

NYTimes JUN 8 1973  
**HALDEMAN STATES  
WATERGATE DOUBT  
DISTURBED NIXON**

**Says President Repeatedly  
Pressed Staff to Clear Up  
Case in Public's Mind**

**2D-TERM PERIL IS SEEN**

**Former White House Adviser  
Gives 287-Page Deposition  
in Suit by Democrats**

By ANTHONY RIPLEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 7—President Nixon urged his aides, both before and after the election last Nov. 7, to clear up the Watergate case and ease public doubts, according to H. R. Haldeman, former White House chief of staff.

He said that during the Presidential campaign, Mr. Nixon was concerned about Water-

*Excerpts from deposition by  
Haldeman, Page 18.*

gate's political impact. Once he was re-elected, the President wanted the matter disposed of "so that it wouldn't be hanging over into the second term," Mr. Haldeman said.

His picture of the President's concern over the impact of the June 17, 1972, break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate complex was contained in a 287-page deposition taken in private May 22, 24 and 25 and made public today.

The deposition was given in the Democratic party's \$6.4-million damage suit against the Committee for the Re-election of the President and other Nixon supporters.

**Conflict About Mitchell**

Mr. Haldeman's testimony conformed in many respects to that of his friend and associate of many years, John D. Ehrlichman, the President's former assistant for domestic affairs, which was released two days ago. Mr. Nixon described the two men as his "most trusted advisers" on the day they resigned.

Both Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman defended the President and placed blame on John W. Dean 3d, the President's former counsel, and Jeb Stuart Magruder, who was second in command at the re-election committee.

The two former White House aides offered contrasting testimony on John N. Mitchell, who resigned as Attorney General to become head of the re-election committee. Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony was damaging to Mr. Mitchell on the question of whether he approved the bugging. Mr. Haldeman's deposition tended to support the former Attorney General's denial.

In cautious phrases, often interrupted by claims of executive privilege, Mr. Haldeman pictured the President, Mr. Ehrlichman and himself as having been kept in the dark about Watergate by Mr. Dean. He said that up until last

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urch 22, Mr. Dean stoutly maintained there had been no White House involvement.

Mr. Haldeman said he had learned secondhand, through

Mitchell, that Mr. Magruder knew and approved of plans for electronic surveillance of the Democratic headquarters at the Watergate.

Mr. Ehrlichman, in a deposition made public two days ago in the same case, said that information he had gathered on

Watergate affair indicated that Mr. Mitchell personally used three sites for electronic bugging and that three meetings on the subject were held. The first two plans were rejected and the third accepted, he said.

The deposition by Mr. Haldeman mentions only two meetings at Mr. Mitchell's office—meetings at which bugging plans were reportedly rejected. Maurice R. Dunie, an attorney for the Democratic National Committee, asked Mr. Haldeman if he knew of the meetings at the time they were going on.

Mr. Haldeman replied that Dean later claimed to have told him about the meetings. He answered:

"I don't have a recollection of his giving me that report to clear and present recollection; but I have no reason to question his statement that he told me. I think I am willing to accept that as a possibility."

**Concern by Nixon Cited**

Mr. Haldeman recounted at length Mr. Nixon's concerns about the Watergate affair.

"From the time of the Watergate break-in to the election, there were periodic new developments with regard to Watergate that would appear in the press or that would come up as part of the investigation or the various actions that were being taken by the prosecutors, court and so on," Mr. Haldeman said.

"Whenever there was such a development there was a concern expressed on the President's part, usually to me, that I try to get the facts in this matter determined and made my own."

There was natural concern

on his part, being at that time up for re-election... that the insinuations and appearances and allegations that were arising would be detrimental to that campaign effort and that there was a desire that facts be known, cleared up and established in the public mind as well as legally so that those doubts would not persist."

**Concern After Election**

Mr. Haldeman said he had asked Mr. Dean repeatedly, "Can't we get the full story out?"

He said Mr. Dean replied that the full story was not available because of a lack of knowledge, conflicting statements, legal rights of defendants and "the questions of the ongoing legal [criminal] process as contrasted to the ongoing political process."

In the postelection period, from Nov. 7 to the end of the year, "there was a new concern on the President's part" that "any questions pending on the Watergate" be "cleared up," Mr. Haldeman said.

