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THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY,

exts of Documents Relating to Domestic

Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, June 6— The following are the texts of recommendations for in-creased domestic intelligence gathering made to President Nixon in July, 1970, by an inter - agency Government committee; an analysis of the committee's report and of strategy to be used to secure the cooperation of J. Edgar Hoover; and a "decision memorandum" reflecting President Nixon's approval of the committee's recom-mendations. The President later rescinded his approval after the plan was opposed by Mr. Hoover. Special to The New York Times

Recommendations TOP SECRET Handle via Comint Channels

Only Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection A. Interpretive Restraint on **Communications Intelligence RECOMMENDATION:**

Present interpretation should be broadened to per-mit and program for cover-age by N.S.A. [National Security Agency] of the communications of U.S. citi-zens using international zens using international facilities.

RATIONALE:

RATIONALE: The F.B.I. does not have the capability to monitor in-ternational communications. N.S.A. is currently doing so on a restricted basis, and the information is particularly useful to the White House and it would be to our disad-vantage to allow the F.B.I. to determine what N.S.A. should do in this area without regard to our own requirements. No to our own requirements. No appreciable risk is involved in this course of action.

B. Electronic Surveillance and Penetrations.

RECOMMENDATION:

Present procedures should be changed to permit inten-sification of coverage of in-dividuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal

United States who pose a major threat to the internal security. Also, present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage of foreign nationals and diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community. At the present time, less than [unclear] electronic penetrations are operative. This includes coverage of the C.P.U.S.A. (Communist Party, U.S.A.s and organized crime targets, with only a few authorized against subject of pressing internal security interest. Mr. Hoover's statement that the F.B.I. would not oppose other agencies seeking approval for the operating electronic surveillances is gratuitous since no other agencies have the capability. Everyone knowledgeable in the field, with the exception of Mr. Hoover concurs

JUNE 7, 1973 Intelligence-Gathering Plan

that existing coverage is grossly inadequate. C.I.A. and N.S.A. note that this is particularly true of diplomat-ic establishments, and we have learned at the White House that it is also true of new Left groups. C. Mail Coverage

RECOMMENDATION:

Restrictions on legal cov-erage should be removed. Also, present restrictions on covert coverage should be relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest. RATIONALE: RATIONALE:

RATIONALE: RATIONALE: There is no valid argument against use of legal mail covers except Mr. Hoover's concern that the civil liber-ties people may become up-set. This risk is surely an acceptable one and hardly serious enough to justify de-nying ourselves a valuable and legal intelligence tool. Covert coverage is illegal and there are serious risks involved. However, the ad-vantages to be derived from its use outweight the risks. This technique is particularly valuable in identifying es-pionage agents and other contacts of foreign intelli-gence services. **D. Surreptitious Entry**

D. Surreptitious Entry **RECOMMENDATION:**

Present restrictions should be modified to permit pro-curement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic ma-terial.

foreign cryptographic ma-terial. Also, present restrictions should be modified to permit selective use of this tech-nique against other urgent security targets. RATIONALE: Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if ex-posed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelli-gence which cannot be ob-tained in any other fashion. The F.B.I., in Mr. Hoover's younger days, used to con-duct such operations with great success and with no exposure. The information secured was invaluable. N.S.A. has a particular in-terest since it is noscible by

secured was invaluable. N.S.A. has a particular in-terest since it is possible by this technique to secure material with which N.S.A. can break foreign crypto-graphic codes. We spend mil-lions of dollars attempting to break these codes by machine. One successful sur-reptitious entry can do the job successfully at no dollar cost.

Surreptitious entry of fa-cilities occupied by subver-sive elements can turn up

in 1970

information about identities, methods of operation, and other invaluable investigative information which is not otherwise obtainable. This technique would be particu-larly helpful if used against the Weathermen and Black Panthers. Panthers.

Panthers. The deployment of the ex-ecutive protector force has increased the risk of surrep-titious entry of diplomatic establishments. However, it is the belief of all except Mr. Hoover that the technique can still be successfully used on a selective basis.

E. Development of Campus Sources

RECOMMENDATION: Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded coverage of violence-prone campus and student - related groups groups.

Also, C.I.A. coverage of American students (and oth-ers) traveling or living abroad should be increased.

