

## Nixon Blocked Plan To Kill Hanoi Hawks

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WASHINGTON — President Nixon has rejected some extremely rash proposals for bringing an end to the Vietnam war which have been submitted to him by advisers within and without the administration.

One of the most far out suggestions made to the President was that the United States government should encourage and assist South Vietnamese commandos or secret agents to assassinate the top "hawks" in the North Vietnamese Politburo.

This suggestion was made by a man who, while not a member of the administration, is frequently consulted by the White House and State Department on foreign policy matters and who played a prominent diplomatic role in World War II.

From talking with this man, who prefers to remain unidentified, his reasoning is as follows:

The North Vietnamese regime is known to be split between "doves" and "hawks."

The doves are believed to favor a peace settlement based on Nixon's offer of a cease-fire and withdrawal within four months thereafter of all American military forces in Vietnam, though the "doves" also assure that the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) will have one third representation in a new Saigon coalition government.

The "hawks" still believe that time is on the Communist side and that if they hold out long enough they will eventually gain control of the south. They are not prepared to settle for anything less than a coalition

government in Saigon in which the NLF would have dominant influence.

Intelligence reports indicate that the North Vietnamese people are fed up with the war and far more eager

# Plan to Kill Hanoi Top Reds Blocked

—From Page 1

for peace than for military conquest of the South.

They are badly hurt by the bombing and have suffered, since the war started, more than a million men killed out of a population of 21 million.

All available information indicates that it is the top "hawks" who are fanatically determined to continue the war until the Communists gain control, directly or indirectly, of a new, non-elected Saigon government.

The "hawks" are believed to include Le Duan, secretary-general of the North Vietnamese Communist Party; Nguyen Chi Thanh, who is reported to be in charge of the war in South Vietnam; Le Duc Tho, the chief negotiator in the Paris peace talks; Truong Chinh and Nguyen Duy Trinh, two powerful politburo members.

Surprisingly, General Vo Nguyen Giap, the military leader, and Premier Pham Van Dong are not considered to be extremely hawkish. They lean towards Russia and appear to be more moderate.

Elimination of the top "hawks" could, in the opinion of the man who suggested it to President Nixon, bring a quick end to the war.

Assassination of them would be less horrible than the continued murder of thousands of men, women and children in both North and South Vietnam through an indefinite continuation of the war.

President Nixon ruled out this idea — completely.

He is adamantly opposed to acts of terrorism and

would not allow the American government, or any of its services, to be a party to political assassination.

Another "option" the President ruled out was the idea of an Inchon-type landing by large South Vietnamese forces, backed by American air and naval support.

A contingency plan for such an operation exists in the Pentagon. The objective would be to cut North Vietnam almost in half by a landing south of Hanoi and Haiphong and a drive across the upper neck of the north from the coast to Laos, thus trapping the bulk of the North Vietnamese forces operating south of the one-time Demilitarized Zone.

Such an operation would involve a major escalation of the war. It would also involve the risk of precipitating Chinese "volunteer" intervention, especially if the North Vietnamese army collapsed and the South Vietnamese forces attempted to occupy Hanoi.

Vice President Spiro Agnew, in an interview with a Hearst journalistic team, excluded the likelihood of such an operation on "pragmatic grounds." He said he did not believe American public opinion would support continued military aid to a South Vietnamese government that resorted to aggressive action against the north.