

AID FOR RADICALS DISPUTED BY C.I.A.

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'69-'70 Studies, Rejected by
White House, Found No Tie
to Foreign Governments
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WASHINGTON, May 24—

The Central Intelligence Agency reported in 1969 and 1970 that it could find no substantial evidence to support the Nixon Administration's view that foreign governments were supplying undercover agents and funds to radicals and Black Panther groups in the United States, White House and intelligence sources said today.

The C.I.A.'s findings were rejected, the sources said, by high-level White House aides who arranged in late 1970 for 35 agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to open overseas intelligence posts in 20 countries. The bureau's expansion is said to have angered Richard Helms, then the C.I.A. director, and other agency officials.

"We tried to show that the radical movements were home-grown, indigenous responses to perceived grievances and problems that had been growing for years," one official who worked on the agency's analyses recalled. "We said the radicals were clean and that we couldn't find anything. But all it turned out to be was another nail in Helms's coffin."

Mr. Helms was relieved as

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Fear of Radicals Was Disputed by C.I.A.

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the agency's director late last year.

The C.I.A. said it would not comment on its 1969 and 1970 reports. One former White House official who worked on security matters in 1970 acknowledged that the agency's reports on student unrest had been available. But he added, "it as never our position that we had hard information" about the foreign link to domestic disturbances.

The intelligence sources said that the first C.I.A. study was submitted to the office of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national security adviser, more than six months before Mr. Nixon decided to establish a special inter-agency committee to prepare recommendations for expanded domestic intelligence operations.

The New York Times reported today that the committee's report, approved by Mr. Nixon and his top intelligence advisers in July, 1970, called for the F.B.I. to mount a massive counter-insurgency program, involving spying, wiretapping and burglaries, against the Black Panthers, potential Arab saboteurs, radical students, and Soviet espionage agents.

The program was not put into effect because J. Edgar Hoover, then director of the bureau, refused to act without written authorization from Mr. Nixon.

Mr. Nixon, in discussing the proposal during his Watergate statement Tuesday, cited what he said was a wave of domestic bombings, campus disturbances and gun battles in early 1970 and added: "Some of the disruptive activities were receiving foreign support." He cited no evidence.

Fears Over 'Kids' Seen

Elsewhere in his statement, Mr. Nixon characterized the 1970 report as one of "three important national security operations" that had become involved in the Watergate scandal. The two other programs, he said, were the series of telephone wiretaps on newsmen and White House aides instituted in 1969 and the establishment of a special investigation unit in 1971 in connection with the Pentagon papers leak.

One intelligence official said

that the White House had a "preoccupation" with the extent of foreign influence on domestic radicals and blacks. "Whenever kids went abroad," the source said, "there were those in the White House who were convinced that they were meeting with Communists and coming back with dope."

The C.I.A. studied three distinct areas in both 1969 and 1970, the source said. It analyzed student patterns throughout Europe, North Africa and Latin America to determine whether there was any connection between activities there and the United States' disturbances. No significant connection was found, he said.

Another main area of study was in the Mideast, where nations — especially Egypt — were analyzed to determine whether the Arab student population in the United States was being drawn into radical activities under the leadership of the Arab bloc.

"For years there had been indications," the source said, "that there were Arab students in the United States who were probably financed by (Mideast) embassy money who were trying to draw support against Israel. To our knowledge there were no serious efforts beyond that. By that I mean there were no illegal activities by those students—no recruiting American spies and no bomb-throwing."

The third main study area concerned possible Algerian support for the Black Panthers, the source said.

"That question was tracked back and forth 16 times over and over again," he noted. "Every intelligence agency said we know it's an interesting hypotheses but, by and large, the judgment of the intelligence community in 1970 was that there was no significant Algerian support for the domestic operations of blacks."

Cleaver Ouster Noted

"History supports that judgment completely," the official declared. He noted that the Algerian Government apparently ousted Eldridge Cleaver, the Black Panther leader, and his followers late last year.

Both C.I.A. reports, which are still classified, the sources said, attempted to put the protest activities of blacks and students into a sociological con-

text, the source said. "We thought that it was absolutely imperative that the causes of what was happening — the Vietnam war and racial injustice—had to be understood."

A White House official who worked on the 1970 domestic intelligence report characterized the agency studies as having "absolutely nothing to do with student activities."

The official said that none of the participants in the 1970 working group—including the C.I.A., which was represented by Mr. Helms—"disagreed in any way with the threat assessment of that report."

One high-level agency source said in response that Mr. Helms's role during the White House discussions of domestic violence was to "calm them down, to keep things in perspective but yet at the same time to go through the motions of cooperation."

"So he made the effort," the source continued, "and two times those reports—each more than 200 pages long—went so far as to put in context the political activities of both the blacks and radical students."

"The response of the White House," he added, "was to move F.B.I. agents into C.I.A. activities."

Other sources said that the agents had been dispatched abroad after a White House meeting of Mr. Nixon, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Hoover. "Apparently, it was a hush-hush deal," one former White House official said. "My impression was that the President and Mr. Kissinger had lost confidence in the C.I.A. and wanted to have a double-check on what was going on abroad."

The F.B.I. now spends about \$3-million a year to maintain about 40 agents and more than 30 clerks in the overseas offices, one Justice Department source said. The offices are officially described as intelligence liaison units.

"It caused a tremendous furor in the agency," one intelligence official recalled. "Helms was furious."

Lost and Found Is Busy

BUDAPEST, Hungary (AP)—The lost and found department of Budapest's public transport system handled about 18,000 articles last year.