


Why Not a Detente



IN AN ERA of budding detente the clandestine operations of the KGB and CIA are an anachronism. Even so, both sides will continue to engage in secret political warfare and espionage as long as the other side conducts such operations. But the decline of the Cold War and technological advances in information-gathering clearly challenge the validity of these operations. The time has come to add this subject to the agenda of U.S.-Soviet negotiations toward the goal of phasing out the clandestine functions of both the KGB and CIA.

For years Washington and Moscow have used the clandestine operations of the other side as a sort of litmus paper to measure true intentions. A U.S. President or a Soviet Communist Party secretary might talk of peace, but the knowledge of on-going clandestine operations is always hard evidence of the other side's continuing aggressive intentions. Thus, the activities of the KGB and the CIA reinforce the continuity of each other. If the Soviets are going to conduct secret political action and espionage, then we should, too.

Yet, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev says time and again that "the process of detente is irreversible." Detente means a relaxation of tensions for the purpose of reducing the possibility of war. But the clandestine operations of the CIA and KGB manifestly increase tensions. They are a form of warfare.

KGB Blunders

IF THESE CLANDESTINE programs were achieving important foreign policy gains for either the U.S.S.R. or the U.S., then their continuation, though debatable, would be understandable. But that is not the case.

The KGB has had very few political warfare successes in recent years. The same is true of the CIA, unless the "destabilization" of the Chilean government is considered a success. The U-2 incident, the Bay of Pigs and the CIA failure in Vietnam have been highly publicized, but less is known about some of the reversals for Soviet foreign policy caused by the KGB. For example:

- In early 1969 there were a number of serious military incidents on the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviets demanded that the Chinese sit down at the negotiating table to settle the matter, but the Chinese refused. In August Boris Davidov, a senior KGB officer in the Washington embassy, had lunch with an American specialist in Sino-Soviet affairs. Soon there was a story in the American press indicating that the Soviets were considering a pre-emptive nuclear strike against China. In September a story appeared in the London Evening News signed by Victor Louis, undoubtedly the most publicized of all KGB operatives, which speculated about a Soviet strike to eliminate Chinese nuclear bases. These stories were followed by a flurry of news items, datelined from Hong Kong to Helsinki, about Soviet aggressive intentions against China.

In December, 1969, under a headline saying "Chinese Communists Appear to Expect a Russian Attack," Joseph Alsop reported that long-stalled talks dealing with border incidents were proceeding between the Soviets and Chinese. "It is perfectly clear," he wrote, "that the Chinese only consented to talk at all because of Soviet threats . . . The language of the Chinese announcement of the talks quite openly implied that there had been

Soviet threats of an extremely crude and brutal kind."

So the KGB operation succeeded in pressuring the Chinese to resume the talks, but it also alarmed the Chinese leaders so much that they signaled interest in secret negotiations with the U.S. Soon there was ping-pong diplomacy, and not long thereafter Henry Kissinger was on the way to the breakthrough which led to President Nixon's visit to China, the beginning of more friendly U.S.-Chinese relations and membership for China in the United Nations. Surely, no development in

recent history has been a greater setback for Soviet foreign policy.

- In 1955 and '56 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles turned down the appeals of Egyptian President Abdel Nasser for U.S. arms aid and help in building the Aswan dam. So the Soviets filled the vacuum and their relations with the Egyptians became very close.

However, things began to change when Nasser died in 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. Sadat was neither pro-Soviet nor anti-Western, but he was very much of an Egyptian nationalist. He showed such independence that the Soviets began to worry whether they would have sufficient political influence to protect their vast investment in Egypt. By the spring

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in Dirty Tricks?



By John Twohey—The Washington Post

of 1971 the Soviets were so alarmed that they instructed the KGB to arrange a coup to eliminate Sadat from power.

But Sadat, in response to a warning, moved swiftly to arrest more than 90 plotters. He was astounded to discover that his trusted chief of intelligence, Sami Sharaf, was a KGB agent. The KGB had begun cultivating Sharaf in 1955, and by 1959 he had emerged as the de facto chief of Egyptian intelligence. By 1967 he had become Nasser's closest adviser. Sharaf was the key KGB agent in the plot against Sadat.

