

# 'Fresh Hope' for Truce

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WASHINGTON, June 13—The Vietnam communiqué signed in Paris today revealed little more than that all sides were still willing to reaffirm on paper their January commitment to a cease-fire and political conciliation in Indochina.

As Henry A. Kissinger conceded at his Paris news conference, the 14-point document provides only "fresh hope" that what he called "a new spirit" may emerge to achieve what the original cease-fire agreement last January failed to do.

There are no new mechanisms to enforce the cease-fire,

and the basic framework of the January agreement remains untouched by the drawn-out negotiations between President Nixon's adviser on national security and Hanoi's chief negotiator, Le Duc Tho.

The essential problems that have haunted Vietnam for so many years remain unresolved by the agreement disclosed today. For the cease-fire to work, a considerable amount of trust and goodwill will have to be shown by Hanoi and Saigon.

And administration officials have found no sign that Hanoi has dropped its plans to unify Vietnam under its banner. Like

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wise, as President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam has made clear in recent days, the Saigon Government is no more trusting or conciliatory about Communism than in the past.

What is unknown, of course, is whether the latest document is only a convenient cloak for more significant secret understandings reached by Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Tho in their 75 hours of negotiation.

Without such secret agreements, the entire process of renegotiations would seem on the surface to be meaningless.

In Cambodia, for example, where American bombers have been active for 100 days — in raids for which Congress is poised to cut off funds — the new document says merely that Article 20 of the original agreement, dealing with Laos and Cambodia, "shall be scrupulously implemented."

## Accord Is Ambiguous

But, from the start, Article 20 has been a model of ambiguity.

It calls on foreign countries, for example, to end all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, but sets no deadline. Neither does the new communiqué.

As interpreted by Washington, this meant that foreign military activity could continue in Cambodia until a cease-fire was negotiated by Cambodians. This has been the justification for the continued American bombing.

Mr. Kissinger said in Paris today that "there is nothing that commits the United States to cease such operations," adding, "It is our hope, and we will make a major effort in that direction, to continue diplomatic contacts that will produce a cease-fire in Cambodia."

It has always been assumed here that one of Mr. Kissinger's priorities in Paris was to get some assurance from Hanoi that it would use its considerable influence on the Cambodian insurgents to make a political deal with the Government of President Lon Nol in

Phnom Penh, and thereby end the need for American bombing.

But all signs from Capitol Hill suggest that Congress will go ahead and cut off funds for bombing in Cambodia by the end of this month, making it improbable that the insurgent forces there, sensing such a victory in the air, might make the political deal sought by Mr. Kissinger.

Undoubtedly, in coming days, the Administration will urge Congress not to be hasty and to permit the bombing to continue until a settlement is achieved for Cambodia.

Mr. Kissinger in the past has cited the need to have both carrots and sticks in dealing with Hanoi, and the stick in this case is the threat of American air power.

As for the carrot, Mr. Kissinger can be counted upon to try to persuade Congress of the value over the long run of American economic aid to Hanoi, if North Vietnam shows willingness to meet its cease-fire obligations.

The new communiqué states flatly that the United States will resume economic talks with Hanoi in four days and that the first phase of the talks will conclude 15 days later.

## Pledges by U. S.

To encourage Hanoi's cooperation, the United States has also agreed to end the reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam and to begin prompt removal of the remaining mines in North Vietnam's waters, with a deadline of 30 days to finish the operation.

But these are the only obligations the Americans can offer toward a settlement. They also are the only points of leverage in the agreement. With the last forces gone from Vietnam, along with the prisoners, the United States — except by using its air power — can only urge the Vietnamese parties to work together and carry out the detailed provisions intended to supply a framework for both a military truce and an eventual political conciliation.

The new communiqué provides the two South Vietnamese

parties a variety of tools to reach a peaceful solution.

Regular liaison flights will be carried out between Saigon and Loc Ninh — a suggestion that Loc Ninh, near the Cambodian border is now an unofficial Vietcong capital.

The North Vietnamese will be permitted by the accord to send military equipment, on a one-for-one replacement basis, across the demilitarized zone between the two Vietnams, so long as they designate some site on the South Vietnamese side as a legal "point of entry."

## Presence of Troops

But so far, North Vietnam has still not acknowledged the presence of its troops in South Vietnam, or its infiltration of men and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam. If it now begins to accept "points of entry," as called for in the original cease-fire accord, this would represent a significant change in attitude.

In the political sphere, numerous obligations are undertaken by Saigon and the Vietcong. These obligations, if accepted in a spirit of cooperation, could lead to a radical transformation of the political scene.

But nothing has happened since January to suggest that Mr. Thieu, whose Government controls most of the population and territory of South Vietnam, will agree to giving the Vietcong much of a voice in the Government.

## Thieu Seeks Election

Aware of American public opinion, Mr. Thieu has been pressing for an immediate new election in South Vietnam to "prove" that the Vietcong have virtually no political base. The new communiqué does not set any election date, but calls upon both sides to agree within 45 days on such question as what the elections should be for.

Because of the legacy of distrust in Vietnam, the latest communiqué has aroused little enthusiasm here. Few people in the Government expect the Vietnamese to carry out the spirit or the letter of the agree-

ment, and there are many who believe that the United States, having in effect negotiated two cease-fire agreements, should now bow out of the area.

But Mr. Nixon's ultimate intentions are unclear. It remains to be seen whether he views the communiqué as a parting gesture toward Vietnam, or as further symbol of American involvement in Southeast Asian affairs.