

Excerpts From Testimony Given Before

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 14 —

Following are excerpts from a transcript of testimony in the 11th day of hearings on the Watergate case today before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities:

MORNING SESSION

Jeb Stuart Magruder

MR. MAGRUDER: I have a statement. I did help organize the Committee for the Re-election of the President beginning in May of 1971 and I remained there throughout the entire campaign. Unfortunately, we made some mistakes in the campaign which have led to a major national concern. For those errors in judgment that I made I take full responsibility. I am, after all, a mature man and I am willing to face the consequences of my own acts.

These mistakes were made by only a few participants in the campaign. Thousands of persons assisted in the campaign to re-elect the President and they did nothing illegal or unethical. As far as I know at no point during this entire period from the time of planning of the Watergate to the time of trying to keep it from the public view did the President have any knowledge of our errors in this matter. He had confidence in his aides and I must confess that some of us failed him.

I regret that I must today name others who participated with me in the Watergate affair. This is not through any desire to implicate others but simply to give you the facts to the best of my recollection. Thank you.

MR. DASH: Could you give us some of the context of the earlier plans on the intelligence operations that now Mr. Liddy was going to fill?

A. In September of 1971 we had a luncheon meeting, John Dean called and asked me to join him and Jack Caulfield for lunch. At that time they had envisioned a private investigating firm being formed by Mr. Caulfield, they called the project Sandwedge and the idea would be Mr. Caulfield would leave the White House for this private investigating firm and this firm would then be available than for the committees to re-elect the President.

In November of 1971 it was indicated to me that the project was not going to get off the ground and subsequently G. Gordon Liddy came into the picture after that.

When Mr. Liddy did come into the picture were you aware of his prior relationships in the White House with the so-called plumbers group? A. No, I was not.

Who Approved Liddy

Q. Who finally approved Mr. Liddy's position at the committee? A. Mr. Mitchell.

Q. Did there come a time when Mr. Liddy did present his plan to the Attorney General, Mr. Mitchell? A. The first meeting was Feb. 27. I am sorry, Jan. 27, 1971. And we had a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office.

Q. Who attended that meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office on Jan. 27? A. Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, Mr. Liddy and myself.

Q. Prior to the meeting on Jan. 27, did you know any of the details of the plan that Mr. Liddy was going to present on that day? A. No, I did not.

Q. Could you describe in detail what occurred on Jan. 27 in Mr. Mitchell's office?

A. Mr. Liddy brought with him a series of charts, they were professionally done charts, and had color, some color, on each of the charts. As I recall there were approximately six charts. Each chart contained a subject matter and was headed by a code word. I cannot recall many of the code words, the one I do recall is Gemstone. I think one was called Target but I cannot specifically recall the other code words. Each chart had a listing of certain types of activities with a budget and as I recall there was one chart that totaled up the activities and the budget totaled to the million figure that he had mentioned previously.

Q. Liddy was presenting this in the form of a show-and-tell operation? A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. What were the size of these charts? A. As I recall, they were approximately, probably the size of the chart that is on the display stand.

Q. Were they on an easel or display stand in the Attorney General's office? A. Yes.

Projects Described

Q. Could you give us to your best recollection what some of these projects were?

A. They were, of course, the projects, including wire tapping, electronic surveillance, and photography. There were projects relating to the abduction of individuals, particularly members of radical groups that we were concerned about on the convention at San Diego. Mr. Liddy had a plan where the leaders would be abducted and detained in a place like Mexico and that they would then be returned to this country at the end of the convention.

He had another plan which would have used women as agents to work with members of the Democratic Na-

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Senate Select Committee on Watergate

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cause of a certain atmosphere that had developed in my working at the White House, I was not as concerned about its illegality as I should have been at that time.

Q. I still can't quite come to grips with why you all had an expressed reservation about this and you still went ahead with it.

A. I knew you would get to this line of questioning, so why don't I give you what I think is the appropriate response here.

I had worked for some two years, three years, really, in the White House and at that time, I was mainly engaged in the activities trying to generate some support for the President. During that time, we had worked primarily relating to the war situation and worked with anti-war groups.

Student of Ethics

Now I had gone to college, as an example, under—and had a course in ethics as an example under William Sloane Coffin, whom I respect greatly. I have great regard for him. He was quoted the other day as saying, well, I guess Mr. Magruder failed my course in ethics. And I think he is correct.

During this whole time we were in the White House and during this time we were directly employed with trying to succeed with the President's policies we saw continuing violations of the law done by men like William Sloane Coffin. He tells me my ethics are bad. Yet he was indicted for criminal charges. He recommended on the Washington Monument grounds that students burn their draft cards and that we have mass demonstrations, shut down the city of Washington.

Now, here are ethical, legitimate people whom I respected. I respect Mr. Coffin tremendously. He was a very close friend of mine. I saw people I was very close to breaking the law without any regard for any other person's pattern of behavior or belief.

So consequently, when these subjects came up although I was aware they were illegal we had become somewhat inured to using some activities that would help us in accomplishing what we thought was a cause, a legitimate cause.

Now, that is absolutely incorrect; two wrongs do not make a right.

For the past year, I have obviously had to consider that and I understand completely that that was an absolute, incorrect decision. But that is basically, I think, the reason why that decision was made, because of that atmosphere that had occurred and to all of us who had worked in the White House, there was that feeling of resentment and of frustration at being unable to deal with issues on a legal basis.

I fully accept the responsibility of having made an absolutely disastrous decision, or at least having participated. I didn't make the decision, but certainly participated in it.

