

# Excerpts From Hunt's Testimony on

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, May 7—  
Following are excerpts from  
a transcript of additional  
grand jury testimony by  
E. Howard Hunt Jr. and from  
an affidavit by Egil Krogh Jr.  
as released at the Pentagon  
papers trial here today:

## Hunt Testimony

Q. All right. Now, did you  
ever engage in any other  
clandestine operations? A.  
Not of that type, no sir.

Q. What type did you en-  
gage in? A. The only other  
one that comes to mind has  
to do with the widely publi-  
cized fraudulent Vietnamese  
cable.

Q. Tell us about that. A.  
Which to my knowledge is  
not an illegal activity.

Q. What did you do?

A. During the course of  
the researches, which are  
performed with the help of  
the Department of State, go-  
ing over many hundreds of  
cables, comparing them with  
what actually appeared in  
the Ellsberg so-called Penta-  
gon papers it became clear  
to me, from the State Depart-  
ment files, that a number of  
cables were missing. And  
that is to say that the chron-  
ological files did not contain  
cables in chronological se-  
quence. Some of these micro-  
file—well, there weren't no  
micro-file, but they were  
greatly reduced in size ap-  
proximately 3 by 4 inches  
from an 8—about half-size  
reduced.

## Chronology Found Lacking

But these small versions  
had been extracted so that  
there was not a complete  
chronology of the period of  
the Vietnam war immedi-  
ately prior to and subsequent  
to the assassination of then  
Premier Diem.

## Inquiries at Pentagon

This encouraged me to  
have inquiries made at the  
Central Intelligence Agency  
as to whether or not their  
chronological files for 1963  
were still intact. I wanted to  
obtain legal access to their  
files to see whether or not  
any of these chinks in the  
assassination story could be  
filled in through reference to  
C.I.A. traffic.

I was told that the com-  
munications office of the  
Central Intelligence Agency  
did not maintain their chron-  
ological files for that period  
of time. I think that more  
than five years had elapsed  
and they had been destroyed  
not stored at the Department  
of State.

I also had occasion to in-  
quire—or I had inquiries  
made—of the Pentagon as to  
whether the so-called back  
channel had been utilized for  
any of its missing traffic and  
was told that no copies had  
been kept at the Pentagon of  
this type of traffic that  
might have taken place be-  
tween, let's say, the com-  
manding general in Saigon  
and the chief of staff in  
Washington.

I also, with some difficulty,  
managed to obtain the State  
Department's file. It was a  
State Department back chan-  
nel. It was Secretary of State  
to the Ambassador, back and  
forth, and I went through  
that, satisfied myself that  
there was nothing of sub-  
stance in there but, at the  
same time, I had concluded  
that a lot of significant traf-  
fic was missing.

And there came a time  
when I mentioned this to Mr.  
Colson, who I had been di-  
recting my research into the  
—at the particular period—  
the Vietnamese war, and told  
him that, in my opinion, a lot  
of stuff that should have  
been there had been ex-  
tracted.

He said, "How do you ac-  
count for that?" And I said,  
"Well, some of the cables  
that they still have on hand  
at the Department of State  
have been sent, with date  
stamps, saying photographed  
or duplicated for the John F.  
Kennedy Memorial Library."

## Removal Termed Possible

So I said, "Well, obviously,  
anybody who had been given  
access to the Department of  
State files for the purposes  
of incorporating them into  
material held by the J.F.K.  
Library would also have had  
opportunity to remove any  
cables that could have been  
embarrassing to the Kennedy  
legatees."

And he said, "Well, what  
kind of material have you  
dug up on the files that  
would indicate Kennedy com-  
plicity?"

And I showed him three or  
four cables that indicated  
that they had pretty close  
to pull the trigger against  
Premier Diem's head, but it  
didn't say so in so many  
words. Inferentially, one could  
say that it was a high degree  
of Administration complicity  
in the actual assassination of  
Diem and his brother.

