to wire-tapping.

Private citizen Rusk likes to fish occasionally and he is "trying to get into golf again." He finds little time really to get into it because he works a full schedule at the University of Georgia, where he teaches from Monday through Thursday during the school year. On weekends he lectures throughout the United States most frequently to young people.

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"I underestimated, myself, the tenacity of the North Vietnamese, and I overestimated the patience of the American people," Rusk says in looking back on it.

Look back he does, because people ask him about the war, but Rusk reflects with equal thoughtfulness on the tragedy of Watergate that has replaced the tragedy of Vietnam. As always, he sees what has happened from the point of view of power, and he is concerned about the presidency.

"The President is peculiarly vulnerable to misunderstanding and misapprehension," Rusk said last week over crab cakes and whiskey sours. In considering what has happened to Richard Nixon under Watergate, he has withheld judgment on the guilt or innocence of the President and on the impact of the scandal itself. He believes that the constitutional question surrounding the President's withholding of the White House tapes is a close one. One senses that his



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Rusk with Rep. Donald Fraser last March at a House hearing on the law of the sea.

Dean Rusk:

RUSK, From Page C1

Dean Rusk has come a long way from the days when his government was eyeball-to-eyeball with the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis, or when shouting demonstrators denounced him and his President for the deaths of soldiers and civilians in a war America no longer wanted. He is back in his native Georgia now, back home where he began. These are his views on what has happened in his country, on Watergate and on the world:

Q: *Would you comment on the impact of the Vietnam war and related events upon the present attitudes of Americans and the possible consequences? Would it again be possible to enlist the support of Americans for a limited war, either real or so-called?*

A: I think one can detect around the country a rather general mood of withdrawal from world affairs. This is reflected not only in the national decision that has been made by the American people and the Congress and the President to get out of Southeast Asia. One sees it in the growing demands to withdraw our troops from NATO, to eliminate or make deep cuts in foreign aid, to impose severe restrictions on imports, and in a rather general feeling that we should forget the rest of the world and take care of our problems here at home.

Now, this may be an understandable temporary reaction to the prolonged agony of Vietnam. It could be the beginnings of a cycle of isolationism comparable to, say, the 20s and the 30s. I hope, myself, that this is temporary, because we have on our plate in the coming years some major issues that are vital to this country. Such things as the law of the sea, the nuclear arms race and nuclear war, and how you build a durable peace, problems of the environment on an international scale, the population problem right around the globe, better answers in the field of race relations—not only in this country, but as our example might have an impact on similar problems elsewhere—and the coming problem of reduction in the supply of non-renewable resources such as critical minerals and fossil fuels. These are extraordinarily important national issues for us, but they can only be resolved on an international basis—that is, by a responsible and active participation by the United States in world affairs.

Now, my generation came out of World War II, looking back on the experience of the 30s with the idea that collective security was the answer to preventing World War III. It was written into Article I of the U.N. Charter, it was reinforced by such treaties as NATO, the Rio Pact in this hemisphere, and certain treaties across the Pacific. So one can understand why the idea of collective security is eroding among many Americans. It has cost us many casualties.

We've taken over 600,000 casualties in dead and wounded since the end of World War II—Korea, Southeast Asia, the Berlin blockade, a few in the Greek guerrilla attacks during the 1940s—and it hasn't been all that collective. We put up 90 per cent of the non-Korean forces in Korea and 80 per

cent of the non-Vietnamese forces in Vietnam. So I can understand why a good many Americans would say, "Look, if this idea of collective security means that we're going to suffer 40,000 or 50,000 dead every 10 years, and it's not even collective, it doesn't sound like a very good idea."

What does concern me, however, is that if we are in the process of pulling away from collective security, we're not seriously addressing ourselves to the question of what we'd put in its place as a means of organizing a durable peace and preventing World War III. To me this is the overriding question of foreign policy, because if all of these thousands of megatons go off in anger, not only will it eliminate most of the answers, it'll remove the questions because there won't be anything left.

Now, my generation came out of World War II with a rather simplistic answer—the notion of collective security. The next generation may have a much more complicated answer—no single theme as powerful as the notion of collective security. Maybe it will require action on many fronts. Maybe it's a whole bundle of sticks, no one of which will be decisive but which all together could in fact bring us nearer the durable peace which we must achieve. But we need more discussion about this, and I would like to see us address ourselves to it in what might have been called, in an earlier stage, a great national debate, similar to the kind of national debate we had when we went into NATO and went into the Marshall Plan and things of that sort.