Q. A decision really that is going to affect history that was made in almost a casual way. A. Yes, sir.

Beginning of Cover-Up

Q. When did you first begin planning the cover-up?

A. I think there was no question that the cover-up began that Saturday when we realized there was a break-in. I do not think there was ever any discussion that there would not be a cover-up. At least, I did not participate in any discussion that indicated anything else except at one point where we possibly thought that I might volunteer to become the key figure in the case.

Q. An historic decision to forward with this plan was followed with another historic decision to cover it up without any great debate or discussion of the matter.

A. That is correct, sir. Now, I think to be fair, Senator, I think you have to realize that I felt, and I can't speak for the others, that the President had no knowledge of this plan and consequently if it had gotten out that people like Mr. Mitchell and others had been involved at that point in time, I honestly thought that his re-election would be probably negated.

Q. Did it ever occur to you that there might be other alternatives, that one of them might be to report this directly to the President or to the F.B.I. and make a clear breast of it at that moment, that that might have less effect on the election, rather than more effect—

A. As I said, we did indicate at one point that we might possibly do that up to a certain point. I think it was felt that if it ever reached Mr. Mitchell before the election, the President would lose the election. Since he was not involved, to my knowledge, I thought that was the best decision. I did not think it was a right decision, but I thought it was the best decision.

Q. Was there ever any consideration of presenting this material to the president for his information and knowledge and for his determination?

A. I would not have been in a position to do that. It would have been people at

the other level. I do not know what occurred between Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and the President.

Competing Organizations

SENATOR INOUE: Learned commentators have suggested that we have at the present time in the White House two competing organizations, one headed by Mr. Mitchell and the other by Mr. Haldeman. Did you have two competing organizations?

A. No, I would disagree with that completely. To my knowledge, in every meeting I ever attended with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell, they were on extremely good terms. I never saw any difficulty in Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Mitchell agreeing. In fact, I think that is one reason Mr. Mitchell agreed to run the campaign, because he knew Mr. Haldeman would be his chief day-to-day contact at the White House. I disagree with that statement. That has been bandied about, I know. I do not agree with that.

Q. Is there a possibility that one group of people are trying to make another group the scapegoats for this?

A. I do not think so. I do not see any evidence of that specific type of activity. Obviously everyone now is basically on his own and consequently, it is difficult to say anything is of a coordinated, concerted effort at this time. I would think most individuals are operating independently of each other at this time.

Q. We have received testimony that Mr. Strachan was a very important conduit, that he was the liaison between the committee and the White House; that on the other end was Mr. Haldeman. A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you receive any indication that Mr. Strachan did in fact convey those memos and messages that you have been sending to him?

A. Well, Mr. Strachan had a method of working with Mr. Haldeman. And that was he would do a summary sheet capsulizing activities of the campaign. It was a straightforward memo that condensed much of the information that he would give Mr. Strachan. That was his typical method of dealing, I think, with Mr. Haldeman.

Q. Did you receive any feedback from Mr. Haldeman indicating that he had in fact received these memos? A. No, sir.

Discussion With Haldeman

Q. Now, when you discussed this matter in January, I presume that you told Mr. Haldeman everything you knew about the cover-up?

A. I think my main purpose, Senator, was to just indicate that there were a number of people involved and that in case people's memory was growing short I hoped he realized it was not myself or any other single individual who was involved in this cover-up.

Q. This was in January? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you surprised when the President announced that he had decided to begin an investigation on March 21? A. Was I surprised?


Q. Yes. A. Well, knowing full well of Mr. Dean's role I could well imagine that the President possibly had been informed incorrectly, since he was investigating his own problem, I could see where he could very easily have misled individuals at the White House to protect himself.

Q. But you had notified Mr. Haldeman in January of the correct activities. A. Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. Magruder, in your testimony this morning, you have indicated that there were several who knew about the cover-up. I will list a few names, Mr. Dean knew about the cover-up? A. Yes, yes sir.

Q. Mr. Mitchell knew about the cover-up? A. Yes sir.

Q. Mr. Haldeman knew about the cover-up? A. Directly from my knowledge



Job Stuart Magruder, right, testifying before the Senate Watergate committee yesterday. Listening, from the left, were Edward J. Gurney, Republican of Florida; Fred D. Thomp-

son, chief minority counsel; Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee; Sam J. Ervin Jr., Democrat of North Carolina, chairman, and Samuel Dash, committee's chief counsel.

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only in January. I did not know directly before.

Q. Mr. Erlichman knew about the cover-up. A. I did not ever know that Mr. Erlichman knew about the cover-up.

Q. Mr. Kalmbach? A. I only knew in Mr. Kalmbach's case he was funding the cover-up.

Q. Mr. Mardian? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. Kleindienst? A. No, sir, I did not know of any involvement by Mr. Kleindienst.

No Knowledge of Gray

Q. Mr. Gray? A. No, sir, I had no direct knowledge of Mr. Gray's involvement.

Q. Mr. Strachan? A. He was aware of the cover-up.

Q. Mr. LaRue? A. Yes, he was aware.

Q. Mr. Egil Krogh? I cannot specifically recall any direct knowledge that I would have known that he knew about the coverup.

Q. Mr. Colson? A. I have no direct knowledge that Mr. Colson knew about the cover-up.

Q. Mr. Howard, Mr. Colson's aide? A. I don't think he knew directly about the cover-up. I think he realized that we had some problems and we were taking care of.

Q. Mr. Stans? A. Only the discussion I had in June with Mr. Stans which would indicate some knowledge after that point to some extent.

