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Following are excerpts from the testimony before the Sen-ate Watergate committee jes-terday by former CIA Director Richard Helms. The excerpts begin with the guestioning of Helms by assistant committee counsel David Dorsen.

Dorsen: Did you have a onversation with (then conversation with (then deputy CIA director) Gen. (Robert E.) Cushman con-cerning Howard Hunt in the summer of 1971?

Helms: Yes. I recall that Gen. Cushman informed me that he had authorized giving to Howard Hunt a tape recorder and a camera, and I asked for what purpose and he said he wanted to conduct a one-time inter-view and that he had been properly authenticated by the White House and that he was working at their behest.

Helms: Subsequently . . . I Helms: Subsequently ... I learned, I believe, in memorandum tht Mr. Hunt asked to have a secretary who was stationed with the CIA in Paris brought back from Paris and assigned to him in the White House. He also wanted this to be done secretly and he didn't want anybody to know about it. That, to me, was unaccepta-ble. I saw no reason for this. ble. I saw no reason for this. ble. I saw no reason for this. It seemed to me that the agency was being used, if it was being asked to have somebody brought back to (from) Paris and assigned to man doing unidentified chores at the White House, so I got ahold of Gen. Cush-a man doing unidentified thought this was totally un-acceptable and I woudn't stand for it. I don't recall whether it was then or a few days later but at some point days later but at some point the various additional rethe various additional re-quests which Hunt was mak-ing of the agency seemed to be totally unacceptable, and I asked Gen. Cushman to call Mr. Ehrlichman and tell him that we just weren't go-ing to do this anymore ing to do this anymore.

Dorsen: ... Now you have indicated that in your con-iversation with Gen. Cush-man that you indicated to Mr., Gen. Cushman that John Ehrlichman should be called. Why was it that John Ehrlichman was to be called?

Helms: Because it was my distinct impression that he

¹⁷distinct impression that he was the one who had ar-ranged with Gen. Cushman to have Hunt get these pieces of equipment. Dorsen: A m bassador Helms, when for the first time did you learn of the burglary of Dr. Lewis Field-ings' office, that is Dr. Dan-iel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's iel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

Helms: I forget which weekend in May it was. I think the second weekend of May this year, 1973, I was in Shiraz, and I picked up on Sunday an English language

newspaper and saw on the first page of it there had been a burglary in the office of a psychiatrist in Califorof a psychiatrist in Califor-inia and the burglary had been done, it was said in the newspaper story, with the asistance of CIA equip-ment. That was the first time I had ever heard of Dr. Fielding, a burglary, or the fact that Dr. Ellsberg had had a bsychiatrist.

had a psychiatrist. Dorsen: Do you know of your own knowledge whether any equipment was used in the burglary that was the "property of the CIA? Helms: I have been as-sured by members of the

agency, and this assurance was given me when I was back here in May testifying before four other congres-sional committees that the sional committees that the equipment that was given to Hunt was not used in the burglary of Dr. Ellsberg's of-fice, that actually Mr. Hunt was physically not at the of-fice, he was staked out at doctor — at Dr. Fieldings' residence, and that since he wasn't given any burglary equipment by the agency I have always wondered how have always wondered how it was that he used that equipment in the break-in

Dorsen: A m b as s a d o r Helms, during the summer of 1971 did you learn of a re-quest by a member of the White House staff for the Central Intelligence Agency to do a psychological or psy-chiatric profile of Dr. Ellsberg?

Helms: Yes, I was familiar Helms: Yes, I was familiar with this request. Sometime before this Mr. David Young, who was one of the rassistants at the White House, had originally been on Dr. Henry Kissinger's staff, informed me that he was being transferred to Mr. (John D.) Ehrlichman's White House staff, in other White House staff, in other words, he was going to work for Mr. Ehrlichman, and that he had been given duties in connection with duties in connection with general security procedures in the government, classifi-cation of documents, investi-gation of leaks and a clutch

of other such matters. Subsequent to that, he called me and said that he wanted to get into these things, he wanted to find out how the agency and the intelligence community has intelligence community han-dled the classification of documents, and other secu-rity procedures, and I said I

thought that under the circumstances that the best thing for me to do would be for me to put him in touch with the agency's director of security, a gentleman named Howard Osborne, who would then be able to talk with him and be as respon-sive to his requests as the agency could be.

