

# Joint Chiefs Toughened Nixon

Post 1/5/73  
By Jack Anderson

It was the Joint Chiefs, more than anyone else, who persuaded President Nixon to disrupt the momentum toward peace in Vietnam last October.

This is the word from sources close to the negotiations, whose access to all the relevant documents, nevertheless, has been limited. Few have seen all the paperwork relating to the Paris effort.

Henry Kissinger's surprise criticism of the launching of the negotiations has threatened privately to scuttle the full transcripts of the secret talks. But at a time when the President and Kissinger may withhold the transcripts from some of their closest advisers.

Other documents have been tightly restricted, and the Xerox machines have been monitored to prevent unauthorized copying. Our sources, however, have been able to reveal some of the hidden facts.

The 58-page draft agreement, which Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho hammered out in Paris last October, was approved at first by the President. He sent messages to North Vietnam's Premier Pham Van Dong, requesting only minor clarifications in the agreement and suggesting Kissinger might fly directly

from Saigon to Hanoi to add the final touches.

Not once in these messages did the President question the basic text of the draft agreement. The objections were raised after Kissinger sat down in Saigon with South Vietnam's President Thieu. Still, Kissinger was confident enough of a settlement that he made his famous "peace is at hand" statement on Oct. 26.

## Military Advice

But, meanwhile, the President was having some second thoughts about the draft agreement. Our sources say he was influenced less by Thieu, however, than by the Joint Chiefs.

For instance, Gen. Creighton Abrams, the Army chief, and Adm. Noel Gayler, the Pacific commander, began issuing direct secret warnings that the agreement would leave the survival of a non-Communist regime in grave doubt.

The Joint Chiefs urgently advised the President not to sign an accord with Hanoi at least until the Saigon regime received enough military supplies to defend itself. For once the agreement was signed, the U.S. couldn't furnish new equipment but only replacements.

Mr. Nixon agreed to hold off the signing and sent a cable to Hanoi, asking Premier Pham Van Dong for a postponement.

At the same time, the President ordered a massive airlift of supplies to Saigon. The shipments included hundreds of planes and helicopters, tons of arms and ammunition.

There had been verbal agreement in Paris that both the political and military status quo would not be changed in the South before the cease-fire. The North Vietnamese reacted by preparing for a resumption of fighting. School children were evacuated from Hanoi, for example, in apparent anticipation of renewed bombing.

In Paris, Le Duc Tho protested to Kissinger that the military shipments to Saigon violated their agreement and, therefore, withdrew the concessions that had been made earlier. Although the talks continued and progress was made, the Communists suddenly became difficult and kept reopening old issues.

## Ultimatum to Hanoi

Earlier, for example, they had agreed to the unconditional release of American prisoners within 60 days after the cease-fire. When they brought this up for renegotiation, the President angrily summoned Kissinger home.

He also sent another cable to Pham Van Dong, offering him a choice between bargain-

ing or bombing. The ultimatum gave Hanoi 72 hours to renew serious bargaining.

The President, meanwhile, reviewed the military contingency plans with the Joint Chiefs, who ordered preparations for the most massive bombing raids of the war. His strategy was not only to cripple Hanoi's military power but to demonstrate that Russia and China would not come to North Vietnam's rescue.

This was a gamble Mr. Nixon had taken last May when he ordered the mining of North Vietnam's harbors and the bombing of her supply lines. He correctly calculated that Moscow and Peking would not intervene. This would alarm the North Vietnamese and bring them to the truce table, he believed.

He decided to take the same gamble in December, demonstrating once again he could strike Hanoi a mortal blow without Russian-Chinese intervention. His purpose again was to compel the North Vietnamese to come to terms.

Throughout the bombing, he carefully kept his lines open to Hanoi, Peking and Moscow. Now Kissinger is ready to go back to Paris to put the finishing touches, if possible, to a Vietnam settlement.