

Excerpts From News Conference by Saigon Official

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, June 13—Following are excerpts from a news conference given here today by Nguyen Xuan Phong, deputy chief of the South Vietnamese delegation to the Paris negotiations on Vietnam, as recorded and translated from the French by The New York Times:

To begin with, I will read you our delegation's communiqué concerning the signing of our joint communiqué:

The joint communiqué, which we have just signed a little earlier, requires of all parties signatory to the Paris agreement the strict application of that agreement. By signing this communiqué, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam hopes that the Paris accord will at last be implemented correctly so that true peace returns to South Vietnam and so that the South Vietnamese people may exercise with the briefest delay its right to self-determination by means of general, free and democratic elections.

Ever since the opening of the conference of La Celle-St. Cloud, the delegation of the Republic of Vietnam has continuously proposed to discuss the totality of the problems facing the two South Vietnamese parties and has called for an appropriate working method in order to arrive quickly at concrete results. We hope that this time, after signature of the joint communiqué, the other party will have a more positive attitude. In that case, a satisfactory solution to the Vietnam problem could be rapidly found.

I would like to say a few more words before going over to question time.

Hope Is Voiced

As the communiqué I have just read to you shows, it is with renewed hope that we signed the document this afternoon, with the hope of at last witnessing the definitive end of hostilities and of a rapid general settlement of the problems facing the

South Vietnamese parties. According to the document before you, in about 36 hours cessation of hostilities in South Vietnam will have to be definitive.

I would also like to define my Government's position on the joint communiqué we signed this afternoon.

First, this document is meant to permit a better implementation, a complete implementation, of the Paris accord and protocols. As far as we are concerned, the basic document remains the Paris accord and protocols. The joint communiqué is not a new document replacing the Paris agreement. It is not a new accord and, incidentally, I would like to explain the unfortunate misunderstanding I have seen in the press, which said that a Saigon spokesman had declared we would not sign the new accord. It is indeed in context that he made his declaration: that is that the Paris accord of Jan. 27, 1973, is not reopened. The joint communiqué brings clarifications and helps the parties in a better implementation.

Question of Elections

The second point is again based on the Paris accords. The joint communiqué reaffirms that the political solution for South Vietnam must be a global solution, where all aspects are linked. There remains once again the basic question facing the South Vietnamese parties, the question of general elections. The process defined in the document again stresses the primary importance of general elections, requiring formation of a National Council of National Concord and an agreement on the institutions to be voted into existence. Thus the question of democratic parties must be settled as well as the question of Vietnamese armed forces present in South Vietnam.

Military Questions

The third point is the passages concerning the military questions, a question much discussed even in the press,

the question of defining zones of control. In order to achieve complete and definitive cessation of hostilities it is necessary to eliminate the zones of control.

The zones that have been defined by the Paris accord and the protocols. It is in the military context that this task must be tackled, and no attempt should be made to give this task any other meaning. It is not admissible to settle a political problem under the guise of (settling) this question. The Paris accord and the protocols define quite clearly how we must proceed in order to settle South Vietnam's political problem. Zones of control and the question of zones of military control must be defined by the position of units in South Vietnam.

Infiltration Cited

The fourth point: If we want to really put an end to the hostilities, it is necessary for unequal implementation to cease. The Paris accord stipulates modalities for a program of replacement of arms and ammunition. The joint communiqué has clarified this point.

Thus it is time that the

infiltration, which as continued since Jan. 28, 1973, stop, and stop definitely. And now, in a context of military conflict, the military aspect is important, and thus not only must infiltration cease, but troops that are not Vietnamese must leave South Vietnamese people themselves to settle their political problems and exercise fully their right to self-determination.

The fifth point, as stated clearly in Article 20 of the Paris agreement and as Paragraph 13 of the joint communiqué also recalls, is that foreign troops in Laos and Cambodia must rapidly evacuate those two neighbor countries.

This we consider an extremely important question, since Vietnam is closely linked to the situation in Cambodia and Laos. Consequently, it is necessary that the situation in Cambodia and Laos become stabilized and return to normal.

The sixth and last point I would like to make is that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is still the sole legal Government of South Vietnam pursuant to the Geneva agreements of 1954.