Q. Mr. Sloan? A. Yes, I am sure he knew about the cover-up.

Q. Mr. Porter. A. Only to the extent that he has testified that he assisted me for what he thought were legitimate reasons.

Q. Mr. Odle? A. No, as far as I know he did not know.

Q. Finally, the President? A. To my knowledge no, no direct knowledge.

AFTERNOON SESSION

SENATOR WEICKER: Would you tell the committee what Mr. Dean told you after your Aug. 16 grand jury appearance? A. He simply notified me the next day that I would not be indicted.

Q. Do you have any indication as to the basis for that statement? A. My understanding it was from official sources.

Q. Official sources being what? A. Being the Justice Department.

Q. Did you know of any influence exerted by the White House over U.S. attorneys and/or the grand jury? A. No, I do not. As a matter of fact, at least in relation to the U.S. attorneys, I got the opposite impression.

Q. You got the opposite impression from whom? A. From Mr. Dean primarily.

Q. Well, if he gave you the opposite impression so far as the U.S. attorneys were concerned, who was he talking about when he indicated that you would not be indicted?

A. You were indicating whether there was any influence. My indication from Mr. Dean was that they had no influence over the U.S. attorney. But when evidently the U.S. attorneys had decided

not to indict me after the Aug. 1 grand jury appearance and they transmitted that to the appropriate officials, Mr. Dean evidently was notified of that fact.

Q. On June 18th, you received a call from Mr. Haldeman. Is that correct? A. Yes sir.

Assumption Not Made

Q. You had given a complete description of the incident to Mr. Strachan. Did you make the assumption that all of this had been transmitted to Mr. Haldeman?

A. I didn't make that assumption. I did not know what background material I think Mr. Haldeman called me because of the serious nature of the problem and to be sure that we were taking measures to handle the situation.

Q. Mr. Magruder, do you or did you operate from the presumption, when you were talking to Mr. Haldeman, that

he knew what this break-in stemmed from?

A. Senator, that is a difficult question to answer. I had to assume that since I communicated completely with Mr. Strachan that these communications were known to Mr. Haldeman to some extent. But that is strictly an assumption on my part. And in fact, in the January meeting, Mr. Haldeman indicated to me that he did not have any knowledge of the break-in previous to that.

So, of course, I assumed it simply because I had been working with his assistant. But that is an assumption and purely that.

Q. But you did not feel that you had to give a backgrounder on the subject, did you? A. He did not ask for a backgrounder, Senator as I recall.

Q. Now we move to January, 1973, and the meeting with Mr. Haldeman, was this conversation with Mr. Haldeman before or, after the trial? A. It was before the trial, before the Inauguration, sometime early in January, after the first of the year.

Q. Let us be very specific. The trial was not over, is that correct? A. As I recall, the trial had just begun. I had not testified.

Q. And the story you told him, you told him before the trial was over? A. That is correct.

Q. So Mr. Haldeman knew that perjury was going to be committed? A. Yes, I think that would be correct.

SENATOR TALMADGE: You testified this morning that Mr. Dean was intimately involved in both the planning, the execution and the coverup? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, to what extent was Mr. Colson involved? A. To my direct knowledge only through the telephone conversations that he had with me and some references to that matter that his assistant, Mr. Howard, had relating particularly to Howard Hunt. We did not discuss the specific Watergate wiretapping directly, I did not, with Mr. Colson, other than his admonition to me to in effect get on the stick and get the

Liddy project approved so we can get the information on Mr. O'Brien, something to that effect.

Q. Now, to what extent was Mr. Stans involved?

A. To my knowledge, to no extent before June 17, other than as chairman of the finance committee being aware of the cash disbursements were being made to Mr. Liddy. Now, on June 24, I think it was, on a Saturday we did meet and discuss the Watergate problem with him and my best recollection is we didn't go into specifics.

Q. Is it your conclusion as a reasonable man in your position, that the Watergate affair could have been undertaken and completely isolated from the President by his closest aides and friends without his own personal knowledge?

A. Because I did work at the White House, Senator, and because I am very familiar with the staff system that did exist when Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman were his primary aides, it is very easy for me to see how he would not have been aware. Almost all of the work that was done by the key staff people and by our committee was capsulized and passed on to Mr. Haldeman and I am just positive that many things occurred in the White House that he did not or was not aware of. It was just the way that system worked. So I have no difficulty in believing that personally.

Democrats and Kickbacks

Q. What are you saying. As I understand it, is that his staff, was so completely remote, kept him so isolated, that this could have transpired without his knowledge, approval and consent. Is that your testimony? A. Yes, sir, I can understand that very well.

SENATOR GURNEY: And one of the missions of this committee is to look into

all of the irregularities in the 1972 Presidential campaign, Republican and Democrat. You mentioned this morning that one of the reasons why you thought that you ought to find out more about what was going on on the Democrat side was because of this kickback situation at the Democrat convention. Now, where did you learn about this and what did you learn about it?

A. A newsman called me early in the year and said there was something of interest that we should look into and indicated that along with the democratic Convention at the Fontainebleau Hotel, there would be a business exposition.

And he said, this business exposition is a setup deal. The exposition people, and requesting that the business take space at this exposition. The business would then take the space and pay—let's take a figure of, say \$10,000—of which five would go to the business

exposition company that was putting on the exposition, and the company would get a booth, but the other five would be kicked back to the Democratic party to assist itself in its debts.

