

DEC 19 1972

Kissinger Version of Talks Raises Doubts in Paris

12/19/72
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Washington Post Foreign Service
PARIS, Dec. 18—Political observers in Paris are not buying Henry Kissinger's version pinning all the blame on Hanoi for the breakdown of the Vietnam peace talks.

There were simply too many seeming inconsistencies in Kissinger's performance Saturday, the observers here say, to accept his version, however well his remarks went down in the United States.

Moreover, Kissinger suggested that the modalities for policing an eventual cease-fire was a major complication causing the breakdown in the talks. But observers here are convinced that the real sticking point involved the so-called National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, a body

which theoretically is to be made up of equal numbers of Vietcong, Saigon and neutralist members.

Its mission, as vaguely defined by Hanoi in October,

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is to "activate" the cease-fire accord and help organize elections during the transition period.

South Vietnamese President Thieu has denounced the council as a disguised form of coalition government, a solution he has steadfastly rejected.

What stuck in Thieu's throat was the Vietnamese language description for the council. While in English it was innocuously described as an "administrative structure," in Vietnamese and

French it was called a "structure of power" suggesting the diminution of authority of the Saigon regime after a cease-fire.

So intense was his opposition that in November Thieu persuaded the United States to propose changes in the draft accord which cut out the neutralist third of its membership and vetoed the council's right to operate at the province, village and hamlet level.

Although Kissinger or members of his entourage last week leaked word that problems of South Vietnamese sovereignty were the main sticking point, observers here believe the question was posed in more practical and less theological terms than Kissinger has admitted then or since.

Nor do observers believe that the formal recognition of the demilitarized one Z nam is the serious an obstacle, especially in these days now separating the two Vietnams of increasingly good relations between the two Koreas and two Germanys.

Moreover, as almost everyone except South Vietnamese government members clearly recollects, the DMZ was set up as a temporary demarcation line in the 1954 Geneva Accords ending the French Indochina war. The DMZ, in fact, was supposed to disappear thanks to elections which the Geneva Accords stipulated should reunite the country in 1956.

Observers here are less impressed by Kissinger's complaint about ever changing Hanoi demands than the American public which apparently is not aware that much of North Vietnam's maneuvering has been dictated by radical new demands introduced by the United States in November on Saigon's behalf.

If rumors attributed to other members of Kissinger's negotiating team here are to be believed, the Americans are already looking for a scapegoat. And the rumors about State Department displeasure with Kissinger's "talented amateur" negotiations in early October is making the rounds of the Paris cocktail-diplomatic circuit.