

PRESIDENT MEETS WITH JOINT CHIEFS ON TRUCE ACCORD

Pentagon Leaders Are Said to Approve Projected Terms of Vietnam Settlement

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NIXON SEES THIEU AIDE

White House Says in Future Troop Cuts Will Not Be Announced Publicly

NYTimes

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 — The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the Southeast Asian situation with President Nixon today and told him, according to a well-placed Administration official, that they supported the terms of the projected settlement in Indochina now being negotiated with North Vietnam and being urged on South Vietnam.

Later, Mr. Nixon met again with Nguyen Phu Duc, the special envoy of President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam, and urged Saigon again to take a more affirmative attitude toward the proposals to end the Vietnam war, an official said.

Mr. Duc spent two and a half hours with Mr. Nixon last night and 35 minutes today. He then went to the State Department for lunch with top officials.

Troop-Cut Blackout

As discussions on the settlement plan continued, Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, said that no more public announcements would be made about American troop withdrawals from South Vietnam now that the level had fallen to 27,000 men.

Pentagon sources said that while there would be some slight reductions in coming weeks, the full force would not be withdrawn from South Vietnam until a final agreement was signed to end the war. Under the projected accord, the remaining American forces will

be pulled out within 60 days after a cease-fire. American prisoners would be released in the same period.

The agreement will not affect the 54,000 American airmen assigned to Thailand and the 60,000 aboard Seventh Fleet ships off the Vietnamese coast. It is understood that Mr. Nixon has told the Joint Chiefs that in case of flagrant violations of the cease-fire by North Vietnam, he would feel free to order retaliatory air strikes.

Kissinger Trip Due

The meeting with the Joint Chiefs, which was not announced until it was under way, was seen as a further effort by Mr. Nixon to insure that all loose ends are taken care of before Henry A. Kissinger, his chief adviser on foreign policy, returns to Paris on Sunday to resume talks on Monday with Le Duc Tho, the chief Hanoi negotiator.

The "signing on" by the Joint Chiefs for the projected settlement was viewed here largely as a formality. It is understood that the chiefs had been consulted individually, and had advised the President of their support, so long as American strength in Thailand and in the Seventh fleet was not diminished, at least in the initial stages of the agreement.

In the past, Presidents have sought the Joint Chiefs' agreement when a major diplomatic action was contemplated to dispel any possible criticism from conservatives in the United States, fearful of such an action's impact on American security.

Mr. Kissinger—who attended the meeting of the Joint Chiefs along with his deputy, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr.—was said to be confident that he

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was close to completing the agreement with the North Vietnamese,

One official said Mr. Kissinger believed that 95 per cent of an accord had been negotiated, while before the resumption of talks on Nov. 20 in Paris, only 90 per cent had been agreed to.

Most Administration officials have indicated that they believe the principal problems lie not so much with Hanoi as with Saigon. They said that the extended talks held by Mr. Nixon and his chief aides with Mr. Duc in the last two days had been useful in trying to make

clear to Saigon that an accord is inevitable, and that they must accept it in coming weeks or run the risk of losing American support.

From same story, as carried by SFChronicle 1 Dec:

in coming weeks, or run risks of losing American support.

A high administration official said that there has been discussion about a possible Nixon-Thieu summit meeting, but for the moment, Mr. Nixon believes that such a meeting would only be useful after a settlement is signed.

The official said that if a summit were held before it was signed, Thieu would appear as an American "stooge" if he accepted the accord and therefore, might be tempted to use such a summit to raise unacceptable objections.

The official said that if such a meeting was held before an accord was signed, Mr. Thieu, fearful of appearing as an American "stooge" if he accepted, might be tempted to use the meeting to raise unacceptable objections.

But following a signing, a meeting might be useful to build up Mr. Thieu's prestige and to discuss the future of Southeast Asia, the official said.

'Residual Force' Pledge

The White House decision against announcing any more troop cuts before a final accord is reached was consistent with Mr. Nixon's promise in the past to leave a "residual force" in South Vietnam until an agreement was achieved.

The highest level of American forces in Vietnam was 543,000 in April, 1969. But since the summer of that year, the forces have been reduced to levels announced ahead of time by Mr. Nixon. The last such announcement was on Aug. 29, when the White House said the level would drop from

39,000 on Sept. 1 to 27,000 by Dec. 1.

The principal problem to be negotiated in Paris next week, according to American officials, involves the Administration's request that North Vietnam agree in writing to a formula by which its forces in South Vietnam will be reduced in step with demobilization of Saigon's army. Hanoi, in return, has reportedly asked that the United States insure that Saigon release its thousands of political prisoners.

Administration officials say they believe final details can

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be worked out with Hanoi in Paris next week. Mr. Kissinger would then return to Washington, and probably go on to Saigon to put the draft before Mr. Thieu.

A high official said that the Administration's chief concern at the moment was to get Saigon's acceptance "in tandem" with the end of the Hanoi-Washington negotiations — a goal it believes can be achieved.

Times Report Is Denied

Special to the New York Times

PARIS, Nov. 30—North Vietnam's spokesman at the Vietnam talks here, Nguyen Thanh Le, today reiterated Hanoi's position that the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam had been established by the Geneva Accords of 1954 as a "provisional military demarcation line" and of no lasting political or territorial significance.

He spoke in commenting on a report in The New York Times today that Hanoi had agreed to accept the restoration of the demilitarized zone, breached by North Vietnamese troops in last spring's offensive.

Mr. Le also denied that Hanoi had agreed to a cease-fire for Laos and Cambodia, as Administration sources were reported to have told The Times. The spokesman said the problems of those countries must be settled by those countries themselves.

Asked about a third part of The Times dispatch, stating that North and South Vietnam would be free to receive virtually any weapons their allies could supply them, Mr. Le said that Hanoi stood by the text of the draft accord released last month.

The text limited shipments to "one for one" replacement of arms already in Vietnam.

Saigon Asks Direct Talks

Special to the New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Nov. 30—Tin Song, the quasi official Saigon newspaper, said today that South Vietnam and the communists should begin negotiating directly and do away with "go-betweens."

This has been suggested many times by the Saigon Government, but its reiteration seemed to indicate special uneasiness in the presidential palace.

The United States Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, met for fifteen minutes today with Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam. There was no indication what was discussed, but there have been reports that President Nguyen Van Thieu is trying to arrange a meeting with President Nixon.

Immediately afterward, Mr. Thieu called a meeting of his National Security Council, which includes Mr. Lam, Pre-Tran Thien Khiem and Hoang Duc Nha, Mr. Thieu's private secretary.

Tin Song, said in an editorial:

Communists must understand that they cannot reach any cease-fire accord without the agreement of the Republic of [South] Vietnam.

And they have the disadvantage of misunderstandings. The editorial also said: "The Communists want to retain these intermediaries, and if they reach a vague, unclear agreement, they can take advantage of it much more easily. The

"Go-betweens were only significant during the first period of the peace talks, when both sides wanted to settle their differences on the battlefield. Now, both sides want to solve their problems through negotiations. Intermediaries only waste time.