It was apparent to Mr. Osborne that Mr. Young originally made the request for a profile on Mr. Ellsberg. Mr. Osborne then brought this request to me.

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Dorsen: Excuse me, Am-; bassador. Could you briefly summarize at the present time what this profile is? gether a lot of information about a foreigner, maybe a foreign statesman or a for-eign dignitary, and then at-tempting to analyze what sort of a human being he was. These things were called variously, I think, psychological profiles, is as good a title as any, psycho-logical study. The idea was to give insights into what motivated some of these in-dividuals, why they did things the way they did, and dividuals, why they did things the way they did, and so forth.

so forth. David Young knew that the agency wrote papers such as this because he had seen them when he was on Dr. Kissinger's staff. So, he then said that he wanted the agency to do this and he re-monstrated with him. I said agency to do this and he re-monstrated with him. I said we have nothing—we know nothing about Dr. Ellsberg. I have never laid eyes on him in my life. We have no records on him. We know nothing about him and I think this is an imposition to ask us to do this. He pled with me He said

He pled with me. He said that this was very impor-tant, that the White House tant, that the White House was very much interested in getting this material sorted out, that Mr. Ehrlichman re-garded it as highest priority, so did Dr. Kissinger, that we should help, that we were the only ones they knew in town that did things of this kind, had practice in doing them, and please, would we do so ...

do so ... Dorsen: Did the staff of the Central Intelligence the Central Intelligence Agency thereafter prepare such a profile?

such a profile? Helms: Yes, they did ... I understand that it was for-warded to Mr. Young, that it was found to be unsatisfac-tery, that Mr. Young demon-strated with the people who had written the fact that it was unsatisfactory. I believe it was ... I have learned since that it was

pointed out to them that more material was going to have to be provided, otherwise, they couldn't do any better than they had done already, and Mr. Young said all right, we will try and get you some more material, which I believe he did. So that the second profile more that the second profile was written.

Dorsen: And was the sec-ond profile delivered to Mr. Young also? Helms: I believe so . . . Dorsen: And did you have

a conversation with Mr. Young in connection with the delivrey of the second profile to him? Helms: "Yes... and I told him that the provelocity

herms: res... and 1 tota him that the psychologists and psychiatrists who worked on this were very disturbed about the whole exercise. They didn't feel the material they had been given was adequate, that they were being put in an unfair position, that they didn't want their profes-sional reputations put on the line as a result of this kind of an exercise, and that if he was insisting on having this, then I wanted his understanding and his under-standing that he would not identify it for the agency and put these fellows in jeopardy, put these fellows' professional reputation in jeopardy.

Dorsen: During the period that the two profiles were prepared, which I believe was — took us into early November of 1971, what was November of 1971, what was your understanding as to the identity of the persons over at the White House who were involved in re-questing the profile and pro-viding information to the

questing the profile and pro-viding information to the agency for the profile? Helms: I never heard of anybody being connected with this exercise except Mr. David Young, and when I returned here in May of this year, 1973, I was in-formed at the agency that during this period, this psyduring this period, this psy-chologist who had been con-sulting with David Young at the White House, that Howard Hunt had been present on one occasion, anyway, and that he had specifically asked not to inform me that he had been present. They certainly did not inform me, so I was totally unaware of his identification with this exercise in any form whatever.

Dorsen: Mr. Helms, I would like now to direct your attention to June of

1972 and ask you when for the first time did you hear of the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate?

Helms: It is my impres-sion that I heard about it, read about it in the newspa-pers and heard it on the ra-

Dorsen: And during the days immediately following the break-in were there conversations at the CIA concerning the break-in?

