From Nixon news conference 17 Feb 71 (transcript filed Nixon Administration 18 Feb 71):

I am not going to place any limitation upon the use of air power except, of course, to rule out a rather ridiculous suggestion that is made from time to time — I think the latest by Hans Morgenthau — that our air power might include the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

As you know, Mr. Lisagor, this has been speculated on for a period of five years and I have said for a period of five years that it is not an area where the use of nuclear weapons, in any form, is either needed or would be wise.

THE PRESIDENT: We will make this on the record today.

The mike is for the purpose of a transcription which will be available, I think, rather soon after we complete the conference because it will be run simultaneously by the stenographers.

Are there any questions which you want to ask?

## 1. Next Step in Indochina

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Q. Mr. President, the next logical step in Southeast Asia would seem to be South Vietnamese forces moving into the southern part of North Vietnam for the same reasons that they moved into the Lactian Panhandle. Would our policy rule out support for this type of move — ar support for all A. I won't speculate on what South Vietnam may decide to do with regard to a possible incursion into North Vietnam in order to defend their national security. However, I will restate our policy. I stated that policy on Nov 3 and have restated if at least nine different times publicly since the time.

I stated about the same may be are withdrawing our force time we are withdrawing our force time we are withdrawing our force that I if I found that the same may be a large up his activity shours and a large that would the same may be a large to deal with the new state of the same may be a large to this activity should be a large to the same and the same and the same and the same and the same against the south and the power against the south and a suppower and a suppower against the south and a suppower as a support for the south and a suppower as a support for the suppower as a support for the suppower as a support for the suppower as a suppower as a suppower as a suppower as a supp

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## 2. Limitations on Process

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Q. Mr. President in its that guide, is there any limit to that we might do to protect our forces in south Vietnam?

A. We have indicated several limits. For example, we are not going to use ground forces in Laby. We are not going to use advisers in Laby with the South Vietnamese forces we are not going to use ground forces in Cambodia or advisers in Cambodia, as we have previously indicated, and we have no intention, of course, of using ground forces in North Vietnam. Those are limitations.

Q. I had reference to our use of dir power.

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clude the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

As you know, Mr. Lisagor, this has been speculated on for a period of five years and I have said for a period of five years that it is not an area where the use of nuclear weapons, in any form, is either needed or would be wise.

As far as our air power is concerned, it will be directed a sunst — and I ought to be as precise as I was on Dec. 10 — against those military activities which I determined are directed against and thereby threaten our remaining forces in South Vietnam.

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(Original filed Nixon Administration)

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