

New Watergate Developments

Effect on Diplomacy

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By Anthony Astrachan

Washington Post Foreign Service

NEW YORK, April 23—Henry A.

Kissinger, acknowledging that the Watergate affair could affect the nation's foreign relations, said today that Americans must ask themselves whether "we can afford an orgy of recriminations."

He called for compassion for some of those involved in the mushrooming scandal.

In foreign relations, Kissinger said, "a great deal will depend on how foreign countries will assess the degree of authority in this country and the degree of dedication of the public to the objectives of its foreign policy."

Answering questions at the Associat-

ed Press luncheon of the annual meeting of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Mr. Nixon's chief foreign policy advisor commented:

"I have no question that the President will insist on the full disclosure of the facts, and that when that is accomplished and the human tragedies are completed, the country will go on.

"Then we have to ask ourselves whether we can afford an orgy of recriminations or whether we should not keep in mind that the United States will be there longer than any particular crisis—whether all of us do not have an obligation to remember that faith in the country must be maintained and its promise should be eternal."

See KISSINGER, A9, Col. 3



Associated Press

Kissinger: "One should ask for compassion for these people."

KISSINGER, From AI

"It is difficult to avoid a sense of the awfulness of events at the tragedy that has befallen certain people," Kissinger said earlier. "Without prejudging anyone's guilt, one should ask for compassion for those people."

Asked about his own future, Kissinger said, "This moment is not the time for senior officials to talk about their resignations until the framework of the future becomes clearer, and the President's conceptions of what one's duties are."

On Indochina, Kissinger told questioners that the cease-fire agreement had been "systematically, not to say cynically, violated by the other side" but offered no specifics about the U.S. response to that violation.

In a prepared speech, Kissinger said that President Nixon would adopt a broad approach to reshaping U.S. policy on Europe because "the political, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other."

Kissinger called North Vietnamese violations of the cease-fire agreement "total" as well as "systematic" and "cynical." He said there were "no real charges that we have not live up to the letter and spirit of everything we negotiated." South Hanoi in fact issued a detailed list of allegations 10 days ago and the United States has sent a reply to the states that attended the Paris peace talks. The reply has not yet been made public.

Kissinger insisted, "No one can think we are looking for a pretext to remain involved in Southeast Asia." But twice he asked rhetorically what the United States should do "if we can neither threaten nor offer incentives." He did not offer an answer.

On the continuing bombing of Cambodia, Kissinger said, "We are not asking that every tactical move receive everybody's endorsement." But he reiterated the American wish that the agreements be observed, which he said would have the desired effect of "removing Southeast Asia from national debate."

Kissinger said that the United States was not prescribing any particular government for Cambodia and that all forces in Cambodia should participate in a settle-

ment there as they were supposed to do in Laos and in Cambodia. This came in response to a question about Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the ousted ruler of Cambodia, and suggested that the United States was prepared to allow Sihanouk to play a role in Cambodia's future.

Kissinger described the Vietnam cease-fire agreements as the result of a "painful process of negotiation after 10 years of civil war." Such an authoritative reference to the Vietnam civil war is unusual, although not unprecedented.

On Europe, Kissinger said in effect that the Europeans could not simultaneously ask the United States to accept their independence and their criticisms of America and ask for a veto of America's "independent policies."

He cited Europe's tendency to become a closed trading system, excluding the United States and other nations, and said that comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe and Japan "must engage the top political leaders, for they require above all a commitment of political will. If they are left solely to the experts, the inevitable competitiveness of economic interests will dominate the debate. . . . There will be no framework for the generous solutions or mutual concessions essential to preserve a vital Atlantic partnership."

Kissinger took what amounted to a hard line on Atlantic defense, saying that the United States would maintain its forces in Europe and not withdraw unilaterally. "In turn," he added, "we expect from each ally a fair share of the common effort for the common defense." This contrasted with the usual State Department claims that the European allies already contribute a fair share.

On diplomacy, Kissinger acknowledged European fears that superpower agreements might be made at the expense of allies and spoke of the need "to articulate a clear set of common objectives together with our allies" which would make it a "technical question whether a particular measure is pursued in a particular forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or multilaterally."

He cited the need for a cooperative rather than a competitive approach on problems such as the energy crisis, and underlined the need in all fields for Japan to be a "principal partner in our common enterprise."