

HAIG WILL CONFER WITH NIXON TODAY ON THE CEASE-FIRE

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General to Report on Talks in
Southeast Asia—National
Security Council to Meet

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WASHINGTON, April 11—The White House announced today that Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., President Nixon's special envoy to Indochina, would meet with the President tomorrow morning immediately upon returning from a four-day assessment of the military situation in Southeast Asia.

Administration officials said the report the President would get would serve as a focus for a major decision on what to do about what they describe as a deterioration of the cease-fire.

The White House said the National Security Council would then meet at 10 A.M.

No Announcement Due

However, Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, told newsmen not to expect any major announcement after the President's discussions with General Haig and the subsequent Security Council meeting.

The announcements today came as two legal scholars and a former Attorney General appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to support legislation that would restrict the President's war powers, and to argue that Mr. Nixon had no constitutional authority to continue bombing in Cambodia. [Page 5.]

In Cambodia, meanwhile, a senior Government official discounted somewhat reports of a crisis in Phnom Penh. He denied that the capital was under Communist siege and implied that the United States airlift of fuel to the city was an American, not a Cambodian, idea.

Concern Varied in Capital

Here in Washington, sources in various Government departments described the White House as deeply disturbed by continuing reports of a weapons build-up by North Vietnam and by military activities by its forces, particularly in South Vietnam and Cambodia, since the Vietnam cease-fire officially went into effect on Jan. 28.

On a number of occasions recently, the President has warned North Vietnam to adhere to the Paris cease-fire

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accords or face the consequences.

In announcing the Haig trip last Saturday, Mr. Ziegler said that it had been made necessary by "developments," and that the United States was concerned over what he said was the failure of North Vietnamese forces to withdraw from Cambodia, over "the level of violence in Cambodia" and over "ongoing violations of the cease-fire in South Vietnam."

One senior Administration planner said:

"The sending of General Haig to the scene was both a signal to Hanoi that the President was fast losing patience, as well as an opportunity for a very experienced and highly regarded specialist in the war to assess the situation and offer recommendations."

At the Pentagon, Jerry W. Friedheim, the department spokesman, said the North Vietnamese build-up of tanks, guns and men in South Vietnam was now equal to or greater than a year ago, just before a large scale tank-led offensive began on March 30.

At the time of the cease-fire, Henry A. Kissinger, the principal American negotiator, pointed out that there was no provision for the withdrawal of Northern troops, which he then

estimated at 145,000, from the South.

However, he said that the North and South Vietnamese were committed to negotiate a mutual demobilization of forces, with the troops thus released to return to their homes. As for arms, the accord provides for "one-for-one" replacement, but no increase.

Officials here said the Nixon Administration now faced a serious problem.

On the one hand, they warn on, it does not want to take any precipitate action that might destroy the cease-fire, however imperfect.

But on the other hand, they said, the White House feels that some action may be called for to persuade Hanoi to live up to the terms of the accords and to dissuade it from possible plans for any offensive soon in South Vietnam.

According to these planners, these are among the courses of action now being considered:

Urgent diplomatic representations, both to North Vietnam directly and to the Soviet Union and China, to halt what officials here described as the flow of several hundred truckloads a week of weapons and ammunition into South Vietnam. Administration officials assert that North Vietnam has balked at setting up monitored checkpoints through which replace-

ments might legitimately enter the country.

Quiet concurrence in a request from South Vietnam to shift from essentially defensive reactions to active land and air attack—for a limited period—against troop and weapons concentrations within its borders.

Encouragement of South Vietnam to work out arrangements with Cambodia for the South Vietnamese to employ its forces to escort convoys of food and fuel to Phnom Penh.

The use of American airpower to attack the eight to ten North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile sites in the northernmost province of South Vietnam and to use B-52's to bomb tank parks and ammunition dumps in the south.

Renewed American mining of the principal ports of North Vietnam.

Resumed bombing, on a heavy scale but over a limited duration, of military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area of Vietnam.

Officials stressed that any of the military operations, if they were carried out, would be aimed at forcing greater compliance with the cease-fire, not seeking a full-scale resumption of warfare. But they concede such a risk exists in any of the alternatives.

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