

# KISSINGER TO SEEK 'NORMALIZATION' IN VISIT TO HANOI

Favors Diplomatic Relations  
'in Principle,' but Time  
Is 'Far Down the Road'

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GIVES INTERVIEW ON TV

Adviser Also Tells of Nixon  
Reasons for Resumption  
of Bombings in North

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WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 — Henry A. Kissinger said tonight that during his mission to Hanoi next week he would explore ways of moving relations between the United States and North Vietnam "from hostility toward normalization."

In an hour-long televised interview, Mr. Kissinger said that the United States favored establishment of diplomatic relations with Hanoi "in principle," but that such action was still "far down the road."

He also said that while future aid to North Vietnam would be discussed, this was not the primary purpose of his trip.

He said that his main goals were to start a constructive dialogue, and to work out the machinery for future exchanges of ideas. He likened the situation, at one point, to that existing with China, with which the United States likewise has no official relations.

## Explains December Bombing

Mr. Kissinger also gave the first detailed explanation of President Nixon's controversial decision in December to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong when the Paris talks broke down.

The President's chief adviser on foreign policy was interviewed in his White House office by Marvin Kalb, the diplomatic correspondent of the Columbia Broadcasting System.

Their conversation ranged from current Vietnam issues to a discussion of Mr. Kissinger's ideas on the "balance of power," and included thumbnail sketches of the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, the Soviet Communist party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev and Le Duc Tho, the Hanoi negotiator—all Communists with whom he has dealt during his four years with President Nixon.

## 'Most Painful' Decision

Regarding the bombing, Mr. Kissinger said it was "the most painful, the most difficult, and the most lonely" decision that Mr. Nixon had to make.

He said that Mr. Nixon chose to bomb because he felt it was necessary to prevent the negotiations from deteriorating into polemics. B-52 bombers were chosen rather than smaller aircraft, Mr. Kissinger added, because it was the "rainy season" and the huge aircraft were all-weather planes.

Mr. Nixon did not discuss his decision with the American people, Mr. Kissinger said, because to do so would have ruined the confidentiality of the Paris talks, and would have made Hanoi's resumption of the

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The President decided, Mr. Kissinger said, that if the bombing produced positive results, "it would speak for itself," and if it failed, he would give a full report later to the nation.

"For whatever reason, once the talks resumed, a settlement was produced rapidly," he said, although he refused an invitation to credit the settlement to the bombing. He said it would serve no useful purpose for him to speculate on Hanoi's motives in advance of his trip to Hanoi, which begins on Feb. 10.

Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Kalb videotaped the interview early this evening for showing, at 9 P.M. Mr. Kissinger seemed tense for most of the conversation, which came at the end of a long day in which he participated with Mr. Nixon in meetings with Prime Minister Heath.

Discussing the recent Vietnam agreement, he said, "The biggest task now is to move a generation that has known nothing but war towards an attitude of peace—and that is an intangible quality.

He said that a political settlement by the Vietnamese parties still has to be achieved, but that this was possible, if there

was a period "of some months" in which the vietnamese "get used to more peaceful pursuit."

## 'Difficult Period Ahead'

Mr. Kissinger said that he did not trust in goodwill alone. "A lot depends," he said, "on the actions of the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, and on the sort of relationship we'll be able to establish with North Vietnam."

"So it is a difficult period that is ahead," he said.

Mr. Kissinger said that although there were no agreements with Moscow or Peking, on holding down arms deliveries to Vietnam, "it would seem reasonable that everybody will assess now this military relationship to the contestants." He added that "we would like the Chinese and the Russians to behave responsibly in preserving the peace in Indochina."

Asked about the situation in Laos and Cambodia, Mr. Kissinger said, "We will observe any cease-fire that is established in Laos and Cambodia."

He noted that since Monday an unofficial cease-fire had existed in Cambodia and that the United States was observing it. He said that "in Laos we have hopes that a formal cease-fire will be signed in the near future and in that case the ques-

tion of our role will become moot." Mr. Kissinger said that his trip to Hanoi had been under discussion with North Vietnam for a long time, but that it should not be viewed in the context of the talks, "but in the context of establishing a post-war relationship."

Noting the speculation stirred by Mr. Nixon's announcement of his trip yesterday, Mr. Kissinger said, "I don't quite agree that the purpose is for determining aid."

That, he said, was one of "the possible middle-term outcomes."

"The real problem in relation to North Vietnam is that here is a country that has been almost constantly at war throughout its existence," he said.

"It is a country with which we have made armistices in 1954, in 1962, and we've never made a genuine peace with it," he said.

"Now we would like to explore the possibility of whether after the experiences of the last decade, having established a pattern of coexistence with Moscow and Peking, it seems to us not inconceivable that if we can coexist with Peking we can coexist with Hanoi," Mr. Kissinger said.

"So the basic purpose of the trip is an exploratory mission to determine how we can move from hostility towards normalization," he said.

"The basic purpose is to establish a new relationship, similar, perhaps, to my first trip to Peking," he said, referring to his secret mission in July, 1971, that set the stage for Mr. Nixon's trip last February.

Asked if diplomatic relations might be established, Mr. Kissinger said "well, far down the road."

"The first problem is to es-

tablish some sort of on-going dialogue to work out machinery for exchanging ideas and in principle we are willing to explore this but not as the first step," he said.

Mr. Kalb said that in another interview President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam had said he might ask for new American air strikes in Vietnam. He asked about American policy.

Mr. Kissinger said "it would be extremely unwise for a responsible American official" at this time "to give a checklist about what the United States will or will not do in every circumstance that is likely to arise."

But he said that for the immediate future, the North Vietnamese were not militarily strong enough to launch "an overwhelming attack" on the south, even if they did violate the agreement.

"What happens after a year or two has to be seen in the circumstances which then exist," he said.

Minor violations, he said, should be handled by Saigon's forces.

"We did not end this war in order to look for an excuse to re-enter it," he said.

He was asked about Mr. Tho, with whom he negotiated the agreement. He said that he was "an impressive man," driven by "a certain missionary zeal."

"He's a man who's never known tranquility. And where necessary, to fight in order to end the war, he fights, in order to achieve certain objectives he's held all his life," Mr. Kissinger said.

Asked to compare Chou En-lai with Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Kissinger said that Mr. Chou was "very intellectual and very

subtle." Mr. Brezhnev, he said, was "more elemental and more physical." But he said that both were impressive individuals who rose to the top through considerable competition.

He said that Mr. Chou was of the earlier school of Communists—more evangelical than Mr. Brezhnev's generation of bureaucrats.

Mr. Kissinger was asked to compare the balance of power today with that concept as expressed in the nineteenth century. He said that the main difference was that in the past, there were numerous shifts of alliances and "little wars" to prevent any minor changes in the balance, "because they believed that any marginal change could be transformed into an overwhelming advantage sooner or later."

But now, because of the nuclear threat, "you can't have these shifting alliances, you can't have these endless little wars."

But he said that there was one thing similar today as in the past—"No nation can make its survival dependent on the goodwill of another state if it has a choice about it, especially of a state that announces a hostile ideology, so you must have a certain equilibrium of strength in order to retain some freedom over your fate."

## Hopes for Unity in U.S.

As he did during his recent news conference, Mr. Kissinger often expressed the hope that the Vietnam agreement would be "the basis of the reconciliation of the American people."

He was asked questions about American relations with Russia and China, and he responded that it was not in the United States interest to seek to play off one against the other.