Q. What was the name of the newsman? A. It was Kevin Phillips, Senator.

Q. In your testimony earlier, you mentioned a meeting between Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean and yourself. This is the one in April, I believe. A. I am sorry, Senator. I met first with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman.

Q. Yes. A. Mr. Haldeman indicated that since there was a controversy over the two meetings in January and February, that Mr. Dean, Mr. Mitchell and I should settle those differences together.

Q. You mentioned also that Mr. Dean apparently would not indicate any position that he was going to take.

A. I felt rather strongly

since the three of us had agreed on the position that I would take which, in effect, caused me to testify at the grand jury incorrectly, hoped that they would support the position that we had all agreed on. Mr. Mitchell did agree that he could support that with, I think, minor variations. Mr. Dean indicated that that created problems for him and lobbied us to discuss it at a later date.

SENATOR ERVIN: I was very much impressed with your testimony about the climate that prevailed in the White House and afterwards in the committee to re-elect the President. As a matter of fact, was there not a fear there of Americans that dissented from policies of Government? You spoke about your former professor—

A. The Reverend Coffin. Yes.

Q. He just came down and demonstrated. There were a great many demonstrations,

weren't there? A. He did quite a bit more than demonstrate.

Q. He was supposed to try to frustrate the draft. A. He did, and he participated in many activities that were considered illegal.

Q. You were disturbed at the demonstrations, weren't you, the people at the White House? A. Yes, sir. We were.

Q. The reason I asked the question, I have had to spend my time fighting such laws and legislative proposals as no-knock laws, preventive detention laws, the claim that there was an inherent right of the President to bug anybody suspected of domestic subversion, and things of that kind. And I just could not understand why people got so fearful.

A. I would characterize that at least my reaction was stronger after three years of working in that atmosphere than it had been before.

Q. I am familiar with that kind of atmosphere. I came up here during Joe McCarthy days when Joe McCarthy saw a Communist hiding under every rose bush and I have been here fighting the no knock laws and preventive detention laws and indiscriminate bugging by people who've found subversives hiding under every bed. In this nation, we have had a very unfortunate fear. And this fear went to the extent of deploring the exercise of personal rights for those who wanted to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.

Some of it happened before you got into the White House and I am not blaming you, because even under a Democratic Administration, I had an investigation here where they became so afraid of people that they used military intelligence to spy on civilians whose only offense was that they were dissatisfied with the policies of the Government and assembled and petitioned for relief.

Now, I think that all grew out of this complement of fear, did not it, the whole Watergate incident?

A. I think from my own personal standpoint, I did lose some respect for the legal process simply because I did not see it working as I had hoped it would when I came here.

tional Committee at their convention and here in Washington, and hopefully, through their efforts, they would obtain information from them.

Q. With regard to the use of these women as agents, did this involve the use of a yacht at Miami? A. He envisioned renting a yacht in Miami and having it set up for sound and photographs.

Q. And what would the women be doing at that time? A. Well, they would have been, I think you could consider them call girls.

Q. Now, what was the total budget that he presented at this meeting? A. Approximately a million dollars.

Q. Mr. Magruder, what was Mr. Mitchell's reaction, Mr. Dean's reaction, your own reaction when you heard this presentation?

A. I think all three of us were appalled. The scope and size of the project was something that at least in my mind was not envisioned. I do not think it was in Mr. Mitchell's mind or Mr. Dean's, although I can't comment on their state of mind at that time.

Mr. Mitchell, in an understated way, which was his method of dealing with difficult problems like this, indicated that this was not an acceptable project.

Q. And did Mr. Mitchell give Mr. Liddy any instructions at the end of this meeting? A. He indicated that he would go back to the drawing board and come up with a more realistic plan.

'He Was Encouraged'

Q. So it would be true that Liddy, at least, left that meeting without being discouraged from continuing to plan an intelligence operation. A. I would say he was encouraged, but he was given the right to come up with a more reasonable plan.

Q. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Liddy after the meeting? A. Yes, he left with John Dean and I on our way back to the committee and indicated his being disturbed because he had assumed that everyone would have accepted this project at face value. We indicated that certain of these things were inappropriate and that he would have to redo them and come back at a later date.

Q. Did you make any report of the meeting to anyone after the meeting?

A. Yes, I made a report to Mr. Strachan at the White House.

Q. Now, did you disclose everything concerning that meeting to Mr. Strachan? A. I do not recall at that meeting whether Mr. Liddy had had these charts put into 8½ by 11 size to hand out. If he had, I would have sent those over to Mr. Strachan. I do remember discussing it. I do not recall in this meeting whether we had working papers and so I can't recall specifically; I think I just on the phone discussed the general nature of his proposal.

Q. Was this telephone conversation with Mr. Strachan in which you did report the general nature of the discussion consistent with your general reporting to Mr. Strachan as you did from

time to time, matters that should get to the White House staff? A. Yes, everything that I did at the committee everything that we did was staffed to Mr. Strachan so that he could alert other officials at the White House as to our activities.

Q. Was there a second meeting on the Liddy Plan, Mr. Magruder? A. Yes, the following week in February, Feb. 4th, as I recall, we met at 11 A.M. in the morning.

Q. How did that meeting come about, who attended? A. Mr. Liddy indicated that he was ready to discuss a reduced proposal. I alerted Mr. Dean and he set up an appointment with Mr. Mitchell and we reviewed a reduced proposal.