Helms: Yes. In the first place, sometime on that weekend I received a tele-phone call from Mr. Howard Osborne, the Director of Security, to inform me that



of the names of the individuals who had participated in the break-in and also to say that Mr. Hunt in some fashion was connected with it. Mr. Osborne's call to me was a perfectly routine matter that had been . . . there was a charge on him as director of security to inform me whenever anybody in me whenever anybody in the agency got in any kind of trouble, whether they were permanent employees or past employees... Dorsen: Am I correct that James McCord also was a former employee of the agency?

agency? Helms: He was.

Dorsen: And when then did Mr. McCord and Mr. Hunt leave the employ of

the agency? Helms: They left it at dif-ferent times in 1970. They were both retired, as I recall if.

Dorsen: . . . Did you have a conversation with (then Acting FBI Director) Pat-ricl: Cray on that afternoon, namely. he afternoon of June 22?

Helms: I believe that the committee is in possession of a memorandum which says—a memorandum or note from Mr. Gray that says I had this conversation. I have no reason to question that at all. I was talking back and forth with Mr. Gray at various times in connection with this Water-gate break-in, so I have no reason to doubt that there was one on the 22d of June.

Dorsen: In these conversations did you discuss the possibility of CIA involve-

ment in the break-in? Helms: I assured Mr. Gray that the CIA had no involvement in the break-in. No involvement whatever.

And it was my preoccupa-tion consistently from then to this time to make this point and to be sure that everybody understand that. It doesn't seem to get across very well for some reason, but the agency had nothing to do with the Watergate break-in. I hope all the newsmen in the room hear me clearly now. Dorsen: Mr. Helms, I would like to move then to June 23, 1972, and ask you if you recall attending a meet-ing with Mr. Ehrlichman, erybody understand that. It

you recall attending a meet-ing with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. H. R. (Bob Haldeman, and (deputy CIA director) Gen. Vernon E. Walters. Helms: I do recall attend-ing that meeting ... in Mr. Ehrlichman's office on the second floor ... west wing of the White House... Gen. Walters and I arri-ved-first and waited for a few minutes. Then Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Erhlich-man came into the room, as best I can recall what was man came into the room, as best I can recall what was said, and Mr. Haldeman did most of the talking, so — and whatever Mr. Ehrlich-man contributed in the course of this was either to nod his head or smile or to agree with what Mr. Halde-man said. I just simply want to introduce it this way be-cause it is a little easier for cause it is a little easier for

Mr. Haldeman said that there was a lot of flak about the Watergate burglary, that the opposition was capitalizing on it that it was going to — it was apprarently causing some sort of unified trouble, and he wanted to know whether the agency had anything to do with it. I assured him that the agency had nothing to do with it. He then said that the five

men who had been found in the Democratic National: Committee headquarters had been arrested and that that seemed to be adequate under the circumstances, that the FBI was investigat-ing what this was all ablut, and that they, unified, were concerned about some FBI investigations in Mexico.

He also at that time made some, what to me was an incoherent reference to an in-vestigation in Mexico, or an FBI investigation, running into the Bay of Pigs. I do not know what the refer-ence was alleged to be, but in any event, I assured him that I had no interest in the Bay of Pigs that menuscon Bay of Pigs that many years later, that everything in connection with that had been dealt with and liquidated as far as I was aware and I did not care what they ran into in connection with that. At some juncture in this

conversation, Mr. Halde-man then said something to the effect that it has been the effect that it has been decided that Gen. Walters will go and talk to Acting Director Gray of the FBI and indicate to him that these operations — these in-vestigations of the / FBI might run into CIA opera-tions in Mexico and that it was desirable that this not happen and that the investihappen and that the investi-

gation, therefore, should be either tapered off or re-duced or something, but there was no lauguage saying stopped, as far as I recall.