American Structures (and others) traveling or living abroad should be increased. RATIONALE: The F.B.I. does not cur-rently recruit any campus sources among individuals be-low 21 years of age. This dra-matically reduces the pool from which sources may be drawn. Mr. Hoover is afraid of a young student surfacing in the press as an F.B.I. source, although the reaction in the past to such events has been minimal. After all, everyone assumes the F.B.I. has such sources. The campus is the battle-ground of the revolutionary protest movement. It is im-possible to gather effective intelligence about the move-ment unless we have campus sources. The risk of exposure is minimal, and where ex-posure occurs the adverse publicity is moderate and short-lived. It is a price we must be willing to pay for effective coverage of the campus scene. The intelli-gence community, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, feels strongly that it is impera-tive the [was unclear] in-crease the number of campus sources this fall in order to forestall widespread vio-lence.

C.I.A. claims there are not existing restraints on its cov-erage of over-seas activities of U.S. nationals. However, this coverage has been gross-ly inadequate since 1965 and an explicit directive to increase coverage is required.

F. Use of Military Undercover Agents

RECOMMENDATION: Present restrictions should be retained

RATIONALE:

The intelligence community is agreed that the risks of lifting these restraints are greater than the value of any possible intelligence which would be acquired by doing so. Budget and Manpower

Restrictions

RECOMMENDATION:

Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to pro-jected manpower needs and other costs in the event the various investigative straints herein are lifted.

RATIONALE:

RATIONALE: In the event that the above recommendations are con-curred in, it will be neces-sary to modify existing budg-ets to provide the money and manpower necessary for their implementation. The intelli-gence community has been badly hit in the budget squeeze. (I suspect the for-eign intelligence operations are in the same shape) and it may be will be necessary to make some modifications. The projected figures should be reasonable, but will be subject to individual review if this recommendatoin is acif this recommendatoin is accepted.

Measures to Improve Domestic Intelligence Operations

RECOMMENDATION:

RECOMMENDATION: A permanent committee consisting of the F.B.I., C.I.A., N.S.A. D.I.A. [Defense Intelli-gence Agency] and the mili-tary counterintelligence agen-cies should be appointed to provide evaluations of do-mestic intelligence estimates, and carry out the other ob-jectives specified in the re-port. port. RATIONALE:

RATIONALE: The need for increased co-ordination, joint estimates, and responsiveness to the White House is obvious to the intelligence community. There are a number of opera-tional problems which need to be worked out since Mr. Hoover is fearful of any mechanism which might jeop-ardize his autonomy. CI.A. mechanism which might jeop-ardize his autonomy. CI.A. would prefer an ad hoc com-mittee to see how the system works, but other members be-lieve that this would merely delay the establishment of ef-fective coordination and joint operations. The value of lift-ing intelligence collection re-straints is proportional to the straints is proportional to the availability of joint opera-tions and evaluation, and the establishment of this inter-agency group is considered imperative.

Top Secret

Analysis and Strategy Memorandum for: H. R.

Haldeman From: Tom Charles Huston Subject: Domestic intelli-gence review

1. Background

A working group consist-ing of the top domestic intel-ligence officials of the FBI, CIA, DIA, NAS, and each of the military services met reg-ularly throughout June to discuss the problems outlined by

the President and to draft the attached report. The discus-sions were frank and the qual-ity of work first-rate. Coop-eration was excellent, and all were delighted that an oppor-tunity was finally at hand to address themselves jointly to the serious internal security threat which exists. I participated in all meet-ings, but restricted my in-volvement to keeping the committee on the target the President established. My im-pression that the report would be more accurate and the recommendations more helpful if the agencies were allowed wide latitude in ex-pressing their opinions and working out. arrangements which they felt met the Presi-dent's requirements consistent with the resources and misdent's requirements consistent with the resources and mis-sions of the member agencies.


2. Mr. Hoover

I went into this exercise fearful that C.I.A. would re-fuse to cooperate. In fact, Dick Helms [Director of Cen-Dick Helms [Director of Cen-tral Intelligence] was most cooperative and helpful, and the only stumbling block was Mr. Hoover. He attempted at the first meeting to divert the committee from opera-tional problems and redirect its mandate to the prepara-tion of another analysis of existing intelligence. I de-clined to acquiesce in this approach, and succeeded in getting the committee back on target.

