

# Ellsberg Witness Asserts Military Falsified Reports

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LOS ANGELES, March 6—A Central Intelligence Agency analyst testified today at the Pentagon papers trial that he had attended conferences, in Saigon and Hawaii and at the agency, in which the military purposely diminished estimates of enemy strength in Vietnam.

The witness, Samuel A. Adams, said that there were "political pressures in the military to display the enemy as weaker than he actually was."

He did not say why, but the defense contends that this was done to make it appear that the Army was winning the war.

Mr. Adams said that the monthly estimates of the enemy's military strength, called the order of battle, were prepared for the press and for the White House and that they

each month, one by the Army, the other by the agency.

The Adams testimony pertains to a 1968 Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, eight pages of which are among the 20 "top secret-sensitive" document in this case.

A Government witness, Lieut. Gen. William G. Depuy, assistant to the vice chief of staff of the Army, has testified that disclosure of those eight pages damaged the national defense, was of advantage to a foreign nation and could have helped Hanoi during the Vietnam war.

An example of the information that could have helped Hanoi, General Depuy said, was the American estimates of the enemy order of battle.

Mr. Adams said that he believed the memorandum, writ-

were so inaccurate that after the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968, two official sets of estimates had to be put together

written after the early Tet offensive in 1968, "would be virtually

Continued

useless" to a foreign nation.

The memorandum gave the enemy order of battle at 240,000 troops, which Mr. Adams said "was not the best estimate of how many foemen there were."

He told the jury that an order of battle was "our estimate of how many baddies there are against us."

#### Harvard Graduate

Mr. Adams, 38 years old, is a direct descendant of his colonial namesake. He is a Harvard graduate who attended Harvard Law School for two years and who served as a Navy officer for "three years, four months, eleven days" before joining the C.I.A. in March, 1963.

He is a tall, slightly pudgy man, and he was wearing a blue suit and a red tie when he testified. The tails of his white shirt hung out as he told the jury, "I'm a researcher and not a spy, which is why I can come up here and talk."

He said that between October, 1965, and April, 1972, he worked almost exclusively in the agency doing research on the Vietcong, both at the agency offices in Langely, Va., and in Vietnam, "trying to dope out what made those guys tick, keep going in face of what we could throw at them."

At one point, Mr. Adams used a green marking pen to show upon a large pad on an easel how the military subtracted various "components" of the enemy — the guerrilla forces, for instance — "purposely" to lower the order of battle estimates.

#### "Pentagon East"

He said that at the various conferences held at the agency and in Hawaii and Saigon, which he called "the Pentagon East," the "intelligence community" debated with the military the accuracy of the order of battle estimates.

At one such conference, he said, the Army's top public relations general was present, which "was unusual." Also attending, Mr. Adams said, were representatives of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then commanding officer of the Army in Vietnam, and of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department.

Mr. Adams was questioned by Charles R. Nesson, a Harvard law professor who is one of the defense attorneys. The analyst said that in view of the damage the enemy inflicted during the 1968 Tet offensive,

the Army's official order of battle estimates were "inherently unbelievable" and that "it is my belief the 240,000 figure was purposely low."

#### Studies by Adams

He said that he based that belief on his own studies, based on information from captured enemy documents, among other things, and "from statements by General Westmoreland, where he said at a news conference [in November, 1967] that the enemy is running out of men, more specifically out of guerrillas."

The order of battle referred to in the 1968 joint Chiefs of one quoted by General Deputy said:

"The enemy has been hurt badly in the populated lowlands, is practically intact elsewhere. He committed over 67,000 combat maneuver forces plus perhaps 25 per cent, or 17,000, more impressed men and boys, for a total of about 84,000. He lost 40,000 killed, at least 3,000 captured, and perhaps 5,000 disabled or died of wounds. He had peaked his force total to about 240,000 just before Tet, by hard recruiting, infiltration, civilian impressment, and downwards on service and guerrilla personnel."

#### 400,000, Not 240,000

Mr. Adams said that the correct order of battle would have shown at least 400,000 enemy troops, not 240,000.

The analyst said that he had read about General Deputy's testimony in The New York Times and that he had recalled writing reports showing that the general's figures were wrong.

Earlier in the trial, after a battle between the defense and the Government, Federal District Court Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. ruled that the Adams reports must be turned over to the defense because they were exculpatory material.

That is, they were evidence in the possession of the prosecution that would tend to prove the innocence of the defendants, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., who are accused of six counts of espionage, six counts of theft and one count of conspiracy. The judge refused to allow Mr. Nesson to question Mr. Adams on what the defense contends were the Government's attempts to suppress those reports.