Q: *What would the debate be about?*

A: How the world is going to organize a peace in which these thousands of megatons will not be fired in anger, and what the component elements of that program for a durable peace ought to be. Unless we discuss that question in a realistic fashion, we're likely, through oversight or inertia or instinct, to drift back into a period of isolationism. I've said to some of my student friends that they will not improve their situation if they merely reject the mistakes of their fathers, merely to embrace the mistakes of their grandfathers. Their job is to find out what the answer of their generation is going to be to the question of organizing a durable peace.

Q: *Do you have any clues, from what they say to you, as to what their answers might be at this point?*

A: I'm relatively optimistic in the long run. Partly as an article of faith, I believe that the human race has the capacity to be rational at the end of the day even though in the early morning all of us can be pretty ridiculous. These big issues that I mention, which are on our plate now, could be issues on which we could fight wars. For example, exploding populations might create drives toward what Hitler called *lebensraum*—living space. We could find ourselves fighting wars over limited, non-renewable resources (Sen. Fulbright mentioned in passing the other day the possibility that the West might seize the Middle East because of the requirement for oil, which I thought was not a very wise remark to make under present circumstances.)

They could be issues that could lead us all into conflict. But on the other hand, they could be issues which would cause us to

draw together as a family of man, not world government, to put our heads together to find solutions to these questions out of necessity, not out of sentiments or brotherhood. And I'm rather inclined to believe that the human race, which has lived through some pretty dreadful things in its time, has the capacity to address itself to these questions and find answers which will not lead to that total conflict which, as a race, we cannot endure and, perhaps, cannot survive.

Now, these are central to my own personal answer as to how I spend such limited time as remains to me at my age. I'm using that time to work with young people in the field of international law, trying to enlist their interest in and attention to these great problems to which international law, in the next decade or two, can make a massive contribution. And I have great respect for their intelligence and concern and responsibility, and I've been greatly stimulated and encouraged by the reactions I find.

Q: *How do those young people differ from the young people of your generation?*

A: I think they're better informed. In general, they're more concerned about what's going on in the world.

They have more of a sense of responsibility to take what's called—their language changes so fast I'm not sure what they say now—"a piece of the action" and do something about it, whether it's environment or the population explosion or whatever it might be. I think the world has narrowed, to use that trite expression—that they not only are informed about but realize they are deeply involved with what is happening in other parts of the world.

Now, one does have to beware of a kind of instinctive feeling among the American people. If you scratch the skin of any American you find an isolationist at heart. I think most Americans would rather be here at home doing whatever they want to do than to be involved in matters in other parts of the world, peaceful or otherwise. What we did during World War II and since did not come out of our historic experience as a nation, but was an act of will. And we have to be a little careful about slipping back into the traditional attitudes that evolved when we were developing our own continent and paying very little attention to what was happening in the rest of the world.

Q: *The suggestion here is that the course you now fear is the natural course of our historical development anyway. Do you think that trend was deepened because of the length of the Vietnam conflict?*

A: Well, the American people are, understandably, a very impatient people. I underestimated, myself, the tenacity of the North Vietnamese, and I overestimated the patience of the American people. And we could not, during the Kennedy and Johnson years, honestly tell them or demonstrate to them just when and under what circumstances this struggle would come to a conclusion. War is a terrible thing, under any circumstances. But if the Vietnam experience leads us into a period of American isolation, this might well be the most important cost of the war. And this is paying full respect to the men who lost their lives and takes into account the more than \$100 billion worth of resources that were absorbed in that struggle.


The stakes for the future are so overwhelming that a responsible American participation in world affairs is inescapable if we are to solve our own problems here at home. So I hope very much that if there is this mood of withdrawal, that it is a temporary phenomenon and that we'll decide what our role ought to be in world affairs. Maybe it will be different in important respects than in the past, but that we not try to find a fox-hole to hide in because with these problems that I'm talking about, there's no place to hide. There's no way to escape them.

Q: *What kind of impact is Watergate—meaning the entire complex of issues associated with that word—going to have upon these phenomena you describe and on the ability of the United States to conduct its foreign policy?*

A: Well, I think there's one domestic and one international aspect to that. I think it is very important that we Americans remind ourselves that 99-point-X per cent of the men and women in government are honorable, decent people trying to do the right job, and that we not let the malefactions of, after all, a relatively few people, even in high places, create a sense of cynicism and disillusionment about the political system itself. I think all

Prof. Rusk in his office at the University of Georgia.

