

NIXON BARS TRUCE FOR VIETNAM WAR TILL PACT IS RIGHT

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**Pledges to Sign Agreement
'Without One Day's Delay'
When Issues Resolved**

ASSURES ASIAN ALLIES

**Says Cease-Fire Won't Mean
a Disengagement From
That Part of World**

NYTimes

By **BERNARD GWERTZMAN**
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2—President Nixon insisted tonight that the draft agreement for a Vietnam settlement would not be signed until all remaining issues were solved.

In a televised campaign broadcast, Mr. Nixon declared that "we are going to sign the agreement when the agreement is right, not one day before—and when the agreements is right, we are going to sign, without one day's delay."

For the last week, since North Vietnam made public a summary of the terms of the

Rancor in Paris

At the Paris peace talks, the four delegates exchanged recriminations that reflected strains in both the American and the Communist alliances as well as the dispute over the draft cease-fire agreement. Details on Page 14.

draft agreement, the President's spokesmen have emphasized that another negotiating session was needed to put the accord into final form.

More Planes for Saigon

In another Indochina development, Administration sources disclosed today that the United States had decided to provide the South Vietnamese Air Force with hundreds of planes above previously planned levels as part of an attempt to coax President Nguyen Van Thieu to accept a modified cease-fire plan in the near future. [Page 15.]

President Nixon has told re-

cent visitors that they should not view the projected Indochina settlement as an American disengagement from that part of the world.

In conversations with the Premier of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and others, Mr. Nixon has stressed that he would seek to continue American economic and other assistance to Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam because he believed it was important to maintain non-Communist governments in Southeast Asia.

There would be great temptations for many Americans "to wash their hands" of Indochina, Mr. Nixon has said. But he has assured the Laotian leader and others that so long as he was President, the United States will not follow that course.

The President's views were made known today by reliable non-White House diplomatic sources.

In discussing the projected

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nine-point peace plan, Mr. Nixon has said that he has "no illusions" about North Vietnam, but believes that for a variety of internal and external reasons, Hanoi has decided to seek a respite from the war.

He has said that he does not question Hanoi's good faith in entering into the draft agreement, which still requires final negotiations and signing, but he has told visitors that this does not mean he trusts North Vietnam.

Because of this, he has decided to keep American air force units in Thailand and the United States Seventh Fleet units off the Indochina Coast, in case the cease-fire is rudely broken by Hanoi, he has said.

Meanwhile, the polemical war over the signing of the nine-point accord continued without letup. In Paris, at the regular session of the Vietnam talks, and through radio broadcasts, North Vietnam again condemned the Nixon Administration for seeking an additional round of negotiations instead of signing on Tuesday, as Hanoi said Mr. Nixon had pledged the United States would do.

Administration officials, who said they still were confident that Hanoi would agree to the session sought by Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's chief foreign policy adviser, nevertheless were privately voicing some irritation at Hanoi's statements.

"They are flogging a really dead horse," one official said. The President was reported by an aide to have told his staff before the Oct. 31 deadline

that he would not be "tricked or treated" into signing.

Officially, reporters were referred to the statement made in Paris today by the chief United States delegate, William J. Porter, at the 165th session of the Vietnam talks.

Mr. Porter, repeating the substance of what Mr. Kissinger said last week, asserted: "We believe that peace is near; and the remaining issues that require resolution or clarification can, we also believe, be settled quickly by effort and good will."

The prevailing view in the Administration is that Hanoi is under considerable pressure, both from domestic causes and from the Soviet Union and China, to reach a settlement.

Mr. Kissinger has acknowledged that Hanoi might have justification for believing that the United States had gone back on its word in not signing by Oct. 31. But the continued delay, officials here believe, is caused largely out of Hanoi's concern at not appearing to bow to American demands.

Oct. 22 Request Reported

According to Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon asked Hanoi on Oct. 22 for the additional negotiating session and left the choice of date and place to North Vietnam. No answer has been acknowledged by the Administration, although several officials have given the impression that Hanoi has in fact responded and that an actual date may be under discussion.

While insisting that Mr. Kissinger "has his bags packed"

and is ready to appear in Paris or anywhere else—except Hanoi—to negotiate the remaining differences with Le Duc Tho, the Hanoi politburo member, the Administration has not denied that it has used the delay to speed up deliveries of weapons to South Vietnam and to put pressure on President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam to change his hostile attitude to the draft agreement.

It is hoped here that by the time Hanoi agrees to the session with Mr. Kissinger, Saigon will have brought its attitude into line with Washington's, thereby avoiding a direct confrontation that would come if Hanoi and Washington reached a final agreement and Saigon still balked.

Timetable Outlines

Administration officials have said that Mr. Kissinger would need at least three to four days to conclude an agreement with Hanoi. Then he would have to go to Saigon for further talks with Mr. Thieu. It is even possible that messages with Hanoi would be exchanged.

This would mean, officials said today, that a final agreement, even in the best of cir-

cumstances, would be unlikely before the end of the month. It is even thought possible that Hanoi might wait until after next Tuesday's election before meeting with Mr. Kissinger.

There is virtually no one of stature in the Administration who has expressed doubt that an additional meeting will take place.

In recent weeks, the Admin-

istration has been giving extensive attention to the problems faced by Laos and Cambodia once a cease-fire went into effect in Vietnam.

Mr. Nixon met with Prince Souvanna last Friday and Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who also met with the Laotian Premier, spent an hour yesterday with Foreign Minister Long Boret of Cambodia.

Under the nine-point draft agreement, the United States must withdraw its armed forces from South Vietnam and pull out all military advisers and equipment from Laos and Cambodia. But the wording does not seem to rule out selling military equipment to Laos and Cambodia. Nor are there any prohibitions against supplying of economic aid to any country in Indochina.

Mr. Nixon, in his conversation with Prince Souvanna, said that he thought it important that the countries in the area use the cease-fire period to build up their political and military institutions to resist Communist control.

His emphasis on not wanting to "wash his hands" of Indochina was consistent with the Nixon doctrine, which calls for extensive American aid to Asia, even as American forces leave.

Canada Offers Services

Special to The New York Times

OTTAWA, Nov. 2—External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp today offered the services of Canada's 19-member delegation now in Vietnam to any international supervisory body set up after a truce is in effect.