getting the committee back on target. When the working group completed its report, Mr. Hoover refused to go along with a single conclusion drawn or support a single recommendation made. His position was twofold:

recommendation made. His position was twofold: (1) Current operations are perfectly satisfactory and (2) No one has any business commenting on procedures he has established for the collection of intelligence by the F.B.I. He attempted to modify the body of the re-port, but I successfully op-posed it on the grounds that the report was the conclu-sion of all the agencies, not merely the F.B.I. Mr. Hoover then entered his objections as footnotes to the report. Cufootnotes to the report. Cu-mulatively, his footnotes suggest that he is perfectly satis-fied with current procedures fied with current procedures and is opposed to any changes whatsoever. As you will note from the report, his objec-tions are generally inconsist-ent and frivolous—most ex-press concern about possible embarrassment to the intelli-gence community (i.e., Hoo-ver) from public disclosure of clandestine operations. Admiral Gayler and Gen-eral Bennett were greatly displeased by Mr. Hoover's attitude and his insistence on footnoting objections. They

attitude and his insistence on footnoting objections. They wished to raise a formal pro-test and sign the report only with the understanding that they opposed the footnotes. I prevailed upon them not to do so since it would only aggravate Mr. Hoover, and further complicate our ef-forts. They graciously agreed to go along with my sugges-tion in order to avoid a nasty scene and jeopardize the pos-sibility of positive action re-sulting from the report. I as-sured them that their opinion would be brought to the at-tention of the President.



Tom Charles Huston, former aide to President Nixon

Threat Assessment
 The first 23 pages of the report constitute an assessment of the existing internal security threat, our current intelligence coverage of this threat, and areas where our coverage is inadequate. All agencies concurred in this assessment, and it serves to explain the importance of expanded intelligence collection efforts.

 Restraints on Intelligence

4. Restraints on Intelligence Collection

Part Two of the report discusses specific operational restraints which currently re-strict the capability of the in-telligence community to col-lect the types of information necessary to deal effectively with the internal security threat. The report explains the nature of the restraints and sets out the arguments for and against modifying them. My concern was to af-ford the President the strong-est arguments on both sides of the question so that he could make an informed deci-sion as to the future course of action to be followed by the intelligence community. I might point out that of all the individuals invalued Part Two of the report

the intelligence community. I might point out that of all the individuals involved in the preparation and con-sideration of this report, only Mr. Hoover is satisfied with existing procedures. Those individuals within the F.B.I. who have day-to-day responsibilities for do-mestic intelligence opera-tions privately disagree with Mr. Hoover and believe that it is imperative that changes in operating procedures be

it is imperative that changes in operating procedures be initiated at once. I am attaching to this memorandum my recom-mendations on the decision the President should make with regard to these opera-tional restraints. Although the report sets forth the pros and cons on each issue, it may be helpful to add my specific recommendations and the reasons therefore in the event the President has some doubts on a specific course of action.

5. Improvement in Inter-Agency Coordination

All members of the comwith the exception of Mr. imperative that a continuing mechanism be established to effectuate the coordination

of domestic intelligence ef-forts and the evaluation of domestic intelligence data. In the past there has been no systematic effort to mo-bilize the full resources of the intelligence community in the internal security area and there has been no mechanism for preparing community. the internal security area and there has been no mechanism for preparing community-wide domestic intelligence es-timates such as is done in the foreign intelligence area by the United States Intelli-gence Board. Domestic intel-ligence information coming into the White House has been fragmentary and un-evaluated. We have not had, for example, a community-wide estimate of what we might expect short or long-term in the cities or on the campuses or within the mili-tary establishment. establishment.

tary establishment. Unlike most of the bu-reaucracy, the intelligence community welcomes direc-tion and leadership from the White House. There appears to be agreement, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, that effective coordination within the community is pos-sible only if there is direction from the White House. More-over, the community is pleased that the White House is finally showing interest in their activities and an aware-ness of the threat which they so acutely recognize. I believe that we will be making a major contribution to the security of the coun-try if we can work out on

to the security of the coun-try if we can work out an arrangement which provides for institutionalized coordifor institutionalized coordi-nation within the intelligence community and effective leadership from the White House.

6. Implementation of the President's decisions

If the President's decisions If the President should de-cide to lift some of the cur-rent restrictions and if he should decide to authorize a formalized domestic intel-ligence struction, I would recommend the following steps: steps:

recommend the following steps: (A) Mr. Hoover should be called in privately for a stroking session at which the President explains the deci-sion he has made, thanks Mr. Hoover for his candid advice and past cooperation, and indicates he is counting on Edgar's cooperation in implementing the new de-report, announce his decisions, (B) Following this Hoover session, the same individuals who were present at the in-itial session in the Oval Office should be invited back to meet with the President. At that time, the President should thank them for the report, anounce his decisions, indicate his desires for future activity, and present each with an autographed conv of

indicate his desires for future activity, and present each with an autographed copy of the photo of the first meet-ing which Ollie took. (C) An official memoran-dum setting forth the precise decisions of the President should be prepared so that there can be no misunder-standing. We should also in-corporate a review procedure which will enable us to en-sure that the decisions are sure that the decisions are fully implemented.