And he said, "Well, this  
isn't good enough. Do you  
think you could improve on  
them?"

I said, "Yes, I probably  
could but not without tech-  
nical assistance." After all, I

had been given some training  
in my past C.I.A. career to  
do just this sort of thing and  
had done it successfully on  
numerous occasions, floating  
forged newspaper accounts,  
telegrams, that sort of thing.

So he said, "Well, we won't  
be able to give you any tech-  
nical help. This is too hot.  
See what you can do on your  
own."

So, with the very meager  
means at my disposal, which  
were literally a Xerox ma-  
chine in the White House,  
a razor blade and a type-  
writer—which was not the  
same one as had been used  
on the original cables—I set  
about creating two cables  
which bore on that particular  
period.

The process was relatively  
simple. I first of all prepared  
a cable text. In other words,  
from many of these cables I  
could pretty well adjust the  
text to the type of language  
that would be used by the  
man who was the ostensible  
originator, and altered these,  
from time to time, until I  
was satisfied that I had two  
credible cables.

## Signature Problem

Then the problem came of  
getting the bottom line, which  
had the signatures of the  
reviewing officers and the  
originating and the heading,  
which had also the time date  
stamp on it, which was a  
crucial thing.

And simply by Xeroxing  
and re-Xeroxing, I substituted  
a text for what previously  
had been a legitimate cable  
and could use those.

I was not satisfied with the  
result. I showed them to Col-  
son. He seemed to like them  
and I said, "These will never  
stand any kind of scrutiny."  
I said, "Let's be very sure  
about that."

And I asked the F.B.I. to  
tell me what kind of type  
face has been used on the  
original State Department  
cables and actually a White  
House cable, because one of  
them was ostensibly a White  
House cable, and I found out  
that it would be impossible  
for me to get access to a  
similar type page.

So I knew this was a tech-  
nical problem that could not  
be overcome. So if anybody  
was going to see these  
cables, they'd simply have to  
see them. They could never be  
published.

So there would just have  
to be a fast brush show on  
a take-it-or-leave-it basis,  
which I began to believe was  
the purpose Mr. Colson had  
in mind.

\*4. That on or about July 15,

1971, affiant was given oral  
instructions by Mr. John D.  
Ehrlichman, assistant to the  
President of the United States  
for domestic affairs, to begin  
a special National Security  
project to coordinate a Gov-  
ernment effort to determine  
the causes, sources, and rami-  
fications of the unauthorized  
disclosure of classified docu-  
ments known as the Pentagon  
papers.

5. That Mr. David Young  
of the National Security  
Council staff was assigned to  
this special project with him;

6. that to his information  
and belief one reason  
for undertaking an independ-  
ent investigation centralized  
among White House staff  
was that a close personal re-  
lationship existed between  
the the then director of the  
Federal Bureau of Investiga-  
tion, J. Edgar Hoover, and  
Mr. Louis Marx, father-in-law  
of Daniel Ellsberg, admitted  
public source of the Pentagon  
papers.

7. That on affiant's infor-  
mation and belief the estab-  
lishment of an independent  
investigatory unit reporting  
to the White House staff was  
expressly agreed to by Direc-  
tor Hoover and this agree-  
ment manifested in a memo-  
randum from Director Hoover;

8. That to his information  
and belief Central Intelligence  
Agency investigative support  
was unobtainable for this  
special National Security  
project and to the lack of  
C.I.A. jurisdiction within the  
Territorial United States;

9. That in July, 1971, the  
affiant recommended to Mr.  
John D. Ehrlichman that Mr.  
G. Gordon Liddy be em-  
ployed by the special unit as  
an investigator and staff as-

\* This is from Krogh's  
affidavit. See  
Washington Post  
8 May 73.

