

End of story was either inadvertently not clipped, or there was none. Probably the latter, since the last column fits the end of the headline over the continuation.

White House Is Pressing Pentagon for Data on Truce

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eral substance of the give-and-take was ascertained in a series of interviews.

The following is a reconstruction of the dialogue:

Q. If there is a standstill cease-fire, in which North Vietnam agrees not to send any more reinforcements into South Vietnam, what are the prospects that southern forces can hold their own?

A. About 200,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong regular troops are in the South, compared with 1.1 million regular and regional South Vietnamese forces. The North holds much of the two northernmost provinces, plus pockets in the Ashau Valley southwest of Danang, along the central coast north of Quinhon, along the Laotian and Cambodian borders and in various spots in the Mekong River delta. From a strictly military point of view, if enemy forces were neither reinforced nor resupplied with major weapons and ammunition, South Vietnam would be able to handle small scrapes and even a sudden breakdown in the cease-fire.

Q. If Communist main forces generally respected the cease-fire, but fomented acts of terrorism and assassination against Saigon's representatives in the countryside, would the South be in a position to counter such trouble?

A. Conduct under a cease-fire could not be accepted on good faith alone. It would require policing by an international supervisory force of several thousand troops equipped with helicopters and good communications and free to move anywhere to censure willful violations. It would be difficult to prove that a killing was a political act rather than gangsterism or vengeance. South Vietnam might have to resort to counterterror if the other side mounted a determined covert war effort.

Providing Basic Services

Q. If, during an interim period in which the two sides negotiated a political settlement, there were two governmental entities in the South each governing the territory it now holds, could Saigon effectively provide the normal functions of police, schools, hospitals, mail, tax collection, open roads?

A. There would need to be free access for both sides on roads through territories

to endure world censure, by taking over Cambodia—which they could have done long ago but haven't so far, Cambodia should be "safe" for a while. So long as the cease-fire continues, the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia would have little impact on South Vietnam.

Q. While a temporary two-

government system prevailed in which each side governed those areas it clearly controls, what military problems might arise in contested areas?

A. This would present the single greatest threat to the viability of the cease-fire. Both sides can be expected to try, by fair means or foul, to extend from their areas into

contiguous contested areas. Extensive peacekeeping activity might hold down the number of incidents, but not eliminate them.

Q. If Hanoi agreed to withdraw some of its troops on some sort of proportional basis, South Vietnam demobilized a portion of its army, would this be verifiable and workable

White House Bids Military List Needs Under a Truce

NYTimes

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

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WASHINGTON, Oct. 20—The White House is pressing the Pentagon on an urgent basis for answers to a series of questions on the military requirements for an effective cease-fire in Indochina.

The question started about two weeks ago, during Henry A. Kissinger's intensive talks with North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris, according to Pentagon officials.

Previously, military planners had been routinely writing and rewriting contingency plans involving various kinds of truce arrangements.

State Department Queried

The questions range from an assessment of whether the South Vietnamese forces could handle a situation in which 200,000 enemy troops would remain for an extended period in their territory to how important an international peacekeeping force would be to maintain a cease-fire.

State Department sources said that related queries were directed at about the same time to William H. Sullivan, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and a handful of other Vietnam specialists.

While officials declined to disclose precise details of the White House questions, or the Pentagon's responses, the gen-

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