Q. Where was this meeting? A. At the Justice Department.

Subject of Discussion

Q. Was it in Mr. Mitchell's office? Were any targets specifically mentioned, either by Mr. Liddy or anybody?

A. We discussed the potential target of the Democratic National Committee headquarters, primarily because of information we had relating to Mr. O'Brien that we felt would be possibly damaging to the Democratic National Committee. We discussed the possibility of using electronic surveillance at the Fontainebleu Hotel, which was going to be the Democratic National Committee headquarters, and we discussed the potential of using the same method at the Presidential headquarters.

Also at that meeting, Mr. Mitchell brought up that he had information—that he either Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Dean—that they had information relating to Senator Muskie that was in Mr. Greenspun's office in Las Vegas. He was a publisher of the newspaper in Las Vegas.

Mr. Liddy was asked to review the situation in Las Vegas to see if there would be potential for any entry into Mr. Greenspun's.

Q. Do you know what was, what it was they were looking for in Mr. Greenspun's office? A. No, I do not.

Q. Do you know what the information was that Mr. Mitchell mentioned concerning Mr. O'Brien? A. Yes. We

had had information from reliable sources that at the Democratic National Convention, they had a business exposition. The business exposition was being put on by a separate business exposition company. It was our understanding that the fee the business concern paid to this business company was then kicked back or partially kicked back to the Democratic National Committee to assist them in the payment of their debts.

Q. What was the general kind of information that you would be looking for in these break-ins or electronic surveillance?

A. Well, I think at that time, we were particularly concerned about the I.T.T. situation. Mr. O'Brien has been a very effective spokesman against our position on the I.T.T. case and I think there was a general concern

that if he was allowed to continue as Democratic National Chairman, because he was certainly their most professional political operator, that he could be very difficult in the coming campaign. So we had hoped that information might discredit him.

Mitchell Reaction Asked

Q. What was Mr. Mitchell's reaction to this presentation at the second meeting? A. We agreed that it would not be approved at that time, but we would take it up later; that he just didn't feel comfortable with it even at that level.

Q. But again, would it be true to say that at least Mr. Liddy was encouraged to continue in his planning? A. Yes, I think that is correct.

Q. Now, after this meeting, Mr. Magruder, did you report to anyone about the meeting? A. Yes, I sent the documents that Mr. Liddy had given us at the meeting to Mr. Strachan.

Q. And did those documents contain all of what Mr. Liddy had presented at that meeting? A. They did not contain, as an example, the discussion on targets because that was a discussion and that was not in the documents.

Q. Did you have a telephone conversation with Mr. Strachan concerning that meeting? A. Yes, I indicated the general context of that meeting.

Q. And did that include Mr. Mitchell's suggestions concerning the Las Vegas mission? A. I cannot recall specifically that point, but I would assume that I probably discussed the key targets that we had discussed.

Q. And that would include the Democratic National Committee headquarters and Mr. O'Brien? A. Yes.

Q. Did there come a time after the second meeting that you had some difficulty with Mr. Liddy and Mr. LaRue played some role in that? A. I met him, ran into him on the third floor of our building, and asked him would he be more cooperative in producing the work that we needed quickly? He indicated some disturbance with me at that time.

Disagreement with Liddy

Q. What was the difficulty that did occur. A. Well, I simply put my hand on Mr. Liddy's shoulder and he asked me to remove it and indicated that if I did not, serious consequences could occur.

Q. Was he more specific than serious consequences? A. Well, he indicated that he would kill me. But I want to make it clear that I did not, I do not regard that and I do not now regard that as a specific threat. It was simply Mr. Liddy's mannerism.

Q. And thereafter, there was a meeting with Mr. Liddy and Mr. LaRue came? A. Yes, we agreed, Mr. Liddy and I, that he would terminate from the committee all activities. Then we discussed the intelligence-gathering and he indicated at one point that possibly, Mr. Hunt could become involved directly in this area.

Figures in Senate Inquiry

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 14 — Following are the names of individuals who figured today in hearings by the Senate select committee on the Watergate case:

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Sam J. Ervin Jr., Democrat of North Carolina, chairman.

Herman E. Talmadge, Democrat of Georgia.
Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii.
Joseph M. Montoya, Democrat of New Mexico.
Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee.
Edward J. Gurney, Republican of Florida.
Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL

Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director.

WITNESSES

Jeb Stuart Magruder, former deputy director of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

PERSONS NAMED IN TESTIMONY

John N. Mitchell, former Attorney General.
G. Gordon Liddy, former White House aide, convicted of conspiracy, burglary and wiretapping in the Watergate case; in jail.
Hugh W. Sloan Jr., former treasurer of the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President.
John W. Dean 3d, former counsel to the President.
H. R. Haldeman, former White House chief of staff.
John D. Ehrlichman, former White House domestic adviser.
Frederick C. LaRue, former White House aide and chief deputy to Mr. Mitchell at the Committee for the Re-election of the President.
Hank Greenspun, publisher of The Las Vegas Sun.
Lawrence F. O'Brien, former Democratic National Chairman.
Gordon Strachan, former assistant to H. R. Haldeman.
E. Howard Hunt Jr., former Central Intelligence Agency agent and White House consultant; pleaded guilty to spying in the Watergate case; in jail.
Robert C. Mardian, official of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.
John J. Caulfield, former employe of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.
James W. McCord Jr., convicted participant in the Watergate break-in; free on \$100,000 bail while awaiting sentencing.
Robert C. Odle Jr., director of administration for the Committee for the Re-election of the President.
L. Patrick Gray 3d, former acting director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Charles W. Colson, former counsel to the President.
Egil Krogh Jr., former chief assistant to John D. Ehrlichman.
Richard G. Kleindienst, former Attorney General of the United States.