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After the failure of the attempted coup it looked as though Soviet Middle East policy would collapse. The Soviets were so desperate that they presented Sadat with a 15-year Treaty of Friendship, pledging to stay out of the internal affairs of Egypt and agreeing to provide vast quantities of weapons. Later, even after Sadat had expelled 10,000 Russian technicians, the Soviets continued to send planes, tanks and ground-to-air missiles.

Sadat accepted anything he could get until he had achieved his purpose in the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel. However, he has not forgotten how close the KGB came to ending his career. This explains, in part, the restoration of U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic relations and Sadat's extraordinarily friendly talks with Kissinger and now Mr. Ford.

- In the years after World War II the Soviets' greatest concern was that German rearmament might lead to a Bonn attempt to take over East

Germany and Berlin—and to war. But then Willy Brandt emerged as Chancellor of the Federal Republic with his *Ostpolitik*. The most important step in the policy, designed to promote relaxation of tensions with the Soviet bloc, was Bonn's recognition of Pankow as a separate, independent nation, marking the abandonment once and for all of the concept of a reunited Germany. General Secretary Brezhnev vigorously supported all elements of the *Ostpolitik*, but especially Bonn's recognition of East Germany.

Under the circumstances Brandt's sudden decision to resign must have come as a stunning blow to the Kremlin. And yet Brandt resigned because of the discovery that one of his highest ranking assistants, Gunter Guillaume, was a spy. What happened is now amply on the record:

In 1956 the East German intelligence service, which for years had been directed by the KGB, sent Guillaume to West Germany. Posing as an escapee from communism, he did remarkably well—for himself and for his bosses. In 17 years he progressed from running a wurst and flower stand to the position of personal assistant to the federal chancellor. Despite the obvious threat to crucial Soviet foreign policy objectives, the KGB took the incredible risk of leaving Guillaume in place. It is not difficult to imagine what would have happened had Brandt's successor rejected his *Ostpolitik*.

Electronic Intelligence

THE EGYPTIAN AND German stories illustrate the fact of intelligence life that spy operations can be conducted with remarkable success over a long period of time—and yet end up having disastrous or potentially disastrous results for policy. It is clear that, in an era when negotiation is supposed to be replacing Cold War confrontation, the clandestine operations of the KGB and CIA are archaic. They are hostile, provocative acts running counter to the professed objectives of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

Of course, good intelligence will continue to be important for both sides. But intelligence data does not have to be obtained through espionage.

Strategic intelligence of utmost importance can now be obtained through technological, rather than human, means. We are able to observe Soviet medium, intermediate and intercontinental range ballistic missile tests through the use of radar and electronic interception of telemetry signals. We know what they have tested and what they have not tested.

Through seismic and acoustic receivers we know the size and location

of all their nuclear tests. Through the precision cameras of space reconnaissance we know the size and location of their missile silos.

For years we have known how big, and approximately how accurate, their missiles are—and how many they have. We are able, via sonar and other sophisticated devices and techniques, to track their missile-firing submarines.

The miracles of high-flying cameras which can photograph the entire U.S.S.R. in a few days, combined with the information obtained from electronic interception, radar and computers, provide us with much more accurate intelligence than we had available when espionage was rampant at the height of the Cold War. In fact, in an era of strategic parity or essential equivalence it is imperative that both sides have excellent information about the capabilities of the other. That is the only way the balance of deterrence can work.

In the interim, SALT agreement signed in Moscow in 1972, both sides acknowledged the importance of space reconnaissance as an essential means of verifying that the terms of the agreement are fulfilled. If the Soviets had not developed accurate space reconnaissance of their own, it would have been in our interest to make such facilities available to them. If both sides intend to limit strategic arms, it will be essential that information about the systems of each be open, not secret.

There remain, for example, problems about verifying the limit on the number of missiles upgraded into MIRV's by being fitted with multiple warheads. The high-flying cameras can locate the missile silos, but if the silo is covered, the cameras cannot determine whether the missile within it has multiple warheads. One solution is simply to assume that all categories of missiles successfully tested with multiple warheads will be so equipped when placed in the silo.

