


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# Newsweek

**INDICTED**



*John Mitchell*





MY TURN: George W. Ball

## Gaullism, Nixon Style?

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the principal result of our major foreign-policy initiatives of the past two years has not been so much to break fresh ground as to expunge the aberrations that separated us from the policies of our Western European allies. Thus, in establishing the beginnings of a working relationship with China, we have in large degree merely followed the example of Britain in 1950 and France in 1964. In seeking a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union, we have repeated the precedents of President de Gaulle in 1963 and more recently of the Bonn government, which concluded a treaty with Moscow three years ago. In removing restraints on East-West trade, we have done little more than bring our practices in line with what the Western European nations have been doing for years. Finally, in ending our active involvement in the Vietnamese civil war—if, in fact, we have conclusively done so—we have undertaken an extrication that France achieved in 1954.

The result is a curious paradox. Though one might expect that the removal of differences through this convergence of policies would bring us to a closer understanding with our Western European friends, relations are today more strained and fragile than at any time in the past two decades.

### FIVE EQUAL POWERS

In large part, this is due to the unilateral means by which we undertook our diplomatic repositioning. First was the President's failure to consult—or even to inform—our alliance partners before announcing his historic trip to China, and since then he has continued to play an essentially lone hand. Transacting an impressive volume of diplomatic business at the summit meeting in Moscow last May, he has, in manner at least, accorded equal treatment to our allies and adversaries—or even treated the Communist powers with greater deference than our Western friends. Finally—and this has proved the most disturbing question—did he really mean to adumbrate a new American design when he unveiled his famous concept of a peaceful world of five equal balancing powers—the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union, China and Japan—"each balancing the other"?

What many Europeans deduced from all this was not that America had embraced a "new isolationism," in spite of much trendy talk along that line, but that our government was pursuing something approaching an American variant of

Gaullism. There was clearly a sense of *déjà vu*, for, like President Nixon, General de Gaulle had also envisaged, at the heart of world politics, a constellation of mutually balancing powers to supplant the bipolar world of Washington and Moscow. Nor was that the only nostalgic resemblance; common threads of aloofness and secrecy characterized both regimes—conditions assuring the flexibility needed for a free-form game of balance-of-power politics. To achieve the requisite maneuverability the President dared not show his hand; his next moves must be kept concealed not only from America's allies but also from the American people and even the Congress.

### FAITS ACCOMPLIS

The only way to make this possible was to concentrate the power to act and decide within the forbidding walls of the White House, while inducing Congress and the people to accept major policy moves not by consultation in advance but by a series of *faits accomplis* made palatable through time-honored devices of effective theater—the skillful use of surprise, the grandiloquent announcement and the pageantry of well-staged summit meetings. There has been no better example of this than the dramatic unveiling of the President's plan to visit China—with the glamour and color of the television spectacular forestalling and frustrating criticism in conservative quarters.

Unfortunately, the confinement of all serious foreign-affairs business to a narrow White House circle has sharply diminished the range of our diplomatic potential by disabling us from dealing with more than one or two major areas at a time. Meanwhile, the fact that, throughout the past two years, our efforts and attention have been narrowly focused on secret talks with Peking and Moscow has necessarily excited suspicion and disenchantment throughout European chancelleries. Some have seen in our unilateralism—our American Gaullism—a danger that the United States might make an accommodation with the Soviet Union at the expense of Western European interests; others have feared that, in playing an intricate chess game of balance-of-power politics, Washington might prefer to deal with a fragmented Europe and thus be led to undermine the unity so far achieved by the European Economic Community.

Against this background the President's designation of 1973 as the "Year of Europe" seemed to some skeptics

across the water more ominous than reassuring, for they read in the slogan little more than that America was now proposing to demand commercial and economic concessions in aid of its own ailing balance of payments.

It was to silence these suspicions and prepare the way for fruitful discussions that that resourceful tactician Professor Kissinger launched a vigorous offensive. In what was proclaimed as a major policy speech, on April 23 he called for a "new Atlantic Charter." Then immediately following came the State of the World message and a Kissinger press conference. What this frenetic activity seemed to denote was a frontal effort to allay the apprehensions caused by our unilateralist practices and the President's ill-chosen reference to the five "balancing powers." In fact, the State of the World message explicitly rejects the classical concept of balance of power—with its "continual maneuvering for marginal advantages over others"—as both "unrealistic and dangerous" in "the nuclear era." Meeting the skeptics head-on, it categorically insists that, though we deem it essential to involve the Communist powers in a common effort of peace, America still respects the "distinctions between friends and adversaries."