Q. Did you know at that time that Mr. Hunt was working with Mr. Liddy?
A. I think by that time, I had been encouraged by certain staff members at the White House to be sure that Mr. Hunt was not employed by us directly, but employed by Mr. Liddy. So I think I was aware at that time that he was.

Q. What staff members at the White House made such encouragement?
A. Mr. Howard, Richard Howard.

Q. Who is Mr. Richard Howard?
A. He was Mr. Colson's assistant.

Colson Is Named

Q. After the Feb. 4 meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, when the plan was not still approved, did there come a time when anyone else at the White House urged you to get the Liddy plan approved?

A. Yes. Mr. Charles Colson called me one evening and asked me in a sense would we get off the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's plans, that we needed information, particularly on Mr. O'Brien. He did not mention, I want to make clear, anything relating to wiretapping or espionage at that time.

Q. In that discussion, did you get the impression that he knew what the Liddy plan

was? A. I want to be careful. I knew Mr. Hunt was a close friend of Mr. Colson's, he had been referred to me earlier by Mr. Colson. I did make the assumption that he did know but he did not say that he did.

Q. Were there any further contacts that you had with Mr. Colson's assistant?

A. Mr. Howard did indicate what we thought was the professionalism, particularly of Mr. Hunt, and the need to gather this information. But, I would like to make it clear there was a general, I think, atmosphere in the White House and the committee of the need to gather information. This was not necessarily information that would be gathered illegally.

Q. Now, did there come a time when you had a third and final meeting with Mr. Mitchell on the Liddy plan on or about March 30, 1972.

A. Yes. We had, there had been a delay in the decision-making process at the committee because of the I.T.T. hearings. Mr. Mitchell was on vacation at Key Biscayne. I went down to Key Biscayne, Mr. LaRue was there, and we met and went over approximately 30-some decision papers mainly relating to direct mail and advertising, the other parts of the campaign.

The last topic we discussed as the final proposal of Mr. Liddy's which was for approximately \$259,000. We discussed it, brought up again the pros and cons, I think I can honestly say that no one was particularly overwhelmed with the project. But I think we felt that the information could be useful and Mr. Mitchell agreed to approve the project and I then notified the parties of Mr. Mitchell's approval.

Form of Memorandum

Q. What was the form of the memorandum or decision paper that was presented to Mr. Mitchell at this meeting?
A. It was simply the same 8½ by 11 blank sheets typed up with the basics of the plan, the number of people he would have to hire, the number of electronic surveillance equipment and amounts he would have to purchase and so on.

Q. Now, prior to going down to Key Biscayne you would send over a copy to Mr. Strachan?
A. My formal position with Mr. Mitchell was we would send over key papers before we discussed it with Mr. Mitchell, so if there was any questions in those papers Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Strachan could get back to us their opinion on a subject.

Q. Now, this quarter million dollar project you say Mr. Mitchell approved in Key Biscayne, what was that project specifically?

A. It was specifically approval for initial entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington, and that at a further date if the funds were available we would consider entry into the Presidential contenders' headquarters and also potentially at the Fontainebleu Hotel in Miami.

Q. Now, when you say that project was approved included the entry of the Democratic National Committee headquarters and perhaps other entries, did that also include the use of electronic surveillance or bugging?
A. It included electronic surveillance and pho-

tography or documents, photographic of documents.

Do you recall Mr. Sloan questioning an initial large sum of money, \$83,000 which Mr. Liddy requested after the approval of the plan?
A. Yes.

A Substantial Sum

Q. Could you tell us what happened and how that was resolved?

A. Well, he had called me and said that Mr. Liddy wanted a substantial sum. I indicated that Mr. Liddy did have that approval. Mr. Sloan evidently then went to Mr. Stans. Mr. Stans went to Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Mitchell came back to me and said why did Gordon need this much money and I explained to him this was in effect front end money that he needed for the equipment, and the early costs of getting his kind of an operation together. Mr. Mitchell understood, evidently told Mr. Stans it had been approved and the approval was complete.

Q. Well, do you recall a discussion that you had with Mr. Liddy concerning an effort to enter the McGovern headquarters?

A. Yes. After the first entry of the D.N.C. headquarters, Mr. Strachan and I were in my office and Mr. Liddy came in and indicated that he had had trouble the night before, that they tried to do a survey of the McGovern headquarters and Mr. Liddy indicated that to assist this he had shot light out. At that time both Mr. Strachan and I both became very concerned because we understood from Mr. Liddy that he would not participate himself nor would anyone participate in his activities that could be in any way connected with our committee.

Q. Now, there was this entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters, which occurred May 27, Memorial Day weekend of 1972, did Mr. Liddy report that to you?
A. Yes. He simply indicated that he had made a successful entry and had placed wiretapping equipment in the Democratic National Committee.

Q. When did you get any of the fruits or the results of this bugging and photography operation?
A. Approximately a week and a half after the initial entry, I received, the first reports. They were two forms, one were capitulation of the telephone conversations. Not direct references to the phone conversations. And the second, photography, the pictures of documents that they had taken at the democratic national committee headquarters.

Met With Mitchell

Q. Did you show these materials with the photographs to anybody?
A. Yes, I brought the materials into Mr. Mitchell in my 8:30 morning meeting I had each morning with him. He reviewed the documents, indicated that there was really no substance to these documents and he called Mr. Liddy up to his office and Mr. Mitchell indicated his dissatisfaction with the results of his work.

