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# The Pressures On N. Vietnam

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ALTHOUGH THE North Vietnamese make their own decisions, they are apparently coming under growing pressure from the Chinese and Russians to reach an accommodation with the Nixon administration.

A key question at the moment, however, is whether the pressure from the Chinese and Russians will significantly prompt the North Vietnamese to accept the administration's proposals, or whether the Hanoi leaders will reject the advice of their Communist allies as they have in the past.

There is no evidence at this stage to indicate that Peking and Moscow have gone as far as to threaten to cut off their aid to North Vietnam. On the contrary, Chinese and Soviet supplies are pouring into North Vietnam in such abundance that, as a recent visitor to Hanoi noted, youngsters there have ample gasoline to fuel the Czechoslovakian-made motor bikes now beginning to proliferate around the city.

But according to a well-informed European who spoke with Premier Pham Van Dong a couple of weeks ago, the North Vietnamese leaders do not entirely trust their Communist allies. Thus they are becoming increasingly concerned by the prospect of finding themselves diplomatically isolated—as they were at the 1954 Geneva Conference, when the Chinese and Russians compelled them to concede to a partitioned Vietnam.

THE CHINESE interest in seeing a Vietnam settlement indirectly stems from their preoccupation with Taiwan, the island redoubt of Chiang Kai-shek's rival Nationalist regime.

In the final communique issued at the end of the President's trip to China in February, Mr. Nixon pledged to remove the U.S. military forces from Taiwan when the level of violence in the area had subsided. What this signified was that American troops on the island, most of whom are engaged in supplying Vietnam, would be withdrawn from Taiwan if peace could be achieved.

Since they are fundamentally more determined to acquire Taiwan than to help the North Vietnamese, the

Chinese have evidently been working to promote a settlement of the war.

This has been apparent in the way the Chinese have been encouraging the North and South Koreans to resolve their differences. Last July, in fact, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai hailed the opening of talks between North and South Korea as a model for Vietnam, saying that moves by peoples "to settle reasonably their mutual disputes have become an irresistible trend."

Similarly, the Russians are trying to talk the North Vietnamese into reaching a settlement, partly because their aid program to Hanoi is costly and partly because they fear that a continuation of the war could poison their relations with the United States.

THE RUSSIANS vividly indicated that they were not slowed that they were not about to sacrifice their relationship with the United States for the sake of Vietnam when they held their May summit meeting with President Nixon even though he had just mined the Haiphong harbor.

More recently, the Soviet leaders have been making it even more clear that they favor an end to the war on terms less than ideal for Hanoi. In a speech last week, for example, Soviet Premier Kosygin gave his rhetorical support for the Vietcong's latest proposals. Significantly, however, his statement underlined the need for peace rather than emphasizing Moscow's backing for a protracted war.

The present situation is a good deal more complex for the North Vietnamese than it was a few years ago, when the Chinese and Russians differed in their outlook toward the war. At that time, Peking favored a continuing conflict while the Kremlin advocated a compromise, and the Hanoi leaders were able to play one off against the other.

But now, in contrast, both the Chinese and Russians are effectively on the same wave length as the White House, and this parallelism could make it difficult for the North Vietnamese to try going it alone for a long time.