

THE INAUGURATION/COVER STORIES

Nixon II: A Chance for New Beginnings

AS Richard Nixon began his cherished "four more years," the stands before the Capitol were filled with the usual spectators—dignitaries, members of the frustrated U.S. Congress and Nixon's own somewhat besieged bureaucracy. But another varied cast of characters could readily be visualized as symbolic spectators: world leaders; the chief participants in the Viet Nam negotiations; the American P.O.W.s and the American antiwar movement—which, in perhaps its final gesture, was staging demonstrations near by. Though Nixon only briefly spoke of Viet Nam, the consciousness of the war and the prospects of a precarious cease-fire hovered over the proceedings.

Nixon's Inaugural Address indicated that his quest for "a peace that will endure for generations" remained his primary goal and world affairs still concerned him most. In a restrained, muted speech, he spoke of America's "bold initiatives" in 1972, and warned against "a time of retreat and isolation." He also restated the Nixon doctrine enunciated on Guam in 1969: "The time has passed when America will make every other nation's conflicts our own, or presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own affairs."

Seeking to link foreign and domestic policies, Nixon declared that both abroad and at home the U.S. must turn away from paternalism, from an attitude that "Washington knows best." He developed his familiar themes—less federal spending, more self-reliance. Said he: "Let us remember that America was built not by government but by people—not by welfare, but by work—not by shirking responsibility, but by seeking responsibility." As if yearning for the world of his California boyhood, when self-reliance brought just rewards and fewer people were locked into an interdependence that required the helping hand of government, Nixon turned around John Kennedy's most famous pitch for patriotism: "Let each of us ask, not just what will government do

for me, but what I can do for myself."

As Nixon defended this philosophy, it does not mean that he wants government to ignore its duties. "The shift from old policies to new will not be a retreat from our responsibilities, but a better way to progress," he promised. But, as interpreted by many Congressmen, worried mayors and various advocates of federal social programs, Nixon was setting the stage for an onslaught against the liberal domestic policies of past Democratic Presidents. His State of the Union message this week, and his budget presentation next week, will pinpoint the programs to be cut. "The President's budget message," predicted one of his aides, "will be akin to the firing at Fort Sumter." At a time when federal funds are running short, such cutbacks neatly fit his essentially conservative social attitude. Nixon watchers are sure that he has moved far away from his first-term notion, inspired by the tutelage of Pat Moynihan, that "Tory men and liberal policies are what have changed the world."

Bankrupt. Nixon has dispatched managerial experts throughout his Administration to analyze programs, eliminate those that do not work, and seek ways to cut out waste. Instead of specific grants, Nixon intends to disburse federal funds to local governments, first through unrestricted general revenue sharing and then, if Congress approves, through special revenue sharing for broadly categorized aims. Under attack will be federal programs in public housing, rural assistance, education, health, and public employment.

Even liberals have to admit that too much money has been spent for too long on ineffectual schemes, that many of the old programs are bankrupt. In large part these programs were created because state and local governments had failed to meet genuine needs; there is no guarantee that they will do so if the Federal Government now withdraws. Despite the alarms of Nixon's opponents, and some of his own rhetoric, no one can to-

tally reverse the trends of several generations; many of the programs are irrevocably locked in the modern American system. Still there is no doubt that Nixon means to cut—and cut deeply. Just how deeply will define the politics of the coming year and perhaps of the entire second term. Says one presidential adviser: "Our adversaries will argue that the President is against education or that he doesn't care about little children starving to death. We will be accused of greed and being mean-spirited. If we can articulate our position better, we might succeed."

In recent months it has been Nixon's tactics more than his aims that have made much of Congress and the bureaucracy apprehensive: his decision making in seclusion, his failure to consult Congress or inform the public. Noting that some of the Administration's friendliest columnists, such as James J. Kilpatrick and William S. White, have turned critical, one presidential aide conceded: "Maybe we have made some mistakes since the election. We should be playing the role of the magnanimous victor. We should be more open."

Viet Nam will continue to affect the U.S., as the fate of Nixon's "peace with honor" rests on the shaky base of the Saigon government's survival. The echoes of the Christmas bombing will linger, and partly account for the odd lack of triumph in Washington as the cease-fire approached; the terms of the settlement will be bitterly debated for years to come. Yet the obsessive preoccupation with Viet Nam is bound to recede, and thus a relieved President may turn more conciliatory as he leads the U.S. into the complex postwar world. Said Nixon in his address: "Let us again learn to debate our differences with civility and decency, and let each of us reach out for that precious quality government cannot provide—a new level of respect for the rights of one another." Indeed, government cannot provide that. But a President could—by setting a tone and an example.

THE NIXONS AND AGNEWS ON THE INAUGURAL STAND AFTER THE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY



The Final Push for Peace

THE divisions in Viet Nam still cut so deeply after a generation of warfare that no one could say with certainty that the fighting would soon cease. Yet last week's flurry of diplomatic maneuvering, from Key Biscayne to Saigon to Paris, gave every indication that for the U.S. peace finally was, indeed, "at hand." Declared a high U.S. official: "We are very close to a final agreement. I think there is no turning back now."

