

# U.S. Will Use GIs to Patrol Truce at First

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By Peter Braestrup  
and Michael Getler  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The United States will be relying primarily on its own military observers, not the much-publicized international control teams, to monitor early stages of the Vietnam cease-fire, Pentagon sources said yesterday.

This plan stems from the belief that the International Commission of Control and Supervision (Canada, Indonesia, Hungary, Poland) cannot start functioning effectively in the field until at least four weeks after the peace-keeping forces arrive.

"There will be a lot of confusion at the start," said a senior Army officer. In particular, organization, logistics, radios and helicopters for the 44 four-nation teams assigned under the Paris accords to local and border posts will take time, it was said.

Under the Paris accords, all U.S. troops must be out of Vietnam within 60 days of the cease-fire. Thereafter, the Canadians and Indonesians of the ICCS will be the only non-Communist outsiders overseeing the cease-fire between the Vietnamese.

The ICCS advance parties are due in Saigon Monday morning, with seven 20-man regional teams to be in major hinterland cities 48 hours later. Forty-five more ICCS teams of 8 to 12 men each are due for deployment 15 to 30 days later covering contested areas, border points and the demilitarized zone.

Only two of these teams will be stationed in what is now Communist-held territory—at Gio Linh on the DMZ and at Lao Bao on Highway 9 below the DMZ's western end.

Pentagon sources said this ICCS timetable, perhaps necessarily so, was optimistic, in terms of providing a fully functioning ICCS network in 30 days.

During the 60-day U.S. troop withdrawal period, the United States will be relying on its own field monitors. These will include U.S. advisers to Saigon's province chiefs and troop units—among the last Americans to be withdrawn.

The United States will also be relying for information—in major cities like

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Danang and Can Tho—on State Department and Central Intelligence Agency personnel working out of U.S. consulates, officials said. These civilians will stay on after the 60-day troop withdrawal period, but they will have limited access to "hot spots" and none to remote border areas, officials predicted.

Lastly, the United States may rely, during the 60-day period, on its 825-man contingent assigned to the temporary four-party (North Vietnam, Vietcong, South Viet-

Communist Vietnamese) organization, serving as a double-watchdog and a "forum to settle differences."

For everyone involved, Pentagon sources emphasized, policing a cease-fire in Vietnam will be technically difficult on the fluid, "leopard-spot" pattern of the opposing forces, especially in the Delta and Saigon areas.

Policing South Vietnam's 600-mile-long frontier against infiltrators will be equally difficult for the nine widely separated ICCS border teams. Army sources noted that at one time (1968-69) 54 U.S. Special Forces

nam, United States) Joint Military Commission to be set up under the accords. Except for border-watching, its team structure parallels that of the ICCS.

Getting both sides to agree on joint procedures and joint local headquarters, Pentagon officials said, will be no easy task. But the U.S. and South Vietnamese observers are largely already in place, since none of the JMC team sites are in Communist-controlled towns.

After the 60-day period expires, the four-party JMC is supposed to become a two-party (Communist and non-

border-watching camps had dotted the jungles and mountains facing Cambodia and Laos, and heavy North Vietnamese infiltration still occurred.

Unless the opposing Vietnamese sides intend to observe the spirit of the cease-fire, Pentagon sources said, its provisions would be easy to circumvent.

Under the agreement, the North can keep what the United States estimates as a force of 145,000 troops already in South Vietnam.

Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger indicated

in his press conference Wednesday that there was no way to negotiate the removal of those troops from the South since they had not been forcibly ousted in battle. But if the terms of the agreement are lived up to, he said, "there is no way" that Hanoi can avoid "a considerable reduction" in its forces in the South "over a period of time."

The agreement includes "a flat prohibition" against any outside troops "for any reason whatsoever" coming into the south, so that what Kissinger calls "normal attrition" of Hanoi's troops

now in the south cannot be made up by replacements.

The administration apparently believes it will be impossible for the north to retain a large army in the south without replacements.

There is also a flat prohibition against presence of foreign, or North Vietnamese forces, in Laos and Cambodia which shuts off that infiltration route—legally at least as well as a similar provision relating to the DMZ.

Finally, the agreement contains a vague provision for eventual reduction and demobilization of forces on both sides.