He said the President wanted it cleared up "for the effect on the start of the new term and the desire that before the Congress returned and before the President was inaugurated that the whole matter be cleared up and made known so that it wouldn't be hanging over into the second term."

Mr. Haldeman often used the subjunctive case to guard his statements about the President. He said, for example, that Mr. Nixon "would have raised again questions as to why this couldn't now be cleared up."

"Basically the answers [from Mr. Dean] continue to be the same."

He said Mr. Dean stuck to his story that there was no White House involvement, with slight modification, as late as March 22.

Mr. Haldeman said it was a lack of information and "lack of delivery on the assignment that he [the President] had given Dean" that caused Mr. Nixon to ask for Mr. Ehrlichman's investigation.

"As of the 22d [of March] he was expecting in a few days this full development [report] from Dean which never materialized and things were moving on and he wasn't getting the results he had sought and I

think he, at this point, made a shift in assignment and took Dean, in his own mind at least, off the assignment and put Ehrlichman on it with the idea of busting through because he wasn't getting through from Dean," Mr. Haldeman said.

#### Own Role Described

Mr. Haldeman pictured his own role as a "conduit" for information to the President. He said he was the President's "basic contact with the re-election campaign in general," but added "I would not say that I functioned as a continuing liaison with the committee."

He did not explain the difference.

He said that on March 28 he met with Mr. Mitchell in Mr. Haldeman's White House office.

He said Mr. Mitchell told him that Mr. Magruder had felt pressure from the White House to get on with the gathering of intelligence on the Democrats and that the pressure had come from Charls W. Colson, special counsel to the President.

As a response to this pressure, according to Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Mitchell said Mr. Magruder said "he had launched a Liddy intelligence program which included the D.N.C. [Democratic National Committee] project."

The "Liddy" reference is to G. Gordon Liddy, convicted director of the Watergate burglary team.

#### Colson Statement Noted

"Magruder's outline as of that time, as expressed to Mitchell the day before and as reported by Mitchell to me, was that the Watergate project, the entry and bugging of the D.N.C., had been conducted with Magruder's knowledge and approval," Mr. Haldeman said.

He said he talked to Mr. Colson about it later and was told that Liddy and E. Howard Hunt Jr., who pleaded guilty in the Watergate burglary, had come to Mr. Colson's office because they were unable to get anyone to listen to their intelligence gathering plans. Mr. Haldeman said that Mr. Colson had told him that when the two men came to his office, he felt rushed at the end of a long day and did not believe their request involved anything illegal.

"He picked up the phone and

called Magruder while Hunt and Liddy were still present and talked to Magruder and said these guys tell me they have got an intelligence program set up that nobody over there will listen to. At least listen to it and see if you don't want to consider it. If it's not to be used, fine; but it ought to be at least considered. That was the extent of his conversation."

#### Funds Discussed

Mr. Haldeman, in discussing a \$350,000 cash fund that he controlled, said he thought the money was picked up at the re-election committee in early April. He said the matter was handled by his assistant, Gordon C. Strachan, though Mr. Strachan did not handle the cash personally.

But Mr. Haldeman was vague as to whether it was held in a bank and declined for the most part to say what it had been spent on, except for \$22,000 that went for advertising.

"I must admit," said Mr. Dunie, the Democrat's attorney, "I am acutely curious about \$350,000 in currency, if I understand your testimony correctly, being picked up by some individual whose name you do not know. Do you know the name today?"

"No I do not," Mr. Haldeman replied, adding that the name was known to the Watergate grand jury.

"Do you know the name of the bank today?" Mr. Dunie asked.

#### Moscow Will Pay Damages To Paris for TU-144 Crash

MOSCOW, June 6 (UPI)—The Soviet Union will pay France for damage caused by Sunday's crash of a supersonic TU-144 airliner near Le Bourget airport, the Soviet press agency Tass said Wednesday.

The agency said that the Council of Ministers had ordered the appropriate Soviet organizations to pay the damages "according to established international norms." It said that \$84,000 had been appropriated for "granting extraordinary allocation to the population that had suffered damage."

Tass also gave its first extended account of the investigation of the crash.