

Hanoi: No More Negotiations Until Pact Is Signed

By Jonathan C. Randal 28 OCT 72
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PARIS, Oct. 27—A Hanoi spokesman said today that North Vietnamese negotiators would not meet Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger unless he decided to sign the peace agreement on Tuesday.

Over tea at the North Vietnamese headquarters, Nguyen Thanh Le seemed to ridicule Kissinger's assertions that anything remained to negotiate and told newsmen that "all the points Kissinger raised are taken care of in the agreement."

To buttress his case, Le brandished a full text of the

agreement in Vietnamese, apparently a 30- to 40-page document and said the version released yesterday was only a "resume."

With varying degrees of detail he also rebutted most of the "six or seven concrete issues" which Kissinger said yesterday required settlement before the United States will sign a final peace agreement.

In bantering fashion, Le made clear that Kissinger would be received by Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy, his two principal interlocutors in the secret negotiations, only if he returned to Paris with a clear mandate to sign the final agreement. "We insist on Oct. 31, the date set and agreed upon, for the signing ceremony here in Paris," Le said.

"On Nov. 1 or 2 after the signature," if Kissinger wanted "to discuss questions interesting to the two parties, I think the answer would be positive," Le said.

Observers noted that even that offer apparently was loaded, since in theory the questions Kissinger still wants to negotiate could be construed by Hanoi as inter-

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esting only Saigon, not Washington.

In the same bantering tone Le said, "if Dr. Kissinger is interested in meeting Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy on Oct. 31, the day of signature, I think Xuan Thuy or Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy pleased to meet him."

"If the date of signature is the 31st," Le continued, "then 'if' on the 30th Kissinger wants to meet Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy to drink champagne while awaiting the signature, I think the response would be positive."

Disclosing a series of what he called "secrets," Le went

into considerable detail to dispute Kissinger's claims that further negotiations were needed to clarify "linguistic" differences between the English and Vietnamese texts.

Kissinger, aided by Vietnamese language experts on his staff, had worked since September on the agreement's wording, Le said.

During Kissinger's four straight days of secret meetings here starting Oct. 8, much time was devoted to the texts. "The Oct. 11 meeting began at 9:30 a.m. and ended at 2 a.m. Oct. 12," Le said, "with experts translating into English and Vietnamese" as well as discussing "political and technical" questions.

The experts again worked on the text "in the afternoon and evening of the 12th," Le said.

"Finally from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. on Oct. 17," when the President's national security advisor flew back from Washington for a one-day stop before going to Saigon, Le said, "Kissinger and Xuan Thuy studied the text of the agreement chapter by chapter, article by article, sentence by sentence and word by word," he said.

Asked if he thought Kissinger lied in his news conference, Le replied "I think what I am saying is as clear as daylight and you can draw your own conclusions."

Continuing his point-by-point rebuttal of Kissinger's "unjustable pretexts to prolong the negotiations and the war," Le noted that the Presidential advisor had said "peace is at hand." "We say that peace is at end of a pen," he said.

Turning to Kissinger's misgiving about an international cease-fire inspection commission, Le said that the agreement covered in detail "its composition, its prerogatives and its func-

tions." "There is total agreement," he said, "no aspect has been left up in the air," in a word all questions dealing with (this commission) have been agreed."

He declined to spell out the details, however, and, somewhat ominously, he raised fears that the international supervision teams would not start working immediately after the cease-fire. He recalled that similar inspectors began work only a "month or two" after the 1954 cease-fire ending the French-Indochina war.

Although he declined to name the countries to be represented on the international cease-fire supervision commission, he said he thought the nations canvassed by the United States and North Vietnam "will answer the invitation with pleasure."

He also disclosed that the United States had proposed "several times" that the peace agreement be initialed in Hanoi, before its final signature in Paris.

Le thought that Paris would be "the ideal place" for the international conference which the accord stipulates should be called within 30 days of the cease-fire.

As for the powers of the tripartite National Council of Reconciliation and National Concord, Le sought to disarm Kissinger's fears that the treaty language could suggest that the body was a coalition government rather than an administrative entity.

South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu has charged that the council, to include Saigon, Vietcong and neutralist representatives, was a disguised coalition government which he has steadfastly rejected.

Le said the United States and North Vietnam had agreed on "all these questions—on the council's prerogatives, functions, work methods." But when asked if the council's decisions required unanimity or just a simple majority for implementation, Le said elusively that "naturally after signature you will know all these details."

Le also disputed Kissinger's contention that the Oct. 31 final signature date was a North Vietnamese suggestion. Rather, he said, the date was proposed by President Nixon himself in an Oct. 20 message to Hanoi Premier Pham Van Dong. Thus Kissinger would scarcely invoke any "misunderstanding" on this score, he added.

Le also disclosed that the Paris signing ceremony called for Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Hanoi Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to sign first. North Vietnam "will represent" the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government, and the United States will "represent" South Vietnam, he said.

The American, North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese and PRG foreign ministers would sign the document.

As proof of Hanoi's desire to get on with the negotiations, Le said that the Hanoi negotiators had proposed signing an agreement "at the end of September or early October."

Returning to his bantering tone in dealing with a new meeting with Kissinger, Le said that if Kissinger agreed now to sign on Tuesday, Le Duc Tho could return in time from Hanoi.

Le evaded a direct response when asked if the treaty stipulated how much money the United States had agreed to pay in reparations. He noted that the agreement's terms were "flexible and moderate." "It would be logical to demand U.S. help to heal the wounds and participate in the reconstruction of the North Vietnamese economy," he said, and added that President Nixon has promised American aid.

Kosygin Voices Hope For Quick Agreement

MOSCOW, Oct. 27 (AP)—Premier Alexei N. Kosygin told the envoys of North Vietnam and the Vietcong today that he hoped "the talks on Vietnam would be continued and lead soon the signature of an agreement ending the war," according to Tass.

The official Soviet government news agency said Kosygin received the diplomats—Vu Toan, charge d'affaires of the North Vietnamese embassy, and Cao Van Hung, head of mission for the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-