### AFTER WATERGATE

While clearly useful to say, no such mere assertions will by themselves persuade Europeans that America's flirtation with Gaullism was only a holiday fancy. They will be watching how we conduct ourselves from now on, and, although our future course of action cannot be definitively predicted, one element already at work may prove more significant than any conscious Presidential decision. That is the effect of the Watergate disclosures in compelling the White House to abandon its Gaullist type of aloofness in favor of a more open and cooperative style of conducting the public business—including our relations with other capitals.

Given the loss of confidence he has suffered, no longer will the President be able to administer foreign policy with the authority and secrecy of a dynast, communing only with himself and Dr. Kissinger. From now on, not only Congress but the American people must be taken into confidence, which necessarily implies more open exchanges with our allies. Fully exposed to the sunshine, eighteenth-century balance-of-power politics—with their traditional apparatus of shifting and reversing alliances—will be quite unworkable. Indeed, it is even possible that the State Department will once again become America's foreign office instead of merely the repository of menial chores.

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# THE PERISCOPE

## A FRIEND IN NEED

Although he begged off replacing White House chief of staff H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird is quietly working for the President. He is advising him on personnel changes and, as one colleague put it, "on a few other things," a phrase Washington takes to mean the post-Watergate cleanup. Laird has an out-of-the-way government office, halfway between the White House and Capitol Hill.

## THE MAKING OF A DILEMMA

One innocent victim of the Watergate scandals: author Theodore H. White, whose fourth "Making of the President" book is due to go to press right now—just as indictments are being issued and investigations proliferate. He is locked in by contracts with his publisher, Atheneum, as well as Time-Life Films and the Literary Guild, which has selected his book for September distribution. Should White put aside two years of work to try to stay *au courant* with the breaking Watergate story? After wrestling with the problem, White concludes: "The countdown is over, blast-off has taken place and I'm in orbit. I have enough fresh background to explain how Watergate happened—but I'll be waiting for the trials like everybody else."

## THE WATERGATE BOOK CLUB

The tide of Watergate books will soon be at the flood. The Washington Post's prize-winning team of Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein has a \$55,000 advance for a book due in November. Frank Mankiewicz, George McGovern's campaign director, will publish another the same month. Watergate operatives James McCord and E. Howard Hunt are reported hard at work on first-person accounts. Clark Mollenhoff, Washington bureau chief of The Des Moines Register (and a onetime Nixon aide), has a manuscript in the works, and a writing team from The Sunday Times of London is mulling one. "Our Gang," novelist Philip Roth's savage satire on the Nixon Administration, will be reissued in a "Watergate Edition." And a paperback on the scandal is being prepared with the dramatic title "The Impeachment of Richard Nixon."

## OLD STORIES NEVER DIE

The dizzy succession of new faces in the front offices of the Nixon Administration has revived one of Washington's hoariest gags. With all the comings and goings at the Pentagon, Justice De-

partment, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI and other bureaus, the recurring line heard in the corridors is, "If the boss calls, be sure to get his name."

## AN OLD PRO'S VIEW

The full dimensions of the Watergate scandal did not emerge until after his death in January, but the late President Lyndon Johnson had seen enough to form an opinion. In his view, he told friends in Texas, "Nixon has made a terrible mistake surrounding himself with amateurs."

## PERON'S HOMECOMING

The No. 1 guessing game in Buenos Aires is what exiled dictator Juan Perón will do after his protégé, Héctor Cámpora, is installed as President next week. First bet was that Perón would visit Argentina briefly, then return to his base in Madrid. The word now is that he will settle in Buenos Aires and take a large hand in Cámpora's administration. A search is on for a house to handle Perón and a full staff.

## ENERGY AND THE ECOLOGISTS

A new voice has been raised in the energy vs. environment debate—and it is sounding a note that clashes with the theme adopted by the Administration. The White House has echoed industry arguments that much of the energy plight should be blamed on overeager environmentalists. Now Russell Train, head of the President's own Council on Environmental Quality, is contradicting this line. Of the 75 major nuclear-power plants now behind schedule, Train says, only nine have been held up by environmental debate. He also challenges the oil-industry view that desperately needed refineries have been blocked by clean-air-and-water advocates. Until the latter half of 1972, Train says, existing refineries never got above 75% of capacity.

## THE SHRINKING STOCK MARKET

Watchdogs at the Securities and Exchange Commission are concerned over the latest Wall Street phenomenon—companies using new profits and cash to buy back their own publicly held stock. In recent months, such "buy-ins" have accounted for 5% to 10% of all public trading on the New York Stock Exchange. With mutual funds and other institutions doing 60% to 70% of exchange business, the SEC fears that the supply of stock available to small investors is getting too tight for a genuinely open market.