

Excerpts From Thuy and Rogers

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 6 — Following are excerpts from interviews with Xuan Thuy, the North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris peace talks, and Secretary of State William P. Rogers as broadcast today on the Columbia Broadcasting System program "Face the Nation," and transcribed by The New York Times. Mr. Thuy, whose interview was taped Friday in Paris, spoke in Vietnamese and his remarks were then translated into English.

Mr. Thuy

I tell you at least twice President Nixon has broken peace engagements — first when he had the private meetings with Ambassador Cabot Lodge. Ambassador Lodge himself proposed to keep the meetings a secret but afterward, in November, 1969, President Nixon published these private meetings.

Second, when Special Adviser Kissinger had private talks with me and Mr. Le Duc Tho, Kissinger himself proposed that we should not communicate the substance of the meetings to any other Americans or any other third persons.

But we keep the promise and we did not divulge the secrecy. But now both President Nixon and Special Adviser Kissinger make public these private meetings.

The facts of publication of the substance of these private meetings constitute an obstacle to the negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem.

Terms Are Issue

It is a serious obstacle. The principal thing is now how the United States will settle the Vietnam problem, whether the settlement will be based on the respect of genuine independence and freedom of the Vietnamese people.

I know what the Nixon Administration wants now. It wants that the U.S. troops may be withdrawn from Vietnam but not totally.

It wants that the Saigon administration, that the United States created, remain there in power.

The seven points of the Provisional Revolutionary Government have won the support of the Soviet Union, of China, of all the countries, of the peoples throughout the world.

The two fundamental points of the seven points—that is, the points relating to the military questions and the political questions mentioned by the Provisional Revolutionary Government on Feb. 2, and presented to the Paris conference on Feb. 3—these two points have made recently the subject of a statement by the Government of China.

Criticism by China

In this statement, the Chinese Government criticized the eight points of President Nixon and supported the two points—the two clarifications — of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

The main problems to be settled is to know whether Mr. Nixon really wants a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, whether he will respond to the two legitimate demands of the Vietnamese people mentioned in the two points of clarification made by the Provisional Revolutionary Government on Feb. 2. I think I should explain to you that the two new points proposed by the Provisional Revolutionary Government contain many things new and flexible. Regarding the military questions, the Provisional Revolutionary Government now demands that the United States stop all air activity and other acts of war against the two zones of Vietnam.

And the United States should fix a specific date for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces as I have mentioned to you before—that is, all ground forces, air forces and naval forces—without leaving advisers, military personnel, armaments, war materials and without attaching any conditions to this withdrawal.

And President of the United States should now fix a period of time—six months, for instance, as President Nixon did—regarding the political questions. Now it is proposed that President Thieu should resign immediately and the Saigon administration should change its policy.

Charges Against Saigon

A change of policy means that the Saigon authorities should give up its war-like policy and stop its policy of terror, abandon its characters of repression, terror and oppression. It must disband the concentration camps and free all political prisoners and to apply to insure democratic liberties for all the people as provided for in the Geneva Agreement of 1954.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government is proposing that Nguyen Van Thieu should resign immediately. And any person who succeeds Nguyen Van Thieu in the Saigon administration without Nguyen Van Thieu should change its policy.

We put the question of prisoners within the military question. You should remember that this approach was advanced in 1971. And I would like to draw your attention that by that time it was our earnest desire to see Mr. Nixon rapidly settle the Vietnam problem peacefully. That is to say to withdraw U.S. forces and to change the Nguyen Van Thieu administration through the election of Oct. 3, 1971.

But Mr. Nixon refused to do that and, as you know, the election, the October election, listed one candidate. And now Nguyen Van Thieu is still in power. He is implementing the U.S. policy! he's served as an instrument for Mr. Nixon for the continuation of the Vietnamization of the war. That is the reason why the Provisional Revolutionary Government put forward the two clarification points.

[Here, Mr. Thuy was asked whether the setting of a date by the United States to withdraw its troops would bring the release of American war prisoners.]

You should realize the difference of the conditions in 1971 and the present conditions in 1972. As you realize after the Oct. 3, 1971, election in South Vietnam, the Vietnamese people understand still more clearly that Mr. Nixon's words and deeds do not match. There is contradiction between his words and his deeds.

Prisoners As Pawns

It is not we who use the prisoners as pawns. It is Mr. Nixon who uses the prisoners as pawns in the political aims. But we should wonder why Mr. Nixon still uses the political problems for his aims. Why does he not make a statement: Now we stop any commitments to the Saigon administration; we will stop any support to the Saigon administration, and we will no longer maintain this administration. And then the Vietnamese problems will be very rapidly settled — both military questions and political questions. And then all prisoners, all American servicemen, will go home.

... the list we originally published, you are aware of that already. But since then a number of other Americans have been captured because the war continues and sometime—in due time—we shall publish a list—we'll let you know. You can be in confidence that we highly value human beings, all the captured Americans, those who are wounded, we give them medical treatment. We do our best in our possibilities to treat them in a decent way.

... very recently, in a session of the Paris conference, Mr. Porter raised the question that North Vietnam was preparing for military offense in South Vietnam.