I hate to suggest a further imposition on the President's time, but think these steps will be necessary to pave over some of the obvious problems which may arise if the President decides, as I hope he will, to over-rule Mr. Hoover's objections to many of the proposals made Mr. Hoover's objections to many of the proposals made in this report. Having seen the President in action with Mr. Hoover, I am confident that he can handle this situa-tion in such a way that we can get what we want with-out putting Edgar's nose out of joint. At the same time, we can capitalize on the good will the President has built up with the other prin-cipals and minimize the risk that they may feel they are being forced to take a back seat to Mr. Hoover. 7. Conclusion

7. Conclusion

7. Conclusion I am delighted with the substance of this report and believe it is a first-rate job. I have great respect for the integrity, loyalty, and com-petence of the men who are operationally responsible for internal security matters and believe that we are on the threshold of an unexcelled opportunity to cope with a very serious problem in its

germinal stages when we can avoid the necessity for harsh measures by acting swift, discreetly, and decisively to deflect the threat before it reaches alarming proportions.

I might add, in conclusion, reaches alarming proportions. I might add, in conclusion, that it is my personal opinion that Mr. Hoover will not hesitate to accede to any decision which the President makes, and the President should not, therefore, be re-luctant to overrule Mr. Hoov-er's objections. Mr. Hoover is set in his ways and can be bull-headed as 'hell, but he is a loyal trooper. Twenty years ago he would never have raised the type of objec-tions he has here, but he's getting old and worried about his legend. He makes life tough in this area, but not impossible—for 'he'll re-spond to direction by the President and that is all we need to set the domestic in-telligence house in order. **TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Decision Memorandum The White House

Washington July 15, 1970

TOP SECRET

Handle via Comint Channels only Subject: Domestic Intelli-

gence gence The President has care-fully studied the special re-port of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ad hoc) and made the fol-lowing decisions:

1. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence

National Security Council Intelligence Directive Num-ber 6 (NSCID-6) is to be in-terpreted to permit N.S.A. to program for coverage the communications of U.S. citizens using international citizens using international facilities.

2. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations

and penetrations The intelligence communi-ty is directed to intensify coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security. Also, coverage of foreign nationals and diplomatic establish-ments in the United States of and diplomatic establish-ments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community is to be intensi-fied fied.

3. Mail Coverage

Restrictions on legal cov-erage are to be removed, restrictions on covert coverage are to be relaxed to permit use of this technique on se-lected targets of priority for-eign intelligence and internal security interest.

4. Surreptitious Entry

Restraints on the use of surreptitious entry are to be removed. The technique is to be used to permit procure-ment of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material and against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.

5. Development of Campus Sources

Coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups is to be increased. All restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, C.I.A. coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad is to be increased.

6. Use of Military Undercover Agents

Present restrictions are to be retained.

7. Budget and Manpower Each agency is to submit a detailed estimate as to pro-jected manpower needs and other costs required to imple-ment the above decisions.

8. Domestic Intelligence Operations

A committee consisting of A committee consisting of the directors or other appro-priate representatives ap-pointed by the directors, of the F.B.I., C.I.A., N.S.A., D.I.A., and the military counterintelligence agencies to be constituted effective counterintelligence agencies is to be constituted effective August 1, 1970, to provide evaluations of domestic intel-ligence, prepared periodic domestic intelligence esti-mates carry out the other domestic intelligence esti-mates, carry out the other objectives specified in the re-port, and perform such other duties as the President shall, from time to time, assign. The director of the F.B.I. shall serve as chairman of the committee. Further de-tails on the organization and operations of this committee are set forth in an attached memorandum.

memorandum. The President has directed The President has directed that each addressee submit a detailed report, due on Sep-tember 1, 1970, on the steps taken to implement these de-disions. Further such periodic reports will be requested as direumstances merit

circumstances merit. The President is aware that procedural problems may arise in the course of imple-menting these decisions. However, he is anxious that such problems be resolved with maximum speed and minimum misunderstanding Any difficulties which may arise should be brought to my immediate attention in order that an appropriate solution may be found and the President's directives implemented in a manner consistent with in a manner his objectives. Tom Charles Huston,

TOP SECRET Handle via Comint Channels Only

Organization and Operations of the Interagency Group on Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security (IAG)

1. Membership

The membership shall consist of representatives of the F.B.I., C.I.A., D.I.A., N.S.A., and the counter-intelligence agencies of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. To insure the high level consideration of issues and problems which the Pres-

The Day's Developments

1970 Intelligence Plan: President Nixon was warned before giving it his approval that parts of the "1970 Intel-ligence Plan" for expanded domestic surveillance were "clearly illegal" and would pose "serious risks" to the Ad-ministration because Federal agents would be engaged in the crime of breaking and entering. The plan was rescinded after five daw because of enperition but L Ederar Macune after five days because of opposition by J. Edgar Hoover.