At this point, the references to Mexico were quite ences to Mexico were quite unclear to me. I had to rec-ognize that if the White House, the President, Mr. Haldeman, somebody in high authority, had informa-tion about something in Mexico which I did not have information about which is Mexico which I did not have information about, which is quite possible — the White House constantly has in-formation which others do not have — that it would be a prudent thing for me to find out if there was any possibility that some CIA operation was being — was going to be affected, and, therefore, I wanted the nec-essary time to do this. essary time to do this.

essary time to do this. I say this in explanation of the fact that there seems — that since I had consist-ently pointed out that no CIA operations had been vi-olated by any investigation up to then, that we had had nothing to do with the Watergate burglary, the fact of the matter was that if an investigation continued to go on it might run into some-thing we were doing in Mex-ico. This possibility always had to exist. Nobody knows everything about every-thing.

thing. So at this point I think it was repeated a second time that Gen. Walters was to go and see Acting Director Gray with this charge. It Gray with this charge. It was then indicated that Act-ing Director Gray would probably be expecting the call, that he was looking for some kind of guidance in this matter, and that this should take place as soon as possible possible.

I believe Mr. Ehrlichman at that point made his sole contribution to the conver-sation, which was that he should get down and see Gray just as fast as he could.

We left this meeting, Gen. Walters and I, and went downstairs to the automo-bile, and I spoke to Gen. Walters along the following lines: I said when you got to see Acting Director Gray, I think you should confine yourself to reminding him that the agency and the FBI have a delimitation agree-ment, an understanding for many years that if the agency runs into any FBI agents or operations, the FBI shall be immediately noti-fied and if the FBI runs into any agents or operations, it We left this meeting, Gen. any agents or operations, it shall be immediately notified.

I was not sure whether Acting Director Gray was familiar with this because he had not been acting di-rector of the FBI for very long. I wanted Gen. Walters to understand about this be-cause he had been with the

agency, I think, only about six weeks at that time, had been having briefings, and I was not sure whether this had ever come to his attention.

In other words, I was asking him to make a legiti-mate request of the acting director of the FBI that if they ran into any CIA oper-ations in Mexico or any

they ran into any CIA oper-ations in Mexico or any place else they were to no-tify us immediately and I thought Gen. Walters should restrict his conversation with Acting Director Gray to that point. Precisely whether he did or not, well, you will have an opportu-nity to ask him. Dorsen: To your knowl-edge, did Gen. Walters have a meeting with Patrick Gray? Helms: Yes, he had one very shortly after this meet-ing in the White House be-cause he reported to me later in the day about his meeting with Gray, that he had been to see him, that the general purport of what they had discussed, and then the first time I learned that Acting Director Gray had told Gen. Walters at this meeting about some money having been sent to Mexico. I was unaware of any money having been sent

I was unaware of any money having been sent there at the time, and even that explanation did not say that explanation did not say what the money was for. But also floating around in this at the time was the name of a Mexican lawyer that we had been asked to check out by the FBI to find out if this man was in any out if this man was in any way connected with the CIA.

CIA: His name was Ogarrio, I believe, and we had been running traces, which is a word of art of going through the record to find out and check with our people in Mexico to see if they knew him, and so forth, and it was some day subsequent that we got the information back that he was indeed a lawyer

we got the information back that he was indeed a lawyer in Mexico, but we had never had any connection with him and so I notified the FBI. Dorsen: Now, on Monday, June 26th, did Gen. Walters receive a telephone call from (presidential counsel) John Dean? Helms: Gen. Walters told me that he had been called by a man he did not know in

me that he had been called by a man he did not know in the White House named John Dean, and that Dean had asked to see him, and when Walters said, "Well, what do you want to see me about," and so forth, I be-lieve Dean referred to the matters on which we had talked with Haldeman and Ehrichman on the previous Ehrichman on the previous Friday. In any event, Dean said to Gen. Walters, "If you want to verify my bona fides and who I am and my au-thority to talk with you, please call John Ehrlich-man."

man." So by the time Walters talked to me he said he had talked to Dean, had verified by telephone conversation with Ehrlichman that it was all right to talk to Dean and that he was going down of that he was going down to see him.

Dorsen: When. Gen. Walters came back from seeing Mr. Dean, did he talk to you about the meeting?

Helms: He reported the meeting to me and told me that Dean had raised with him this question of the Watergate burglary, that there was a lot, there were a lot of problems in connection with it, problems unidentified. Was there any way in which the agency could help, and so on. It was quite clear that

It was quite clear that some kind of feelers were being put out to see (a) if there was any agency involvement or, (b) whether the Agency was prepared to assist in some way which was not at all identified.