That was about as definitive a statement as Washington would allow in a week of rumors. TIME correspondents nevertheless were able to reconstruct much of the final push toward peace and to glean the general outlines of the

LE MINH



THIEU AT DAUGHTER'S WEDDING

impending settlement. Despite the relative rush with which the pieces began falling together, a successful outcome had been seriously in doubt at many points along the way.

When President Nixon announced on Dec. 30 that he was suspending air raids on Hanoi, and that the North Vietnamese had agreed to return to "serious" talks in Paris with Henry Kissinger, Washington was pleased, of course, but not at all sure that there would be speedy progress. At Kissinger's first session with Hanoi's Le Duc Tho on Jan. 8, the atmosphere was bitter and frosty. Kissinger therefore tackled some of the less contentious issues first, including a mutual release of military prisoners and the technicalities of arranging a cease-fire. These were largely resolved in two days of tough give-and-take.

Tho balked, however, on a key issue: the precise status of the six-mile-wide Demilitarized Zone. Hanoi, which has consistently refused to view Viet Nam as two nations, wanted free mil-

itary movement through this "temporary" buffer zone. South Viet Nam's President Nguyen Van Thieu, on the other hand, claims that the DMZ is a permanent political border for his sovereign nation. It was largely at Thieu's insistence that the U.S. had reopened discussion on this subject, which had purposely been left vague in the nine-point agreement announced by Kissinger in October. Now, on orders from Nixon, Kissinger told Tho that the U.S. simply would not stand for protracted haggling on this point. The implication was that Nixon might turn the B-52s loose on Hanoi again.

Whether this threat was decisive is not certain, but suddenly, on Jan. 11, Tho indicated a willingness to make some concessions on the DMZ issue. Perhaps the continued pressure from Peking and Moscow to achieve a settlement was as influential as any potential

Thieu, then settled back to watch the Super Bowl game.

Without even waiting to hear Thieu's reaction, Nixon on Monday morning ordered a suspension of all U.S. "bombing, shelling and any further mining of North Viet Nam." A unilateral action unlinked to any Communist response, this was the signal to Hanoi that Nixon was satisfied with the Paris pact. It was also a sure sign to Thieu that the U.S. would make peace with or without his cooperation.

In Saigon, Thieu got the message. Although privately angered at the provisions—especially their failure to require that all North Vietnamese troops return to the North after a cease-fire—he indicated that he would bow, however reluctantly, to the U.S. pressure. He obviously feared, and with good reason, that the U.S. would cut off all aid to his government if he refused to agree. Even such staunch Thieu backers as U.S. Senators Barry Goldwater and John Stennis last week publicly urged



LE DUC THO (FOURTH FROM LEFT) CONFRONTS
For the U.S., no turning back.

U.S. military moves. At any rate, that breakthrough got things moving. Both sides soon agreed in general on the size and powers of a four-nation International Control Commission to supervise the cease-fire, the authority of an interim National Council of Reconciliation to arrange for new elections in South Viet Nam, and the disposition of North Vietnamese troops in the South.

On Jan. 13 Kissinger flew back to the U.S. to present a draft of the proposed settlement to Nixon. Technical teams from both sides remained in Paris to work on the "protocols," the detailed arrangements for carrying out the general principles. Before leaving Paris, Kissinger told Tho that if Nixon approved of the draft there would be a clear military signal from the U.S.

Kissinger stopped off in Washington to pick up his former aide, General Alexander M. Haig Jr., now the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, before flying to Florida. At Key Biscayne, Nixon stayed up well past midnight to go over the draft, then discussed it for another four hours with Kissinger and Haig on Sunday morning. Convinced that the deal would give the Saigon government "a reasonable chance" to survive, Nixon dispatched Haig to talk it over with

the Saigon government not to stand in the way of a settlement.

Thieu nevertheless continued his rearguard action, giving his followers the impression that he was fighting for every possible Communist concession but was being coerced by the U.S. Instead of "objecting" to the principles of the draft, as he had done so strenuously in October, he now sought "clarification" of the protocols. For that purpose, Thieu sent his own technical team to Paris to work on the uncompleted details—and these details still contain the possibility of delay and disruption.

Yet as Haig moved on to the capitals of Cambodia, Laos and Thailand to explain the terms to officials of those governments, the peace momentum continued to build, and any resistance from Saigon looked futile. Then came the simultaneous Washington-Hanoi announcement on Thursday that Kissinger and Tho would meet again this week in Paris "for the purpose of completing the text of an agreement." That seemed to set up a final scenario, which, subject to unpredictable changes, would have the agreement initialed before the end of the week. Ministers of the four

concerned regimes—the U.S., North Viet Nam, South Viet Nam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong)—would formally sign the papers next week. A cease-fire would go into effect 24 hours later—just in time for *Tet*, the Vietnamese New Year, which begins on Feb. 3.