Q. Well, did he tell him anything more than he was dissatisfied? Did he ask for anything more?
A. He did not ask for anything more. He simply indicated that this was not satisfactory and it was worthless and not worth

the money that he had been paid for it.

Q. Mr. Magruder, did he mention . . . he did not see any O'Brien telephone—A. There was no information relating to any of the subjects he hoped to receive and Mr. Liddy indicated there was a problem with one wire tap and one was not placed in a proper phone and he would correct these matters and hopefully get the information that was requested.

Q. Did you show these documents to Mr. Strachan? A. As I recall, because of the sensitive nature of these documents, I called Mr. Strachan and asked would he come over and look at them in my office. As I recall I only had one copy of these documents. As a recall, he did come over and look over the documents and indicate to me the lack of substance to the documents.

Q. What took place in Los Angeles when you first learned about the break-in?

A. Well, I was at breakfast at the Beverley Hills Hotel. I received a call from Mr. Liddy and he indicated there had been a problem the night before. I said well, what kind of a problem or something of that type and he indicated that our security chief had been arrested at the Watergate and I said you mean Mr. McCord and he said yes.

Reported to LaRue

Q. Now, did you report that back to anybody?

A. Yes, I first talked with Mr. LaRue and indicated the problem, and Mr. LaRue then talked to Mr. Mitchell and then Mr. Mitchell and Mr. LaRue and I discussed it again together. Mr. Mitchell asked Mr. Mardian to call Mr. Liddy and ask him to see the Attorney General, the current Attorney General, Mr. Kleindienst, and see if there was any possibility that Mr. McCord could be released from jail.

Q. Did you call Mr. Strachan?

A. I told him—of course, he knew no more than we knew. He knew that they had been apprehended and we had a problem and just discussed in a sense that we had a problem and we did not quite know what to do about it. At that time, we had heard that there was some money at that time found on the individuals and we had hoped that it was money that had been found at the Democratic National Committee, but unfortunately it was our money.

Q. Did you receive a call from Mr. Haldeman? A. Yes. The next morning, on Sunday, I received a call from Mr. Haldeman. He asked me what had happened. Again, I told him basically—

Q. From where was he calling? A. Key Biscayne. He just asked me the basic background of the break-in and what had happened. I just told him what had happened. He indicated that I should get back to Washington immediately, since no one in any position of authority was at the committee and to talk with Mr. Dean and Mr. Strachan and Mr. Sloan and others on Monday to try to find out what actually had happened and whose money it was and so on.

Q. Now, you did return to Washington? A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you have a meeting on that evening, the evening of June 19, when you came back to Washington, in Mr. Mitchell's apartment?

A. Yes, Mr. Mitchell flew back that Monday with Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian. We met in his apartment with Mr. Dean. That would have been Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Dean, Mr. Mardian and myself.

One solution was recommended in which I was to, of course, destroy the Gemstone file. So I called my office and—

Removal of Documents

I asked Mr. Reisner to cull through my files, pull out any sensitive material that could be embarrassing to us. There was the suit that was placed against us by the Democratic National Committee that asked for immediate disclosure. As I recall, we all indicated that we should remove any documents that could be damaging, whether they related at all to the Watergate or not.

Q. Mr. Sloan has testified before the committee, Mr. Magruder, that shortly after your return and after the break-in, that you asked him to perjure himself concerning the amount of money that Mr. Sloan had given Mr. Liddy. Could you state your own recollection.

A. The first meeting was when I determined from him that the money was our money.

My understanding of the new election law indicated that he would be personally liable for cash funds that were not reported. These were not reported funds. So I indicated at that meeting that I thought he had a problem and might have to do something about it.

He said, you mean commit perjury? I said, you might have to do something like that to solve your problem and very honestly, was doing that in good faith to Mr. Sloan to assist him at that time.

Now, later we met three times. That was on the subject of how much money had been allocated to Mr. Liddy.

Mr. Sloan would not tell me what the figure was. He refused to tell me the figure. He said, I cannot tell you the figure.

I think the real problem was that he knew it was \$199,000 and I was aghast at that figure, because there was no way Mr. Liddy should have received that much money in that short period of time.

Q. Now, Mr. Magruder, there came a time when you agreed to make up a story about how the break-in and the bugging took place and who was involved?

A. Yes. I want to state here, though, that there was never any feeling on my part, no one asked me to do anything. I personally felt that it was important to be sure that this story did not come out in its true form at that time, as I think did the other participants. So I want to make it clear that no one coerced me to do anything. I volunteered to work on the cover-up story.

Questioned on Story

Q. Who participated with you without coercing you in the working up of the fabricated story?

A. Well, there were a series of meetings. They were mainly held in Mr. Mitchell's office. The main participants typically were Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Dean. Much of the meetings would be on subjects that were perfectly, I think, acceptable to discuss.

You know it is very hard for me to pinpoint exactly when and how we came up with the cover-up story, but it became apparent when we found out the sums were in the \$200,000 range that we had to come up with a very good story to justify why Mr. Liddy would have spent that amount of money on legal activities.

Q. Could you tell us why the story required that the break-in involvement be cut off at Mr. Liddy and not at you?

A. Well, there was some discussion about me and I volunteered at one point that maybe I was the guy who ought to take the heat, because it was going to get to me, and we knew that. And I think it was, there were some takers on that, but basically, the decision was that because I was in a position where they knew that I had no authority to either authorize funds or make policy in that committee, that if it got to me, it would go higher, whereas Mr. Liddy, because of his past background, it was felt that would be believable that Mr. Liddy was truly the one who did originate it.