It was at this meeting with Gen. Walters when he was reporting this to me that I told him that I wanted him to be absolutely certain that he permitted nothing to happen using the agency's name, facilities or anything else in connection with this business.

with this business. I said I did not care whether he wanted to be a scapegoat, I did not care

whether he was prepared to quit on the issue, I did not care anything about that. I simply wanted him to do absolutely nothing because I told him point blank even though he was a military officer and even though he was a presidential appointee, that if he did something wrong it would besmirch the name of the agency no matter whether he took the blame or not, and that was simply not going to happen and I wanted him to be abundantly clear on this in any conversation he had with Mr. Dean or anybody else, and he reported to me on the subsequent two conversations with Mr. Dean I not only re affirmed this but I said, "You hang in there, you are doing fine, but don't you yield an inch."

Dorsen: . . Could you briefly summarize, of course, ambassador, what Gen. Walters told you with respect to the meeting of the 27th and the meeting of the 28th?

Helms: It is my recollection that it was at the meeting of the 27th . . that the issue first came up of whether or not the CIA out of its covert funds was prepared to provide bail money for the defendants in the Watergate burglary. Not only did this issue come up, but I also believe that the additional point was made would it be possible for the CIA to pay the salaries of these individuals while they served their jail sentences. Gen. Walters . . pointed out to Mr. Dean that the agency could not possibly do anything like that. That he (Walters) had no authority to do it on his own, that his authority is derived from me and that he knew what my position was, and in addition, he said he could not conceivably imagine that a thing like that would remain secret forever, and last but not least, under the ground rules which we operate with the Congress, or which the agency operates with the Congress of the United States, any exceptional expenditure of this kind would have to be identified with the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. This obviously cooled Mr. Dean's order ...

Fred Thompson, the committee's minority counsel, then questioned Helms about his conversation with then Acting FBI Director Gray.

Thompson: As I understand it, you had a conversation with Patrick Gray on June 22 when you advised him that the CIA was not involved in the break-in. Was your conversation limited to CIA involvement of the break-in or did your go into whether or not the investigation might uncover other CIA operations possibly.

Helms: I don't recall ever discussing with Mr. Gray this question of its uncovering other CIA operations.

Thompson: Strictly the break-in discussion?

Helms: We had no involvement and I believe as part of this conversation there was this business about the Mexican lawyer, I don't recall whether he was specifically mentioned, the Mexican lawyer was mentioned at that time, but Mr. Gray had on his mind in some way the idea that there was some CIA involvement that they were running into and I was attempting to reassure him that this was not the case as best I knew it.

knew it. Thompson: CIA involvement in the Watergate break in itself?

Helms: Or in some way connected with it.

Thompson: . . Did he state the source of his concern?

Helms: He never did. Thompson: Did he indicate whether or not it was due to the bureau's own investigation 'or whether or not someone else had told him that from outside the bureau?

Helms: I was unable to tell. I simply was surprised that this kept coming up.

Thompson: So the next day you had the conversation with Mr. Walters and Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman as I understand. I would like to go over briefly what you stated was discussed in that conversation. I believe you stated that Mr. Haldeman indicated that the Watergate was being capitalized on, that five members had been arrested an dthat seemed adequate and that sort of thing. Obviously the Watergate investigation was the reason for the meeting, was it not, as to what the investigation might disclose. That was the basis for the meeting.

Helms: Well, I can only assume in hindsight that it was, Mr. Thompson, because at the time nobody had identified to us why we were being called to the White House...


Thompson: When they stated their concern about possible Mexican involvement with the CIA, of course they were talking about the Watergate investigation turning up other involvement were they not?

volvement, were they not? Helms: I assumed this is what they were talking about, yes. But as I mentioned a moment ago and I do want to underline this, I was totally. unfamiliar at that time with what Mexico had to do with anything.

Thompson: But you had talked to Pat Gray theday before and I believe you stated that you thought that he might have mentioned a Mexican lawyer at that time.

he might have mentioned a Mexican lawyer at that time. Helms: Yes, sir, but when the Mexican lawyer's name was mentioned it was never any implication as to why they were even asking about him, so that this was not very revealing.

Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), vice chairman of the committee, then questioned Helms about the assistance the CIA gave to Howard Hunt in 1971.



By Bob Burchette-The Washington Post

Assistant Chief Counsel Dave Dorsen begins questioning of former CIA Director Richard Helms yesterday.

Baker: On July 22 (1971), Hunt visited Gen. Cushman and requested the agency, the CIA, to furnish him with identification documents, an alias, and physi-cal disguises. Are you aware of that?

Helms: Yes, I am.... Baker: And they were

supplied. Helms: I believe-Helms: I believe—yes, yes. Baker: Did you later learn

on good authority, particu-larly from agency authority, that Hunt requested and received bogus identification documents, an alias and a physical disguise?

Helms: Yes. There was a voice changer, wasn't it, and a wig?

Baker: I was coming to that. Then on sveeral occa-sions Hunt met with CIA people and received further people and received further alias documentation, specifi-cally the name of Edward Joesph Warren, disquise ma-terial which I believe may have included a wig, a

speech alteration device which some of us would de-voutly wish for, a recorder in a typewriter case and a camera in a tobacco pouch. Helms: I have heard that

is what he was given

Baker: . . . on Aug. 26 you were advised of increasing demands made by Mr. Hunt—he had already made several which had been acceded to, the ones I have just described—increasing demands from CIA for technical and other assistance, including that to be supplied with a personal secretary then located in Paris. Did you have personal knowledge of that? Helms: I did and it was at that time that I spoke to Can Cushman as I have al

Gen. Cushman as I have already said.

Baker: That was in effect the straw that broke the camel's back.

Helms: Yes, sir, you put that well.

Baker: And you declined to go any further and my in-formation based on the staff interview with you, Mr. Am-bassador, indicates that you were appraised of these facts by Cushman and that you told Cushman that Hunt had now gone too far and that Cushman should tell Ehrl-ichman that no further as-sistance would be afforded to Hunt.

Helms: Yes, sir. Baker: Cushman did apprise Ehrlichman on Aug. 27 ... and on Aug. 30 Cushman sent you a memorandum on which you wrote the word "good."

Helms: Yes, sir . . .

Baker: Mr. Helms, is it clear from all of this that the CIA at whatever level, the CIA at whatever level, and you to some extent, were aware of the fact that Mr. Hunt, at least, was deeply involved in White House activity with CIA support and that you blew the whistle after a great number of things had al-ready occurred?

Helms: Senator Baker, if we go to July and August of 1971, I certainly was totally unaware of any illegal activ-ity, any improper activity, or anything theat would be or anything that would have raised a question about the type of thing that Mr. Hunt was involved in. I assure you there hadn't been any intimation whatever that intimation whatever that there was any question of a burglary, there was any question of stealing any-thing, there was any ques-tion of his having commit-ted any illegal or improper acts acts.

Baker: I don't doubt that,

Baker: I don't doubt that, Mr. Helms... Now, let's see how that goes. We have got Hunt, we have got (James) McCord, we have got (Bernard) Barker, we have got (Frank) Sturgis, we have got (Eugenio) Martinez (all five are convicted Watergate are convicted Watergate conspirators). We have got two sets of forged identity documents.

We have got a voice alteration device. We have a wig, a camera, a tobacco pouch. We have got the processing service for that. We have got the certain knowledge that all these things were discussed between White discussed between White House staff and CIA staff and I wonder if that doesn't lead us to the idea that when these people are caught that somebody would certainly say, well, what was the CIA involvement?

Helms: Well, Senator Baker, I have the greatest respect for you and if you would . . . if those were the would . . . If those were the thought processes that have gone through your mind I have no reason to argue with them. I simply a mo-ment ago was not trying to make a self-corving state. make a self-serving state-ment. I was simply trying to indicate that there has been a tendency, it seems to me, in recent times to have everything run in reel time, as though all of these things were known and that, therefore, one should have had the good sense to know this thing or that thing at a ccrtain period of time and I simply was trying to out that this was not the case.