United Press International



the facts are going to come out, and I think appropriate action will be taken. What those facts will show, and what that action will be, I'm not prepared to say yet. But we must not lose confidence in this extraordinarily resilient constitutional system of ours, because it's rooted in the notion of individual freedom. And to me that's very important.

We shouldn't subject all public servants to a smear based upon the malefactions of the Watergate crowd. Internationally, I doubt very much that there will be many who will make moral or political judgments about the rights and wrongs of Watergate. There'll be a few countries in which that would be important—constitutional democracies, to whom these issues are important. But for perhaps a majority of the world's nations, this kind of thing is more or less taken for granted. They've had their full share of it. And some of them have been saying that that's the way we've been doing things anyhow, as a matter of propaganda and political tack.

But what is important, from the international point of view, is the capacity of the President and the Secretary of State to speak effectively and with authority on behalf of the American people in the conduct of our foreign relations. Anything which weakens the ability of the President to do that necessarily limits what he can accomplish in his negotiations with foreign nations. So I would hope that we would get all the facts out, take the necessary action and get this business behind us as soon as possible so that we can get on with the public business.

Q: *From your reading of what's going on abroad have you reached a conclusion about whether or not the President's effectiveness is impaired by Watergate?*

A: I think it's perhaps too early to make that judgment generally in the foreign policy field, but I have no doubt that in a good many capitals they will be looking with interest at the questions as to the ability of the President to speak as the leader of the United States. And I hope that question will soon be clarified so that there's no longer any doubt about that.

Q: *How do you feel about using intelligence information for partisan purposes? What dangers do you see from this aspect of Watergate?*

A: It seems to me that it is important for our government to have highly sophisticated means of intelligence in the kind of world in which we live, but I'm deeply concerned about any indication that these powerful methods be used by any administration—Democrat or Republican—for partisan political purposes. A good deal of information comes in from a variety of sources which could be politically damaging to one's opponents, and I do not believe that those who are in government are entitled to use that information or those means in the free-swinging hurly-burly of the political processes by which the American people determine who are to represent them in Washington.

Q: *Did we get a good peace in Vietnam?*

A: I think the agreement itself, or the agreements, are reasonable agreements. They were very complex and had associated with them a good deal of complex machinery. The key question is whether or not there will be compliance on all sides with those agreements. I'm disappointed by the degree of compliance thus far, when in view of the fact that we clearly are moving out and are not going back, our own bargaining position with respect to those agreements has been, I think, severely limited. It may take another decade yet to know the full consequences of Vietnam and whether or not peace can come to that part of the world.

Q: *One more question. Looking back on your long service in government, can you single out anything that you particularly regard as an achievement, and also do you have any particular regret about something you would have liked to accomplish but were unable to?*

A: This sounds like a great oversimplification, but the principal satisfaction that I felt in leaving government was that I was able to assist in some way to add eight years to the period since a nuclear weapon has been fired in anger. We've now put behind ourselves 27 years since that has occurred. The more time we can add to that span, the greater will be the possibility that the use of these weapons will become literally unthinkable. So that's the principal satisfaction.

Now there were of course disappointments—call them regrets, if you like—because foreign policy is that part of our public business which we ourselves cannot control. The Congress, the President, the courts, state and local governments, within constitutional limits, can pretty well decide what we do about our domestic affairs. But when we move beyond that national frontier, we're dealing with about 140 other governments, no one of which simply salutes when we speak. So we often want to accomplish things which we can't accomplish because others simply won't act the way we want them to act. So a certain amount of disillusionment, disappointment, is built into the very process of foreign relations.

Now I regret very much the colossal mistake of the Bay of Pigs. I regret very much, as did President Johnson, the fact that we were not able to bring the Vietnam struggle to an end while we were still in office. And I suppose if one looked over the 2,100,000 cables that went out of the Department of State with my name signed to them, that I could find quite a few I would have written the other way. I think there's one point that's worth making, and that is that most foreign policy decisions are made about the future. They're trying to shape future events in one direction rather than another. And providence has not given us the capacity to pierce the fog of the future with accuracy. And so, yes, there are disappointments, there are regrets in hindsight. And there always will be for those who carry those responsibilities.