Q. When you testified to the grand jury that time, did you testify to the false story? A. Yes, I did.

Q. What role did Mr. Dean play in preparing you for your grand jury appearance?

A. I was briefed by our lawyers and Mr. Mardian. Also, I was interrogated for approximately two hours by Mr. Dean and approximately a half hour in a general way by Mr. Mitchell.

Report by Dean

Q. Now, after you appeared before the grand jury for the second time, did Mr. Dean give you any report?

A. Yes, the day after Mr. Dean indicated that I would not be indicted.

Q. During your appearances before the grand jury or preceding it what, if anything, was told to you concerning the question of executive clemency for yourself or for those who were going to accept the blame in the story?

A. They made assurances about income and being taken care of from the standpoint of my family and a job afterwards and also that there would be good opportunity for executive clemency. But having worked at the White House and being aware of our structure there, I did not take that as meaning that had a direct relationship to the President at all.

In fact, the use of his name was very common in many cases where it was inappropriate; in other words,

where he had not had any dealings in the matter. So I knew that this did not necessarily mean it came from the President or anyone else other than Mr. Dean or Mr. Mitchell.

I knew that and as soon as I knew Mr. Dean began to indicate some reluctance to discuss those meetings in the same terms that I had discussed them at the grand jury. I knew the story would not hold up under a second investigation by your committee, which, of course, had begun to hold hearings and also the grand jury.

Q. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Haldeman in January, 1973? A. Yes, I did.

Q. Could you briefly tell us what the nature of that meeting was and what was discussed?

A. It was to discuss future employment regarding myself and Mr. Porter's employment. Also I thought I had better see Mr. Haldeman and tell him what had actually happened. I thought probably that this maybe was becoming scapegoat time and maybe I was going to be the scapegoat, and so I went to Mr. Haldeman and I said I just want you to know that

this whole Watergate situation and the other activities was a concerted effort by a number of people, and so I went through a literally monologue on what had occurred. That was my first discussion with Mr. Haldeman where I laid out the true facts.

Date in January

Q. Do you know what day or date approximately in January the occurred? A. It would have been before the Inaugural.

Q. All right. I want to go back. Putting you back to around June 24, do you recall having a meeting with Mr. Stans and with Mr. Mitchell? A. Yes, sir.

Q. At that time, do you recall whether Mr. Stans was informed as to what occurred, actually the true story?

A. Then, as I recall, we indicated to Mr. Stans the problem we had with the money, and would he try to work with Mr. Sloan to see if Mr. Sloan could be more cooperative.

In recollecting as best as I could that meeting, we did not get into great detail as to what had actually happened at the Watergate.

Q. Basically, you were telling Mr. Stans how this money was spent. A. Yes, that is correct.

SENATOR BAKER: On Jan. 27th, Feb. 4th and March 30th you met to discuss the Liddy plan? A. Yes sir.

Q. Where was the third meeting? A. In Key Biscayne.

Q. Who was present? A. Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mitchell and myself.

Q. It is important for us to know, Mr. Magruder, what took place at that meeting. It is important for me to know exactly how the assent was given.

A. Well, as I recall, it was the last subject we brought up at our meeting. It had the figures and the amounts and it was quite obvious as to what they were for. There

would be dollars next to equipment, as an example, and so on, and we discussed the pros and cons, Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mitchell and I, not any great feeling of acceptance to this plan, with the exception that supposedly these individuals were professional, the information could be valuable. Mr. Mitchell simply signed off on it in the sense of saying, "Okay, let's give him a quarter of a million dollars and let's see what he can come up with."

Final Authorization

Q. You say Mr. Mitchell signed off on it. Do you mean physically initialed it or signed it? A. No, sir, I mean said, we will give Mr. Liddy the \$250,000.

Q. And he identified the targets? Did that include the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he do that with a pencil? A. He may have. He wrote some things on some documents. I cannot specifically recall what he wrote on the documents because I destroyed the documents.

Q. Was there any question in your mind that the plan was agreed to by Mr. Mitchell? A. No, sir, there was no doubt. But it was a reluctant decision. I think that is important to note. It was not one that anyone was overwhelmed with at all. But it was made and he did make it.

Q. Tell me more about why it was a reluctant decision.

A. We knew it was illegal, probably inappropriate. We didn't think that much would come of it. We had at least 30 decisions we made that day about even greater sums of money than that \$250,000.

Q. Did you have any decision to make that day that involved any illegal action? A. No, sir.

Q. Or any clandestine activity? A. No, sir.

Q. Did that stand out in your mind, why you made that decision reluctantly? A. Yes, sir, I think so.

Q. Did you ever express any reservations about it? A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you say? A. Well, that it was illegal, and that it was inappropriate, and that it may not work.

Three Were Told

Q. To whom did you say that? A. To Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Strachan.

Q. What was Mr. Mitchell's reply? A. I think he had similar reservations, sir.

Q. What did he say? A. Well, by this time, we had some indications of lack of compatibility with Mr. Liddy's behavior and we knew that this was possibly an inappropriate program.

Q. What was Mr. LaRue's reaction? A. Similar. He was not overwhelmed with the program.

Q. What was your reaction? A. I was not overwhelmed with the program, but you must, I think, understand that I had personal feelings relating to Mr. Liddy and I was concerned about letting those personal feelings overcome a possible decision that might be made.

Q. What was Mr. Strachan's reaction?

A. I think he felt uncomfortable with Mr. Liddy. But again, I think we have to, in all honesty, say that we thought there may be some information that could be very helpful to us and be-