These statements by Mr. Porter—Mr. Rogers on Feb. 3 made the same statement—make me wonder whether it is the United States who is now conditioning opinion for launching some military adventures against the Vietnamese. As for us, we always want to settle the Vietnam at the Paris conference. And if now Mr. Nixon gives response to the two crucial points made by the Provisional Revolutionary Government, I firmly believe that a settlement can be rapidly reached.

Mr. Rogers

In every session that we had with the North Vietnamese, they made it clear that they would not talk about a military solution except in the context of an over-all political solution. So what Xuan Thuy has said is untrue.

We have in every opportunity pointed out that the North Vietnamese will not work out a military solution in the absence of an over-all political solution. It's

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quite clear that on every occasion they have said, in effect, we will not return your prisoners of war unless you overthrow the government in South Vietnam and work out all the other arrangements we insist on. In other words, they're using these prisoners as political hostages and there has never been any doubt about it and I would hope that the American people would finally conclude that that's true. I noticed this morning on the front page of the New York Times they point that out in an interview they had with Xuan Thuy. The New York Times sent a series of questions to North Vietnam and they responded to the effect that they would not work out a military solution except in an over-all political solution. So it is not possible for us to work out any military solution unless we in effect, give them exactly what they want.

And that would mean a total defeat for the United States.

It's not the Saigon regime that we're supporting. We're supporting the idea that the people in South Vietnam should decide themselves their future. That's the reason we're there to begin with. Now if we at this stage said we didn't care, we're perfectly prepared to have the Communists take over the Government of South Vietnam, and then it would mean eventually Laos and Cambodia, too, obviously; then our whole effort would have been for naught. We have fought this war, a long, tragic, difficult war for the United States with very good intentions. We don't want any territory. We don't want a permanent presence there. We just want to work out a solution so the people in South Vietnam can determine their future. And if the South Vietnamese people want a Communist government, we have said that's acceptable to us. But we're not going to, at this stage, just pull up stakes and get out and say to the Communists you go ahead and take it over, we're sorry about this whole thing.

Self-Determination Discussed

We're quite flexible on how we determine what the people want. They [Hanoi] talk about self-determination. What do they mean? How do you decide what the people of South Vietnam want unless you ask them. And we're quite flexible about how we do it. And when I say we, I mean President Thieu is quite flexible. He's prepared to have an electoral commission that includes all elements in the society including the P.R.G. He's prepared to resign. He's prepared to work out a fair election. How else do you decide what the people of South Vietnam want unless you ask them?

Communism doesn't really represent the will of the people, it represents the will of a small group of people that control the Communist party.

But they haven't made any suggestion at any time in the process, even to my knowledge, that did not lead to one conclusion, and that is, you get out, you overthrow the Government of South Vietnam and permit the Communists to control that whole area in Indochina — that's what they have in mind and they've never deviated from that.

Now if they have something else in mind, if there's some other way that they

know about to determine what the people of South Vietnam want, why don't they suggest it?

What they have said is that the only thing they want is total control of the government of South Vietnam. They have never made any other suggestion. Now you ask me, are we gloomy, is this a period of gloom? The answer is no.

Vietnamization Praised

We think the Vietnamization program is working well. President Nixon has succeeded in getting Americans out of the combat role. Our casualties are way down, we're going to continue to reduce.

So as far as the American troops are concerned, as far as our participation is concerned, President Nixon has brought this war to an end.

Now what he is trying to do now is to work out a fair solution to the problem of Indochina — not necessarily for the United States — but for the people of the area.

And we—we find that the other side is totally intransigent. Now the reason for that is that they have a feeling they can divide the American people. They are unsuccessfully militarily, they haven't been able to infiltrate South Vietnam the way they thought they could.

They haven't any international support to speak of. President Nixon's recent television address was acclaimed all over the world as a very reasonable basis for a solution to this problem.

So their last remaining hope is can they divide the American people. And one of the reasons that I'm here today and one of the reasons that President Nixon made his speech is we want to make it clear that we're not going to permit that.

President Nixon has made

a proposal that is as fair and reasonable as any proposal ever made by a nation like ours, including provision for rehabilitation of the area by a large amount of money. If we can't get negotiations started then we'll proceed through Vietnamization. We're trying to give the other side a fair and generous opportunity to work something out in a political way.

There's no doubt about the fact that they have tried to divide the American people — they did it in the election in '68 and I'm sure that they think they can do it again.

I am suggesting that under the Constitutional process the executive branch of the Government and the President and Secretary of State have responsibilities for negotiating with foreign governments.

And at a time when we have very sensitive negotiations going on, then I think it is incumbent on other branches of the Government to let us conduct those negotiations.

Now I'm not saying they shouldn't criticize us, but I'm saying as far as the negotiations are concerned it's obvious that if there are counter-proposals made by public figures that could adversely affect the negotiating process.

If that process can continue, and it's clear to the North Vietnamese that the American people are going to support the Government, then we have a chance to work out a negotiated settlement. They have not rejected the proposal as such, they haven't used that word. They've criticized it, obviously, and they will continue to criticize it.

But I think they feel that there are elements of that proposal which are—could be the basis for a negotiated settlement.
