


Leader of War Study



The New York Times

LACKED DETAILS: Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State in 1963, at news conference yesterday, said President Kennedy and top aides lacked details of coup against South Vietnam President.

By **TERENCE SMITH**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 23 —

A former Government official who had over-all responsibility for the preparation of the Pentagon's study on the Vietnam war said today that, in his view, none of the material published so far could endanger the national security.

But the official, Paul C. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security affairs, said that there were "certain elements" of the unpublished portions of the study that could adversely affect the national interest if "prematurely revealed."

As an example, he cited the section of the 47-volume study that concerns the secret diplomatic initiatives taken during the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

"I'd hate to see that published," Mr. Warnke said to reporters who met with him for an on-the-record breakfast interview at the National Press Club.

Study's Release Deplored

The New York Times, in its initial report on the Pentagon study published on June 13, stated that this volume was missing from the copy of the study made available to it.

Although he is an outspoken critic of the war, Mr. Warnke today deplored the unauthorized release and publication of the Pentagon study.

The release of top-secret documents, he said, could set

a "very mischievous precedent" that could have a damaging impact on dealings within the Government and with other governments.

As Assistant Defense Secretary and head of the office of Internal Security Affairs, from August, 1967, Mr. Warnke indirectly supervised the preparation of the voluminous report. It was put together over 18 months by what he described as a "pick-up team of 35 or 36" military and civilian specialists under the direct supervision of Leslie H. Gelb, who was an aide to Mr. Warnke.

The report was completed in the fall of 1968 and transmitted to Mr. Warnke, who was the senior official to "sign off" on it. This means he acknowledged completion of the work without endorsing it and forwarded it to the then Secretary of Defense, Clark M. Clifford.

A Trust 'Violated'

In deploring the publication of the study, Mr. Warnke said that the man who leaked the documents "violated not only a law, but a trust."

"If we cannot count on that trust being respected," he said, "then the conversations and debates on major issues within the Government will be severely restricted."

Mr. Warnke said that some of the news reports of the study particularly those based on only a few of the attached documents, could be misleading.

"These are a newsman's evaluation of an analyst's analysis of incomplete documents," he said. "As such, they are only as good or as bad as that man's view."

While not a complete history, Mr. Warnke said, the report, if published in full, would be a "very competent job within its limits."

"It is basically unslanted,"

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Sees No Security Threat So Fai

he said. "The different sections are uneven, some are better and more objective than others, but the writers tried to be objective."

Ex-Aid Tells of Coup

By E. W. KENWORTHY

Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs in the Kennedy Administration, said yesterday that President Kennedy and his top advisers "had no detailed knowledge of the time or place" of the coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam on Nov. 1, 1963.

However, Mr. Hilsman, who is now a professor of political science and history at Columbia University, said at a news conference that the Kennedy Administration "knew there was coup plotting" by the South Vietnamese generals against President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who controlled both the secret police and the "special forces."

'Nothing Secret'

Moreover, Professor Hilsman volunteered that "publicly our actions and statements encouraged the coup."

Explaining what he meant by this, Professor Hilsman recalled that President Kennedy, in an exclusive interview with Walter Cronkite, the Columbia Broadcasting System newscaster, on Sept. 2, 1963, had said that it might be "useful" to have both a change of policy and personnel in the South Vietnamese government.

A few days later, Mr. Hilsman continued, in an interview with the National Broadcasting Company, President Kennedy said that he favored the continuation of United States aid to those supporting the war against the Viet Cong, but not to those who were not supporting the war.

This, Mr. Hilsman said, was an allusion—obvious to the

Diem Government but perhaps not to the President's American audience—that United States intelligence sources suspected that Ngo Dinh Nhu, and possibly President Diem, were contemplating a deal with the Vietcong and their North Vietnamese supporters.

"There was nothing secret about these actions [of the President]," Mr. Hilsman said. "We knew this would encourage the generals to a coup. And this is what happened."

The preference of the Kennedy Administration, Mr. Hilsman said, was that Diem continue in office but "without Nhu."

"Nothing came of it," he said.

In response to questions Mr. Hilsman stood firmly by his contention that, aside from President Kennedy's public statements, the United States government was not implicated in the coup which resulted in the deaths of President Diem and Mr. Nhu.

Mr. Hilsman called the news conference not only to discuss the coup but also to explain two memorandums he sent to Secretary of State Dean Rusk on Aug. 30 and Sept. 16, 1963. Yesterday The Chicago Sun-Times printed the text of the first memorandum and a part of the text of the second.

'Contingency' Memorandum

The first memorandum presented a number of possible actions that President Diem and Mr. Nhu might take and what the United States response might be. These responses arranged from warning President Diem of a cutoff in aid to the actual encouragement of a coup against him. The second memorandum considered and rejected a possible "reconciliation track" and advocated a "pressures and persuasion track" in dealing with President Diem.

Today Mr. Hilsman explained

that the first was a "contingency" memorandum drawn up a few days after Mr. Nhu's special forces, despite United States warnings and protest, had attacked the Buddhist pagodas in Saigon and Hue. The second memorandum, he said expressed "my personal feeling about what we should do."

Mr. Hilsman said today that although The New York Times in his opinion, was guilty of "a technical illegality" in publishing classified material from the Pentagon study on the Vietnam war in its issues of June 13, 14 and 15, he was for publication because security was not involved in the treating of events that "are over."

Rostow on Bombing

In an interview today on the ABC Evening News, Walt Rostow, a former White House adviser to President Johnson was asked if he thought it proper for President Johnson to have depicted himself in the 1964 Presidential campaign as the "candidate of reason and restraint" in the light of recent disclosures from Pentagon documents that there was an assumption during the campaign "that it would be necessary to bomb North Vietnam."

In reply, Mr. Rostow said that it was only after the battle of Pleiku, in February of 1965, that Mr. Johnson "finally became convinced that he would have to respond and moved over to his graduated and limited attack on the North."

Mr. Rostow added that the "so-called consensus to bomb" was a decision made after discussions in September that the Government "should be prepared to retaliate . . . to any further provocations" such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident. "When the proposition was put to President Johnson to respond on November 1, he refused. When it was put to him on September 24 he refused."