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# Saigon and Vietcong Offer Proposals for Settlement

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By FLORA LEWIS NYTimes

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, April 25—The rival South Vietnamese regimes traded new plans for a political settlement here today, just two days before the end of the 90-day period set by the cease-fire agreement for a solution to their dispute.

Both sides said that there had been "absolutely no progress" in their talks so far.

They have been meeting at the leisurely pace of about once a week in the chateau at La-Celle-St.-Cloud outside Paris. Today was their eighth session, and the first in which they went beyond arguments on an agenda.

The South Vietnamese delegation presented a 10-point proposal with a firm calendar that would culminate with national elections on Sunday, Aug. 26.

Spokesmen for the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Gov-

ernment in Paris attacked the plan as "mere propaganda" but did not reject it outright and agreed to examine it.

[In Saigon, the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Tran Van Lam, acknowledged that the proposal was essentially a restatement of Saigon's longstanding position on a political settlement. He gave no indication that he expected the Communists to accept the proposal but said it was intended as a demonstration of "maximum goodwill."]

The Vietcong presented a six-point proposal that they said went "to fundamentals" and avoided the "sensationalism" of setting deadlines.

On the surface, the two plans appeared to have many points of similarity, as both

Continued on Page 10, Column 1

## Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

were based on various articles of the Paris accords of Jan. 27 and drew heavily on the language of the signed agreements.

### Basic Differences Persist

But this appearance of movement concealed the continued chasm between their positions, reflected clearly in the priorities urged in each plan and the order of settlement required for successive points.

The persistent depth of disagreement was also evident in explanation of the points provided by the two sides. Their leaders repeatedly used the same phrases of self-congratulation and accusation they had been exchanging for five years, each proclaiming his own "goodwill" and denouncing the other's lack of "constructive reaction."

The announcement that William H. Sullivan of the United States, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and Nguyen Co Thach, Deputy Foreign Minister of North Vietnam, will meet in Paris Friday, and word that Henry A. Kissinger and his North Vietnamese counterpart, Le Duc Tho, may meet here next month, was made in Washington, Hanoi and elsewhere in Paris while the Vietcong and South Vietnamese were holding their customary briefings for newsmen after their session here.

But reporters present did not learn about that until afterward, and nothing was said at the briefings about the new United States-North Vietnamese talks by either the Vietcong or the Saigon spokesman.

Saigon's plan, presented by Deputy Premier Nguyen Luu Vien, made two important concessions in an evident attempt to lure the Vietcong into early elections, or at least to gain credit for flexibility.

### Election Formula Revised

One concerned "general elections." The proposal called for voting for an "organism representing the people of Vietnam to decide the political future of South Vietnam," and said: "This organ will decide on state institutions at both the national and regional levels."

Previously, Saigon had insisted that the elections should be held under the existing Constitution for existing institutions, a formula designed to strengthen its chances of maintaining full control. The Vietcong had

demanded elections for a constituent assembly.

Questioned closely, the Saigon spokesman Nguyen Trieu Dan, said the "organ" would be "sovereign" and have "full freedom of action with all options open."

The second concession, although Mr. Dan never used the word, related to Saigon's continued demand for withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. The phrasing itself was part of the concession, since it referred to "non-South Vietnamese" forces in the South instead of "North Vietnamese," which the Communists take as a provocative charge.

The South Vietnamese proposal offered to reduce the size of the South's army concurrently and by the same number as troops withdrawn. That procedure would, of course reduce the total Communist higher percentage than the higher percentage than the Saigon forces.

The Vietcong's plan, presented by Nguyen Van Hieu, a minister of state, called for an immediate end of hostilities, with both sides withdrawing to their positions of the date the cease-fire ostensibly took effect; release of all civilian prisoners; full freedom of political action, press and travel throughout the country; and formation of a three-segment national council of conciliation with fairly broad powers.

Only after those measures had been fulfilled, the text of plan said, would there be elections and discussion of reducing the number of troops on both sides.

## Saigon Cites 'Goodwill'

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, April 25—At a news conference today Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam acknowledged that the proposal presented to the Vietnamese Communists in Paris today was essentially a restatement of Saigon's longstanding position on a political settlement for South Vietnam.

He gave no indication that he expected the Communists to accept the proposal.

But he said it was made by his Government as a demonstration of "maximum goodwill" two days before the 90-day deadline set down in the Paris accords by which the Vietnamese were to have signed an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam.

In response to a newsman's question, Mr. Lam said that the proposal amounted to a condensation of the four principle

issues that have been discussed by the two Vietnamese delegations in Paris since mid-March.

He said these included the structure of the Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, general elections, democratic liberties and the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South.

### Right of Veto Stressed

In the lengthy news conference, in which the Foreign Minister spoke in English, French and Vietnamese, sometimes bypassing his official interpreter, he left unanswered how the council might be constituted, but said that the Saigon Government's National Assembly would have the right to veto any decisions reached by the council.

Instead of saying that the North Vietnamese must withdraw from South Vietnam, Mr. Lam insisted upon using the language of the Paris proposal, which referred to "non-South Vietnamese armed forces."

"We all know who we are talking about," he said, suggesting that this thin face-saving device might be enough to permit the Communists to begin negotiating the withdrawal from the South of North Vietnamese troops who they have never admitted were present below the 17th Parallel.

Western diplomats here found nothing encouraging in the proposal and felt certain the withdrawal question, however posed, would doom the entire package.

There did, however, appear to be a slight concession in the proposal. This was the first time, South Vietnamese sources noted, that the Government offered to match the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops with a commensurate demobilization of its own military forces. Previously the demands for withdrawal have been unconditional.