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**Some Leaders in Congress  
Fear a Short-Lived Truce**

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WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 — Congressional leaders, including some prominent opponents of the Indochina war, gave President Nixon a standing ovation after a lengthy White House briefing this morning on the negotiated truce in Vietnam.

But several members of Congress expressed concern that the peace might prove short-lived. One of them, Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, said that he would introduce legislation Friday to bar "re-entry" of American combat forces, including air

forces, should the truce be broken.

The dominant reaction on Capitol Hill, as Senators and Representatives learned—a few at the White House, most by watching television—of the details of the agreement, appeared to be one of gratitude at American disengagement, but no more than frail hope that the war itself was over.

According to several accounts of the private 2-hour-20-minute meeting between Mr. Nixon and the Congressional leaders, the President also alluded to the

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agreements are in force.

¶An international conference on Vietnam will take place within 30 days, and both the Soviet Union and China are expected to attend. No site has been chosen yet.

¶The United States will exercise restraint in shipping military equipment to the area and "we believe that the other countries — the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—can make a very major contribution to peace in Indochina by exercising similar restraint."

In discussing the agreement in his news conference at the Executive Office Building, next to the White House, Mr. Kissinger went through the accords in detail. He said that one of the "thorniest" issues in the negotiations had dealt with the release of prisoners.

#### Linking of P.O.W. Issue

He noted that one point, the North Vietnamese sought to link the release of the American prisoners with that of South Vietnamese prisoners in Saigon jails.

But, as he pointed out, the final agreement returned to the original nine-point draft agreement of October and provided that civilian Vietnamese prisoners would be handled independently of the Americans.

Another crucial issue centered on the international machinery to supervise the cease-fire.

Originally, the United States had proposed a 5,000-man force made up of Canadians, Hungarians, Indonesians and Poles. The North Vietnamese, at one point, suggested that the force be limited to only 250 men.

#### 1,160 Men in Force

The eventual compromise, as made public today, called for a force of 1,160 men, equally divided among the four nations. The observers, who will be based only in South Vietnam, will be assigned to regional and border areas to check on movement into the country and to report on cease-fire violations.

At the State Department today, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who will sign the accord for the United States Saturday, called in the ambassadors from the nations participating in the international control group and explained their responsibilities.

Mr. Kissinger said that once the expected cease-fire in Laos took effect, the Ho Chi Minh Trail network, the main supply route from North Vietnam to South Vietnam would cease to function.

The Laotian cease-fire, he said, will be a formal one, similar to the Vietnam agreement, between the Government and the Communist-led Pathet Lao.

But because of the various factions in Cambodia, it is only expected that "a de facto cease-fire will come into being over a period of time relevant to the execution of this agreement," he said.

Mr. Kissinger stressed that the agreement contained "substantially" the modifications

sought by the United States in the original nine-point accord reached in October.

A key modification, he said, was the defining of the "linguistic" problem raised by the Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, a three-part group of Saigon, Vietcong, and neutralist elements to supervise new elections.

President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam feared that Hanoi was trying to use language to cloak a disguised coalition government, something he would not accept. Mr. Kissinger said the final language eliminated such ambiguities.

In his presentation, Mr. Kissinger sought to demonstrate in some detail that the modifications he said were needed in the accord during his Oct. 26 news conference had been essentially achieved.

#### Reason Given for Bombing

He noted, in running through the chronology of the last few months, that the talks had broken down last month and he said the heavy bombing of the Hanoi area, from Dec. 18 to 29, was necessary then "to make clear that the United States could not stand for an indefinite delay in the negotiations."

He declined the invitation from a questioner, however, to attribute the success of the last round of talks, from Jan. 8 to 13, solely to the bombing attacks.

#### No Monopoly of Anguish

But he did say: "I can only say that we resumed the negotiations on Jan. 8 and the breakthrough occurred on Jan. 9 and I will let those facts speak for themselves."

Mr. Kissinger ended his long opening remarks with a plea for reconciliation, not only in Indochina but also in the United States.

"It should be clear by now that no one in the war has had a monopoly of anguish and that no one in these debates has had a monopoly of moral insight," he said. "And now at last we have achieved an agreement in which the United States did not prescribe the political future to its allies, an agreement which should preserve the dignity and the self-respect of all the parties. And together with healing the wounds of Indochina, we can begin to heal the wounds in America."

The actual text of the document was called "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam." It was accompanied by four protocols, or documents detailing how to carry out the cease-fire. One dealt with the return of captured military and civilian personnel, both foreign and Vietnamese.

#### Protocol on Commissions

Another dealt with an American obligation to remove and deactivate the mines that were laid in the ports and waterways of North Vietnam since Mr. Nixon's order of May 8, 1972, to step up military action against North Vietnam.

A third protocol concerned the carrying out of the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the joint military commissions

made up of Americans and the three Vietnamese parties. The fourth concerned the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

The broad sweep of the documents did not seem to go much beyond the nine-point draft agreement reached by Mr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the chief Hanoi negotiator, in Paris in October, but not signed then.

At that time, Mr. Kissinger said that while the United States was seeking modifications, it did not intend to reject the nine-point accord altogether.

The actual text of the October draft was not made public, only Hanoi's summary, which Mr. Kissinger did not dispute. So without that draft, it was difficult today to make a

detailed comparison.

But the main provisions remained the same. The military sections called for an international supervised cease-fire, to be followed by the withdrawal of all American forces within 60 days, and the release of all American prisoners in the same period of time.

The new agreement also provided—as did the draft—for the

South Vietnamese to decide their own future, and for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the closing of foreign bases not only in South Vietnam but also in Cambodia and Laos.

Mr. Kissinger today listed the changes that were sought and achieved since Oct. 26.

He said the United States wanted the international control commission to be in place

at the time of the cease-fire to avoid last-minute efforts by Communist forces to seize territory.

Under the current agreement, he said, the international commission, as well as the four-party group made up of Americans and the three Vietnam elements, will meet within 24 hours of the cease-fire, with some forces will be in place within 48 hours, and the rest within 15 to 30 days.

The second goal, he said, was the desire for a cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia at about the same time as the one in Vietnam. The United States now expects the fighting in Laos and Cambodia to stop sooner than it would have had the accord been signed in October, Mr. Kissinger said.

Mr. Kissinger recalled the linguistic problem over the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and said it had been resolved.

"I pointed out on Oct. 26," he said, "that we would seek greater precision with respect to certain obligations, particularly without spelling them out as they applied to the demilitarized zone and to the obligations with respect to Laos and Cambodia. That, too, has been achieved."

He also claimed that the American effort—made public at his Dec. 16 news conference—to find some language that would make clear that the two Vietnams should live in peace with each other proved productive.

"We did not increase our demands after Oct. 26 and we substantially achieved the clarifications which we sought," he said.

Throughout Mr. Kissinger's news conference, he returned to the need for reconciliation and for the healing of wounds.

He said it was clear that "whether this agreement brings a lasting peace or not depends not only on its provisions but also on the spirit in which it is implemented."

"It will be our challenge in the future," he said, "to move the controversies that could not be tilled by any one document from the level of military conflict to the level of positive human aspirations and to absorb the enormous talents and dedication of the people of Indochina in tasks of destruction." He added:

"We will hope in a short time the animosities and the hatred and the suffering of this period will be seen as aspects of the past."