

'Nixon Feels Pact Unjust' — Kissinger

SFXaminer
North Vietnam
Blamed for Delay

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WASHINGTON — (AP) — Henry Kissinger reported yesterday that the Vietnam peace talks have not yet produced an agreement "that the President considers just and fair." He blamed North Vietnam, which he portrayed as pursuing tactics of delay and sudden, inexplicable changes during the secret bargaining in Paris which broke off last Wednesday.

Kissinger still held forth the possibility of reaching an agreement in a short time, but overall his remarks created the impression that it would be later than Administration officials had speculated.

And he made it plain that President Nixon is prepared to override any remaining objections by South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu and sign a pact if he deems it meets U.S. conditions.

Kissinger Account

Kissinger gave his account of his sessions with Hanoi's Le Duc Tho to a crowded news briefing at the White House. His hour-long presentation marked the first public, authoritative U.S. version of the course of the secret parleys since they resumed Nov. 20.

When he last made such an appearance Oct. 26, Kissinger said he believed "peace is at hand" and said one more, brief negotiating session could produce an agreement to end the long war.

(Sen. George McGovern, the defeated Democratic presidential nominee, said later today that: "It is regrettable that the Administration in the closing days of the election campaign misled many people into believing that the war was virtually over")

"When Congress convenes next month I think we must look again to the possibility of congressional action to terminate any further American military involvement in Indochina.")

'No Charade'

In telling about continuing negotiating difficulties, Kissinger said the proposed agreement is 99 percent completed and the remaining 1 percent involves a fundamental point which he did not spell out.

He also held open another meeting with Tho, who currently is headed back to Hanoi.

But "the President decided we could not engage in a

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charade with the American people" by leaving an impression that the many meetings in Paris meant peace was imminent, he said.

"We will not be blackmailed into an agreement, we will not be stampeded into an agreement, we will not be charmed into an agreement whose conditions are not right," Kissinger continued.

"We are in a position where peace can be near, but peace requires a decision."

Initial Progress

He said substantial progress toward an agreement had been made during the first three days after his return to Paris Nov. 20 but then things changed suddenly.

"From that point on the negotiations have had the

character where a settlement was always just within our reach and was always pulled just beyond our reach when we attempted to grasp it."

He said he does not know "what decisions were made in Hanoi at that time" but suggested North Vietnamese motives could have included:

- Waiting for more differences to crop up between the United States and its South Vietnamese ally.

- Mounting further pressures on the U.S. negotiating position.

- Or perhaps North Vietnam simply could not decide just how it wished to proceed.

Hanoi Blamed

The holdup on the negotiations at this point thus involves Hanoi rather than Saigon, Kissinger said.

"If an agreement is reached that meets the stated conditions of the President, if an agreement is reached that we consider just . . . no other party will have a veto over our actions," Kissinger said in reference to Thieu's objections to the nine-point plan.

"But I am also bound to tell you," he said, "that today this question is moot because we have not yet reached an agreement that the President considers just and fair."

Kissinger reaffirmed Nixon's conditions for an Indochina settlement: release of the American prisoners, an Indochina-wide cease-fire, U.S. force withdrawal and a political solution for South Vietnam that is not imposed from outside.

'Different Interpretation'

He said that after the Oct. 26 announcement it became clear that the Communists were preparing to mount a massive military attack to start several days before the proposed cease-fire and to last for some weeks after. In addition, he said, North Vietnam's prime minister had implied a different interpretation of the proposed political solution

than indicated in the negotiations and Saigon raised objections.

He stated also that the United States "wanted some reference in the agreement, somehow, however allusive, however indirect, which would make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force.

"These seem to us modest requirements, relatively easily achievable."

Supervisory Force

While not specifying the one major point unresolved, Kissinger did say that the U.S. and North Vietnamese concepts of international supervisory machinery are "at drastic variance, and that . . . is an understatement."

The U.S. proposal would place several thousand international peacekeeping troops in the field to supervise the cease-fire, giving them freedom to move around in their inspection duties.

But Hanoi favored only a 250-man supervisory force, nearly half kept at headquarters, dependent for communications and logistics and physical needs entirely on the party whose area it is supposed to inspect, he said.

Kissinger said the North Vietnamese did not present their proposal on inspections until the evening of Dec. 12, the night that Kissinger was slated to return to Washington.

He said the North Vietnamese refused to put forward their propositions or discuss those of the American side before Kissinger was on the point of ending his Paris stay.

Issues Narrowed

On substantive changes, Kissinger said, the Paris sessions which resumed Dec. 4 after an eight-day break "began with Hanoi withdrawing every change that had been agreed to two weeks previously."

But by the end of the week the issues appeared suffi-

Mr. Tho had said that he had agreed with Mr. Kissinger that neither would say anything about the talks

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ciently narrowed to the point where Nixon ordered Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger's chief aide, back to Washington to be available for presenting the proposed agreement to America's allies.

"At that point we were presented with 16 new changes, including four substantive ones, some of which now still remain unsettled," he said, continuing:

"The major difficulty that we now face is that provisions that were settled in the agreement appear again in a different form in the protocols (diplomatic side-agreements spelling out details, such as on prisoners of war repatriation, etc.)

"And that as soon as one issue was settled, a new issue was raised."

The question of withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South is not directly addressed in the nine-point draft accord.

South Vietnam demands ouster of the North Vietnamese forces, while Hanoi does not publicly admit they are in the South.

Kissinger said the United States, claiming South Vietnam's concurrence, has not included a demand for North Vietnamese withdrawals from the South in Nixon's peace conditions going back to 1971. The United States is

not going to add it now, he said.

At the same time, he affirmed that Washington wants a stipulation of some kind against further North Vietnamese encroachment against the South by force.

"We cannot make a settlement which brings peace to North Vietnam but not to South Vietnam," he said.

"It was our conviction that if we were going to bring an end to ten years of warfare we should not do so with an armistice, but with a peace that had a chance of lasting."