# Vietnam Cable and From Krogh's Affidavit

sistant, and Mr. Ehrlichman subsequently authorized the employment of Mr. Liddy;

## Hunt Remembered

10. That Mr. E. Howard Hunt was recommended to affiant for assistance on the Pentagon papers investigation, such recommendation was made to affiant over the telephone by Mr. Charles C. Colson, Special Counsel to the President;

11. That Mr. Colson's recommendation of Mr. Hunt was based on Mr. Hunt's investigative experience as an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency;

12. That Mr. Hunt was at that time employed as a part-time White House consultant by Mr. Colson on matters no known to me;

13. That information obtained by the special unit made it imperative to ascertain whether the unauthorized disclosure of the Pentagon papers was (a) an individual act, (b) the act of a small group, or (c) the result of a wider conspiracy to engage in espionage;

14. That during the early stages of the investigation, affiant received information suggesting that Dr. Ellsberg did not act alone;

15. That the affiant was informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the so-called Pentagon papers were in the possession of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., prior to their publication by The New York Times newspaper suggesting an effort to aid and abet an enemy of the United States through the ally;

16. That shortly thereafter additional public disclosure

of classified information related to national security took place, to wit:

A. Publication of a news story on the Strategic Arms Limitation talks with the Soviet Union, and

B. Publication of a news story on Aug. 12, 1971, regarding a Soviet move to avert a war by entering into a pact with India;

17. That following the publication of the above mentioned SALT story, the affiant was personally instructed by President Nixon, in the presence of John D. Ehrlichman, that the continuing "leaks" of vital information were compromising the national security of the United States, and the President instructed the affiant to move ahead with the greatest urgency to determine the source of "leaks;"

18. That the affiant was informed by the C.I.A. that a news story had put in jeopardy the life of an intelligence agent, thus emphasizing the need for increased investigative effort on the part of the affiant's special unit;

19. That in addition the affiant was informed repeatedly during the months of July and August of 1971 of the extreme threat perceived to be developing by high Government officials, because of the possibility of further unauthorized disclosure as to the capacity of the United States Government to conduct its foreign affairs and protect its national security;

20. That efforts to discover the sources had not succeeded;

21. That affiant's special

unit received information from an interview conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with one Dr. Fielding, former psychiatrist to Daniel Ellsberg, which yielded no information;

22. That additionally a psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg, prepared by the C.I.A. provided no useful information to the affiant's special unit;

26. That general authorization to engage in covert activity to obtain a psychological history or ascertain associates of Dr. Fielding was thereafter given to the special unit by John D. Ehrlichman;

27. That plans for acquiring the information from the office of Dr. Fielding were developed by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy;

28. That to affiant's information and belief a first trip to California was undertaken by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to determine means for acquiring the information.

29. That films of the premises of Dr. Fielding's office were brought back by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy following the first trip.

30. That the affiant's understanding and belief certain of these films were left in a camera belonging to the Central Intelligence Agency and transmitted to the Department of Justice by the Central Intelligence Agency.

31. That a second trip was undertaken to acquire the information in early September 1971.

32. That in affiant's supervisory capacity, affiant agreed to the mission with the understanding that Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy would

obtain the service of certain mission.

34. That recent newspaper reports suggesting that an individual had accepted responsibility for the entry into two offices on the premises where Dr. Fielding has his office was a completely unknown incident to affiant;

## Funds for Undertaking

35. That to affiant's understanding and belief the funds for implementing the effort to acquire the information were provided to affiant through an unknown intermediary after a request by affiant to Mr. Charles Colson for the funds;

36. That to affiant's knowledge affiant did not inform Mr. Colson as to the reason for the request for funds;

37. That to affiant's understanding and belief the funds totaled \$2,000.00 which were to be used for expenses;

40. That to affiant's understanding and belief no information of any kind was transmitted to any Government agency for use in the prosecution of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg derived from either trip to California as none was obtained.

41. That upon return from the second trip to California, failure of the objective to acquire information was reported by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to affiant and photos of destructive activity within an office were displayed to explain the events which had reportedly transpired.

42. That photographs of Dr. Fielding's apartment were presented by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy with a recommendation that another attempt be made to acquire the desired information.