Since the days of the McCarthy era and the national hysteria over communist penetration and spies there has remained in this country an exaggerated sense of the threat of the KGB. Even if the FBI were not doing its job, there are very few vital secrets for the KGB in the United States. We want the Soviets to have a very thorough understanding of our strategic strength. That is the point of deterrence.

Code machines and computers have made our codes and cryptographic systems virtually impenetrable. Our war plans are supposed to be secret, but a careful reading of the annual Defense Department posture statement, the congressional hearings and the technological journals gives any trained observer most of the essential data. There are diplomatic secrets, but those secrets are very short-lived, usually valid only during the period of negotiation.

Secrecy Hurts

ACTUALLY, SECRECY is often an impediment to national security in a democracy. In 1970 the Pentagon asked its Defense Science Board to establish a task force to study the effects of the secrecy system. The board concluded that as much as 90 per cent of classified scientific and technical defense information should not be so designated. The board members estimated that most secret information would become known within a year. They noted that excessive secrecy tended to stifle inventiveness and useful research in weapons systems.

One member said, "If present trends continue for another decade our national effort in weapons research will become little better than mediocre." Another member concluded that "while secrecy is an effective instrument in a closed society, it is much less effective in an open society in the long run; instead, the open society

should recognize that openness is one of its strongest weapons."

The U. S. moon program was open; the Soviets' was secret. It was the U.S. which landed on the moon.

As in the past, most essential information will continue to come from open sources. The technological means for information-gathering will provide most of the additional required material. Of course, there will also be a continuing quest for information by diplomatic establishments. Just as newspaper reporters have confidential sources, so diplomats will have confidential sources. Whether the diplomat is called a KGB or CIA officer or a foreign service officer makes little difference. If he is part of the diplomatic establishment he has the same privileges and the same risks of being made persona non grata.

But there is a great difference between diplomatic information gathering and the recruitment of agents within the opposing government. The latter is a much more provocative and hostile action. When discovered, such acts sharply increase tensions. In a time when both sides are advocating detente, the risks of developing a Penkovsky or a Philby outweigh the benefits.

Now it will be said that the Soviets—because they have a closed society, a police state and an ideology which advocates conspiracy—will never give up their clandestine operations. Perhaps so, but if we intend to move ahead with a growing detente, now is the time to find out.

It must be anticipated that there will be vigorous opposition in the Kremlin, both bureaucratic and doctrinal. Nevertheless, Brezhnev and his fellow politburo members have demonstrated that their advocacy of detente may be over-riding. In the struggle for power in the Kremlin the politburo has ousted Shelest and Shelepin, both anti-detente hawks. It is worth noting that Shelepin was a former chief of the KGB. Brezhnev and the others know that the KGB has made serious blunders and has sometimes set back Soviet foreign policy.

Phasing Out Spying

THERE IS A LONG history of negotiations between the U.S. and Soviets in the field of clandestine operations, but never an attempt to negotiate a broad reduction. There have been many spy exchanges, some of them highly publicized, such as the swap of Col. Rudolf Abel for U-2 pilot Gary Powers. There have been deals about provocative "black" radio broadcasts, and Soviet jamming has been reduced as inflammatory political commentary has been phased out.

Political warfare and espionage, like strategic missiles, form a subject for negotiation. One technique that has worked before is to announce that we are unilaterally phasing out certain operations and will be carefully watching to see whether the Soviets follow suit. This was the technique used by President Kennedy which led to the partial nuclear test-ban agreement.

As the phase-out proceeded, both sides would verify the implementation of the arrangements through the techniques of counter-espionage. The FBI would have responsibility within the U.S., while CIA counter-espionage and liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services would bear responsibility abroad. The KGB counter-espionage system would obviously monitor whether the U.S. was carrying out its side of the bargain.

Once the dialogue begins, all sorts of possibilities will come into view. There will, as noted, be strong resistance by the hawks on both sides. If the Soviets are unwilling to go along, it is important that we should know that, especially in these days of review of the role of the CIA. But if we have sufficient self-confidence combined with the common sense to maintain our guard while showing flexibility, there is now a prospect for persuading the Soviets to join us in ending the clandestine war.