Laird Joins White House: Melvin R. Laird, former Secretary of Defense and a former Congressman, was named chief domestic adviser to the President as part of Mr. Nixon's effort to reshape his top-level staff. Gen. Alex-ander M. Haig Jr. will continue as chief of staff at the White House, but has resigned from active Army duty in response to Congressional criticism of his dual role. Ronald L. Ziegler, the hWite House press secretary, will be given added policy duties and the title of Assistant to the President President.

Sloan Testifies: Hugh W. Sloan Jr. said pressure was applied by Presidential Counsel John W. Dean 3d and others to get him to resist cooperating with prosecution of others to get nim to resist cooperating with prosecution of the aWtergate conspirators. Mr. Sloan, former treasurer of the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President, also testified at the televised Senate hearing that Jeb Stuart Magruder and Frederick C. LaRue, finance committee aides, had suggested that he perjure himself when questioned about transactions related to the Watergate investigation about transactions related to the Watergate investigation.

Closed Session Sought: Archibald Cox, the special Watergate prosecutor, asked for a court order tc compel the Ervin committee to question Mr. Dean and Mr. Magruder in closed session or, if in open session, to bar live television and radio coverage. Both men are to testify next week under immunity, which Mr. Cox fears will hinder later prosecution for alleged cover-ups of the Watergate

Senate to Receive Logs: The White House agreed to turn over to the Ervin committee logs of the President's conversations with his dismissed counsel, Mr. Dein, relating to Watergate. hTe committee had threatened to subpoena the logs.

Ellsberg Prosecution Dropped: The Justice Depart-ment said it would not appeal last month's dismisal by Federal Judge William M. Byrne Jr. in Los Angele of all charges against Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony ; Russo Jr. for stealing and making public the Pentagon Papers. The dismissal resulted from the Government's disclose that the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist had beerbroken into on national-security grounds by figures laternvolved in the Watergate case.

ident expects to be before the group, the directors of the respective agencies should serve personally. However, if necessary and appropriate, the director of a member agency may designate another individual to serve in his place.

2. Chairman

The director of the FBI shall serve as chairman. He may designate another indi-vidual from his agency to serve as the FBI represent-ative on the group.

3. Observers

The purpose of the group is to effectuate communitywide coordination and secure the benefits of communty-wide analysis and estimating. wide analysis and estimating. When problems arise which involve areas of interest to agencies or departments not members of the group, they shall be invited, at the dis-cretion of the group, to join the group as observers and participants in those discus-sions of interest to them. participants in those discus-sions of interest to them. Such agencies and depart-ments include the De-partments of State (I & R, Passport); Treasury (IRS, Customs); Justice (BNDD, Community Relations Serv-ice); and such other agencies which may have investiga which may have investiga-tive or law enforcement re-sponsibilities touching on domestic intelligence or internal security matters. 4. White House Liaison

The President has assigned The President has assigned to Tom Charles Huston staff responsibility for domestic intelligence and internal se-curity affairs. He will partici-pate in all activities of the group as the personal repre-sentative of the President. 5. Staffing

The group will establish

such sub-committe or working groups as itleems ap-propriate. It wilklso deter-mine and implaent such staffing requireents as it may deem neceary to en-able it to carrout its re-sponsibilities, sject to the approval of the resident. 6. Duties

battes
The group will have the following duties.
(A) Define the pecific requirements of maker agencies of the uteligence community.
(B) Effect closediret coordination between numbers

ordination betwee member agencies.

(C) Provide reguly ealua-tions of domestic intillignce. (D) Review policie gern-

ing operations in the fil of domestic intelligence ai de-

velop recommendations (E) Prepare periodido-mestic intelligence estites which incorporate the nlts of the combined effor of the intelligence commun.

(F) Perform such otheu-ties as the President ay from time to time assign 7. Meetings

The group shall meeat the call of the chairman a member agency, or the Wite House representative. 8. Security

Knowledge of the existence Knowledge of the existence and purposes of the group shall be limited on a strict "need to know" basis. Op-erations of, and papers or-iginating with, the group shall be classified "top se-cret handle via Comint chan-nels only." 9. Other Procedures The group shall establish

The group shall establish such other procedures as it believes appropriate to the implementation of the du-ties set forth above. [TOP SECRET]