What happens after that will be determined by how each side follows the provisions of the truce agreement. On many points the emerging agreement does not differ much from the aborted Washington-Hanoi arrangements of October. The U.S. will withdraw all of its troops from South Viet Nam within 60 days after the cease-fire, and Hanoi will release all American prisoners of war within the same period. Within 30 days, an international conference will be held with representatives of the U.S., China, Russia, North Viet Nam, South Viet Nam, the P.R.G., Britain and France, in order to ratify the settlement more broadly. A four-nation International Control Commission (presum-

WITHDRAWALS. Thieu also lost on his demand that all North Vietnamese troops withdraw from the South. Instead, the cease-fire permits all forces to retain control of areas they hold at the time the truce begins. As in October, there is a tacit understanding that some of the North Vietnamese troops (estimated at about 145,000) will withdraw, but the agreement apparently will call only vaguely (and with little practical meaning) for some demobilization of forces on both sides. No new troops will be allowed to enter South Viet Nam, but military equipment can be replaced on a "piece-for-piece" basis.

PRISONERS. In December Hanoi tried to connect the release of American P.O.W.s with a simultaneous release by the Saigon government of all the political prisoners it holds (estimated by U.S. officials in Saigon at 100,000). It has yielded on that, leaving the question of civilian prisoners to later negotiations with Saigon. The South Vietnamese, however, will free some 9,000 North

freer movements of his own police and aircraft for the protection of areas he controls. A last-minute decision for the U.S. is just which of these and other Thieu reservations, if any, to take seriously enough to present again in Paris.

The imminent peace agreement apparently will be a somewhat tighter and more detailed pact than the one originally brought home by Kissinger in October. It is thus more to the liking of President Nixon, a lawyer who mistrusts ambiguities. Yet diplomats often prefer vagueness when situations are so complex that they cannot be reduced to neat and enforceable formulations on paper. Whether the slight improvement over the October deal is worth the December air raids remains doubtful.

Thieu has probably been somewhat



KISSINGER ACROSS THE CONFERENCE TABLE
For the Vietnamese, a bitter beginning.

ably Canada, Hungary, Poland and Indonesia) will provide the personnel to observe and report on truce violations. A four-party military commission (the U.S., South Viet Nam, North Viet Nam and the P.R.G.) will also help supervise the cease-fire. The National Council of Reconciliation (composed of the Saigon government, the P.R.G. and neutralist representatives) will arrange for new elections to be held in South Viet Nam within six months.

Other provisions that were questioned anew following the October agreement, *TIME* has learned, apparently were resolved as follows:

THE DMZ. The zone apparently will be considered a temporary line of demarcation, and a border only between military forces (as provided in the Geneva Agreement of 1954). There will be some limitations of movement of troops and military supplies through this area. Thieu lost his argument that the DMZ be considered a political boundary. As in the October agreement, the political future of Viet Nam is left to future negotiations among the Vietnamese; the pact separates the military from the political issues.

Vietnamese and 28,000 Viet Cong military prisoners, while Hanoi must similarly release any South Vietnamese troops it has captured.

THE I.C.C. The U.S. apparently has won its argument that the Control Commission must be large enough to act as a truly effective body in supervising the truce. While Hanoi had claimed that a force of about 250 men would be sufficient, the U.S. demanded some 5,000. A compromise puts the figure at roughly 3,000, or 750 from each of the four member nations.

THE COUNCIL. The Communists sought to make the projected National Council of Reconciliation in effect a coalition government to rule the South until new elections are held. Thieu and the U.S. opposed that, insisting that it be only a body to create and supervise elections. The treaty leaves the precise role of the Council vague.

As the details to flesh out those principles are worked out in Paris this week, there is plenty of opportunity for more trouble, including those protocol "clarifications" sought by Thieu. He wants the initial four-party truce teams, for example, to be stationed near Viet Cong strongholds, while Hanoi seeks far fewer observation sites. Thieu also wants



KISSINGER AT WHITE HOUSE

strengthened, at a further loss of American and Vietnamese lives and of the U.S.'s international reputation. Even last week, after Nixon had called off the bombing of the North, the U.S. on one day alone launched 30 B-52 assaults and 335 tactical air strikes against Communist forces in South Viet Nam—one of the most intensive poundings of the war.

Such attacks will soon stop, as the U.S. withdraws and the remaining combatants profess a willingness to forgo military force as a means to their still incompatible ends. There surely will be more killing before the cease-fire as Communist troops plan a last-minute drive to seize more territory and Saigon commanders launch spoiler operations to prevent it. Even after the cease-fire, two armed camps will remain locked in a struggle for political supremacy. "For you Americans it is the end," said a South Vietnamese neutralist in Paris last week, "but for us it is just another bitter beginning."