

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 8, 1964.

Books on C.I.A. and Bay of Pigs Disturb Officials

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Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 7—

Two books, one not yet published, have caused considerable alarm in Government ranks, especially among members of the intelligence community, because of their disclosure of United States secrets.

In addition, intelligence leaders are pained by material in the books that alleges they are not responsible to higher authority. Besides questioning the effectiveness of intelligence officials, some passages in the books impugn the loyalty of these officials, Government sources point out.

For example, in "The Bay of Pigs," by Haynes Johnson, published last month by Norton, it is reported that Cuban rebels were advised of plans to disregard President Kennedy should he have decided at the last minute to cancel the scheduled invasion of 1961.

Issue of Reporting

In "The Invisible Government," by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, to be published by Random House on June 22, it is alleged that clandestine intelligence activities are carried out without adequate reporting to Congress or the White House.

The Wise-Ross book particularly, according to intelligence sources, publishes for the first time the names of various agents and the "cover" designation of certain clandestine operations.

The complaints by Government officials are unusual in that, while they charge many inaccuracies, they also concede many accurate disclosures. In the past, books about intelligence operations have elicited only blanket condemnations as inaccurate.

The Johnson book on the United States - supported exile invasion of Cuba tells of conversations between a United States military officer and Cuban exile leaders at the end of March, 1961. The invasion took place the following April 17 and was quickly crushed.

The officer, who was on temporary duty with the Central Intelligence Agency, discussed the invasion plans with the leaders of Brigade 2506—Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Roman, Erneido Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.

According to the author's interviews with the Cubans, they were told by the military officer that certain superiors in the Administration were opposing the Bay of Pigs invasion plan. The officer was said to have advised the Cubans that any last-minute disapproval was to be ignored.

Thus, the officer reportedly explained, if word came that the invasion plan was canceled or put off, the Cuban leaders were to "make some kind of show" as if they were putting the C.I.A. advisers in custody,



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Allen W. Dulles, who was head of the C.I.A. during the Bay of Pigs invasion.

and go on with the plan. The C.I.A. aides, although imprisoned, would give them the plans.

Government sources concede that the Cuban exile leaders did believe they had received such advice from the C.I.A. contact. But these sources report that the officer in question denies absolutely that he ever said United States authorities were to be ignored.

Explanation Reported

According to the reported explanation by the officer, he told the Cuban leaders that they were to proceed with the Bay of Pigs invasion even if members of the Cubans' Revolutionary Council were to renege at the last minute.

The Revolutionary Council was the top political unit of the Cuban exiles.

Government sources feel that the officer who spoke to them is telling the truth. The only plausible explanation, it is said, is that the Cubans' imperfect mastery of the English language led to the confusion.

Although the officer, who is no longer with the Central Intelligence Agency, has flatly denied the Cubans' version, he has been unwilling to do so publicly.

The officer, who has resumed his regular military career, has said that he does not want to call any more attention to the contribution made by his military service to a clandestine operation. He is said to be concerned also that there might be some retribution against his family. According to unconfirmed reports, the officer is a career Army man.

Qualified sources say there is no record that the leading officials of the Central Intelligence Agency ever issued instructions to disregard any last-minute

decision to hold off the invasion.

Allen W. Dulles, who was then director of Central Intelligence, is said to be furious over the allegation that such instructions were conveyed to the Cuban brigade leaders.

Qualified sources point out that the Navy had ships in the vicinity of the invasion fleet. Any indication that President Kennedy's orders were being ignored, they say, would certainly have brought orders to the Navy to intervene against the exiles.

Certainly there is nothing to suggest that the Navy would have failed to carry out orders of the President, Government sources report.

The Johnson book is nevertheless regarded by informed officials as a good, detailed account of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Some high Government officials reportedly cooperated with Mr. Johnson to an unusual extent.

According to one report, many of the book's criticisms of the C.I.A. reflect the critical attitude toward the agency that has been ascribed to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who played an important role in the invasion and in the subsequent investigation of it headed by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.

According to officials, "The Invisible Government" contains many disclosures of important intelligence operations, notably the name of agents.

In answer to the standard argument that if a newspaperman can obtain such information a Soviet agent certainly can, intelligence sources say that the precautions taken against Soviet espionage do not apply to authorized United States newspapermen who receive special opportunities for interviews.

Moreover, it is said, even where United States agents abroad are known to the local community, much is lost when their identity becomes publicized. Some foreign governments, for example, recognize that certain officials are intel-

ligence agents but are impelled to demand their withdrawal when this becomes a matter of public record.

The United States knows the identities of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Soviet agents throughout the world, it is said. But there is a difference, experts add, between knowing their identities and relating them to specific operations.

It is very important and not always possible for intelligence analysts to link certain opposing agents with specific operations, these experts point out.

Damage Feared

Thus, officials assert, the Wise-Ross book's identification of certain persons with specific incidents is believed to have done considerable damage to the United States' clandestine operations.

Government sources deny emphatically the book's contention that intelligence operations are conducted without properly informing the executive and legislative branches.

It is said in the book that Lyndon B. Johnson was not given a briefing by the Special Group until he became President. According to qualified sources, the briefings were available to Mr. Johnson even when he was Vice President.

At present the Special Group consists of John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense; U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

The Special Group is the executive department's control unit over the activities of the C.I.A. and other intelligence units. No clandestine plan or operation is ever undertaken, either as a policy or a project, without the group's approval, it is said.

As for informing Congress, intelligence officers stress that key members are told of all intelligence operations in the greatest detail.