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Documents Give Insight On White House Efforts

By ANTHONY RIPLEY
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WASHINGTON, June 26 — The documents that John W. Dean 3d submitted with his testimony before the Senate Watergate committee give a rare insight into the White House and related 1972 Presidential campaign activities.

There are glimpses of Presidential attitudes and fears of news leaks and demonstrators.

There are the thoughts and plans of those who served the President.

There are conversations over the handling of campaign funds.

There is the reluctance of James W. McCord Jr. to go along with part of the cover-up of Watergate.

There is the penetration of Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr.'s rival campaign.

There is even the attempt to keep the Senate hearings themselves under control and a number of other points in the still unfolded scandals.

In all, Mr. Dean submitted 50 documents to back up his written testimony of 245 pages.

Excerpts Given

Following are excerpts from some of the documents gathered by Mr. Dean, who served for almost three years as Mr. Nixon's counsel until his dismissal April 30:

A memorandum from Gordon Strachan to his boss, H. R. Haldeman, then the White House chief of staff, undated and dealing with news leaks:

"It would be helpful to realize that there are five distinct types of leaks: only some of these are deterrable. The types include: A) the August SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] leak prompting the lie detector tests at State. The individual consciously violated the law to protect his own view of national interest—non-deterrable;

"B) The September SALT (accidental war agreement) leak: too many individuals (all of Congress and our NATO allies) knew and so the information is not controllable—non-deterrable;

"C) The self-serving leak which strengthens the individual policy position by acquiring public support before the final decision is made—deterrable;

"D) The ego-stroke leak where the individual either wants to see his name in print or to be known as one with influence—deterrable;

"And E) the careless leak resulting from either a slow individual with information and a foot reporter or too much liquor—deterrable."

Monthly Reporting Plan

The memo stated that 11 cases for "possible Haldeman action as 'Lord High Executioner' to stop leaks" had been studied but that none had been acted upon. A monthly reporting plan, with investigations and use of politically loyal personnel, was put into action with the approval of Mr. Haldeman.

In another of the memos, a long one drawn up this year at Camp David, Mr. Dean attempted to review how a domestic intelligence program that came to disaster in the Watergate burglary on June 17, 1972, had begun.

He said officials had been very concerned about the 1972 Republican national convention, fearing that it might explode in violence, as had the 1968 Democratic convention.

I told HRH (Mr. Haldeman) that we would push the Federal intelligence agencies to keep us informed, but I doubted if we would get much better in

telligence than we had. In short, I was instructed to assist the re-election committee in preparing itself for expected intense demonstrations.

"I discussed this matter with Mr. Hoover (the former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover) approximately — [no date given], and he agreed that we would have a problem, that the F.B.I. would help but that the re-election committee should develop its own capacity to gather such intelligence. He offered to provide names of former agents that might be of assistance but I never asked him for such names."

Instead, the White House developed its own campaign intelligence team headed by G. Gordon Liddy, Mr. Dean said. Liddy was convicted at the Watergate trial.

Message by McCord

After the Watergate burglars were caught and indicted, Mr. Dean said, McCord "was not cooperating with his lawyer" and alleged plans for blaming the Central Intelligence Agency for the break-in were not working.

McCord sent the following message to John J. Caulfield, a former White House aide:

"Dear Jack:


"I'm sorry to have to write you this letter but felt you had to know.

"If Helms [Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms] goes and the Watergate operation is laid at C.I.A.'s feet, where it does not belong, every tree in the forest will fall.

"It will be a scorched desert. The whole matter is at the precipice now.

"Just pass the message that if they want it to blow, they are on exactly the right course.

"I'm sorry that you will get hurt in the fallout."



Associated Press

John W. Dean 3d looking over a memo from John J. Caulfield, ex-White House aide, before afternoon session.

McCloskey Incident

On Dec. 11 and 12 an "operational intelligence gathering scheme "penetrated" Representative McCloskey's Washington campaign headquarters, Mr. Dean memorandums show.

At the time the California Republican was opposing Mr. Nixon in the Presidential primaries.

The "operative" found little money, few volunteers and almost everyone gone off to New Hampshire, according to reports that went from Mr. Caulfield to Mr. Dean to John N. Mitchell, then the Attorney General and later campaign manager for Mr. Nixon.

In late February this year, Mr. Dean prepared the President for a meeting with Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee and vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee.

Among Mr. Dean's suggestions on a briefing paper were to "take Baker's pulse and find out how much he wants to help keep this from becoming a political circus.

"If Baker appears to be truly desirous of cooperating—and the fact he is seeking guidance may so indicate—he might be told that there are matters unrelated to the bugging incident per se (E. G. Segretti, Kalmbach) that could be embarrassing and tarnish good people whose motives were the highest," the memo said.

The reference was to Donald H. Segretti; an alleged organizer of campaign sabotage who has been indicted in Florida in connection with a forged campaign letter.